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This study argues that, contrary to popular assertions of the Turkish 
party system as inexplicable or unpatterned or as the persistent manifestation of 
an essential socio-cultural cleavage, the historic operation of the Turkish party 
system in the national electoral arena has demonstrated both dynamic change 
and significant sets of patterns that illuminate the outcomes of electoral contest 
in different periods.  These can be traced through careful observation of the 
dimensions of competition and domains of identification operating in a 
contingent set of circumstances, the pattern of which I refer to as the political 
paradigm. One can best understand the behavior of the system, its parties and 
the electorate in elections by observing these paradigmatic patterns and the 
points at which they shift.  Dynamic change, thus, is intended to reflect the 
interactive nature of the party systems and the interdependent forces—
institutions, actors, structures—that combine and interact to bring about 
 iv 
significant shifts in the political paradigm—i.e. the contingent ―system of 
interactions,‖ a key component of the standard definitions of parties as systems. 
In the Turkish case, through the study of national campaign discourse, 
existing social and political research and national and provincial-level electoral 
data for general elections, one can detect four periods in which a distinctive 
paradigmatic pattern is in operation.  In the first period from 1950 to 1965, 
structural and institutional factors shaped the nature of multiparty politics such 
that the primary strategies for voter mobilization were various forms of patron-
client relationships and the exploitation of existing local social structures.  From 
1965 to 1977, parties began to utilize ideological imaging to frame both 
themselves and their opponents within the system of party competition while 
also mobilizing votes through the growing power of trade unions and machine 
politics in the large urban squatter communities.  After a three year period of 
military junta rule, multiparty politics and its accompanying paradigm beginning 
in 1983, guided strongly by the military, emphasized moderation, centrism and 
an aversion to ideology, and the selection of party was reduced to particular 
policies and the moderate appeal to service (hizmet) to the people while the 
political elites utilized rapidly expanding media technology to disseminate their 
appeal.  The success of the religiously-oriented Welfare Party in 1994 and 1995, 
initiating the final paradigm, was primarily the result of an anti-establishment 
party capitalizing on existing mundane strategies for voter mobilization, 
specifically providing effective governance at the municipal level which 
translated to ―vote banks‖ for the party in national elections.  This paradigm 
witnessed the importance of local governance, strong regional tendencies in 
 v 
voting behavior, and an increasingly identity-based element in campaign 
discourse, primarily set along a religious-secularist divide and entwined with a 
secondary Turkish nationalist versus Kurdish nationalist- pluralist pole. 
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ÖZET 
 
TÜRK SĠYASĠ PARTĠ SĠSTEMĠNDE PARADĠGMALAR VE DĠNAMĠK 
DEĞĠġKENLĠK 
Wuthrich, F. Michael 
Doktora, Siyasi Bilimi Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Metin Heper, Provost 
 
Mayıs 2011 
Bu çalıĢma, Türk parti sisteminin açıklanamaz olduğu ya da belli bir motif 
sergilemediği, veya sosyo-kültürel bir bölünmenin süregelen bir göstergesi 
olduğu gibi yaygın iddiaların aksine, Türk parti sisteminin ulusal seçim 
arenasında tarihsel iĢleyiĢinin hem dinamik değiĢkenlik gösterdiğini, hem de 
değiĢik dönemlerde seçim mücadelerinin sonuçlarını aydınlatan önemli motifler 
sergilediğini ileri sürmektedir. Bu motifler, benim siyasi paradigma olarak 
adlandırdığım, bağımlı tarihsel koĢullarda rekabet boyutlarının ve özdeĢleĢme 
alanlarının dikkatlice gözlemlenmesi ile ortaya konulablir. Seçim sisteminin, 
siyasi partilerin ve seçmenlerin seçim sırasındaki davranıĢları, en iyi, bu 
paradigmatik motifler ile bu motiflerin kayma noktaları gözlemlenerek 
anlaĢılabilir. Bu durumda, dinamik değiĢkenlik, birleĢerek ve etkileĢerek siyasi 
paradigmada – baĢka bir deyiĢle, partilerin sistem olarak tarif edildiği klasik 
tanımların anahtar unsuru olan bağımlı ―etkileĢim sistemleri‖nde – önemli 
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kaymaları meydana getiren, parti sistemleri ile bağımsız tesirlerin – kurumlar, 
aktörler, yapılar - etkileĢimini yansıtmayı amaçlamaktadır. 
Ulusal seçim kampanyaları söylemleri, varolan sosyal ve siyasi 
araĢtırmalar ve genel seçimler için ulusal ve vilayetler düzeyindeki seçim 
verilerinin incelenmesi sonucu, Türkiye örneğinde, belirgin bir paradigmatic 
motifin iĢlediği dört dönem saptanabilir. 1950’den 1965’e kadar süren birinci 
dönemde, yapısal ve kurumsal etkenler çok partili siyaseti öyle 
biçimlendirmiĢlerdir ki, seçmen mobilizasyonu içn kullanılan öncelikli 
yöntemler çeĢitli patron-yanaĢma bağları ve varolan yerel sosyal yapıların 
istismarı olmuĢtur. 1965’den 1977’ye kadar olan dönemde, partiler, geniĢ kent 
gecekondu topluluklarında sendikların büyüyen gücü ve seçmenlere menfaat 
dağıtılmasını öngören parti politikası aracılığı ile oy toplarken, hem kendilerini, 
hem de parti rekabeti sistemi içerisindeki rakiplerini tanımlayacak ideolojik imaj 
oluĢturmadan yararlanmıĢlardır. Üç yıllık askeri yönetimden sonra, 1983’te 
baĢlayan çok partili siyaset ile ona eĢlik eden, ve ağırlıklı olarak ordu tarafından 
yönlendirilen paradigma, ılımlılık, merkezcilik ve ideolojiden sakınmayı 
vurgulamıĢ ve parti seçimi, siyasi seçkinler, politikalarını duyurmak için hızla 
geliĢen medya teknolojisinden yararlanırken, belli baĢlı politika seçimlerine ve 
partilerin insanlara hizmet etme söylemlerine indirgenmiĢtir. Son paradigmaya 
ön ayak olan, din-yönelimli Refah Partisi’nin 1994 ve 1995’teki baĢarısı, temel 
olarak, düzen karĢıtı bir partinin varolan sıradan seçmen mobilizasyonu 
stratejilerinden, özellikle de, ulusal seçimlerde parti için ―seçim bankası‖na 
dönüĢen belediye düzeyinde etkili yönetim sağlamak yönteminden 
yararlanmasının bir sonucudur. Bu paradigma, yerel yönetimin önemine, seçmen 
 viii 
davranıĢında güçlü bölgesel eğilimlere, ile temel olarak dinci-laik ekseni 
doğrultusunda Ģekillenen ve ikincil olarak Türk ulusalcı’ya karĢı Kürt ulusalcı-
çoğulcu karĢıt uçlarıyla çevrelenen ve kampanya söyleminde önemi gittikçe 
artan, kimlik-bazlı unsurlara Ģahit olmuĢtur. 
 
 
 ix 
 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
 
 
I would first like to thank my dissertation advisor, Professor Dr. Metin 
Heper, whose timely and detailed assistance and guidance were critical to the 
development of this work.  His willingness to take on another advisee despite 
his incredibly packed work-load and his detailed and excellent feedback on the 
work in progress demonstrated once again his character of going above and 
beyond the call of duty.  I will always be grateful for the superb assistance, 
guidance and encouragement that I have received from him. 
The development of this work has also profoundly benefited from the 
input, feedback, and guidance of my other committee and jury members.  I 
would like to thank Prof. Dr. Ergun Özbudun and Prof. Dr. Sabri Sayarı for 
there willingness to come in from Istanbul to provide face-to-face feedback on 
my work as it was developing.  Their feedback, observations, suggestions 
proved to be extremely poignant and very useful in guiding me while I 
developed this work, and I appreciate the encouragement and attention that they 
paid this young scholar-in-process.  Assistant Prof. Dr. Ioannis Grigoriadis and 
Assistant Prof. Dr. Aida Paskeviciute Just, though their official role as jury 
member put them at the end of the process, their suggestions, observations and 
encouragement were a tremendous help, not only for the dissertation but also as 
 x 
I consider further developments for a book project.  I am very grateful to them 
for the very important contributions that they have made. 
I would also like to thank the Bilkent Political Science Department for 
giving me the incredible opportunity of doing my PhD here, and I am grateful 
and will never forget all the great instruction I received from my instructors in 
the PhD program, both in and out of the classroom context: Prof. Dr. Metin 
Heper, Assistant Prof. Dr. Esra Çuhadar-Gürkaynak, Assistant Prof. Dr. Saime 
Özçürümez-BölükbaĢı, Associate Prof. Dr. Alev Çınar, Assistant Prof. Dr. 
Nedim Karakayalı, Prof. Dr. Ergun Özbudun, Prof. Dr. Torsten Selck, Assistant 
Prof. Dr. James Alexander, and Assistant Prof. Dr. Zeki Sarıgil.  While the 
quality of education within class was excellent and as much as one could hope 
for from a quality PhD program, the additional guidance, support, kindness and 
instruction that continued throughout my three years in the program is 
something that I will also be deeply grateful for. 
I would also like to express sincere thanks to my fellow classmates and the 
other PhD students and candidates who were sojourning with me.  Not only 
were my classmates my academic peers, as we progressed through the program 
together, I found myself surrounded by dear friends who had become like 10 
very wonderful brothers and sisters thousands of miles from my original home.  
So I would like to thank my Turkish syblings: Murat Ardağ, Deniz Uğur, Duygu 
Öztürk, AyĢenur Kılıç, Emine Bademci, Deniz Yetkin, Bahadır Dinçer, Mehmet 
Yeğin, and Banu Arslan.  Many of these poor souls had to put up with my 
endless ramblings about the Turkish party system, and they did so with great 
patience.  Beyond my classmates, I have come to find dear friends among my 
 xi 
fellow PhD students and candidates, and I would like to send a special thanks to 
my final office mate, GülĢen Seven, who not only put up with my incessant 
babling about electoral politics, but also wrote the brilliant translation of my 
abstract into Turkish, for which I am greatly indebted.  I would also like to thank 
Gökhan Güler, fellow student and Air Force Major Nedim Karabulut, and 
Volkan Ġpek for their kind support, help and friendship along the way.  Beyond 
this, I would have to go through nearly the entire list of Political Science PhDs 
to cover all the people I should list and who have shown great kindness and help 
to me along the way.  Some were former students of mine from my previous 
career, and these have to have credit for instilling in me the desire and 
enthusiasm for studying political science.  Those classes of students that 
followed my class in years also proved to be great friends.  I would like to thank 
all of these dear friends for their kindness and friendship toward me, and they 
have made leaving such an environment the bitter side of a major 
accomplishment. 
I would also like to express my deep gratitude for a number of people who 
provided critical help to me by freeing up my time so that I could focus on my 
dissertation and finish it within the time needed.  Primary among these is my 
mother-in-law, Kathy Mosier, who flew across the ocean and provided six 
weeks of critical support and babysitting when we were without a nanny.  This 
was a terrific personal sacrifice for which I will always be extremely grateful.  I 
would also like to thank Beth Prochaska, Elizabeth Pullen and Christy Randl for 
volunteering to watch our daughter, Maya, at numerous points so that I could 
 xii 
work.  There is no way that I would have finished even close to the time that I 
did without the help of these saints. 
Finally, I would like to thank my family for the love, support and 
encouragement that they provided me during this process.  I would like to thank 
my mother and father-in-law, Kathy and Dr. Stan Mosier for both emotional and 
very tangible support that they provided along the way.  I would like to 
particularly thank my parents, Fred and Jacky Wuthrich; much of my 
accomplishments in life have their handprints on it.  Their personal modeling of 
irreproachable work ethic in their careers, the intangible values within which 
they raised me, and their tireless love, support and encouragement have a lot to 
do with my own personal success and accomplishments.  I owe them more than 
a lifetime of gratitude. 
I owe a very special thanks to my wife and very best friend, Aimee.  She 
has tirelessly stood behind me and undergone much difficulty to ensure that I 
completed this dissertation and PhD.  It was also she who at some point in the 
winter of 2007/2008 sat down with me and insisted that I pursue a PhD, and she 
even bought a preparation book for the GRE for me.  The sacrifices and love 
that she has shown me throughout this process has known no bounds, and I can 
never repay her for all that she has done to help me see this through to the end.  I 
would also like to thank my little one and a half year old daughter, Maya, for 
providing me with necessary diversions from my dissertation and with hundreds 
of extra smiles and laughter that put the whole of my work in its proper 
perspective. 
 xiii 
Finally, though it might not fit into the ―modern‖ and ―scientific‖ narrative 
of some, I would like to thank the Lord, who, I am convinced, led me to such a 
wonderful place as Turkey and Bilkent University, gave me the opportunity to 
pursue doing something that I love, and endowed me with the abilities needed to 
accomplish the task.  It is to the Lord that I dedicate whatever is praiseworthy in 
this work.  May my endeavors at excellent scholarship and my behaviors toward 
others always display God’s character. 
 
 xiv 
 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
ABSTRACT  .......................................................................................................iii 
ÖZET ...................................................................................................................vi 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ...................................................................................ix 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ..................................................................................xiv 
LIST OF TABLES ...........................................................................................xvii 
LIST OF FIGURES ...........................................................................................xix 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION.........................................................................1 
1.1 Context of the Study and its Case............................................................1 
1.2 Previous Approaches to the Turkish Party System..................................9 
1.3 An Outline of the Argument in this Study.............................................19 
1.4 Methodology..........................................................................................35 
1.5 Final Note on Research Paradigms in Previous Studies.........................38 
CHAPTER 2: POLITICAL CULTURE AND THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IN 
TURKEY.......................................................................................................44 
2.1  Conceptualizations of Political Culture and their Relevance.................45 
2.2  ―Nation Party‖ Culture and the Turkish Party System...........................53 
2.3  Intraparty Leadership Structure and the Turkish Party System.............69 
2.4  Electoral System Change and the Party System in Turkey....................75 
2.5 Conclusion...............................................................................................87 
CHAPTER 3: VOLATILITY, FRAGMENTATION, AND POLARIZATION: 
MEASURING CHANGE..............................................................................89 
3.1 Volatility in Comparative Literature and in Turkish Electoral 
Behavior..................................................................................................93 
3.2 What Fragmentation of the Votes in Party Systems can Tell us...........104 
3.3 Ideological Polarization and Other Polarizations in Turkish Politics...113 
 xv 
3.4 Conclusion.............................................................................................120 
CHAPTER 4:  ESSENTIAL HISTORICAL CLEAVAGES AND THE 
TURKISH PARTY SYSTEM.....................................................................123 
4.1 Theoretical Underpinnings of ―Center and Periphery‖.........................127 
4.2 An Explanative Center-Periphery Cleavage in the Turkish Party System? 
...............................................................................................................139 
4.3 Conclusion.............................................................................................156 
CHAPTER 5: POSITIONING, INTERACTION AND THE TURKISH PARTY 
SYSTEM.....................................................................................................161 
5.1 Left-Right Linear Descriptions and Giovanni Sartori...........................163 
5.2 The Left and Right in the Turkish Party System...................................169 
5.3 Relational Change and Party Competition—Structure and Agency.....181 
5.4 Conclusion.............................................................................................192 
CHAPTER 6: THE INITIAL PARADIGM – 1950-1965.................................195 
6.1 The Context of Initial Multiparty Competition.....................................199 
6.2 The General Trends of the Period.........................................................206 
6.3 Dimensions of Competition...................................................................209 
6.3.1 National Campaign Discourse......................................................209 
6.3.2 Non-Discursive Electoral Strategies..…………………………..232 
6.4 Domains of Identification…………………………………..…………252 
6.5 Conclusion…………………………………………………………….254 
CHAPTER 7: THE IDEOLOGICAL IMAGING PARADIGM – 1965-1980 
…………………………………………………………………………….260 
7.1 The Context of the Period…………………………………………….263 
7.2 Dimensions of Competition…………………………………………..274 
7.2.1 National Campaign Discourse…………………………………..274 
7.2.2 Non-Discursive Campaign Strategies……………………..……290 
7.3 Domains of Identification……………………………………………..300 
7.4 Conclusion…………………………………………………………….301 
CHAPTER 8: THE NATIONAL CENTER PARADIGM – 1983-1991….….305 
8.1 The Context of the Period…………………………………………….309 
8.2 Dimensions of Competition…………………………………………...322 
 xvi 
8.2.1 National Campaign Discourse…………………………………..322 
8.2.2 Non-Discursive Campaign Strategies………………………..…334 
8.3 Domains of Identification……………………………………………..348 
8.4 Conclusion…………………………………………………………….350 
CHAPTER 9: THE CULTURE-IDENTITY PARADIGM – 1995-2007….....353 
9.1 The Context of the Period: The Rise of the Welfare Party………...…357 
9.2 Dimensions of Competition…………………………………….……..370 
9.2.1 National Campaign Discourse…………………………………..370 
9.2.1.1 Religion-Secularism Axis....................................................370 
9.2.1.2 Left-Right and Center Imaging...........................................384 
9.2.1.3 Nationalist Discourse..........................................................392 
9.2.1.4 Economy, Corruption and ―Hizmet‖...................................400 
9.2.2 Non-Discursive Campaign Strategies..........................................403 
9.3 Domains of Identification and the Emergence of Regional Party 
Systems...............................................................................................410 
9.4 Conclusion.............................................................................................420 
CHAPTER 10: CONCLUSION........................................................................360 
10.1 The Relevance of this Work for Individual Case Studies of Party 
Systems..................................................................................................424 
10.2 Interactive Principles of the Turkish Party System, 1950-2007..........428 
10.3 Conclusion...........................................................................................438 
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY..............................................................................440 
 xvii 
 
 
 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
 
 
1. Electoral Volatility .................................................................................96 
2. Voting Bloc Patterns ............................................................................103 
3. Measures of Fragmentation ..................................................................105 
4. Electoral Trends of the Period (1950-1965) .........................................207 
5. Political Parties of the Paradigm in General Elections at a Glance (1950-
1965) .....................................................................................................211 
6. Particular Election ―Shapers‖ in 1950-1965 General Elections ...........232 
7. Correlations of Party Support with Development and Regions ...........243 
8. Regional Volatility from 1950-1965 ....................................................248 
9. Regional Effective Number of Parties from 1950-1965 ......................248 
10. Party Support by Development and Region, 1950-1977 .....................262 
11. Political Parties of the Paradigm in General Elections at a Glance (1965-
1977) ....................................................................................................270 
12. Electoral Trends of the Period (1965-1977) .........................................283 
13. Regional Effective Number of Parties, 1965-1977 ..............................283 
14. Particular Election ―Shapers‖ in 1965-1977 General Elections ...........290 
15. Changing Fortunes of the CHP in Large Industrial Centers ................294 
16. Regional Variation in Voting Behavior Comparison ...........................308 
17. Electoral Trends of the Period (1983-1995) .........................................308 
18. Political Parties of the Paradigm in General Elections at a Glance (1983-
1991) .....................................................................................................324 
19. Particular Election ―Shapers‖ in 1983-1991 General Elections ...........333 
 xviii 
20. The Changing Regional Fortunes of the SHP ......................................347 
21. Electoral Trends of the Period (1995-2007) .........................................370 
22. Major Political Parties of the Paradigm in General Elections at a Glance 
(1983-1991) ..........................................................................................371 
23. Religious Discourse in Elections for the Major Parties .......................374 
24. Nationalist Discourse by Major Parties from 1995-2007 ....................392 
25. Particular Election ―Shapers‖ in 1995-2007 General Elections ...........403 
26. AKP National Election Fortunes in Relation to 2004 Local Election ..407 
27. Regional Patterns of Party System Electoral Competition ...................415 
 xix 
 
 
 
 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
 
 
1. Interactional Elements of a Political Paradigm ......................................23 
2. Percentage of Vote by Top Two Parties in Turkish National Elections 
.................................................................................................................25 
3. Fragmentation away from Two-Party System ........................................82 
4. The Fifteen Highest and Lowest Average Vote Totals by Province for 
the CHP (1950-1957) ...........................................................................147 
5. The Fifteen Highest and Lowest Average Vote Totals by Province for 
the CHP (1969-1977) ...........................................................................154 
6. The Highest and Lowest Average Vote Totals by Province for the 
―Center Left‖ (1950-1957) ...................................................................154 
7. Left-Right Diachronic Comparison ......................................................178 
8. Classic ―Center-Periphery‖ Electoral Cleavage ...................................239 
9. Cross-Cleavage Competition for Peripheral Votes ..............................239 
10. Two Forms of Patron-Client Relations for Political Mobilization .......241 
11. Two-Pronged Campaign Attack (1987-1991) ......................................334 
 
 1 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
 
 
Only careful historical, sociological, and political analysis 
 can do full justice to the distinct qualities of any given political system.
1
 
 
Few would dispute the proposition that the Turkish political party system in 
the electoral arena is a complex case.  Consider that in 2002, in a spectacular 
reversal of fortunes, a party that received a plurality of votes in the previous 
election (22.2 percent) in 1999 managed to accumulate only 1.2 percent of the 
vote, leaving itself beneath the required 10 percent threshold and, thus, along with 
all the other incumbent parties, outside of parliament. In the same election, a party 
slightly more than a year old garnered 34.3% of the vote.  In 1983, every party 
running for election was a party previously untested in elections.  The party of the 
founder of the Turkish Republic—Mustafa Kemal Atatürk—the Republican 
People‟s Party (CHP), has in one election received up to 41.4 percent of the vote 
and as low as 8.7 percent in another; it has been banned from politics, arguably in 
the name of Atatürk,2 its spirit has existed through another party (the SHP), and it 
has returned with its old name and is currently the leading party of the opposition 
                                                          
1
 Hans Daalder, “Party Elites, and Political Developments in Western Europe,” in Joseph 
Lapalombara and Myron Wiener, eds. Political Parties and Political Development (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 67. 
2
 The military‟s intervention on 12 September 1980 was carried out with the expressed aim of 
preserving the essential values and unity of the Turkish Republic as entrusted to the people by 
Atatürk. 
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taking in 20.9 percent of the vote in the last general election in 2007.  These are 
just some of the examples of a system that has been described as exhibiting an 
extreme amount of electoral volatility.
3
  While this observation is undoubtedly 
accurate, one must also not forget that in the early 1960s a student of Turkish 
politics observed, “[The] consistent voting pattern is the major factor in Turkey‟s 
political life today.”4  And he seems to express the existence of this stability with 
a sense of foreboding.   
We should add to this portrait a number of other significant complicating 
factors.  After the initiation of a multiparty system led by İsmet İnönü in 1945, 
and beginning in earnest with the Democrat Party in 1946,
5
 the military has 
intervened and punched the “reset” button on democratic, electorally-mandated 
governance three times, two of which involved ushering in new constitutions (in 
1961 and 1982) and one (in 1971) that amounted to a reset with only amendments 
to the existing constitution.
6
  In each case, after a relatively short amount of time 
and with the declared intention of “re-equilibrating” the democratic system as 
deemed appropriate by the military, there was a return to multiparty politics.  In 
terms of the operating (electoral and party rules, etc.) and relational structure 
                                                          
3
 Sabri Sayarı, “Towards a New Turkish Party System?” Turkish Studies, Vol. 8, No. 2 (2007), p. 
200; Ergun Özbudun, “From Political Islam to Conservative Democracy:  The Case of the Justice 
and Development Party in Turkey,” South European Society & Politics, Vol. 11, No. 3/4 (2006), 
p. 555. 
4
 Joseph Szyliowicz, “The Political Dynamics of Rural Turkey,” Middle East Journal, Vol. 16, 
No. 4 (1962), p. 431. 
5
 The Democrat Party was not the first political party to usher in the multiparty period.  The first 
was the National Development Party (Milli Kalkınma Partisi) founded by Nuri Demirağ in July of 
1945.  By “in earnest” I am saying that the Democrat Party was the first party with the 
organizational structure and support to be a serious threat to the Republican People‟s Party. 
6
 It is also true that in 1997, the military along with elements from civil society pushed a 
government out of power and, ultimately, brought about the closure of the party; undoubtedly, this 
too affected the political system, but it was a much softer intervention into the system than the 
earlier three events were. 
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(issues/positions parties can/cannot take in relation to other parties) of the party 
system, the military has certainly been a confounding factor—the influence of 
which is the primary explanation of the nature of the 1983 general elections, for 
instance.   
The military is not the only group, however, that has attempted to tinker 
with the electoral system; governing parties have, from time to time, also played a 
part in restructuring the electoral rules of the game. Such tinkering, in certain 
instances, could be chalked up to attempts to stabilize and consolidate Turkish 
democracy (primarily by the military), but it has also been a means for short term 
gain (usually the apparent intent of governing parties); in both cases, the 
manipulation of the electoral system has often had effects on the interaction of the 
party system, even if it was not the change in electoral law itself that generated 
the change.  The environment associated with the electoral changes has often, 
perhaps paradoxically, been more predictive of electoral outcomes than the 
changes themselves.   
While the picture is indeed complex, the well-known comment by 
Frederick Frey in his seminal work on Turkish politics elites—“Turkish politics is 
party politics”7—essentially remains as true today as when it was penned in 1965.  
One is hard-pressed to find an effective vehicle for the representation of the 
interests of the people in the realm of government in Turkey outside the domain 
of political parties and the party system. Therefore, in the midst of such 
complexity, because of its prominent place in the operation of Turkish politics 
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 Frederick Frey, The Turkish Political Elite (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1965), p. 301. 
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and democracy, the onus falls on students of the party system in the electoral 
arena
8
 to try to understand and explicate it, ideally illuminating patterns in such a 
way that its general portrait is both simplified to increase understanding yet able 
to capture shifting dynamics in such a way as to anticipate and explain change.  In 
order to accomplish this, several considerations seem particularly relevant:  
distance, tools, and assumptions.  By distance, I am referring to one‟s 
metaphorical distance from the system—i.e. the position of distance from which 
one observes the action and interaction of the system.  Varying distances have 
distinct advantages.  In the context of political research, if your intention is 
comparative and nomothetic, to get a broad picture of trends and make 
generalizations applicable in a vast array of cases, greater distance is necessary. 
Maintaining such a distance, however, while convenient and parsimonious at the 
comparative level, would greatly limit what one is able to glean from a particular 
case.  Conversely, a lack of distance that results in a plethora of detail could also 
have clear drawbacks that would inhibit “seeing the forest through the trees,” so 
to speak.  Arguably, even when one‟s focus is the description of a particular case, 
it seems prudent to position oneself in such a way as to be able to observe the 
particular dynamics at work in the system, and yet be far enough away to be able 
to detect patterns and trends occurring at the case level.  Some distance allows the 
student of the system, rather than just providing unframed details or observed 
                                                          
8
 Bardi and Mair, in suggesting the parameters of approach toward studying party systems, argue 
that party systems behave and are structured differently depending on their context, and thus, that 
studies of party systems could be beneficially limited to specific arenas, such as electoral, 
governmental, or parliamentary arenas.  Though there is overlap between these, certainly, it would 
indeed help precision of analysis to specify a particular arena and focus one‟s attention 
accordingly.  Thus, this study will analyze the party system as it has operated in the electoral arena 
from 1946-2009.  See Luciano Bardi and Peter Mair, “The Parameters of Party Systems,” Party 
Politics, Vol. 14, No. 2 (2008), pp. 154, 156-7. 
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behaviors, to explain behavior and perhaps, to some extent, make predictions.  If 
one is trying to understand one particular system as a whole, such a mid-range 
position seems to optimize the observation.    
Likewise, the tools—the language, methods and application of existing 
theory—that one chooses to appropriate also become crucial in maximizing the 
observation.  Nowhere is this more obvious than with the language of description.  
The descriptors one uses to delineate a system can greatly hamper understanding 
if such descriptors are intended for different purposes or contexts.  Certain 
descriptors are the tools of particular distances that operate only very roughly 
from locations other than what was intended.  Fitting the Turkish case in such 
conceptual frameworks can be of great benefit if the intent is to integrate Turkey 
into a broad study of other systems, but it is of little explanative value when 
examining the individual case. Methods may also be extremely reliable but fall 
short in terms of logic and validity when applied to a specific case, as they, like 
descriptors, are derived for certain distances, contexts, or purposes.  Although 
quantification and statistics can be very useful, as Sartori has warned, an 
uncritical reliance on such methods could be “in fact driving us into a march of 
either false precision or of precise irrelevancy.” 9   Methods utilized and the 
comparative theories exploited must be carefully chosen so that their intrinsic 
logic harmonizes with the study at hand. 
Finally, the assumptions one lays as the cornerstone for study of a 
particular system is also of critical import.  If one begins with an assumption of 
                                                          
9
 Giovanni Sartori, “Where is Political Science Going?” PS: Political Science and Politics, Vol. 
37, No. 4 (2004), p. 786. 
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stability where, in fact, change is the norm, or vice versa, it will confound the 
intention to explicate.  Furthermore, if one relies on a paradigm that assumes 
established and rigid structures that pre-dominantly determine the course of 
political events or on one that places decisive political elites as actors on a white 
background—i.e. which marginalizes the framework within which an actor is also 
acted upon and provided with opportunities and constraints—one‟s picture of the 
system will arguably miss very significant dynamics that are in operation and 
shape and are being shaped by the other existing dynamics.  Additionally, when 
appropriating the well-known descriptors and classifications existing in the 
literature of comparative politics, it becomes too easy to set as a reference point 
the classifications of countries in the particular historical juncture from which 
those concepts have been derived.  In other words, the classification or description, 
rather than operating as the framework through which the system is analyzed, 
becomes the sufficient analysis of the system itself through explicit or implicit 
evaluation of how the system in question measures up to the “standard” cases 
though the realization of these standards might not even exist in any system at this 
particular point in time. 
Embedded within these various approaches to party systems that have 
gained wide usage in comparative politics, for example, are latent standards and 
assumptions that invariably color the interpretation of newer systems.  For 
example, in an excellent study of the Brazilian party system by Mainwaring, the 
author establishes his study on a foundational inquiry into the status quo 
assumptions regarding party systems in relation to newer systems in so-called 
 7 
 
“Third Wave” democracies.10  His argument rests on the observation that newer 
party systems are operating differently from the established democracies from 
which party system theory is derived; therefore, we need to approach them 
differently.
11
  While this is undoubtedly true, the existing standards set by the 
classifications of primarily European party systems at a particular juncture in time 
leads to conclusions that the systems or political elites are behaving contrary to 
“standards” rather than manifesting current historical realities.  In other words, 
new democracies have deficiencies because of problematic cultural norms or poor 
decision-making by political actors, and it is for this reason that they are not 
meeting the standards of “good” party systems.12  Again, though the issue of 
difference (or in many cases problematic operation) among newer democracies is 
not the question, the issue of the explanation of why, for example, levels of 
institutionalization and volatility are different needs to be addressed.   
For example, the lack of mass parties in an organizational sense in newer 
democracies and the frequency of catch-all parties tend to be viewed as poor 
choices made by new democracies rather than a natural tendency of young nations 
entering electoral competition with universal suffrage and widespread media 
access.
13
  With apparently the comparative literatures‟ embedded standards as a 
guide, Mainwaring suggests that “weak party roots in society and a high degree of 
                                                          
10
 Scott Mainwaring, Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of Democratization: The Case 
of Brazil (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999). 
11
 Ibid., pp. 3-4. 
12
 Ibid., p. 5. 
13
 Katz and Mair have also noted that patterns established in comparative organizational literature 
have tended to place the “mass party” structure as the teleological end of a linear process, despite 
the fact that such an organizational form sprung from “dated” historical contingencies.  Richard 
Katz and Peter Mair, “Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The 
Emergence of the Cartel Party,” Party Politics, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1995), p. 6. 
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personalism enhance the role of television in campaigns.”14  If one accounts for 
the historical context, however, it seems more likely to propose that the inevitable 
role of television in campaigns weakens party roots in society and enhances 
personalism.  Considering that these trends have been increasingly observed in the 
“advanced industrial democracies,” 15  it seems problematic to consistently see 
these trends in newer democracies as evidences of problems stemming solely 
from local considerations or novice political actors.  Such assumptions of 
particularism, when in fact global and structural forces are at work, could lead the 
study of “non-Western” systems in particular down a less fruitful path.  We might 
likely see “self-interested politicians” or “clientelism” or “manipulations by state 
elites” as the causes of the problem in these newer democracies despite the fact 
that such phenomena has been observed (and often still is) in the established 
countries though the operation of the party system was less volatile and far more 
institutionalized.
16
  Thus, our initial assumptions when approaching the individual 
case can make a critical difference in analytical outcomes. 
In light of these concerns, it would be helpful to briefly outline how the 
system has often been approached in relation to these three points—distance, tools 
and assumptions. 
 
 
                                                          
14
 Ibid., p. 38. 
15
 For an extensive account of deinstitutionalization and volatility in established democracies, see 
Russell J. Dalton and Martin P. Wattenberg, eds., Parties without Partisans: Political Change in 
Advanced Industrial Democracies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).  
16
 While I do not want to take away from the importance of state or political elites and their 
behavior in affecting the quality of democracy, the phenomena of deinstitutionalization and 
volatility, for example, seem to be operating on forces independent of these actors and global in 
scope. 
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1.2 Previous Approaches to the Turkish Party System 
In describing the Turkish party system in the electoral arena as it has 
operated through the period of Republican multiparty politics (1946-2011), a 
large body of work has appropriated one of two contradictory assumptions (and 
their related tools and distances), both of which are arguably problematic.  One 
assumption emphasizes the historical continuity of the dynamics in the system; 
the other assumes incessant unframeable change.  In assuming continuity—i.e. 
that the essential dynamics in operation determining the outcomes of elections in 
1950 are just as evident and relevant today as they were then—certain tools of 
interpretation, general descriptors and great overarching and static national 
cleavages, are often utilized in correspondence with positions arguably more 
distant from the system.  On the other hand, where continuous change is the 
assertion, tools such as descriptors, if used, are often quickly passed over to focus 
on the rich historical details and the interactions of political parties and political 
and state elites without any systematic framework.   
One common approach residing under the assumption of system 
continuity, which will be discussed in greater depth in chapter three, utilizes the 
descriptive tools existing in comparative politics but at a great distance, allowing 
for a conclusion of continuous unaltered change.  The widely used descriptors, 
“volatility, fragmentation and polarization” are often posited, with one great brush 
stroke, as the key elements of the Turkish party system.
17
   While such 
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 For a few examples, see Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, “Turkish Democracy:  Patronage versus 
Governance,” Turkish Studies, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2001), p. 55; Üstün Ergüder and Richard Hofferbert, 
“The 1983 General Elections in Turkey:  Continuity or Change in Voting Patterns,” in Metin 
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generalities may be true, they seem to be unhelpful and even misleading for a 
number of reasons.  For example, while volatility has indeed been a regular 
feature of the system, leaving the explanation to the descriptor and the numbers 
would suggest much more irrational and unpredictable behavior by the electorate 
than is the case in the Turkish context.  Furthermore, stopping with conclusions of 
high volatility also prioritizes an assumption that the system falls short of the 
standard of other systems in which volatility is indeed lower, ignoring the 
important historical contingencies that lie behind the observed phenomena and the 
possibility that levels of volatility could mean very different things depending on 
the case.
18
 Other critical factors that effectively explain the volatility need to be 
brought into the discussion if one wants to understand and explain the system.  
Political culture and such observed phenomena as the attitude toward opposition, 
the desire for unity, and aversion toward particular interests along with 
organization structure of the parties themselves, for example, could have 
important effects on how parties are formed and how they interact with one 
another, which could also account for some of the trends in these descriptors, as 
will be seen in chapters two and three.  In other words, although volatility could 
be a useful tool, when used at a great distance or as self-explanative analysis, its 
descriptive benefit is hamstrung. 
At a distance, there is ambiguity inherently embedded in these existing 
comparative terms at the individual case level, which requires the scholar to 
                                                                                                                                                              
Heper and Ahmet Evin, eds., State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 80s (Berlin: Walter 
de Gruyter, 1988), p. 85. 
18
 For an article strongly supporting this concern, see Scott Mainwaring and Edurne Zoco, 
“Political Sequences and the Stabilization of Interparty Competition: Electoral Volatility in Old 
and New Democracies,” Party Politics, Vol. 13, No. 2 (2007), pp. 155-78. 
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provide greater precision in specifying and locating the phenomenon when it is 
applied as a descriptor.  Polarization, for example, can be understood in different 
ways and can be located at different points within the system.  Are we simply 
talking about belligerent behavior among the political elites or ideological 
polarization, or both simultaneously?  Are we talking about polarization generated 
from within the system itself or polarization occurring within the society outside 
the system?  Knowing which form of polarization that we are referring to is 
essential. For example, in contrast to the familiar possibility of fragmentation 
from ideological polarization as pointed out by Sartori, a phenomenon which is 
typified well by the Italian case, polarization generated within the political party 
system, depending on the interaction and organization structure of the parties and 
the values of the electorate, could arguably reduce fragmentation and volatility.  If 
voting is polarized, it could lead to a decrease in fragmentation and reduction of 
volatility as, in such a case, transferring one‟s vote to another ideologically 
similar but less competitive option becomes more costly as it gives advantage to 
the “other” party.  Thus, due to polarization around a divisive issue, votes are 
channeled to a major party that can address the polarizing concern opposite the 
dominant party on the other side. This would make general descriptions of 
“volatility, polarization, and fragmentation” problematic as they may indeed have 
a dynamic, interactive relationship.  Arguably such a dynamic interaction from 
polarization—i.e. increasing or reducing volatility and fragmentation—has been 
observed in Turkey, both in the 1970s and the 2000s.  After spikes in both 
fragmentation and volatility while the electorate shifts in relation to a new 
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polarizing division (as in 1973 and 2002), the stabilizing line of conflict 
effectively lowers fragmentation and brings volatility numbers down to lower 
levels as the vote is channeled toward the two major parties competing at that line 
(1977 and 2007). Thus, one needs to move closer to the system; the tools to 
understand dynamics need to be unpacked and considered in relation to one 
another, in order to maximize the benefit they offer. 
These comparative descriptors often stem from observations of certain 
contexts, and if used elsewhere, need to be logically re-conceptualized for the 
specific case.  While many of the descriptors derived from Sartori‟s classic work 
could be useful in the Turkish case, they were not conceived with Turkey in 
mind;
19
 thus, in some cases, descriptors that work well for certain countries, when 
applied to Turkey, either hide essential dynamics or mislead.  When Sartori 
developed his parsimonious classification of various party systems, the 
democratic cases that functioned as the foundational testing ground for such 
application were Italy and established democracies in the West.  As discussed in 
chapter three, these systems emerged in a very particular historical juncture that 
greatly contributed to the eventual “freezing” that Lipset and Rokkan have so 
famously observed.
20
  The democracies that have emerged simultaneously with 
universal suffrage and very different technological opportunities for the 
prospective competing party have exhibited less “freezing” of the party system, 
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 Sartori does indeed refer to Turkey in his definitive work in the section where he is discussing 
the transition from single-party to multi-party regimes; however, my point is that his derivation 
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 Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan, “Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignment: 
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 13 
 
for obvious reasons.
21
  The net result, though, is that such classifications, which 
could offer meaningful description to these frozen systems, provide little help for 
democracies like Turkey, emerging under more modern conditions, whose 
classification could potentially need revision from election to election. The 
description given ultimately provides the weakest of benefit, both for including 
Turkey in a meaningful comparison of other similarly labeled countries, and in 
understanding the particular system in Turkey, potentially leading to two 
important misinterpretations:  one, that the system has consistently demonstrated 
the features of such a descriptor over time, or two, for the reader familiar with 
previous accounts, that the Turkish system is inherently unstable and changing in 
such a way that no meaningful framing of its dynamics is possible.  
Another typical approach to establish continuity in the party system in 
Turkey is to sweep all the complexity under the rug of one massive, national 
cleavage, purported to explain the system‟s electoral competition since multiparty 
politics began in Turkey in 1945.  While many scholars find the center-periphery 
cleavage explanative,
22
 others argue a Left-Right cleavage,
23
 secularist-Islamist 
cleavage,
24
 or a traditionalist-modernist cleavage.
25
  Even the most oft used 
center-periphery cleavage is often interpreted in different ways, sometimes, in 
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 Of course, the “freezing” hypothesis of Lipset and Rokkan has been consistently challenged by 
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usefulness.  See Peter Mair, Party System Change: Approaches and Interpretations (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 57-66. 
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 For one example, see Ali Çarkoğlu and Gamze Avcı, “An Analysis of the Electorate from a 
Geographical Perspective,” in Sabri Sayarı and Yılmaz Esmer (eds.), Politics, Parties and 
Elections in Turkey (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiner, 2002), p. 132. 
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 See Yılmaz Esmer, “At the Ballot Box,” in Sabri Sayarı and Yılmaz Esmer (eds.), Politics, 
Parties and Elections in Turkey (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiner, 2002), p. 110. 
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25
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substance, suggesting a secularist-Islamist interpretation of the cleavage.
26
  This 
ambiguity is problematic.  The fact that scholars posit a single persistent cleavage 
without being able to agree upon its essential nature is itself a clear demonstration 
of the problem.  None of the cleavages expressed above can effectively 
encompass changes that have occurred in the system.  Thus, attempting to stretch 
one socio-political division across more than 60 years of Turkish political space 
leads to an inevitable lack of consensus on interpretation.   
The problem with positing a single cleavage is that, in a multi-dimensional 
cleavage polity, it is so easily done.  If one wants to find evidence for conflict 
over religion, it can be found from the earliest days of the Republic, or even be 
taken back into the Ottoman Empire.  If one proposes a traditional left-right 
economic divide, substantiation from the first years of multi-party politics can 
also be quite easily appropriated for use.  The same could be said for other 
cultural or ethnic cleavages.  Regardless of what one chooses to emphasize, there 
is historical material ready to be employed as anecdotal evidence to support a 
division in society.  One cannot object to the fact that these divisions have existed 
in Turkish society; the critical question, however, is to what extent these 
particular divisions sufficiently explain how the party system has operated over 
time and how the parties within that system have primarily taken up space in 
relation to the other parties with which they have competed electorally.  No one 
cleavage offers such explanatory power for the operation of the system (or 
systems) since 1950.  This will be clarified further in chapters four and five.    
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Other approaches that have examined Turkish politics and the party 
system have taken a predominately historical perspective that enumerates all the 
detailed interactions and changes that have occurred in the Turkish polity through 
time.  Rich narrative of the actions of political parties and political and state elites 
are provided without much of an explicit framework.  These are offered as 
“histories” of politics in Turkey and a number of notable works fit this category.27  
While they provide the reader with an abundance of information regarding 
political leaders and parties throughout Turkish history, there is little framework 
given to contain the dynamics that are described in detail and how these dynamics 
have emerged, disappeared, and/or shifted to accommodate new conditions and 
dynamics that enter the system.  To grasp the dynamics of the party system (or 
systems), one needs a bit more distance so that not only the dynamics between 
political actors—i.e. the party and elites—can be seen, but also the dynamics of 
the political space in which they are interacting. 
Besides these studies on Turkish politics, which address the party system, 
and approach it with foundational assumptions of change or continuity, from great 
distances or close up, there is a great deal of beneficial work on the party system 
from one cross-section of time.  While some maintain a linear cleavage
28
 or 
simply provide a great deal of detail about the state of politics at that moment,
29
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 Several good examples include Kemal Karpat, Turkey’s Politics, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard, 
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Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). 
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other studies have applied quantitative or spatial methods to specific periods of 
time with fruitful results. Electoral data and other statistics have been used to 
detect emergences of new voting alignments,
30
 helping to indicate the ruptures of 
past patterns, leading to new spatial positioning taken up by both old and new 
parties across altered lines of demarcation.  Other works on the party system have 
attempted to capture a rendering of the spatial positioning of parties within the 
party system at a given time through the method of spatial analysis.
31
 While these 
works have provided synchronic snapshots of the party system that have been 
particularly helpful in understanding the interactions of elites and parties within 
the system at a particular time, it is also beneficial to see how these individual 
synchronic pictures of the relationships within the system have changed and 
adjusted through time—i.e. diachronically.  One particular problem with only 
having access to even excellent studies of the party system within one time period 
is an assumption of the continuity of the relationships of one period could be 
interpolated into the past—i.e. stability in party positioning can be too often the 
conclusion that is drawn.   
For example, an outside observer that is aware that the CHP has existed in 
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some form throughout most of the multi-party system years might assume that it 
has largely occupied a similar position in the party system space.  Although it has 
not abandoned certain positions, other positions, such as its expressed attitude 
toward the market, toward labor, toward the EU, toward pluralism and its 
approach toward nationalism have clearly shifted in response to available space 
existing in the political sphere, and various segments of the electorate, therefore, 
have approached it in different ways at different times.  Furthermore, if an author 
argues that these cross-sectional pictures of the system demonstrate the continuity 
of a certain pattern or cleavage,
32
 without access to a historical portrait of the 
system, there is little at hand to refute such a claim. 
As a rare diachronic work that provides electoral geographical modeling, 
Güvenç and Kirmanoğlu have recently provided a geographical portrait of 
electoral behavior and party fortunes at the ballot box spanning from 1950 to 
2009.
33
  While this provides much that is of benefit to the student of Turkish 
electoral politics, it is limited in a number of areas that this study hopes to address.  
First, while the authors‟ intent is to provide a statistical rendering that largely 
speaks for itself, while it illustrates patterns of change in the electoral 
environment, it does not attempt to explain the “continuities and changes” evident 
in general elections.  Furthermore, while it effectively manifests the geographical 
and regional elements in voting behavior, due to the reliance on Bertin Graphics, 
clustering voting patterns where a particular party registered a high concentration 
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of votes, the geographical mappings of electoral fortunes ultimately placed minor 
parties at the forefront of the renderings.  As the history of Turkish electoral 
politics is filled with small parties that, for whatever reason, could only manifest 
regional or provincial followings, the drastic nature of their vote distribution, 
precisely because they received so few, causes the minor parties to dominate the 
color-coded clusterings.  The major parties that largely dictated the nature of 
electoral competition and voter orientations toward politics and elections are 
clearly represented in a position of secondary importance due to the methodology.  
The greater the likelihood that a party has captured the hearts and minds of the 
nation in an election so also is the corresponding likelihood that such a party is 
almost invisible in the geographical renderings as their votes are not concentrated 
but diffuse throughout the country.  Thus, the illustrations of Turkey‟s general 
elections and the local elections of 2009 provided by Güvenç and Kirmanoğlu are 
a better tools to study the electoral fortunes of minor parties rather than those that 
more clearly manifest the contingent nature of the party system in those elections. 
It must be acknowledged at this point, that there have been a number of 
seminal studies that have looked at the Turkish party system across time and have 
provided important insights into the continuities and change within the system 
with a high level of nuanced interpretation.  In doing so they have complicated 
and challenged the previous simplistic descriptions of the system.
34
  This study 
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intends to continue the path blazed by these students of Turkish politics with an 
aim to expand further on their significant contributions.  Though previous works 
have provided a great number of foundational premises underlying this particular 
study, those accounts of the whole system (or systems) over time were largely 
limited to the space of an article or chapter.  Thus, this work endeavors to 
simultaneously summon the major factors and dynamics acting on the system 
(synchronically) and explore their interaction (diachronically) through the history 
of the multiparty system of the Turkish Republic competing in general (i.e. 
parliamentary) elections from 1950-2007. 
 
1.3 An Outline of the Argument in this Study 
The focus of this study will be primarily an analysis of the Turkish party 
system as a relational and competitive mechanism in the electoral arena.  This 
distinguishes it from other works on the Turkish party system in two critical ways.  
First, though a great deal could be gleaned from a study of the operation of the 
party system over time in relation to the governmental or legislative arenas, this 
study limits itself to the analysis of the party system in electoral combat.  While it 
is true that the party system in these various arenas—i.e. electoral, governmental, 
legislative—would have a number of overlapping patterns and themes, there are 
also important differences in behavior in the differing contexts.
 35
  Obviously, the 
space required to adequately do justice to a total history of the party systems in all 
of these spheres would demand multiple volumes; hence, focusing on the electoral 
arena in this instance seems a prudent limitation.   
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Secondly, as the intention is an analysis of the party system, relationally 
and competitively, it necessarily prioritizes the pattern or system of behaviors 
engaged in by parties more so than a detailed profile or biography of all existing 
parties operating in the system at various times; thus, while many studies intend 
careful descriptions of parties in particular periods of time, this work sets the 
behavior and interactions of parties in electoral competition as its focus of 
analysis.  Thus, while many parties will inevitably be discussed, the emphasis will 
be directed toward their relevant patterned behavior in the campaigns for general 
elections.  In the chapters addressing the various periods of party system 
competition, though tables providing a snapshot of the parties, leaders, and 
outcomes of the period will be given to assist the reader, the framework of the 
chapters will necessarily avoid a simple biography of the parties of the period. 
The argument of this study is that, contrary to popular assertions of the 
Turkish party system as the persistent manifestation of an essential socio-cultural 
cleavage or as inexplicable or unpatterned, the historic operation of the Turkish 
party system in the national electoral arena has demonstrated both dynamic 
change and significant sets of patterns that illuminate the outcomes of electoral 
contest in different periods.  These can be traced through careful observation of 
the dimensions of competition and domains of identification operating in a 
contingent set of circumstances, the pattern of which I refer to as the political 
paradigm. One can best understand the behavior of the system, its parties and the 
electorate in elections by observing these paradigmatic patterns and the points at 
which they shift.  Dynamic change, thus, is intended to reflect the relational and 
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interactive nature of the party systems and the interdependent forces—institutions, 
actors, structures—that combine and interact to bring about significant shifts in 
the political paradigm—i.e. the contingent “system of interactions,” a key 
component of the standard definitions of party systems.
36
   
In order to operationalize this usage of “paradigm” for party systems in the 
electoral arena, these political paradigms are described as the summative 
interaction of historically contingent “domains of identification” and “dimensions 
of competition” referred to by Sani and Sartori and later by Mair,37 which, to use 
Mair‟s words, help distinguish “what parties are” from “what parties do,” 38 
respectively.  In this study, the usage of dimensions of competition—i.e. what 
parties do—will indicate the actively employed strategies of parties to mobilize or 
persuade voters to cast their votes in the party‟s direction.  Within this 
classification, campaign discourse takes a prominent role.  How parties select and 
frame a constellation of issues in a certain election or series of elections and the 
images of themselves and other parties that they create to establish the lines or 
positional space in a competitive arena will be given careful attention.  Non-
discursive strategies for collecting votes, such as various forms of patron-client 
relations, the selection of certain types of candidates for representation and the 
utilization of local governance records, for example, will also be examined for 
their role in shaping electoral outcomes.  These discursive and non-discursive 
strategies must be seen as the “front plan” in terms of engaging the electorate and 
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collecting votes in electoral contest; in other words, these strategies are explicitly 
used as such and not incidental features of the contingent competitive space. 
Domains of identification—i.e. what parties are—on the other hand, will 
be utilized to describe the various secondary identities that exist within the 
electorate that, in some way, guide the ultimate outcome of voting.  For example, 
in the European context, the “Christian” identity of a Christian Democrat party 
will undoubtedly direct certain segments of the electoral population to vote for the 
party despite the fact that this identity was never explicitly appealed to by the 
party during the election campaign.  In this case, “Christian identity” acts as a 
secondary means of shaping electoral outcomes and is, therefore, a domain of 
identification.  If, however, a party explicitly utilizes an image in order to appeal 
to voters, it must be understood as one of the existing dimensions of competition.  
In the Turkish context, for example, the “Alevi” identity has rarely, if ever, been 
used as the primary means to appeal to voters; nonetheless, parties, particularly 
those on the “left”, have benefited from having an “Alevi-supportive” identity in 
accumulating votes from this population.  Thus, the critical distinction in this 
study between a “domain of identification” and a discursive imaging strategy 
considered a “dimension of competition” is that, in the latter, it is actively used as 
a campaign tactic—hence, a strategy—whereas the former remains on the level of 
a passive factor. 
By examining the combined relevant patterns of the dimensions of 
competition and the domains of identification, this study also intends to straddle 
the three major emphases in the comparative literature on parties and party 
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systems in elections—spatial modeling, alignment, and organizational studies.  In 
the Turkish case, as with most electoral cases, how parties position themselves in 
relation to others and “chase votes” in elections occupy a significant place in 
explaining party and voter behavior and relates frequently to the dimensions of 
competition.
39
  Additionally, existing social and political cleavages to which 
various segments of the electorate are aligned, even if not appealed to as an 
explicit strategy, persistently function as domains of identification in elections.  
Organizational structures of parties along with their institutional and “cultural” 
determinants also clearly shape the nature of electoral contest and have set 
boundaries on the opportunities and constraints available, or likely trajectories, in 
the arena of competition for votes. 
With these considerations in mind, this study argues that, since the late 
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Figure 1.1 – Interactional Elements of a Political Paradigm 
 
Figure 1.1 illustrates the complex interactions that constitute political paradigms in the Turkish 
case. ―Pn‖ represents the individual party, while ―PN‖ is the sum of the interactions between 
the other competing parties, and where ―E‖ represents the electorate.   
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1940s, one can observe at least four distinct political paradigms operating in the 
Turkish party system, in which the patterns of the dimensions of competition and 
domains of identification shifted with accompanying variations in response by the 
electorate.  Thus, in a particular historical context with its particular constellation 
of socioeconomic, cultural and institutional forces, how parties compete with one 
another and appeal to the electorate, and how in turn voters responds to them 
undergo dynamic change (see Figure 1.1).  If paradigm shifts with their composite 
dimensions of competition and domains of identification have occurred, the 
utilization of cultural cleavages as the primary explanation of voter alignment and 
the party system becomes increasingly problematic.  Thus, as will be argued in 
chapter four, it seems more fruitful to put aside attempts to explain the system 
through an essential cleavage and look carefully at how and why the parties and 
electorate are interacting through these different dimensions and domains as they 
shift from period to period, the intent of this particular study. 
Parties do not exist in a vacuum; neither do the choices made by the 
electorate in favor of one party or another.  The usage of the term “system”—as in 
party system—itself leads us to the conclusion that these elements must be 
understood in their operation and relation to all the other elements.  One cannot 
approach the Republican People‟s Party (CHP) as a stable element, for example; 
it must be understood within the changing paradigms by which it is being shaped 
but also shaping.  When all the important elements affecting the dynamics of the 
system in the context of electoral competition are taken into account, more 
explanative patterns emerge that not only more precisely capture the workings of 
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the system over time, but also provide clues as to how, why, and/or if new 
paradigm shifts are occurring or will occur in the future. 
An examination of trends in the party system over time reveals a number 
of interesting patterns.  For example, if one observes the very rough aggregate 
measure of the percentage gains by the top two parties in parliament, two 
significant patterns are seen to be operating (see Figure 1.2).  In the period from 
1950 to 1969 and from 1983-1995, a strong formation is followed by steady and 
persistent fragmentation of the vote, which suggests an initial clear party 
alignment  
 That, for whatever reason, began to weaken and fragment.  The periods from 
1965-1977 and from 1991-2007 show a trend of initial increasing fragmentation 
during a period of realignment and then a reversal of fortunes with increasing 
Figure 1.2 – Percentage of vote by top two parties in Turkish national elections 
 
Note: Due to military intervention in 1960 and the subsequent ambiguity regarding the 
legacy of the defunct DP, it is widely accepted that the AP and the YTP competed for the 
votes of this party.  With this in mind, the number given for 1961, includes a combined 
share of these two parties. 
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shares going to the top two parties, suggesting that either the integrity of the 
previous system was rejuvenated or that the parties and electorate were 
consolidating around a new paradigm.  As the trend is of fragmentation is 
reversed, one can also observe a tendency for increased voter turnout.
40
  
It follows that an understanding the party system as a system helps us to 
determine the particular paradigm structuring the system in each period and how 
the parties and the dynamic elements of the system interact within the context of 
that paradigm, whatever it is, and then carefully trace how one paradigm shaping 
the system gave way to another, as appears to be the case in the periods beginning 
with 1965 and 1991.  In every case there appears to be a trigger that drastically (as 
in 1950 and 1983) or gradually (1965 and 1991) leads to a shifting of paradigms.   
Election data, campaign discourse of the period, and studies on Turkish 
politics have given us a number of clues as to what these varying paradigms might 
be.  In the first paradigmatic period, with the leaders of the two largest parties in a 
high-stakes plurality electoral system coming from the same set of elites and 
operating within the same basic outlook with only a few policy differences 
between them, the paradigm shaping both party and voter behavior seems to be 
based on local cultural cleavages and how the parties approached these local 
communities.  Voting behavior and competition for votes often took place within 
a framework of the social structure at town or village level.  At the same time, the 
two major parties had tendencies to establish patron-client relationships in order 
to mobilize the local vote, but they did so in different ways.  Even in this initial 
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period, however, when pre-existing cultural factors seem to play a greater role, 
one cannot empirically assert a national center-periphery cleavage in terms of 
electoral or party behavior.   
From the data gathered from quantitative studies in the 1970s, we could 
perhaps argue that the explanative power of an urban-rural cultural cleavage in 
voting and party behavior was most clear in the more developed—i.e. 
centralized—Western provinces where the center was more densely present and 
toward which the more developed rural farmers and village dwellers could 
potentially respond.
41
  However, even with this possible explanation, there is 
much in the literature to suggest that the rural voters in these areas were 
responding less to cultural oppositions and more in regard to the machine politics 
and promises made by the Democrat Party to these communities. In the less 
developed regions of the country, where the periphery resided in greater numbers, 
the center-periphery cleavage as indicative of voting behavior and party 
structuring appears to have been even less salient, and the party lines were drawn 
by factors relevant to the local culture.
42
   This does not mean that functional 
approaches to voting were not relevant, but the predominant manner in which 
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functional concerns translated into political behavior was through relevant local 
socio-cultural realities.  Just as urban dwellers in Western cities were mobilized 
and directed to vote for mass parties representing their identities, villagers in 
remote areas of Turkey were mobilized by local leaders who ostensibly had the 
interests of the local community in mind. The dynamics of this paradigmatic 
period will be analyzed in greater detail in chapter six. 
In the mid-1960s, students of Turkish politics observed a shift toward a 
new paradigm in which ideological, and to some extent, functional, concerns 
played a greater role.  As the country industrialized and large numbers of the rural 
population began migrating to the cities, new spaces opened up for potential gains 
for innovative political parties.  With the maintenance of the status quo likely 
resulting in continued opposition party status for the CHP, and from the courage 
engendered by an arguably “left-of-center” constitution43 crafted in 1961, and the 
entrance of the leftist Worker‟s Party into the system, the party headed by İnönü 
triggered a paradigm shift in announcing a “left-of-center” stance shortly before 
the 1965 election.  Though one might argue the extent to which this maneuver 
was ideological, it was at least undergirded with connotations of socioeconomic 
priorities commonly associated with the “left” in the Western European sense, 
including the land reform, protection of labor, economic planning and other such 
concerns.  In any case, this explicitly referencing by a party of “left-right” image 
positioning brought such ideological imaging and reimaging of other parties into 
                                                          
43
 İnönü used the expression that the 1961 Constitution was “left of center” to bolster support and 
understanding for the parties new position; see Cumhuriyet, Oct. 8, 1965.  This perspective could 
be argued from the inclusion of land reform and economic planning into the document itself.  The 
overall provisions in the 1961 Constitution, however, lend it to being more often referred to as a 
“liberal” constitution. 
 29 
 
the discursive tactics of the period.  This shift at first seemed to be a costly gambit 
for the CHP as the party lost votes in both 1965 and 1969
44
 along with a faction 
abandoning the party and forming the Republican Reliance Party in 1967, but by 
1969, scholars noticed a turn of fortunes for the CHP among the urban voters, 
especially the lower working class.  As the tide turned, the AP increasingly 
shaped its rhetoric in relation to the changing CHP, and the party system took on a 
leftist (“communist”)-anti-leftist stance until it was brought to a halt by the coup 
in 1980 as will be discussed in greater detail in chapter seven. 
A restructuring of the electoral system by the military following its 
intervention in 1980 in order to suppress extreme ideologies, the memory of the 
violence and repercussions brought on by the ideological imaging paradigm of the 
1970s, and the military‟s refusal of all but three new political parties to enter the 
initial electoral contest led to the establishment of a new, but briefly realized, 
paradigm with the elections in 1983.  Stripped of strong ideological underpinnings 
along with an aversion toward emphasizing cultural cleavages, the new paradigm 
was indeed functional,
45
 focusing on the parties‟ provision of goods and services 
(hizmet) and the development of the country.  Distancing himself from the 
cleavages existing in the system in the 1970s, Turgut Özal, the leader of the 
victorious Motherland Party (ANAP), claimed to represent the interests of all the 
previously divided elements of the country—i.e. economically-liberal 
conservatives, Islamists, nationalists, and social-democrats—and his party, indeed, 
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brought together at least some elements from all of these groups.  The combined 
environment fostered by the military and facilitated by Özal and ANAP pushed 
politics in a very centrist direction that led political elites to hold an aversion to 
being classified in “left-right” terminology.   
The return of the old guard in 1987, Özal‟s movement into the presidency, 
and perhaps feelings that the party had not completely delivered on its promises, 
especially at the newly important level of local governance, led to the 
fragmentation of the coalition of the ANAP supporters. Nonetheless, the operation 
of the system and its cleavages embodied a truly “national” competition, with the 
fortunes of the parties (especially when grouped as “families of parties”) largely 
uniform from province to province and region to region.  At the same time, 
rivalries among political elites and fragmentation, bringing ineffective coalition 
governments, made it even more difficult for parties to deliver on their promises 
to the electorate, often couched in the discourse of service (hizmet) to the people.  
The centrist hizmet paradigm became a double-edged sword for the mainstream 
centrist parties.  Though the discourse was effective in wooing voters, it also 
became the impetus for severe punishment by the electorate in future elections as 
parties were often perceived as failing to deliver on their promises, especially at 
the local and municipal government level.  Furthermore, the rapidly-developing 
media and socially-based changes opened the door to new opportunities for party 
innovation. These considerations will be the focus of chapter eight. 
It was in the midst of such a context that the Welfare Party (RP) triggered 
another paradigm shift.  Though an Islamist party, the RP realized its strength 
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would come from effectively delivering goods and services (hizmet) and 
presenting themselves as a modern and moderate party to the electorate, starting 
with the 1991 general election.
46
  This party‟s recognition of the potential benefits 
of privatizing media enabled them to engage their prospective voters directly 
through the medium of television in new ways, allowing the party to “get their 
foot in the door.” Their success at local governance and particularly their 
subsequent victories in 1994 and 1995 brought the issue dimension of religion 
into the party system, altering discourse and the lines and strategies of 
competition.   
At the same time, a strategic gambit by the center-left party (SHP) 
arguably opened the door for ethnic politics that drastically reshaped electoral 
competition in several regions of the country.  The leaders of this major center-
left party agreed to take under its wing an organized group of leftist Kurdish 
politicians, many of whom had formerly been members of the party, who were 
competing for votes in provinces of the southeast.  Although it lead to mixed 
election results for the party—gains in the East, loss in the West—it generated 
frustration from their Western-based centers of support, especially when these 
politicians broke off and formed their own party once in parliament.  Though 
historically the parties associated with the CHP had reasonable competitive 
success in the southeast prior to this election, the fallout from this maneuver 
ultimately relegated the “center-left” parties to the Western and coastal regions, 
and lead arguably to different lines of electoral party system contestation—i.e. 
                                                          
46
 For a study of the Welfare Party‟s effective use of the media for advertising such an appearance, 
see Ayşe Öncü, “Packaging Islam:  Cultural Politics on the Landscape of Turkish Commercial 
Television,” Public Culture, Vol. 8 (1995), pp. 51-71. 
 32 
 
regional party systems—in different areas of the country.47 
Though the Welfare Party was eventually obliged to leave office by the 
military and certain civic groups and, ultimately, shut down by the Constitutional 
Court, it triggered a so-called “secularist versus religious-conservative” 
polarization in the system that has become the focus of many studies, especially 
since the AKP came to power in 2002.
48
  It is important to note, however, that the 
AKP differs in important ways from the RP, despite provoking a similar reaction 
from many secularists.
49
  While it could be argued that the RP emphasized 
providing goods and services (hizmet) as a means for an end which was, in some 
way, religiously grounded, the AKP seems to be simply devout people delivering 
goods and services (hizmet)—i.e. the act of good governance seems more clearly 
their expressed end (whether they have or are achieving this is another matter).  
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Furthermore, while much has been made of the secularist-Islamist (religious-
conservative) cleavage of recent years, this cleavage is arguably most clearly 
culturally-formed for one side of the divide.  In other words, the CHP under Deniz 
Baykal established itself during this paradigm that stretched to the national 
election of 2007 (and the 2009 local elections after that) as the defender of 
secularism and as the stop-gap against religious fundamentalists.  This being true, 
it is not surprising to find that supporters of the AKP (and the MHP) are 
significantly more devout than supporters of the CHP.  But the question is why?  
Which party is more strongly utilizing the language of religion to establish their 
place in the current party system relationship—i.e. as a dimension of competition 
rather than just a domain of identification?  The voter profile for the AKP seems 
to be gaining from the same sort of coalition that brought the Motherland Party to 
power in 1983, and its voters, though more religious, have also been shown to be 
strongly connected to the party according to economic concerns.
50
   These issues 
will be the focus of chapter nine. 
In developing this argument, the focus will be placed on changing 
paradigms in the electoral party system, the indications of which can be seen 
through changes in discourse, strategies, and voting behavior.  These patterns of 
competition occur in contingent institutional, cultural, and socioeconomic 
contexts, which in turn can both shape—i.e. alter the number of relevant parties 
and the primary lines of contestation—and be shaped by the party system and the 
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nature of party interaction and spatial positioning. Though attention will be paid 
toward electoral behavior and shifts in voting patterns within the various 
paradigms, an allusion to classical electoral realignment theory is not intended.  
The mystical and inevitable pattern of realignment posed in earlier studies of the 
party system of the United States is not envisaged in this investigation of the 
dynamics of the Turkish party system.
51
  Nor will there be particular emphasis on 
what V. O. Key classically described as “critical elections” as a determinant of 
realignment.
52
  Although a number of elections in Turkish history could be termed 
“critical”—such as the 1950 election as the first free and fair election, the election 
in 1983, in which all the parties competing were new, and, in part, the 1991 
election—the shifting of paradigms was just as likely to occur suddenly as it was 
over a period of elections—a primary example would be the succession of 
elections from 1965 to 1973.  Furthermore, why the election was critical differs in 
each case along with the forces that led to the electoral outcome. Thus, this study 
will not limit itself by searching for critical elections; in most cases, a number of 
elections were significant or necessary for the final shape of the system.  
Furthermore, this study will not limit itself to relying on simply an agency 
or structural paradigm, nor a cultural or institutional one.  Instead, benefit will be 
sought from the tension that acknowledges that each of these ontological 
paradigms brings valuable actors/forces into the dynamics of the party system.  
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That the system functions within a context (economic, institutional, cultural), 
which structures the possible opportunities and constraints on parties and elites, 
seems to be an essential starting point.  The parties and elites, however, are not 
merely puppets in the system; actors influenced by socioeconomic and cultural 
realities also have options and choices to meet those realities, their actions shape 
future opportunities and constraints, and they effectively frame the context in 
which the other elites and parties interact.  The interactional, relational nature of 
the politics within the system requires us to look at the interaction between the 
individual actors, which includes parties, elites, and indeed the voters also, with 
one another and also the interaction of the actors with the constructed structure.   
Institutions, such as the electoral system within which the party system 
must operate, also both determine and are determined by the social and cultural 
structures and the state and political elites.  That social and political culture also 
acts within this system must also be considered and observed.  Taken all together, 
these varying tensions help us arrive at a more three-dimensional approach to any 
given system, and whether or not we like the ambiguity of all of these elements in 
endogenous interaction with one another, it seems best to acknowledge that this 
tension brings us closer to a more accurate picture than one attempting a more 
„purist‟ theoretical paradigm, messy though it may be. 
 
1.4 Methodology 
 
The systematic approach to studying paradigms and dynamic change in this 
study will involve an interactive analysis of electoral data for national—i.e. 
general—elections, particularly at the provincial level, along with careful 
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observation of the patterns of campaign strategies and discourse.  Where electoral 
shifts in voting behavior have occurred, a search will be made to determine and 
explain the strategies that most logically explain these changes.  Thus, priority 
will be placed on campaign strategies that appear to have impacted how votes 
were distributed across parties by various segments and regions of the population. 
Changes in volatility, fragmentation and party fortunes at the provincial levels 
will be analyzed in order to locate shifting patterns.  Secondary research on 
elections and the party system will also be considered to help confirm or 
disconfirm patterns detected in the data. 
Discourse analysis of the campaign speeches by national leaders and party 
campaign manifests during general elections will be made to determine shifts in 
discursive patterns in electoral contest.  While a more extensive scope of analysis, 
such as including the speechmaking of local representatives of the party or the 
speeches of national leaders in between campaigning, would seem ideal, as this 
study intends to address patterns in national elections spanning 57 years, 
reasonable limits had to be established.  While the author acknowledges the 
limitation could result in potential blind spots, it can also be argued that these 
would be relatively minimal.  Though important issues are certainly addressed by 
party leaders outside of campaigns, campaign speeches most clearly represent the 
foci the party wants to set before the electorate.  Voters universally tend to have 
short memories and speeches that would harm or benefit politicians, if seen as 
critical, are reiterated by the party or its competitors during the campaigning 
period.  As is also widely asserted in the literature, voters tend to simplify the 
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nature of the electoral contest and reduce it to essential images and issues, which 
if related to discourse, necessarily are reinforced in campaigning.  Whether or not 
the voters accept these discursive priorities is another matter, but this tension in 
fact captures the very dynamics targeted in this study; campaign discourse and 
voting behavior do not always match, and studies that only prioritize the speeches 
of politicians result in misleading associations—parties are often competing with 
strategies that are often unrelated or complementary to speechmaking. 
The centralized nature of political parties in Turkey also provides greater 
confidence in the assumption that the discourse of the party leader is the official 
line of the party, even at the local level.  Where distinctions can be made between 
discourse and local voting behavior, the difference is often found in the non-
discursive strategies and domains of identification rather than divergence of party 
discourse at the local level.  The primary sources available to access the speeches 
of national leaders are newspapers.  The large mainstream daily newspapers 
generally covered the speeches of the national leaders of all significant parties.  
Where gaps were evident, newspapers that supported particular parties or 
ideologies were also combed for speeches that might have been absent in larger 
papers.   
It also seems safe to assert that campaign discourse alone cannot be said to 
have exclusively shaped voting behavior in Turkish national elections throughout 
its multiparty history; therefore, secondary sources were also scoured for evidence 
of non-discursive strategies and domains of identification.  As far as “national” 
campaign discourse is concerned, especially in the earlier periods of multiparty 
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history, for example, certain areas of the country were much less affected by the 
political discourse of national leaders and public opinion manifested in print or 
through radio.  Hence, lack of access to radio along with poor and late distribution 
of newspapers to many of the eastern provinces along with lower literacy rates 
and the likely perceived lack of relevance of the affairs of distant Ankara in not 
fully centralized areas suggest that an interpretation of how they voted based on 
the discourse circulating in Western provinces, in the earlier periods, might be 
problematic.  This knowledge alone suggests that it would be dangerous to 
assume that campaign discourse exclusively shaped the electoral contest 
throughout the multiparty period.  Even when campaign speeches were widely 
accessible through various media, there is ample evidence that many of the 
successful parties did not rely on speechmaking as their primary campaign 
strategy.  There is a great body of detailed sociological and political research that 
can be appropriated to this end.   
 
1.5  Final Note on Research Paradigms in Previous Studies 
 
How this study will prioritize and interpret the information existing in 
previous research must also be clarified.  Although there is not enough space in 
this study to delve into this premise in great detail, one can propose that, if a 
“genealogy” of academic work on Turkey and Turkish politics were conducted, 
clear, if somewhat overlapping paradigms exist that frame how Turkish politics as 
an object has been studied.   
In the earlier works on the young Turkish Republic, starting from its 
founding until the 1960s, most students of Turkish politics and society provided 
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political histories whose foundational reference point was classical modernization 
theory—i.e. they studied Turkey to determine its progress on the path of 
modernization and development that had been previously set out by the West.  
These foundational assumptions could be found in the writings of scholars both 
from Turkey—i.e. Turkish citizens—and from the work of foreign observers.  
Based on the assumptions laid out by the theory, the most common proxy to 
measure the advancement of modernity and the “moderns” versus traditionalism 
and the “traditionals” in Turkey was the status and attitude of religion in the 
country.  In these works by scholars such as Karpat, Berkes, Lerner, Lewis, and 
Robinson, though religious discourse was detailed, it was detailed not as an 
emphasis but as a proxy for the greater advancement of modernity.
53
  Thus, in 
those works, one perceives that religiosity, lack of education and conformity to 
traditions were the side effect of a lack of modernity and urbanization.  The 
problem or concern was not with religion or Islam, per se, but that its existence 
was the evidence of a lack of development in general, and education and a 
scientific mindset in particular, which once appropriated by the village farmers, 
would cause the other issues to melt away.  Religion was an issue because it fit 
unquestionably under the umbrella of traditionalism, and it was for this reason 
                                                          
53
 It is important to note that I am referring here to scholarship written during the period in which 
the “modernization theory” paradigm was the academic ontology for scholars of the time, 
particularly those studying non-Western cultures.  This does not mean that these works were 
explicitly structured to address that paradigm—though this is clearly true with Daniel Lerner‟s 
work—but that this understanding is used to frame the interpretations of observations made of the 
society studied—i.e. with an explicit conceptual division between “modern” members of society 
and “traditional” members of society, usually accompanied by analysis that assumes the slow but 
inevitable triumph of the former.  A similar observation in regard to these authors and 
modernization theory has recently been made by Findley. See, Carter Vaughn Findley, Turkey, 
Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity (New Haven: Yale University, 2010), p. 1. 
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that it was highlighted and observed in the earlier work on Turkey.
54
 
Toward the end of the 1960s, the research on Turkey began to shift both its 
methods and, to some extent, its focus.  The rapid mobilization and urbanization 
occurring in Turkey starting from the 1950s created a rich set of questions and 
tensions that needed to be addressed.  The previous assumptions of traditional 
villager and modern city-dweller became complicated by mass migration to the 
cities, which were ill-equipped to handle all the newcomers from the village.  As 
these villages set up new communities largely populated with other recent arrivals, 
the question became which forces will ultimately win the day—the traditional 
village culture or the modern culture of the city.  The method of measuring the 
questions prompted by this essential dilemma became noticeably more 
quantitative.
55
  Rich qualitative description and interpretation gave way to tables 
and demographic data and other tools that could more precisely measure the 
drastic changes that were taking place in the country as a whole, but especially in 
the cities.  Thus, the proxy of religion slipped into the background for the more 
quantifiable application of demographic statistics.  It was through this essential 
issue that politics was approached, the interpretation of the ideological conflict 
occurring in politics seemed logically entwined with these issues of urbanization 
and industrialization. 
                                                          
54
 An interesting illustration of this relationship is the famous work of Niyazi Berkes, The 
Development of Secularism in Turkey, written in 1964.  This work, when interpreted into Turkish 
in 1973 was entitled, Türkiye’de Çağdaşlaşma [Modernization in Turkey]. 
55
 Seminal works from this period include, Frederick Frey, The Turkish Political Elite; Leslie Roos 
and Noralou Roos, Managers of Modernization (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1971); 
Ergun Özbudun, Social Change and Political Participation in Turkey (Princeton: Princeton 
University, 1976); Kemal Karpat,  The Gecekondu:  Rural Migration and Urbanization 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976); and Engin Akarlı and Gabriel Ben-Dor, eds., 
Political Participation in Turkey: Historical Background and Present Problems (Istanbul: 
Bosphorus University, 1975). 
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After the dust settled from the 1980 coup d‟état, scholarship though varied 
in its methods seems to have begun to filter the understanding of Turkish politics 
through the essential center-periphery paradigm as perceived by Şerif Mardin.56  
First published as a journal article in 1973, this work became the foundational 
assumption upon which politics in Turkey was studied.  Polarities and divisions in 
various contexts suddenly begun to mirror and resemble a clash between a 
modern and homogenous center and a traditional and heterogeneous periphery. 
Even those who questioned or challenged the foundational assumption asserted 
alternative interpretations using the same language or pattern of language. 
This too began to shift in the 1990s with the rise of the Welfare Party.  After 
the party registered surprising electoral successes and the international 
community seemed quite eager to read about an “Islamic menace”, it seemed that 
very little on Turkish politics could be written without focusing on Islam and 
Islamists in Turkey.  Scholars began to see the perpetuity of a secular versus 
Islamist division, and they substantiated it by skipping over the works of the late 
1960s and 1970s and utilizing the definitive works of the 1950s and 1960s.  An 
important shift had occurred, however.  Islam, rather than being a proxy for the 
pesky persistence of traditionalism, became the chief tension and question.  
Particularly in the major urban centers, no longer the consequence of being an 
uneducated villager, Islam stood out as a separate force that could act upon the 
unsuspecting and uneducated subject.  It was not a side effect of tradition, but an 
                                                          
56
 Şerif Mardin, “Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?” Daedalus, Vol. 102 
(1973), pp. 169-90. 
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element that could operate as modern
57
 and mimic the practices of the classical 
Kemalist modernist approach in shaping society.
58
  And the perpetual center-
periphery divide was re-constituted to posit an essential secularist (center)-pro-
Islamist (periphery) division in society. 
Each of these paradigm shifts had their own coherence and rationalization 
that spoke to chief issues of their respective periods.  Although, with some 
overlap and deviation, much of the work on Turkey and Turkish politics fits 
within this rough sketch, it must be emphasized that not all scholars were limited 
to such foci.  However, one tendency of the general work that fits within these 
trends is that non-contemporaneous history has often been re-conceptualized or 
reinterpreted to harmonize with the priorities of the paradigm in which they are 
writing.  Consequently, a scholar at a particular time tends to interpret the past 
through the relevance of the present.  It is, thus, more common for a scholar in a 
recent work to posit an explanative secularist-Islamist divide during the 1950s and 
1960s than a scholar writing within that time period. 
For this reason, this essay, when utilizing the interpretations provided by 
scholars of a particular period in Turkish politics, will prioritize the interpretations 
of the body of work contemporary to that period over more recent ones.  Though 
all interpretations, including this one, approach the topic from a certain vantage 
point that emphasizes certain issues over others, it is more likely that the 
paradigm of the scholar complements the socio-political paradigm contemporary 
                                                          
57
 Nilüfer Göle, The Forbidden Modern: Civilization and Veiling (Ann Arbor, MI: University of 
Michigan Press, 1997). 
58
 Alev Çınar, Modernity, Islam, and Secularism in Turkey: Bodies, Places, and Time (Minnesota: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2005). 
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to it; in other words, such a scholar‟s bias, if evident, will tend to correspond to 
and emphasize the political paradigm from which he or she is making 
observations.   
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CHAPTER 2  
 
 
POLITICAL CULTURE AND THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IN TURKEY  
 
 
 
No party in the civilized world has ever represented the whole nation as completely 
and as sincerely as the Republican People’s Party.  Other parties defend the 
interests of various social classes or strata.  For our part, we do not recognize the 
existence of these classes and strata.  For us, all are united.
1
 
We cannot accept the fact that the social classes have irreconcilable interests and 
have to struggle with each other.  Such a conception is outdated and baseless. . . 
This is the sole reason why the Democratic Party is not a class party producing 
conflicts of interests among the social classes, but on the contrary is a “national 
party” assembling around itself all those citizens believing in the above principles.2 
 
 
In attempting to determine paradigms that shaped political behavior and 
attitudes of elites and the electorate alike, one needs to be sensitive to areas of both 
relative change and continuity in the system and how these various forces might 
interact and influence one another.  While it is accurate to claim the existence of 
“change and continuity” in the Turkish party system, or any party system for that 
matter, the location of change or relative continuity is of critical importance.  With 
this in mind, this study will begin by positing a number of possible agents of 
continuity that could be seen as acting to provide opportunities or constraints for 
change.   
                                                          
1
 Quotation by Mahmut Esat Bozkurt taken from, Paul Dumont, “The Origins of Kemalist 
Ideology,” in Jacob Landau, ed.,  Atatürk and the Modernization of Turkey (Boulder, CO: Westview 
Press, 1984), p. 33. 
2
 Quotation by Fuad Köprülü, one of the founding members of the Democrat Party, taken from, 
Kemal Karpat, Turkey’s Politics: The Transition to a Multiparty System (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1959), p. 312. 
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There are a number of operative dynamics that appear to have had a regular or 
continuous influence on the shaping and or boundary setting for the existing 
political paradigms to a greater or lesser extent.  While the pattern of interactions 
between various political actors, within which the military must also be included, 
and the contingent socioeconomic structural forces must be addressed within and in 
relation to the individual paradigms, the potential effects of what is regularly 
referred to as “political culture” and relevant formal institutions, in this case the 
electoral system, must be touched upon before proceeding to specific paradigmatic 
periods.  Widely observed orientations toward politics by elites and the populace as 
a whole, tacked up to societal norms and values (i.e. “political culture”), could 
provide various constraints or possibilities on the shaping of the system. 
Furthermore, the Turkish electoral system, an institution normally functioning to 
provide stability and consistency (continuity), has undergone extensive alterations, 
including a switch from a plurality system to a proportional one and, thus, could be 
considered a possible instigator of change in the relational dynamics between the 
electorate and the parties. Hence, the nature of its affect on the system should be 
investigated. 
 
2.1 Conceptualizations of Political Culture and their Relevance 
 
Political culture is a highly charged concept.  Since its inception as a possible 
variable and explanative factor in the variations in democratic development in the 
late 1950s,
3
 and particularly since the seminal work on the concept, The Civic 
                                                          
3
 See Seymour Martin Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and 
Political Legitimacy,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 53, No. 1 (1959), pp. 69-105.  
Though the focus is certainly on structural concerns and what could be seen as significant in the 
realm of “political culture” seems casually tied to development, Lipset adds a number of aspects to 
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Culture, by Almond and Verba in 1963,
4
 political culture as a valid concept for 
study and utilization in political research has passed through phases of favor and 
disfavor among scholars.  The intent of this study is not to exacerbate the ongoing 
and fruitful debate, but to address a number of salient values or norms in the 
Turkish case that are located within this conceptual domain. Thus, the focus here 
will be to carefully demarcate the boundaries for the concept as used in this study 
and emphasize what is intended or not intended through its usage. 
Scholars have provided us with a number of possible conceptualizations of 
the concept. Pye, for example, gives us the following description of political culture: 
“The sum of the fundamental values, sentiments, and knowledge that give form and 
structure to political processes.” 5  While enumerating a number of essential 
components of the concept, the definition could be seen as containing a number of 
ambiguities.  The usage of the term “sum” prompts the question of what and how 
these components are aggregated.  Are we discussing the composite of all possible 
conflicting values, sentiments and knowledge among individuals in society or the 
sum of the predominate ones operating within a culture or subculture?  Furthermore, 
“knowledge” as a component concept could send one in numerous directions if not 
explicitly delineated and potentially complicates the issue of what should be 
attributed to “culture” and what should be seen as derived from “structure”—
                                                                                                                                                                  
the evaluation that would play a significant part in future discussions of political culture, including 
“participation,” Protestantism, and the problematic “knowledge.” 
4
 Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba, The Civic Culture (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1963). 
5
 Lucian W. Pye, “Political Culture,” The Encyclopedia of Democracy, Vol. 3 (London: Routledge, 
1995), p. 965. 
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probably the most blurry boundary line in the conceptualization and 
operationalization debates.
6
 
Another possible conceptualization of political culture has been provided by 
Inglehart. Regarding political culture, he writes, “People‟s responses to their 
situations are shaped by subjective orientations, which vary cross-culturally and 
within subcultures.”7  This definition emphasizes that political culture as a concept 
needs not be fixed at the “national” level, but can be located among various 
subgroups within any particular polity.  In this line, Diamond provides us with a 
working definition of the concept which seems to be a specification of Almond and 
Verba‟s definition 8  that largely harmonizes with Inglehart‟s understanding: “a 
people‟s predominant beliefs, attitudes, values, ideals, sentiments, and evaluations 
about the political system of the country, and the role of the self in that system.”9  
This definition clarifies that the components should be understood as the 
predominant values, sentiments, orientations of a people; thus, we have a flexible 
understanding of the unit of analysis, requiring an understanding that supersedes the 
individual or aggregate of individuals, but that also provides flexibility in the unit of 
analysis. Elkins and Simeon also emphasize this aspect of the concept and write, 
“Political culture is the property of a collectivity—nation, region, class, ethnic 
community, formal organization, party, or whatever.  Individuals have beliefs, 
                                                          
6
 This could also be seen a potential problem with Kavanagh‟s definition that emphasizes 
“cognitions.” See Dennis Kavanagh, Political Culture (London: Macmillan, 1972), pp. 10-11. 
7
 Ronald Inglehart, Cultural Shift in Advanced Industrial Society (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1990), p. 19. 
8
 “The specifically political orientation—attitudes toward the political system and its various parts, 
and attitudes toward the role of self in the system.” Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture, p. 13. 
9
 Larry Diamond, Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries, Textbook Edition 
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994), p. 7. 
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values, and attitudes but they do not have cultures.” 10  Such a conception will 
provide the framework of this study‟s utilization of the term “political culture.” 
Besides the issue of defining the concept, another potential pitfall in 
discussing political culture can be found in the assumptions about what political 
culture, once defined, can explain, how the concept can be operationalized, and the 
underlying “intentions” of such an approach to the study of various societies.  In 
this vein, the complex relation between culture and structure—how it is delineated 
and to which category should various social phenomenon under scrutiny be 
attributed—the nature of political culture‟s stability or changeability and its 
historical association with modernization theory and developmentalism should be 
discussed.   
One of the most challenging issues to be addressed in relation to the concept 
is to what extent a particular normative behavior or attitude toward politics should 
be deemed structural rather than cultural.  The extent to which “culture” can be 
tacked up to existing structures is an important question.  Furthermore, does the 
chicken precede the egg or vice versa?  Does a particular cultural value exist 
through the shaping of existing structures and institutions, or do the “shaping” 
institutions result from pre-existing values?  To what extent can the two be seen in 
endogenous relation with one another?  Elkins and Simeon discuss this quandary 
and the need for careful demarcation between the two by discussing the conclusions 
of Almond and Verba‟s famous work.  They argue that the variance in “civic 
culture” between the five countries studied in the classic work can be explained 
                                                          
10
 David Elkins and Richard Simeon, “A Cause in Search of Its Effect, or What Does Political 
Culture Explain?” Comparative Politics, Vol. 11, No. 2 (1979), p. 129. 
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when the proportion of educated people is controlled for.
11
  Almond himself has 
pointed out that even the early scholars of political culture “recognized that 
causality worked both ways, that attitudes influenced structure and behavior, and 
that structure and performance in turn influenced attitudes.”12 When should we then 
be looking toward structure and when toward culture?  Elkins and Simeon provide a 
suggestion to this potential dilemma, concluding that “political culture is a „second-
order‟ explanation, appropriately applied only after institutional and structural 
explanations have been ruled out or in conjunction with such explanations.”13   
This seems to be a reasonable guideline.  There are a number of normative 
political behaviors that have been widely touched upon and primarily designated the 
offspring of political culture in the Turkish case that could be argued to spring from 
structural and institutional realities.  For example, one could argue that the widely 
observed tendency toward patronage, which has, in fact, varied throughout time, 
could be explained just as easily by structure or institutions rather than by cultural 
values exogenous to these.  The harsh constraints on ideological appeals and the 
difficulty demarcating clear policy distinctions between parties in the 50s left them 
very little room to do much else than engage in various forms of patron-client 
relations to mobilize the electorate.
14
  The stuffing of bureaucracies and creation of 
positions in the 70s strictly along partisan lines could also be understood within the 
particular contingencies of the period rather than an exogenous value or orientation 
                                                          
11
 Ibid., p. 135. 
12
 Gabriel Almond, “The Study of Political Culture,” in Gabriel Almond, ed., A Divided Discipline: 
Schools and Sects in Political Science (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1990), p. 144. 
13
 Ibid., pp. 139-40. 
14
 This also does not imply that such relations only arise in the context of an absence of ideological 
politics—Italy has shown this not to be the case—but such an environment certainly creates a strong 
impetus in that direction in order to gather together diverse or hierarchically distinct groups. 
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toward patronage.  Furthermore, the political emphasis on charismatic leadership at 
the helm of parties in Turkey, which must at least in part be separated from attitudes 
toward leadership and obedience in general, could also be explained by the 
structures that led to a vast array of “catch-all” parties, which both in theory, 
beginning with Kirchheimer himself,
15
 and also in quantitative research,
16
 are 
associated with strong, charismatic leadership. 
Another potentially problematic assumption related to the concept of political 
culture is that said culture is rigid, stable and deterministic.  Diamond, arguing that 
“such perspectives do not fairly characterize political culture theory” and criticizing 
a number of examples of such approaches to political culture, writes that “three 
decades of research since The Civic Culture have shown that the cognitive, 
attitudinal, and evaluational dimensions of political culture are fairly „plastic‟ and 
can change quite dramatically in response to regime performance, historical 
experience, and political socialization.”17  He later adds that economic and social 
structures, international factors and the practice and operation of the political 
system itself can interact with and shape political culture.
18
  Political culture as it is 
defined, and as the Turkish case tends to support, cannot be understood as 
primordial or transcendental values; instead, these often appear, to use Shilsian 
terminology, as “central system values” disseminated from the practice and 
                                                          
15
 Otto Kirchheimer, “The Transformation of the Western European Party Systems,” in Joseph 
LaPalombara and Myron Weiner, eds. Political Parties and Political Development (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 193, 198.  
16
 Marina Costa Lobo, “Parties and Leader Effects,” Party Politics, Vol. 14, No. 3 (2008), pp. 294-5; 
see also, Richard Gunther and Larry Diamond, “Species of Political Parties: A New Typology,” 
Party Politics, Vol. 9, No. 2 (2003), p. 186. 
17
 Diamond, “Introduction: Political Culture and Democracy,” pp. 8-9. 
18
 Ibid., p. 9. 
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propagation of elites, especially the political elite.
19
  Thus, while processes exist and 
are created that operate to maintain the values, and, as Shils argues, the values 
function to establish order, they are also ultimately negotiated and contested values 
within the center. 
Finally, as the scholarship addressing issues of political culture was initiated 
through the paradigm of modernization theory
20
 as an attempt to explain variance in 
the inevitable progression toward “modernity,” the concepts associated with this 
school of thought that has fallen into disfavor and empirical difficulties has 
engendered skepticism in relation to the motivation for its continued appropriation.  
The usage of political culture, seen from the view of the skeptics, was simply to 
conjure up a villain that could explain the resistance to progress.
21
 Political culture, 
especially as applied to “non-Western” societies, was simply a way to explain 
“backwardness” and the obstacles to forward progress—i.e. resembling “Western” 
democracies.  Thus, the broad categorizations of various “civic” cultures as 
presented to us by Almond and Verba in their nearly half a century old work—
parochial, subject, participant, or a hybrid—were determined by proxies and 
methods that have been argued to prioritize or advantage an Anglo-American 
citizenship “meta-narrative” rather provide a universal measurement of the meta-
orientation toward politics of any particular society or group.
22
  Though 
subsequently used with greater specificity in the research of the last couple of 
                                                          
19
 See Edward Shils, Center and Periphery: Essays in Macrosociology  (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1975), p. 4. 
20
 Margaret Somers, “What‟s Political or Cultural about Political Culture and the Public Sphere?  
Toward an Historical Sociology of Concept Formation,” Sociological Theory, Vol. 13, No. 2 (1995), 
p. 114. 
21
 For a view from this perspective, see Ibid., p. 120. 
22
 Ibid., p. 116. 
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decades, the preponderance of work utilizing the concept still hovers around 
democratization and the consolidation of democracy with political culture as an 
intervening variable.
23
   
While the merits of the use of political culture as a variable explaining 
variance in regard to developmentalism and democratization can be debated, this 
study avoids the issue by specifying and narrowing its scope.  The particular values 
and orientations discussed below are illuminated in order to show how certain 
forces, not readily explainable by existing structures or institutions can have a 
potentially shaping influence on the party system.  These “cultural” elements24 are 
not seen as “inhibiting” or “obstructing” but simply acting and shaping along with 
the other dynamic forces operating on and within the system for outcomes that 
could be interpreted both positively and negatively.  Finally, political culture as 
discussed in this study is being used for values or norms that seem to predate 
existing structures or institutions, but it does not deny the possibility that such 
“values” emerged or were disseminated by elites based on the perceived needs 
stemming from previous structures or institutions. 
 
 
                                                          
23
 For studies of this type, see Larry Diamond, ed., Political Culture and Democracy in Developing 
Countries; Seymour Martin Lipset, “The Centrality of Political Culture,” Journal of Democracy, 
Vol. 1, No. 4 (1990), pp. 80-3. 
24
 This author also acknowledges that, depending on one‟s conceptualization of culture, political 
culture, as defined and used could be argued not to be “cultural” at all.  Just as driving on one side of 
the road could be a predominate behavior, norm, or orientation widely observed in a society but 
would be unlikely classified as “culture”, many of the orientations that have a salient impact on 
politics could be placed more precisely in the category of social norm.  However, rather than 
reinvent the wheel, the study intends to use the terminology widely appropriated in the field, 
following from the assumption that the understanding of the meaning of the concept as it is being 
used seems more important than whether or not the terminology used for the concept is the most 
exact.  Thus, the former is being emphasized over the latter. 
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2.2 ‗Nation Party‘ Culture and the Turkish Party System 
Although there are numerous aspects with which the Turkish party systems 
can be compared to parliamentarian systems of Western and Northern Europe, there 
are a few important characteristics of its operation that distinguish it from the 
essential pattern of interaction and party formation in these democracies on the 
European continent, and which direct it toward orientations more consistent with 
those in newer democracies or the US, for example.  Consider the names of the 
current parties with twenty members in the Turkish Assembly (as of February 
2011)—the Justice and Development Party, the Republican People‟s Party, the 
Nationalist Action Party, and the Peace and Democracy Party.  Along with this, 
consider the names of the other major parties that have floated in and out of Turkish 
political history—the Democrat Party, the Justice Party, the True Path Party, the 
Motherland Party, the Democratic Left Party, the Welfare Party.  Other minor 
parties have been called the Freedom Party, the Peace Party, the New Turkey Party, 
the Nation Party, the Great Union Party, or the Republican Reliance Party to name a 
few others.  A perusal of the many, many parties that have tried their hand, either 
successfully or to no avail, to enter into the party system demonstrate a tendency 
toward utilizing abstract principles consistent with liberal democratic discourse or 
names that represent national inclusiveness.  In other words, among the numerous 
distinct parties that have competed at one point or another for seats in the Grand 
National Assembly since 1950, there are very few parties who have explicitly 
catered to extreme or exclusive ideological interests or particular groups or interests 
within the country.   
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Granted, there have been periods of history in which the freedom to organize 
such a party was constitutionally curtailed, but even when such constitutional rights 
were provided (especially during the Second Republic period from 1961 to 1980), 
the parties attempting to form in the interest of exclusive ideologies, like socialism 
or communism, or groups, such as Alevis or „Labor‟, have not been viewed 
favorably by the electorate, particularly when votes are cast.
25
  For example, at the 
height of its popularity in the 1960s, the Turkey Workers‟ Party garnered a 
whopping 3 percent of the vote (in 1965).
26
  The party emphasizing the welfare of 
Turkish Alevi‟s (interestingly named the Turkish Union Party) was able to boast a 
2.8 percent vote total in its best election outcome, a percentage far below what a 
party representing Alevis could theoretically muster.
27
  These two parties are 
arguably the success stories of particular interest parties in comparison to explicitly 
communist or socialist parties, which have not even been able to realize electoral 
support reaching one percent.
28
 
An important possible complicating case to the general picture is the 
phenomenon of de facto Kurdish parties competing in the system since 1991 when 
they first entered parliament under the umbrella of the Social Democrat Populist 
Party and then splintered off to form their own party once in parliament.  The 
                                                          
25
 Consider the following analysis by Karpat in 1959: “The political parties of Turkey do not 
represent any specific social class but aim, theoretically speaking, at representing the whole of the 
nation.  Accordingly they have reacted unfavorably to the minor political parties which were 
established on a class basis.  All the major political parties of Turkey consequently are middle of the 
road parties.” Emphasis is mine. Karpat, Turkey’s Politics, p. 390. 
26
 Heper has also noted this phenomenon.  See, Metin Heper, The State and Kurds in Turkey (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 156. 
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highest electoral support received by such parties, which have on numerous 
occasions been closed down for violating article 68 of the 1982 Constitution,
29
 was 
6.2 percent in 2002 and less than 5 percent in all other national election contests 
they entered.  Though this percentage seems higher than the other particular interest 
parties that were mentioned, at most, this level of electoral support among Kurds 
represents only a solid minority of ethnically Kurdish voters (probably around a 
one-third ratio of the total Kurdish population or smaller).  Furthermore, these 
parties, though generally acknowledged to represent the interests of Kurds in 
particular, through their party names (and formal campaign platform) have always 
suggested an inclusive character—the People‟s Labor Party, the Democratic 
People‟s Party, People‟s Democracy Party, Democratic Society Party, and Peace 
and Democracy Party—along with their party programs in which they describe 
themselves as a “leftist mass” party. 30   This formally inclusive behavior and 
inclusive discourse during campaigning could be seen as a way of avoiding legal 
ramifications of being a particular interest party, but the fact that such a stipulation 
was newly added to the 1982 Constitution, despite the abysmal showing of other 
particular interest parties in previous national elections, is in itself indicative of 
what seems to be a predominantly national value (i.e. political culture)—that parties 
in Turkey are at least superficially seen as ideally non-class, non-sectarian, general-
interest “nation parties”—parties ostensibly able to represent all segments of society. 
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Others might object to the fact that the historical Islamist parties could be 
considered general-interest “nation parties”; for example, just as Christian 
Democrat parties in Europe could be understood as representing particular interests 
and identities, these parties representing devout Muslims could be seen as 
functioning in a similar manner.
31
  However, there are some important differences 
between the Christian Democrat party phenomenon in Europe and the Islamist 
parties in Turkey, chief among these would be that the former largely emerged as 
the representation of religious minorities—i.e. Catholics in polities whose 
population was predominantly Protestant.  In cases where the “Christian” party 
represented the religious values of the majority, Kirchheimer, who famously 
brought the term “catch-all party” into widespread use, pointed out the possibility 
that such parties could take on a “catch-all” approach, referencing the Christian 
Democrat Party in Italy.
32
  
Furthermore, in the Turkish case, the Islamist movement that gave birth to 
such parties calls itself Milli Görüş (National Outlook) and undeniably had a very 
“national” interpretation of its role, and the place of Islam, in Turkey.  Necmettin 
Erbakan, the leader of these various parties, has famously argued that if Atatürk, the 
founder of the Republic, was alive at that time, he would have supported Erbakan‟s 
party (the Welfare Party—Refah Partisi).33  Ayşe Öncü has also demonstrated the 
effectiveness and strategy of the Welfare Party in using new opportunities through 
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commercial media to appeal inclusively to the Turkish electorate in its campaigns.
34
  
Furthermore, as noted by Hale and Özbudun, Erbakan used the fact that Turkey is 
99 percent Muslim as a justification that his party should be seen as appealing to the 
whole nation.
35
  All of these points suggest that even parties representing religious 
interests couched those interests, not in sectarian, but in inclusive national rhetoric. 
Why would such type of parties completely dominate the scene of Turkish 
Republican politics since the inception of multiparty politics in 1945?  Despite 
institutional and structural changes, some of which were quite drastic, like 
transitioning from plurality to a proportional representation electoral system and 
operating under three different constitutions, the disinclination toward particular 
interest parties has been a constant.  Where minor success has been seen in this area, 
the offending party has suffered the incessant disapproval and disdain of large 
sections of the populace whether one looks to the political “left” or “right”.  Why 
does the population in general seem to disapprove of group interest-based parties 
and how does this affect the operation of the party system and patterns of political 
interaction?  In other words, how has such a “political culture” toward political 
parties developed? 
It is no secret that the political elites that forged the Turkish Republic from 
the ashes of the Ottoman Empire were primarily concerned with unifying the fragile, 
war-torn country.
36
  During the last century of the dying Empire, it had suffered the 
majority of its territorial losses through internal rebellion incited by ethnic and 
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religious nationalisms often fomented by external powers.  In such an environment, 
intellectual and bureaucratic elites pondered the means through which unity among 
the diverse masses could be obtained.  Thus, as proposed by Lapalombara and 
Weiner, in the midst of such crises, “memories are established in the minds of those 
who participated or perceived the events that have subsequent effects on political 
behavior.”37 Particularly influential among these elites were the ideas of thinkers 
such as Ziya Gökalp who promoted corporatism as a remedy to unite the fledgling 
Turkish nation.  Corporatist ideas, which emphasized social harmony and a 
rejection of class interests in favor of occupational groupings, had a strong 
influence on Atatürk and the “central system values”—i.e. approved orientations 
toward politics (political culture)—as they were established by the elites and 
disseminated among the public as shared values in society. 
How might a corporatist-inspired worldview among the founding Republican 
elites affect how the party system operated decades later?  Consider Gökalp who, 
according to Parla, saw the ideal democracy not as “liberal democracy but 
solidaristic democracy, in which individual liberty is meaningful to the extent that it 
does not act against social solidarity and public interest.”38  Contrary to what might 
be assumed, Gökalp was not against the existence of political parties and in fact 
encouraged their existence, but one is struck by his reasoning for their existence.  
He argued that they were a “protective device” against members of parliament 
acting “egotistically and self-interestedly” if not held in check by the discipline of 
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party membership.
39
  In addition to this, parties should be kept from “sectarianism 
and internationalism” and “subordinated to the supreme national interests.”40  A 
particular fear held by Gökalp and others among the Republican elite was 
particularly about class division.  A well-known statement by Gökalp in this regard 
goes as follows:  
If a society comprises a certain number of strata or classes, this means 
that it is not egalitarian.  The aim of populism is to suppress the class or 
strata differences and replace them with a social structure composed of 
occupational groups solidary with each other.  In other words, we can 
summarize populism by saying: there are no classes, there are 
occupations.
41
 
 
Such a view, if a shared value, would create clear constraints on the types of parties 
that could form and operate within the system.  Populism (halkçılık) was often used 
interchangeably with democracy; thus, it would be very unlikely that a party system 
in such a democratic regime would contest explicitly along socioeconomic class or 
other group distinctions. 
There is broad consensus among scholars that this emphasis on unity and de-
emphasis on class or particularist interest was a guiding value of the political elite.  
Heper has argued that “Atatürk did not endorse the promotion of particular interests 
by political parties”42 and that the purpose of the state “was that of ensuring that the 
general interest was not given short shrift.” 43   Özbudun also points out that, 
stemming from Ottoman attitudes toward politics,  “members of the ruling class 
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were supposed to serve „the state‟ rather than any particular social group.”44  He 
also writes that, “Atatürk often expressed the view that Turkish society was not 
composed of antagonistic social classes with conflicting interests but of 
occupational groups that needed one another and whose interests were in 
harmony.”45  Şerif Mardin notes that this emphasis in ignoring social classes was a 
discourse that effectively retarded the development of Marxism in Turkey.
46
  
Furthermore, he argues that this extreme emphasis on social harmony led to a 
constant tactic of accusing the opposition of “dividing the country” for their own 
particular interest whenever such opposition was made manifest.  Karpat also shows, 
that when Turkey moved to a multiparty system, the initial parties all clearly 
emphasized that class could not be the impetus for party and that they intended to 
be the representative of all groups.
47
  
As Dumont shows, these considerations were at times used against the 
existence of oppositional parties altogether.  According to the early Kemalist 
“theoretician” Mahmut Esat Bozkurt: 
No party in the civilized world has ever represented the whole nation as 
completely and as sincerely as the Republican People‟s Party.  Other 
parties defend the interests of various social classes or strata.  For our 
part, we do not recognize the existence of these classes and strata.  For 
us, all are united.  There are no gentlemen, no masters, no slaves.  There 
is but one whole set and this set is the Turkish nation.
48
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If one were to argue that this might have only been the perspective of the founding 
Kemalists and their political party, the CHP, consider the following declaration of 
the Democrat Party attributed to Fuad Köprülu: 
We cannot accept the fact that the social classes have irreconcilable 
interests and have to struggle with each other.  Such a conception is 
outdated and baseless. . . This is the sole reason why the Democratic 
Party is not a class party producing conflicts of interests among the 
social classes, but on the contrary is a “national party” assembling 
around itself all those citizens believing in the above principles.
49
 
 
In contrast to Turkey, many political systems in Western Europe have 
approached the contestation of parties precisely on the aggregation of various 
classes and particular interests, in effect, understanding the accumulation of these 
parts as the united “general interest.”  The varying conceptions can be argued to 
derive from the distinct historical development of politics in these countries.  As 
Hans Daalder has pointed out, in many of these countries, the bases of modern 
political development was founded upon united action of various particular interests 
against the sovereign, thus, “as the political order has in a very real sense built upon 
parts, the idea that men could reasonably be partisans found ready recognition even 
before the age of formalized party politics.”50  Furthermore, male suffrage tended to 
occur over time thus allowing for a relatively smooth transition in accommodating 
the various interests, greatly reducing the threat posed by any particular interest or 
the possible chaos resulting from attempting to integrate numerous interests 
simultaneously.
51
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Despite this point of divergence with a number of established Western 
European democracies, the emphasis on unity and the fear of the divisive, factional 
nature of parties witnessed in Turkish political history is not unique nor foreign to 
the philosophical debates about the dimensions within which democratic politics 
should function.  For example, “The root idea . . . that parties are evil” featured 
prominently in the political thought of Anglo-American writings of the eighteenth 
century.
52
  As Richard Hofstadter points out, the founding fathers of the United 
States, even those associated with political parties, were very much against the idea 
of a party system, utilizing many of the same arguments as were developed during 
the founding of Turkey‟s republic.  In the context of the political development of 
the United States, the argument against parties centered around three related issues 
that also found a voice in the political orientations of Atatürk and other early 
Turkish Republican era thinkers: first, society is best served by political harmony 
and consensus that approaches unanimity; second, a party could easily become the 
tool of particular interests which could then “impose its will” on the rest of society, 
leading to tyranny; and finally, the existence of parties force people to give their 
loyalty to a group that is “much narrower and less legitimate than the „public good‟ 
as a whole.
53
  Despite behavior that betrayed a measure of favor toward the 
Federalists, George Washington saw himself as above party, and devoted an 
extensive amount of his “Farewell Address” emphasizing unity and warning the 
people about the dangers of party politics and factionalism.  As in the Turkish case, 
the early American strategy toward the opposition involved both accusing the other 
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of trying to subversively divide the country and being in treacherous league with 
other foreign powers.
54
  The existence or operation within a party was not seen as 
contradictory for these early Americans, for they, like Bozkurt, believed that their 
own party‟s justification was that it “could bring about, at last, a condition of 
national unity and harmony.  In their eyes the only true justification of any party 
would be its promise of ultimately eliminating all parties.”55 
What effect might such a political orientation or political culture have on the 
operation of the party system and its observed patterns of interactions?  In both 
cases, the US and Turkey, it seemed to promote and foster the emergence of 
“country parties”—read “nation parties”—“formed not on particular prejudices but 
„on principles of common interest.‟” 56   Thus, rather than drawing on explicit 
identities, the parties form around general worldviews that arguably envelop and 
include the vast majority of the national populace.   
To the extent that this political orientation toward unity and general interest 
and against class-based and particularist parties is established as a foundational 
political value among political elites and the public, it should not be surprising that 
existing parties would tend to operate organizationally as “catch-all” parties (or 
cadre or clientelistic parties with a catch-all appeal) in electoral competition rather 
than mass parties, in particular.
57
  The logic behind the campaign strategies of these 
types of party organization will help clarify why this is the case. 
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As Jennifer Smith points out, the success of mass parties in campaigning is 
based on mobilization.
58
  A mass party assumes an electoral base of support, and 
thus, the goal becomes ensuring that this identifiable population votes.  For this 
reason, membership, dues, education and other forms of involvement are significant 
because they increase the likelihood that the party will maximize its vote total 
among its potential electorate.  Such a strategy becomes ineffective, however, if 
one‟s potential electorate is unstable or unknown.  Thus, these familiar mass-party 
strategies are the most clearly applicable to class-based or particular interest parties 
as its relatively loyal support base could more easily be identified, and in fact, the 
very impetus for support by the masses is based on identification with the party.  It 
could be seen as no coincidence then that two of the three mass party subcategories 
provided by Gunther and Diamond are “class-mass” and “denominational-mass” 
parties, which formed largely around an identifiable demographic base.
59
 
The tactic of catch-all parties is to aggregate and persuade the electorate.
60
  
Such a strategy fits well with a “nation party” culture as its organizational impetus 
is to appeal to and literally catch all.  Vague or moderate ideology is preferred to 
very explicit ideological platforms, and thus, their success hinges on charismatic 
leadership.
61
  If one wants to avoid the electoral consequences of being accused of 
representing particular interests, and if one cannot lay claim to explicit 
demographically-based support, the likelihood of forming a party that operates as a 
pluralistic catch-all party seems especially high.  Such a tendency away from mass 
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parties and functioning in ways that fit the category of catch-all parties has been 
widely observed in Turkey.
62
  Although these parties have also been referred to as 
“cadre parties” or “clientelistic parties”—the traits of which can also be discerned 
among the prominent parties in Turkey‟s multiparty history—they have consistently 
operated through an appeal to all groups in society,
63
 they have generally kept their 
ideological basis to a more general and fluid type of political outlook, and have 
relied on strong, charismatic centralized leadership—traits that seem to stem 
naturally from, at least ostensibly, a general interest “nation party” culture.64 
The consequences of such a phenomenon on the pattern of interactions 
between the parties and the parties with the electorate would also likely lead to 
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greater volatility in electoral outcomes compared to polities with interest-based 
parties, an increased likelihood of clientelistic behaviors and patronage, and an 
electorate conditioned to seek out strong, charismatic leaders.  Especially where 
multiple parties exist and ties to their electoral support is based on persuasive 
appeal, charismatic leadership and general and overlapping worldviews, votes are 
more likely to shift from election to election in comparison to other systems in 
which parties have a core measure of foundational support from targeted 
demographic groupings.  A tradition of voting behavior or feelings of loyalty to a 
particular party leader might provide some measure of stability, but these are 
certainly more contigent bonds than those with parties that particularly represents 
one‟s class, ethnicity or denomination.65  Mobilized voters know their party and 
connections are made between the members, their representations, and the ideology 
that binds them together.  The distance provided for by catch-all party strategy 
allows the party to pick up votes broadly through persuasive appeal, but it also 
carries a greater chance for losing existing support as one is expected to persuade 
the voters at every election.  This might be one reason, though certainly not the only 
one, that explains the relatively high, though variable, levels of volatility witnessed 
in Turkish elections, a topic that will be addressed in greater detail in chapter three. 
Furthermore, where ideological distinction between parties is relatively small 
and voter loyalty is less stable, the chance of relying on other pragmatic forms of 
vote mobilization would carry greater weight.  The widely held observations, for 
example, that the programmatic differences between the DP and the CHP in the 
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1950s were quite minimal
66
 and that ideological platforms were largely restricted
67
 
and the simultaneous frequent practices of clientelism and patronage
68
 should not be 
seen as coincidental or unrelated.  Where distinctions cannot be clearly made in 
ideological outlook and party programme, a very logical strategy for both party and 
voters would be to seek reciprocal relationships.
69
  It should also not be surprising 
that such clientelistic voting patterns and patronage were also observed in the US, 
especially in the South, during various periods of its political history.
70
  Thus, these 
norms existing in political behavior—clientelism and patronage—at least in the 
case of Turkey, have to be explained light of the political environment and 
institutional structure rather than unexplicable aspects attributed only to a nation‟s 
“political culture.” In both cases mentioned above, the frequency of such practices 
have clearly been reduced, arguably by intentional and unintentional changes in 
socioeconomic structures and political institutions. 
Finally, although the qualities of such a leader might differ somewhat from 
society to society, the electorate‟s and individual party‟s high valuation of 
charismatic leadership can also be seen as springing from the consequences of an 
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array “nation parties” competing with one another.71  Since persuasion becomes the 
focus over explicit ideology, the onus slides to the leaders to carry this out.  The 
tendency observed in Turkey for parties to be centered around such leadership, 
while at the same time, maintaining an ambigous ideological stance, needs to be 
understood in this light.  The mobilization of the electorate in the context of “nation 
parties” competing against other “nation parties”, as it seems improper to 
emphasize an ideology that would emphasize particular groups over others,  
ideology as a party locus point is replaced with a leader who is more likely to 
enable the flexibility needed to aggregate the vote from various groups, which in 
some cases have competing interest. 
This political orientation, which could be referred to as a characteristic of 
Turkey‟s national political culture, which emphasizes unity and the general, non-
class interests of the nation and, thus favoring “nation parties,” helps illuminate 
some of the continuous features of parties, their interparty interaction and strategies, 
and the constraints on the dimensions of competition in the party system.  As will 
be seen in the discussion of electoral system change in Turkey, prior to 1980 and 
after the 1961 Constitution that changed the Turkish system from plurality to 
proportional representation, what is most surprising is not that fractionalization was 
taking place, but that in 1977, five elections after the change and with numerous 
parties competing, the top two parties were able to garner more than 78 percent of 
the vote combined.  This phenomenon led Sayarı and others to posit a “general 
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inclination of Turkish voters to favor a two-party arrangement,”72 which accurately 
reflects the nature of competition during that period. Though it would have been 
problematic to assert such an inclination among voters in the 1990s, the parties 
rewarded by the electorate even in that decade all ostensibly argued that they 
represented the collective interests of the nation, a feature of Turkish politics that 
continues into the twenty-first century. 
 
2.3 Intraparty Leadership Structure and the Turkish Party System 
 
Another political cultural norm observed in Turkish political elites that cannot 
easily be attributed to existing socioeconomic or institutional structures, but 
important to understand relatively continuous party system dynamics, is the 
intraparty orientation to party leadership and authority.  Consider the following 
analysis by Karpat in 1959:  
The political parties of Turkey are dominated by personalities.  The 
party—whatever its program—normally becomes subordinated to the 
leader, and its policy is moulded in accordance with the leader‟s views, 
temper, and character.  Personality problems are sources of frequent 
frictions which end in total submission to the leader or by the 
elimination of the rebels from the party.
73
 
 
As Karpat and others have observed, more or less regardless of where a party 
positions itself or is positioned relationally in the widely used left-right 
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understanding,
74
 the party leader commands enormous power and control over the 
affairs of the party, party policy and position-placement of party members such that 
Turkish parties are extremely centralized with the party leader at the most central 
axis.    Though the current Political Parties Law leaves the candidate selections 
procedure to the individual party constitutions,
75
 as Özbudun and others have noted, 
across the political spectrum one finds that it is the party leader and his close 
associates that determine party nominations.
76
 This is especially true of any of the 
parties that have managed to obtain electoral success, which at a minimum, would 
be passing the 10 percent national threshold imposed since the implementation of 
the 1982 Constitution. 
Though not a behavior that is condoned—and often censured—by society at 
large, this oligarchic and heavily centralized approach to party leadership among 
political elites, often referred to in Turkish as “lider sultası,” 77  has important 
implications for the pattern of interactions within the party system.  While creating 
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a superficially harmonious party exhibiting a great deal of party discipline,
78
 it 
reduces the chances for alternative approaches or opposition within parties along 
with the opportunity for future leader development, and it increases the possibilities 
of factional parties
79
 and tends toward polarized or belligerent attitudes toward 
competing parties on personal rather than ideological grounds.  
Though backbenchers have shown a high degree of legislative discipline, 
towing the line that has been determined by party leadership, it occurs at the 
expense of a lack of toleration toward dissenting or alternative views.  Mardin 
argues that this stems from “an element in Turkish political culture to which the 
notion of opposition is deeply repugnant,” which he sees as a legacy from the 
Ottoman Empire
80
 and the reflection of a “low tolerance of deviance” observed in 
Turkish society in general.
81
 While its origins can be debated, the behavioral norm 
among political elites seems clear.  When the party leader controls the nominations 
and the expectation that one will conform to the official party position—i.e. the 
position of the central leadership—is high, the consequences of proposing 
alternatives or expressing dissent bring a cost beyond the price that most of the 
hand-picked party representatives would likely bear.
82
  
This also seems to likely facilitate several trends in political party 
composition and behavior.  First, when a party leader consolidates the reins of 
power in his hands, particularly the nomination of candidates and the ability to 
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determine the composition of the party‟s central committee, it would be a rare 
leader that would encourage the cultivation of strong party leaders that might soon 
lead to his or her replacement.  Nominees are generally chosen according to their 
level of loyalty to the head, not on their charisma or ability to cast a new vision for 
the party.  When such potential leadership rears its head, often in the form of 
alternative perspectives or opposition to centralized party decisions, the typical 
result is expulsion from the party.  This, of course, greatly jeopardizes the fortunes 
of the party once the leader retires, or passes away; there is nothing left to the party 
but loyalists who had the characteristics of faithful followers to the now absent 
leader.  This has been the fate of the Motherland Party, the Democrat Left Party, the 
True Path Party,
83
 and the remains of the Milli Görüş movement long led by 
Necmettin Erbakan, the Felicity Party.  This tendencies have been clearly observed 
in the CHP during the tenure of Deniz Baykal at the helm (1992-2010), and the 
AKP has also manifested such tendencies,
84
 such that it is hard to assure successful 
continuation of that party post-Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. 
When the cost of intraparty dissent is so high, the natural offshoot is the 
factionalization of the parties, leading to new parties centered on potential leaders 
who were not “given their due” in the parent party.  As expected, one sees the 
continual traces of such a phenomenon throughout the multiparty period.
85
  
Disgruntled parliament members splinter off to form a new party or join another 
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existing party within which there is greater hope of an upward climb.
86
  This is the 
irony of the centralized intraparty system: a structure intended for unity and 
harmony in policy and behavior, forces an extreme hand even for what might 
appear to be minor differences, and leads to attempted and achieved fragmentation
87
 
in the party system as a whole.  Though the electoral system rules, the nature of 
polarization in society and the electorate have not always rewarded such behaviors, 
the behavior of establishing faction parties has been a relatively constant feature in 
political party interaction.  Furthermore, the multiplication of parties often has not 
served a functional purpose; as the new party also presents itself as a “nation party” 
and, though it usually tries to distinguish itself on one or two minor points of policy 
or ideology from its parent party, it does not bring any substantially new aspect of 
representation. 
Such a situation creates an interesting paradox: despite the fact that the party 
system is filled with very similar types of parties, the personalistic form of 
opposition leads to intractability between parties, and this most often between the 
parties that are most ideologically similar.  When the “center right” and “center 
left” split into factions centered around strong leaders in the 1980s and 1990s, these 
parties showed very little ability to work together because the rivalries of the party 
leaders competing for largely the same electoral population arguably could not 
work together as it would most clearly demonstrate the lack of necessity for the 
existence of separate parties with largely the same outlook.  The continual 
polarization pointed out by many scholars, as discussed in chapter three, stems 
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largely from this phenomenon—i.e. party leaders‟ interpersonal rivalries—and not 
ideology per se.
88
  The level of actual ideological difference has most frequently 
been minimal, with periodic exceptions, and the polarization that has been the 
continuous phenomenon of the system has been the polarization between belligerent 
and competing elites.
89
  Polarization that is shaped around issues salient to the 
electorate has also been observed, but unlike the other type of polarization, this 
“ideological polarization” has been more periodic and turns in cycles with the 
waxing and waning of the significance of various political issues of contention. 
Understanding this phenomenon helps to explain the regular observance of 
fragmentation in the Turkish party system along with the nature of competition 
between parties and for the votes of the public.  Though on one hand, the apparent 
“nation party” value among the elites and the voters would suggest a system filled 
with numerous parties with substantially overlapping ideological and party 
platforms, the nature of the authority structure of the parties centralized around one 
leader and his or her handpicked central committee often brings about fierce and 
non-consensual competition, usually between parties springing from the same roots.  
This is not to say that issues, policy and ideology do not have an important place 
within the system or that Turkish politics is best explained as the public casting 
their votes in an elite popularity contest, but without understanding the battle of 
personalities occurring at the top, and the nature of factionalization in Turkey often 
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resulting in new parties that are mirror images of the parent party, it would be 
difficult to explain the fairly constant polarized behaviors existing among the 
political elites.  In fact, when we examine periods of relatively harmonious 
coalitions in the parliament, the parties involved have always been from differing 
ideological positions, not those of shared political outlook. 
 
2.4 Electoral System Change and the Party System in Turkey 
 
In 1961, after initiating multiparty politics with a multi-member district 
plurality voting, the Turkish voters entered a system operating on a type of d‟Hondt 
proportional representation, a change instigated by the National Unity Committee 
put in place after the coup d‟etat on the 27th of May, 1960.  This new system was 
altered by political elites twice more prior to general elections in the 1960s.  After 
the military intervention on September 12, 1980 and the subsequent constitution 
drafted by the ruling junta and passed by referendum in 1982, d‟Hondt style 
proportional representation was maintained with the addition of a 10 percent 
national threshold, which was also fiddled with a number of times by political elites, 
but which, as of 2011, still retains its basic structure as outlined in 1982. 
To what extent can we attribute change in the party system to change in the 
rules governing the electoral system?  Certainly, the hands involved in the various 
manipulations of the electoral system rules, whether large or small, intended the 
changes to affect a result in how the existing pattern of interaction between parties 
themselves and the electorate was taking place.  Where the military was the primary 
hand altering the rules of the contest, the changes were more drastic and aimed at 
solving what appeared to be the essential causes of regime breakdown that had 
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instigated military intervention and rule.  Thus, when the power of the governing 
political elite was such that it allowed for authoritarian behavior by the ruling party, 
the response was to limit this power by a drastic switch to proportional 
representation.  In the 1970s, when no party could achieve an absolute majority, 
minor coalition partners maximized their blackmail potential yet offered no stability 
or efficacy of government or legislative power; thus, in the 1980 intervention, the 
military tried to prevent these blackmailers, often extremist parties, and 
fragmentation by establishing a high national threshold.  The military of course was 
able to carry out such measures as it did not really have to operate within a 
democratic framework, which would normally restrict how much change would 
take place.
90
  Where the manipulations were instigated by political elites, the 
trajectory of the changes—toward increased possibility of proportionality or 
disproportionality—were predictably in favor of those seeking the changes.  Thus, 
when a coalition of minor parties sought to alter the system, it was in a direction 
that mathematically favored smaller parties,
91
 and vice versa.  The intentions behind 
these changes signal a clear desire to reshape the pattern of electoral competition 
among parties in the system; were these intentions realized in actual operation?  An 
answer to the resounding positive would suggest that it would thus be futile to look 
at paradigms and structures outside of the electoral system to understand party 
system change in Turkey, we need only observe how the rules of the system of 
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competition changed and thus how those changes resulted in the changes observed 
in the party system.  How well does such an argument hold up? 
Starting with Duverger, there have been many who have claimed an important 
role for electoral systems in the shaping of party systems.  Duverger‟s well-known 
“laws” go as follows: “The majority single-ballot system tends to party dualism” 
and “The second-ballot system and proportional representation tend to 
multipartyism.”92 Thus, the type of system would seem to create conditions that 
favored or limited how many parties would be involved in the contest.  In the 1990s, 
when the concern of scholars in the field of comparative politics was directed 
toward the issue of democratization and consolidation of democracy due to the 
ambiguities arising from the explosion of so-called “third wave” democracies, the 
issue of electoral system engineering was allotted significant space in volumes and 
journals,
93
 based on the assumption that the results could be deterministic for the 
fate of the party system and democracy, particularly in the newly emerging 
regimes.
94
 
There has, of course, been a great deal of subsequent criticism of and attempts 
at amending Duverger‟s “laws”, especially regarding the issue of determinacy and 
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the claims regarding proportional representation in particular.
95
  Sartori, in this 
regard, makes what seems to be a crucial distinction between constraining and 
unconstraining electoral systems, the former systems increasing the level of 
disproportionality of representation (single-ballot plurality systems with multi-
member districts being at the high end of this spectrum) and the latter increasing the 
proportionality (pure proportional representation being at the extreme end on this 
side).  He writes, “If it is utterly unconstraining, we have no cause to pursue the 
matter: the electoral system has no effect [on the voter],” and “contrary to a still 
widespread opinion . . . the greater the proportionality of PR, the lesser its 
impact.” 96   In other words, as electoral systems approach pure proportional 
representation, the system does not cause any outcome—such as an increase of 
parties—but is a non-cause; voters can vote without constraints.  Lijphart, in his 
seminal study of electoral systems and party systems, concludes that the effects of 
the electoral system on the characteristics of party systems “are much weaker than 
those between the electoral system and the degree of disproportionality.  This also 
means that for the electoral engineers the electoral system is not as strong an 
instrument for shaping the party system.”97  This is particularly true in regard to the 
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total number of “effective” or competing parties in the party system.98  Even as far 
as the “effective parties” in the party system is concerned,99 in the 27 countries 
study by Lijphart, the electoral system was able to explain only up to 28 percent of 
the variance in party systems.
100
  This suggests that though the electoral system has 
an obvious effect of constraining voter choice (if, of course, the electoral system 
increases disproportionality), the other possible actors, including structure, political 
elites and parties, and central values have an important measure of maneuverability 
in establishing the ultimate structure of a party system. 
Sartori makes an additional claim in regard to electoral systems that could be 
seen as an alternative argument, which should be addressed here if only to largely 
dismiss its application to the Turkish case.  For Sartori, the potential effect that an 
electoral system might have on a party system also depends on whether or not the 
party system itself is “structured”—i.e. institutionalized.  He writes, “So long as the 
voter is personality-oriented, so long as he merely votes for a person, parties remain 
labels of little, if any, consequence.  Hence, as long as these conditions prevail, the 
party system is not structured.”101  Thus, under such conditions, the predictable 
impact of electoral systems is moot.  If, as will be argued below, the electoral 
system has had very little clear impact on the party system in Turkey, could this not 
be the explanative interpretation? 
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Though, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, the charisma of party leaders is a 
widely sought out trait and certainly impacts party fortunes and fragmentation of 
parties has usually occurred due to oligarchic or “sultanic” leadership approaches 
more than significant ideological differences,
102
 there is clearly structure in the 
Turkish party system.  There is, as Sartori calls it, a “system of channelment” within 
the political society through which voting decisions can be made.  It would be hard 
to argue that for parties such as the CHP and the nationalist MHP
103
 that “the 
individual [leader] „elects‟ the party” but rather, that it is these parties “that elect 
(put in office) the individual [leader].”104  Probably the space in Turkish politics 
commonly referred to as the “center-right” might at least superficially seem the 
least structured in this regard, but there are good reasons to believe otherwise.  
Though the party of the “center-right” has consistently changed (historically, this 
was often due to military intervention) and most clearly guided by a strong, 
charismatic leader, whose political existence has often been synonymous with the 
existence of the party, there has always been at least one major party functioning as 
a “system of channelment” for this space in national politics.  Though the ideology 
of this particular political location has been arguably indefinite and flexible, the 
need for this political space—i.e. the center-right—has not been as flexible.  Thus, 
the basis for structure was not the party or parties, which come and go, but the 
spatial location in Turkish politics.  Leaders may emerge with new parties centered 
strongly on their authority, but the success of the party has arguably been in its 
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ability to convince a segment of the population that it is continuing the legacy of 
this well-established relational location in Turkish politics.  Thus, prior to the 1961 
election, the new parties running against the CHP were not primarily strategically 
bent on magnifying a particular leader, but rather convincing the electorate that they 
were the true legacy bearers of the defunct Democrat Party, which had first 
established that political space.  When “left-right” terminology began to be widely 
appropriated in the Turkish system, new parties could argue that they were taking 
up that relational “center-right” (or “the social center”) positioning or following the 
legacy of the Democrat Party, both strategies employed by the currently ruling 
Justice and Development Party (AKP).  Thus, though one might argue that certain 
parties in Turkish politics are not institutionalized, the macro-channels of 
representation, shaping the party system itself, have been institutionalized.  While it 
would be foolish to ignore the impact of strong party leadership and its effects on 
the party system in Turkey, possibly inhibiting the institutionalization of certain 
parties, electoral competition is still primarily politically-oriented not “personality-
oriented” as an alternative argument derived from Sartori‟s proposition might 
suggest.  
Though one cannot completely discount the electoral system changes, the 
effect of these on the party system does not seem to have the influence that is even 
sometimes attributed to it.
105
  Consider for example, the most drastic change—the 
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switch from plurality to proportional representation—in the electoral system.  How 
much did it alter how people voted or how the parties interacted with each other?  
Without a doubt, there was a serious increase in proportionality, since the multiple 
member district plurality led to extremely disproportionate seat allocations in the 
National Assembly in 1946, 1950, 1954, and 1957.  With the d‟Hondt system and 
multiple member districts, this disparity was greatly reduced, but despite some 
claims of increasing fragmentation of the vote, it seemed to have had only a mild 
impact on voter tendencies to favor the two-largest parties.   
For example, the biggest effect on the number of effective parties in 1961 was 
due, not to new electoral laws, but to the impact of the ambiguity as to which of 
several parties would effectively carry the mantle of the Democrat Party, shut down 
by court order on a technicality in 1960.
106
  If one “corrects” for this ambiguity by 
combining the vote totals of the two new parties most clearly making this claim,
107
 
the fragmentation of the vote seems to remain on the same path it was taking prior 
to the electoral system change (see Figure 2.1).  Furthermore, that the fragmentation 
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that existed stemmed from the confusion about which party would bear the DP‟s 
legacy can be seen by the fact that if the electoral results had occurred within a 
pluralistic system as had been previously implemented, the disproportionality of the 
results would have been at its lowest level yet due to the fact that from province to 
province a predominantly two-party system was maintained, but the two parties 
contesting from province to province differed.
108
 
Fragmentation of the vote away from the two largest parties had already 
begun in the 1950s under an extremely disproportionate plurality system.  Under the 
plurality system, besides the CHP, DP, and the minor seat winners, the Nation Party 
and the Freedom Party, Karpat lists 23 other parties (including the Peasants‟ Party, 
which merged with the Nation Party) that actively competed (quite unsuccessfully) 
in elections, at least seven of these independently active through the last general 
election with a plurality system in 1957.  It is true that, as time progressed, the two-
party trend receded at a secular pace, reaching a low point in 1973, and one might 
reasonably posit “path dependence” as a possible explanation for the slow pace of 
fragmentation despite the significant institutional changes.  However, even here, the 
trend away from a two-party system was clearly reversing by 1977 with the two 
largest parties garnering more than 78 percent of the total vote.  Thus, under such a 
drastic proportionality change, what is surprising is not the level of fragmentation, 
rather the length to which the system maintained a system largely centered on two 
major parties considering all the other options.  In this regard, the drastic change 
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from plurality to proportional representation from an electoral standpoint, would 
have to be understood as largely a non-effect as a reading of Sartori would predict. 
On the other hand, the electoral system, though it did not distract the 
electorate itself from an overall two-party trend, it also certainly did not prevent (as 
a non-effect) factions from splitting away from major parties to form minor parties.  
Thus, particularly parties such as the Republican Reliance Party, a faction of the 
CHP, and the Democratic Party, a faction of the Justice Party could break away 
from the major party, knowing that the electoral system would not be a strong 
barrier to their fortunes. While this must be acknowledged, one might also be wary 
of taking this premise too far.  The fragmentation of the vote in the 1950s came 
primarily from the Nation Party and the Freedom Party, which were both formed 
from factions splitting off from the Democrat Party.  Furthermore, as provincially-
based clustering allowed space for the Nation Party and the Freedom Party to enter 
parliament under very strict pluralistic rules, the splinter parties in the late 1960s 
and 1970s also displayed similar clustering techniques that would have guaranteed 
them some seats in parliament regardless of the electoral system.  In other words, 
these parties, even under proportional representation were not experiencing even 
distribution of the vote throughout all the provinces; instead, in certain provinces, 
they were generating a following that resulted in their winning a plurality in those 
localities.
109
 
After the military increased the possibility of disproportionate allocation of 
seating favoring the largest parties by instituting a nationwide 10 percent threshold, 
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 Tuncer and Danacı, Çok Partili Dönemde Seçimler, pp. 82, 85. 
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despite the exact opposite intention of the military,
110
 the speed of fragmentation of 
votes was notoriously astonishing.  Although the fragmentation of seats was 
temporary curbed by government legislation that decreased constituency sizes 
(increasing disproportionality in favor of the largest parties) prior to the 1987 
general election,
111
 by the 1990s, five parties passed the threshold in each of the 
three general elections in this decade and by 1999, the top two parties could only 
garner 40.1 percent of the vote combined.  Furthermore, unlike the regional 
clustering of minor parties under both electoral systems preceding the 1980 coup, 
votes for minor parties with under one percent of the national vote experienced 
diffuse support across provinces despite having no potential to pass the threshold.
112
  
Under the same electoral system, since the 2002 election, the trend has 
reversed with only three parties passing the 10 percent threshold and the top two 
parties taking 67.5 percent of the vote in 2007.  Thus, though the changes could be 
seen as changing some of the dynamics of the party system in the governing and 
legislative arena, in the electoral arena, which is the particular focus of this study, 
the electoral system changes provide only minor assistance in explicating party 
system change. 
The fragmentation of the post-1983 period, of course, had much to do with 
the artificial nature of the return to politics in the initial election in 1983 and was of 
a different nature than the fragmentation of earlier periods.  In 1983, parties were 
artificially established under the junta‟s tutelage while a large set of experienced 
                                                          
110
 Sayarı, “The Changing Party System,” p. 28; Kalaycıoğlu, “Elections and Governance,” p. 55; 
and  Ergüder and Hofferbert, “The 1983 General Elections in Turkey,” p. 89. 
111
 Sabri Sayarı, “Political Parties, Party Systems and Economic Reforms: The Turkish Case,” 
Studies in Comparative International Development, Vol. 31, No. 4 (1996/97), p. 34. 
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 From 1983 to 1995, for example, every party on the ballot, even the most insignificant ones, were 
able to receive some votes from every province. 
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political elites sat on the sidelines restricted from participating.  When the inevitable 
opportunity arose for these experienced politicians and party structures to reenter 
the contest, starting immediately after the 1983 general election and culminating 
with the critical referendum that allowed for all party leaders to return in 1987, the 
politicians that had benefited from the absence of the veterans were, of course, not 
willing to simply step aside.  Thus, the fragmentation of the party system, unlike the 
fragmentation that had occurred in earlier periods, came not from factions splitting 
from parties, but from the entrance of duplicate parties that had been prevented 
from running in the initial election.  The coalition disasters that began to occur in 
the 1990s and the unwillingness for the ideological pairs to unite brought increasing 
disapproval from the electorate.  The existing contraction of the party system since 
2002 that has limited the contest to a “neo-center-right” governing party, a primary 
“center-left” opposition party, minor nationalist party with a relatively stable 
electoral base, and the small Kurdish leftist-nationalist party is much closer to the 
shape that the military framers of the electoral system initially intended, though not 
all the parties would have been their envisioned ideals.  In this sense, it could be 
argued that, once the artificiality was extracted from the system, through a series of 
structural and ideological crises, the limiting 10 percent national threshold is 
beginning to bear some of the fruit of its intended purpose.  The existing electoral 
system has begun to weed out and prevent the distracting emergence of factional 
parties, even those led by politicians of otherwise promising potential.
113
  In this 
sense, we might argue that the current nature of electoral politics and the spoils of 
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 In 2002, Ismail Cem‟s New Turkey Party could be seen as one example.  The politicians that 
have split off from the AKP and formed their own party, such as Abdüllatif Şener‟s Turkey Party 
have also shown little potential to attract voters.  The People‟s Voice Party formed by Professor 
Numan Kurtulmuş after he broke away from the Felicity Party also seems destined to the same fate. 
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the ballot box are the most closely in tandem with and explained by the electoral 
system than they have ever been in the Republic‟s multiparty system history. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
 
Opportunities for change take place within contexts and within these 
contingent environments certain types of change are encouraged or discouraged.  
Though many of the attitudes and orientations toward politics have changed 
throughout the years, some have seemed to persist at least until the present and have 
had what seems to be significant impact on the functioning of the Turkish party 
system and electoral competition.  The predominant values internalized by the 
voting citizen and political elites have important implications on the type of parties 
that flourish in the system and how those parties behave toward the electorate and 
one another.  In Turkey, rather than emphasizing the interests of particular groups in 
society with the understanding that the balance of interests between parties adds up 
to or approaches the general interest, parties are generally expected to represent the 
interests of all groups and the nation at the party level.  This clearly impacts how 
parties interact and the strategies that they employ in order to garner votes at 
election time.  Furthermore, the existing norms related to leadership authority 
within parties have observable implications toward party system fragmentation and 
polarization stemming from uncooperative behaviors, issues that will be discussed 
in greater detail in the following chapter. 
Though the institution of the electoral system, normally an agent of continuity, 
has been the focus of numerous changes and alterations, its power to direct change 
in the party system has had less of an impact than might typically be anticipated.  
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Though since 1961, its proportional rules have made it less a constraining force 
than the rules for plurality operating in the 1950s, the changes that have taken place 
could arguably be better attributed to other  intervening forces.  For most of 
Turkey‟s historical electoral competition, the electoral rules have not strongly stood 
in the way of either fragmentation or contraction of the system, which was instead 
spurred on by forces related to the political paradigms or the process of transition 
from one paradigm to another.    
Though there have been a number of constraints that have set some of the 
boundaries within which contestation has taken place to this point in the history of 
the Turkish party system, these constraints have only provided historical limitations 
to its operation,
114
 they cannot explain how the system has operated within these 
boundaries, an issue particularly salient when seeking to understand a particular 
case.  How parties and political elites have responded in unique ways to changing 
contexts and how their fellow competitors have in turn responded to these 
initiatives, within the boundaries set by this “continuities”, remains of critical 
importance in understanding how the system has operated through its history.
115
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  The author also wishes to acknowledge once again that these observed constraints, such as the 
value toward “nation parties,” can change or be altered in the future.  These are also not fixed. 
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 In this regard, Sayarı writes, “The ability of party leaders to adapt to changing social and 
economic conditions and transform their parties has had a major impact on the dynamics of the party 
system as a whole.” Sayarı, “The Changing Party System,” p. 28. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
VOLATILITY, FRAGMENTATION, AND POLARIZATION: 
MEASURING CHANGE  
 
 
 
For many writers,  
the classification of party systems begins with numbers;  
for some, this is also where classification ends.
1
 
 
In attempting to describe the operation of the Turkish party system, students of 
Turkish politics and the party system in particular have often turned to the tools of 
terminology and formulaic indices frequently employed within the field of 
comparative politics for help in making sense of the observed phenomena in the 
Turkish case.  Most frequently, the descriptors “volatility, fragmentation, and 
polarization” 2  and their widely-utilized formula have been employed to 
characterize the salient features of political and voting behavior, especially since 
the 1970s.   Though these descriptors were conceived to measure change, they 
have often been used to posit continuity—continuous change.  Thus, considering 
their frequent application to the party system in Turkey, it seems worthwhile to 
investigate how these have been used in other contexts, what potential logical or 
                                                          
1
 Stefano Bartolini and Peter Mair, Identity, Competition, and Electoral Availability: The 
Stabilization of European Electorates 1885-1985 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 
p. 130. 
2
 By volatility “the net electoral change between two consecutive elections” is intended.  See Ibid., 
p. 19.  Fragmentation of votes refers to the change in the number of parties competing in electoral 
contests.  Polarization reflects the “distance” between parties or social groups in relation to issues, 
ideology, or consensus.   
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explanative problems have arisen in their utilization in scholarship regarding this 
country, how they might logically apply to the Turkish case, and what they do and 
do not tell us. 
While on one level it certainly seems reasonable to posit these descriptors as 
indicative of the Turkish case across time, how these descriptors are being used 
and how they interact is often left to the imagination.  Lumping together 
descriptors that could likely be interacting in very important ways potentially 
removes the opportunity for a rich understanding of the dynamics of a system.  
These three concepts—volatility, fragmentation, and polarization—referred to in 
one account as the “Bermuda Triangle” of the Turkish party system,3 though 
listed so as to suggest continuity, seem best employed to pinpoint and investigate 
change.  Thus, while it might be true that these three are regularly appearing 
dynamics in the system, observing alterations in their interactions could be of 
greater benefit than emphasizing their continuous presence. 
An additional danger, evident in the comparative literature in general—as 
the chapter‟s initial quotation suggest—and the Turkish case in particular, is to 
endow these concepts and their formulas with causal significance, suggesting that 
the indicators are not merely symptoms of the state of the party system, but the 
continuous “malady” causing undesirable results in the system.  Furthermore, the 
convenient formulas for such descriptors, such as those put forth by Rae, Pedersen 
and Laakso and Taagepera, are crude measures that operate from a distant view of 
the system, missing crucial elements and potentially misguiding interpretations in 
                                                          
3
 Üstün Ergüder and Richard Hofferbert, “The 1983 General Elections in Turkey:  Continuity or 
Change in Voting Patterns,” in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, eds., State, Democracy and the 
Military: Turkey in the 80s (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), p. 85. 
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certain cases.  Though useful, if distant or rough, the formulas and the data 
derived from them necessitate an accompanying observational logic and the 
understanding that these are tools to help locate the acting forces upon or within 
the system, not the manifestation of the primary acting forces themselves. 
 The clarification of how the particular concepts are being used is also of 
critical importance.  For example, the concept “polarization” can be understood in 
various ways and operates very differently from context to context.  Whether or 
not we are talking about ideological or personalistic polarization would lead us to 
very different conclusions regarding its interaction.  While the former could be 
conceivably functioning to limit volatility and fragmentation, the latter would 
likely increase fragmentation.  Is polarization occurring on an elite level or is it 
reflected in cleavages in society?  Is the polarization pro-system—i.e. 
emphasizing divisions along the current lines of political contestation, which 
would likely increase voter turnout—or it is anti-system, challenging the existing 
lines within which politics is framed and leaving many in the electorate 
disillusioned and frustrated with the status quo.  In other words, “polarization” is 
not simply “polarization” and must be located, delineated carefully and, ideally, 
measured when used to explain a particular case.  Leaving the intended meaning 
of polarization in the text to the interpretation of the reader could further 
confound a full comprehension of the interactional nature of the various 
descriptors, the consequences of which will be demonstrated in greater detail 
below. 
Another important consideration is the intention and context from which 
these descriptors were derived and how to transfer the employed formulas and 
 92 
 
interpretation with the intention of studying the Turkish or any other particular 
case.  Though it is true that volatility, fragmentation and polarization have been 
correlated with political instability, this relationship is also clearly related to 
particular contexts: what a certain parallel level of volatility or fragmentation 
means for Turkey could be associated with very different interpretations in 
Switzerland.  If a formula tells us that volatility in some Western European 
country has been around 8.5 over a certain period while it hovered around 20 in 
Turkey across the same time span,
4
 what does that tell us?  Does higher volatility 
necessarily mean that it is representative of a systemic malady, or might different 
average levels of volatility relate to particular contexts and varying dynamics? If 
so, the different rates superficially demonstrate neither a positive or negative 
manifestation, but one that needs to be explained by deeper investigation.   
For example, a country clearly divided across varying ethnic or religious 
groups who each give their vote in mass to a party that represents only their 
identities could conceivably have a volatility rate approaching zero, but most 
analysts would likely not give an optimistic prognosis for the longevity of such a 
democratic regime.  This, perhaps, seems obvious, but the implications of 
underlying assumptions toward volatility, which often involve a standard of 
comparison to “Advanced Industrial Democracies” when “non-Western” 
countries are the focus of study, could be quite misleading in individual cases and, 
thus, the numbers for such descriptors, such as volatility or fragmentation, should 
not speak for themselves, but must be placed within the particular context and 
                                                          
4
 This approximation has been given in the Turkish case, for example, by Çarkoğlu for the period 
1954 through 1995. He determined an average volatility of 21.2.  Ali Çarkoğlu, “The Turkish 
Party System in Transition: Party Performance and Agenda Transformation,” Political Studies, 
Vol. 46 (1998), p. 547.  
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then evaluated.  This suggests the need to be aware of both the context from 
whence the concepts were conceived and the environment in which those 
concepts are being applied in the specific case. 
 
3.1 Volatility in Comparative Literature and in Turkish Electoral Behavior 
 
In 1979, Mogens Pedersen established the widely used and simple formula 
to measure electoral volatility.  If one takes the absolute value of the gain and loss 
of each competing party between the current and previous elections and divide by 
two, one can determine the level of electoral volatility from election to election.
5
  
With such an index, the range of volatility can range from 0, in which all parties 
received the exact same percentage of votes in both elections, and 100, where all 
parties competing in the subsequent election are new (the 1983 election in Turkey 
being such an example).  While the formula itself is easily understood and easily 
applied, it is important to note the context in which Pedersen was using the 
formula and why. 
Both the context and the purpose behind Pedersen‟s study can be derived 
from the original title of his original article: “The Dynamics of European Party 
Systems: Changing Patterns of Electoral Volatility.”6  The context of the article is 
clearly the European—particularly consolidated Western and Northern 
European—party systems with the expressed intention to understand change and 
patterns “diachronically.”  According to the author, the article was prompted by 
the “phenomena of change . . . visible primarily, but not solely, in the Northern 
                                                          
5
 Mogens Pedersen, “Electoral Volatility in Western Europe, 1948-1977,” in Peter Mair, ed., The 
West European Party System (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 198-9. 
6
 Mogens Pedersen, “The Dynamics of European Party Systems: Changing Patterns of Electoral 
Volatility,” European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 7, No. 1 (1979), pp. 1-26.  
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European countries.”7  This concern arose out of what appeared to be manifest 
deviation from the “freezing” of party systems posited by Lipset and Rokkan in 
1967.
8
  Note how Pedersen describes the impetus for the creation of the index for 
volatility: 
If we want to concentrate attention on ongoing format change, we 
therefore have to devise measures of change that will discriminate 
among systems; which will reflect similarities and differences 
between diachronic patterns; and which are fairly easy to interpret in a 
theoretically meaningful way.
9
 
Thus, the purpose behind the measurements is in order to compare and search for 
change, and perhaps, patterns of change.  This is in fact what Pedersen does in the 
article when he applies the measurement to the thirteen European countries he 
studies.  He‟s using the index to examine both the differences between countries 
and the changes in volatility within a country over time.
10
 
Why is this significant?  Pedersen is not using the index to say that France is 
a high volatility nation and that Switzerland is a country with low volatility and 
leaving it at that, as if the rate itself was a meaningful descriptor of the system—
i.e. high volatility represents a poorly functioning system while low volatility is 
the mark of a superior system.  His emphasis is on understanding if and how 
volatility rates in France or Switzerland are changing, and if so, why?  The salient 
issue is change and patterns of change, and whether or not similar patterns of 
change can be detected across nations.  Furthermore, Pedersen is evaluating a 
particular set of countries whose geographical proximity and political histories 
                                                          
7
 Pedersen, “Electoral Volatility in Western Europe,” p. 196. 
8
 Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan, “Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignment: 
An Introduction,” in Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan, eds, Party Systems and Voter Alignment: 
Cross-National Perspectives (New York: Free Press, 1967), pp. 1-64. 
9
 Pedersen, “Electoral Volatility in Western Europe,” p. 198. 
10
 Ibid., pp. 200, 202. 
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would likely demonstrate overlapping trends in relation to volatility; however, 
even among such a group of cases, distinct variance in patterns of volatility and 
trends over time could be seen.  In short, the volatility numbers do not provide an 
explanation for any case, but simply provide the tools assisting explanation of a 
case or cases over time.   
Additionally, in terms of volatility, there is a great deal that the numbers 
don‟t tell us.  As Bartolini and Mair have pointed out, though in a very crude 
sense this measurement of the aggregate net electoral change could be seen as 
representing the minimum amount of actual volatility, even this is complicated by 
a regular influx of new voters and changes in electoral turnout.
11
  This is an issue 
of considerable importance for Turkey, which experiences a net average of 3 
million new voters with each national election. From the general election in 1950 
to the general election in 2007, the population of registered voters went from less 
than 9 million to almost 43 million,
12
 an increase approaching 500 percent.  In 
contrast to the shrinking populations in the advanced industrial nations of Europe, 
the phenomenon of which would likely encourage stable voting patterns and limit 
volatility, such population increases are a serious confounding factor in national 
aggregate volatility scores for Turkey. 
 For one example of these challenges, the National Salvation Party (Milli 
Selamet Partisi-MSP) garnered 11.8 percent of the vote in 1973.  In the 1977 
election, the party increased its votes by more than 4,000, but their overall 
percentage slipped to 8.6 percent.  How can we explain what has occurred with 
                                                          
11
 Bartolini and Mair, Identity, Competition and Electoral Availability, p. 21. 
12
 Official Electoral data for general elections can be found in, Milletvekili Genel Seçimleri 1923-
2007 (Ankara: Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu, 2008). 
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volatility scores that only measure the aggregate net change in percentage of votes 
won?  Ultimately, we cannot.  Did every voter in 1973 cast their vote again for the 
MSP along with approximately four thousand new voters?  How do we account 
for the four million additional voters who cast votes in 1977, but for whatever 
reason—disinterest, inability, etc.—had not voted in 1973?  How do these 
changes affect the composition of votes received by parties from election to 
election?  Accounting for a 3.2 percent loss of votes becomes extremely 
complicated when we begin digging under the surface.  Thus, while national 
aggregate volatility scores give us a glance at possible changes in preferences 
among the electorate, it remains at a great distance and tells us very little about 
changes taking place at the group, class or individual level. 
Table 3.1 provides the total 
volatility for general elections in 
Turkey since 1950 along with the 
volatility occurring between voting 
blocs.
13
  Several observations can be 
made from the data fairly quickly:  
with the exception of elections 
following a military intervention and 
a few notable exceptions including 
1954 and 2002, the general numbers 
for volatility have indeed hovered 
                                                          
13
 See Bartolini and Mair, Identity, Competition and Electoral Availability, pp. 22-3. 
Table 3.1 Electoral Volatility 
Period 
Total 
Vol. 
Inter-
bloc 
Intra-
bloc 
1950-1954 4.5 4.5 0.0 
1954-1957 11.0 6.0 5.0 
1957-1961 56.8* 4.3 52.5 
1961-1965 29.8 3.8 26.0 
1965-1969 14.8 5.6 9.2 
1969-1973 30.1* 2.0 28.1 
1973-1977 18.3 5.7 12.6 
1977-1983 100.0* 13.1 86.9 
1983-1987 38.5 2.9 35.6 
1987-1991 17.4 1.9 15.5 
1991-1995 22.7 1.7 21.0 
1995-1999 22.6 7.7 14.9 
1999-2002 57.0 4.1 52.9 
2002-2007 19.4 5.1 14.3 
AVERAGE 23.3* 4.9 26.7 
* Elections following military intervention. Average 
is calculated without these. 
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around 20 percent as noted also by Çarkoğlu, 14  and the volatility occurring 
between voting blocs has been minimal, at least from the perspective of net 
change.  Thus, where volatility has been high, it has largely operated within blocs 
rather than across them.
15
  What does such an overview tell us?  Why has total 
volatility in general elections in Turkey remained high?  Is this a sign of a lack of 
institutionalization?  What is the significance of high total volatility in relation to 
fairly low volatility across blocks? 
In the initial studies of volatility, as is true with Pedersen‟s study and a 
number of other seminal works on party systems,
16
 the essential cases were 
largely well-established Western European democracies.  With the explosion of 
new democracies in Eastern Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia after the fall of the 
Soviet bloc, there was new motivation to investigate and compare these new 
democracies with the older, established countries of Western Europe.  What was 
discovered was that the volatility in these new countries appeared to be 
significantly higher than in the more established democratic regimes;
17
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 Çarkoğlu, “The Turkish Party System in Transition,” p. 547. 
15
 This has also been noted by Özbudun, who provides a table effectively showing the continuation 
of percentage votes received by each bloc (left and right) over time.  Ergun Özbudun, “Changes 
and Continuities in the Turkish Party System,” Representation, Vol. 42, No. 2 (2006), p. 130.  
Sayarı also has demonstrated that volatility between blocs has been substantially less than 
volatility within blocs. Sabri Sayarı, “Towards a New Turkish Party System,” Turkish Studies, 
Vol. 8, No. 2 (2007), p. 200. 
16
 For other seminal studies addressing volatility in Western Europe, see Bartolini and Mair, 
Identity, Competition and Electoral Availability; and Peter Mair, Party System Change: 
Approaches and Interpretations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997). 
17
 For example, see Scott Mainwaring, Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of 
Democratization (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), pp. 21-60; Scott Mainwaring and 
Edurne Zoco, “Political Sequences and the Stabilization of Interparty Competition: Electoral 
Volatility in Old and New Democracies,” Party Politics, Vol. 13, No. 2 (2007), pp. 155-78; 
Christopher Anderson, “Parties, Party Systems, and Satisfaction with Democratic Performance in 
the New Europe,” Political Studies, Vol. 46 (1998), pp. 572-88.  A similar comparison in a well-
known studies were made for old and new Latin American democracies.  See, Kenneth Roberts 
and Erik Wibbels, “Party Systems and Electoral Volatility in Latin America: A Test of Economic, 
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furthermore, these fledgling countries‟ struggles with instability seemed to be 
paired with the observable rates of relatively higher volatility often with the 
assumption that swings in the electorate was due to “weak institutions.” 
Compounding this has been the frequent observation that, as a whole, these 
established democracies in Europe are encountering a trend toward higher total 
volatility scores, if not on scores between blocs.
18
  How should all of these 
observations be interpreted? 
In a study of volatility between old and new democracies, Mainwaring and 
Zoco, studying 47 countries over time and controlling for a number of possible 
variables, discovered that the chief determinant of low levels of volatility is the 
age of the democracy, and that volatility within countries did not tend to decrease 
over time whether or not the democratic regime was consolidated.
19
  For example, 
despite the impact of any other variables, the model predicted that a democracy 
emerging in 1945 would have an average volatility of 16 while a democracy 
initiated in 1980 would have a volatility of 24.4.
20
  Interestingly, if one removes 
the elections in Turkey that occurred in exceptional circumstances following 
military intervention, the average falls between these two predicted values.   
Why would age of the democracy but not the years of the existence of 
democracy make such a difference?  Mainwaring and Zoco argue that the period 
in which enfranchisement occurred is crucial because in the older democracies, as 
                                                                                                                                                              
Institutional, and Structural Explanations,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 93, No. 3 
(1999), pp. 575-90. 
18
 Mair has consistently shown that the increasing volatility is occurring within blocs rather than 
between them, such that the votes are staying within the “family” so to speak.  Mair, Party System 
Change, pp. 79-82. 
19
 Mainwaring and Zoco, “Political Sequences,” p. 165. 
20
 Ibid., pp. 165-6. 
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new blocs of voters entered the system for the first time, parties that represented 
these groups, such as laborers or farmers, either formed to represent these 
identities or fought prior to enfranchisement for these groups to become full-
fledged democratic citizens.
21
  Thus, for members of these groups, their identity 
and citizenship is bound together with these parties that facilitated or emerged 
during their enfranchisement.  Because these groups were easily identifiable and 
because the parties themselves needed financial support to maintain their 
activities, membership and mobilization and education were emphasized and, thus, 
they operated as mass parties.
22
  A party system that is at least partly composed of 
this type of party, functioning as an identity mobilizer, will tend to have lower 
volatility.  As Bartolini and Mair write, “the mass enfranchisement of new voters 
represents the single most important moment in the structuring of party 
systems.”23  Why was it so crucial in structuring these systems?  “New mass 
parties in the period approaching and subsequent to the extension of the franchise 
to the mass of the citizenry effectively minimized the potential for new political 
formations.”24  Mass parties limited the potentially available votes in the system 
with a clear consequence for electoral volatility. 
On the other hand, in countries in which television became a mass 
phenomenon before the consolidation of electoral cleavages, the more 
technological, pragmatic approaches enabled politicians to persuade the masses 
directly through the media at a distance without the hassle and inefficiency of 
                                                          
21
 Ibid., p. 166. 
22
 For more on this categorization and its absence in the Turkish case, see chapter two. 
23
 Bartolini and Mair, Identity, Competition and Electoral Availability, p. 147. 
24
 Ibid., p. 147. 
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mass party structures.
25
  New realities have made it more likely for votes to be 
acquired by methods of persuasion with the natural consequence of such methods 
being that the electorate, without close affiliational ties to any particular party, 
will “shop around” even if they stay within certain relational or ideological 
boundaries.  In such a context, without mobilized voting and with an independent 
electorate,
26
 volatility will necessarily run at higher levels. These higher volatility 
levels are not necessarily the result of an institutional malady then, but a 
difference related to historical contingencies.
27
  Although it has been the tradition 
in comparative literature to refer to class cleavages related to mass parties and 
mobilized voting by social groups as “functional cleavages,” the individual 
voter‟s behavior of ceaselessly voting according to his social class identity could 
be seen as no more “functional” than the “cultural cleavages” that predated them.  
Thus, though parties and their leadership are moving further away from direct 
contact, albeit localized and limited, with their party supporters, individual voters 
are also becoming empowered to choose and less limited by pre-determined 
identities, whether social class or cultural. 
                                                          
25
 Mainwaring and Zoco, “Political Sequences,” p. 167.  See also Russell Dalton and Martin 
Wattenburg, eds., Parties without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial 
Democracies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); and Philippe Schmitter, “Parties Are Not 
What They Once Were,” in Larry Diamond and Richard Gunther, eds., Political Parties and 
Democracy (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), pp. 67-89. 
26
 Anderson, in his comparative study of volatility between a number of old and new European 
democracies found that institutional differences, the proportionality of the electoral system, to be 
the prime issue effecting the rates of volatility between countries.  If one peruses the data, 
however, it becomes clear that the prime factor causing the coefficients to be significant is the 
inclusion of the new countries in the analysis.  The reason for this seems to be because the new 
countries did not have high rates of party membership or evidence of class voting in their 
elections—both traits of non-modern periods of democratic development.  Anderson, “Parties, 
Party Systems, and Satisfaction,” pp. 579-81.  
27
 Maladies, of course, most certainly do exist within institutions in these countries as they also 
exist in the so-called “advanced industrial democracies”; however, the tendency when 
investigating new or “non-Western” democracies is to assume that institutional or cultural 
maladies are the problem while maladies are usually ignored when faced with similar trends and 
the emphasis is placed on changing technology or other global forces. 
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What then is the concern about high levels of volatility?  By making a case 
that volatility is not necessarily the indication of political instability, at least at the 
regime level, but potentially just a reflection of the reality of the current patterns 
of political interaction in many democratic countries, does this imply that 
volatility is not a possible sign of a problem?  As Mainwaring and Zoco also 
pointed out, electorates generally need shortcuts and cues in order to know how to 
vote.  Most voters are not able to follow politicians and campaigns so closely that 
parties and images do not matter.  Consistent patterns and images help voters 
make “informed” political judgments at the ballot box.  If parties are constantly 
coming and going, the electorate has a terrific challenge in determining how these 
parties are positioning themselves in relation to one another.  Such stable 
positioning allows a voter with limited specific knowledge to anticipate the 
constellation of issues that a particular party might take up, encouraging the voter 
to participate in the system.
28
  Furthermore, volatility can be a sign that the 
electorate is not happy with government performance and existing political 
representation,
29
 signally disillusionment that could potentially become directed at 
the regime itself if not corrected.  High volatility can also open the door to new 
parties and political outsiders that could pose a threat to democratic 
consolidation.
30
 
Analyzing the volatility in Turkey in light of these considerations leads us 
to several sound interpretations and a few points that would require deeper 
investigation than what volatility can provide us.  Based on the context within 
                                                          
28
 Mainwaring and Zoco, “Political Sequences,” p. 157.  This particular issue is also discussed in 
greater detail in chapter four. 
29
 Roberts and Wibbels, “Party Systems and Electoral Volatility,” p. 575. 
30
 Mainwaring and Zoco, “Political Sequences,” p. 156. 
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which Turkey‟s democratic regime emerged (post-World War II) and considering 
the three significant, but relatively brief military interventions, Turkish electoral 
volatility rates are within what might be anticipated.  If we also consider the 
country‟s tendency to prefer inclusive, non-class based “nation parties” which 
have frequently demonstrated the characteristics of “catch-all” parties,31 average 
volatility in the range of 20 might be expected.  Furthermore, when a few 
exceptional cases are removed, the pattern from election to election has shown 
itself to be relatively stable, with neither a clear increasing nor decreasing trend 
being observed.   
Finally, the low volatility scores between blocs seem to demonstrate that the 
electorate has fairly good knowledge about how parties are positioning 
themselves in relation to one another and that, from election to election, those 
major blocs are holding their ground.  The greatest amount of volatility seems to 
be occurring within blocs among relatively similar or related choices.  All of this 
suggests, that the party system in Turkey has been institutionalized, even if 
individual parties have not.  In other words, the voters have a reasonable idea 
about where the major parties are positioning themselves in relation to one 
another and that the voters more or less acquiesce to the primary divisions 
established in the system in any given period. 
Considering the stable and relatively low volatility existing between blocs 
(see Table 3.2), the possibility opens up for the existence of an essential cleavage 
that has shaped the pattern of political contestation since the advent of multiparty 
politics.  As will be discussed in great depth in chapter four, such an essential  
                                                          
31
 See chapter two. 
 103 
 
cleavage has been posited for Turkey as a center-periphery divide.  The stability 
observed at the net aggregate level certainly provides a least the possibility of 
such a continuous cleavage, but it does not 
in any way conclusively support it.  Here 
we reach the limit of what electoral 
volatility on a national scale can tell us; it 
is simply too distant to rule out the 
possibility of shifting among groups or in 
the essential dividing line between blocs.  
It is possible for the ultimate political 
argument to shift in such as way as to 
maintain a large portion of the previous 
divide while picking up new voting blocks 
and losing others.  If this were to occur, the volatility score at the national level 
would not show it.  Thus, continuity in blocs at the national level would not be 
effective evidence against change either in groups of voters switching sides or a 
shift in the divide as to what is considered “left” and “right”.  Such discussions 
must remain outside the scope of volatility as it is commonly used at the national 
level and must wait to be taken up in greater detail in chapter three and four.  
Thus, volatility, when used to examine trends in the Turkish case, will also be 
employed at the sub-national level in order to discover whether or not there exist 
patterns of electoral change at more localized levels, such as that of the province 
or district. 
 
Table 3.2 – Bloc Voting Patterns 
 Bloc Left Bloc Right 
1950 39.6 59.8 
1954 35.1 64.3 
1957 41.4 58.6 
1961 36.7 62.5 
1965 31.7 65.1 
1969 32.9 55 
1973 34.4 57.5 
1977 41.9 53.7 
1983 30.5 68.4 
1987 33.3 65.5 
1991 32 67.9 
1995 29.7 68.9 
1999 36.9 60.7 
2002 29 61 
2007 26.5 68.6 
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3. 2 What Fragmentation of the Votes in the Party System Can Tell Us 
The question of party system volatility itself was conceived in conjunction 
with the concept and formulas for party fragmentation in the system.  Pedersen, in 
creating his formula for volatility argued that indices for fragmentation did not 
greatly assist the study of party system change as these formulas are static, 
measuring the “states” of the systems rather than the “processes” that formed 
them.
32
 In later work, Pedersen and other subsequent prominent works on the 
subject, find that volatility and fragmentation in the system are clearly 
correlated.
33
  However, as Bartolini and Mair point out, there are limits to this 
relationship as a decrease in fragmentation also increases volatility; thus, the 
concepts, though related, are not circularly related.
34
 
What does fragmentation tell us?  Table 3.3
35
 shows the calculations for 
fragmentation of votes in the Turkish party system based on two well-known 
formulas and two more recent indices for this descriptor. In the first column, 
Douglas Rae‟s fractionalization index,36 through weighting the electoral returns of 
competing parties such that the largest parties have greater effect on the 
calculation, measures the extent to which a system‟s electoral strength is 
distributed among various political parties.  The second column‟s index, provided 
by Laakso and Taagepera, flips the squared fractional shares so that the data can 
                                                          
32
 Mogens Pedersen, “On Measuring Party System Change: A Methodological Critique and a 
Suggestion,” Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 12, No. 4 (1980), p. 388. 
33
 Mogens Pedersen, “Changing Patterns of Electoral Volatility in European Party Systems, 1948-
1977: Explorations in Explanation,” in Hans Daalder and Peter Mair, eds., Western European 
Party Systems: Continuity and Change (London: Sage, 1983), p. 52; Bartolini and Mair, Identity, 
Competition and Electoral Availability, p. 143. 
34
 Ibid., p. 131. 
35
 Data taken from, Milletvekili Genel Seçimleri. 
36
 The formula is 1 minus the sum of the squares of electoral shares of all parties. Douglas Rae, 
The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1967). 
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be read as a measurement of effective number of parties in the system;
37
 thus, 
though the scales are entirely complementary, based on the same sum of squared 
fractional shares of the vote, they provide a different mental picture of the 
fragmentation.  Furthermore, as Laakso and Taagepera point out, as the Rae‟s 
fragmentation figures increase in size, it hides the extent of party number 
change.
38
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In a 2010 study, Grigorii Golosov proposes a new formula for effective 
number of parties that is less problematic in extreme cases (column three of Table 
3.3).
39
  The formula, though a bit more complicated than the sum of fractional 
                                                          
37
 Markku Laakso and Rein Taagepera, “‟Effective‟ Number of Parties: A Measure with 
Application to West Europe,” Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 12, No. 1 (1979), p. 4. 
38
 Ibid., pp. 23-4. 
39
 The formula for this measurement is the sum of one over one plus the square of the party with 
the largest share divided by the share of „i‟ party minus the share of „i‟ party.  Grigorii Golosov, 
Table 3.3 – Measures of Fragmentation 
 
Election 
Rae‘s 
Index 
Effective 
number 
of Parties-
LT-1979 
Effective 
number 
of Parties-
G-2010 
Effective 
number 
of Parties-
TPS 
1950 .536 2.2 1.9 2.11 
1954 .533 2.1 1.8 2.14 
1957 .587 2.4 2.2 2.22 
1961 .706 3.4 3.1 2.8/2.3* 
1965 .630 2.7 2.2 2.50 
1969 .696 3.3 2.7 2.83 
1973 .767 4.3 3.9 3.39 
1977 .680 3.1 2.9 2.61 
1983 .649 2.9 2.4 2.65 
1987 .757 4.1 3.5 3.46 
1991 .786 4.7 4.3 4.15 
1995 .838 6.2 6.1 5.48 
1999 .853 6.8 6.3 5.78 
2002 .816 5.4 4.3 4.33 
2007 .712 3.5 2.7 3.13 
* First number is actual fragmentation. The second figure 
represents fragmentation if one controls for the unnatural 
confusion regarding the legacy of the closed Democrat Party 
that seemed to be rectified by the subsequent general election. 
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squares models, calculates the number of “effective” parties by juxtaposing the 
strength of each party in relation to the party with the largest share of the votes.  
While the numbers stay fairly consistent with Laakso and Taagepera‟s index for 
the moderate cases, as are typically found in Western European democracies with 
which the earlier formulas were tested, the Golosov index seems to produce a 
more intuitively accurate number for systems with a strongly predominant party 
or very fragmented systems with lots of little minor parties.
40
  In the fourth 
column a derivation of this formula has been created by this author that is 
sensitive to the fragmentation away from a two-party system, in particular, rather 
than fragmentation away from the dominant party; it assumes, at minimum, a two-
party format. 
What interpretations can be made of the Turkish party system based on 
these calculations? Even one of the seminal works, creating the index for effective 
number of parties, bids us caution on this account.  Laakso and Taagepera write, 
“We must distinguish between party system stability (of which the effective 
number of parties is one aspect) and government leadership stability.”41  Their 
own study of number of parties and government instability leads them to this 
conclusion: “There is little correlation between [average number of parties] and 
executive instability.”42  For example, in a case like Turkey, which has had its 
share of political and governmental instability, often but not always associated 
with coalition governments, we see a secular trend toward increasing 
                                                                                                                                                              
“The Effective Number of Parties: A New Approach,” Party Politics, Vol. 16, No. 2 (2010), pp. 
171-92. 
40
 Ibid., pp. 183-7.  
41
 Ibid., p. 20. 
42
 Ibid., p. 21. 
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fragmentation, with the fractionalization index reading above .8 and effective 
number of parties registering above 6.  One could make the evaluation that it was 
the level of fragmentation that created the problems of governance.  However, one 
finds very similar numbers for Switzerland, frequently associated with stability, in 
the last two elections (2003 and 2007) with fractionalization numbers at .817 
and .822 and the effective number of parties ala Laakso and Taagepera 
approaching 6.
43
  Throughout Europe, one can find many similar figures 
corresponding to those calculated for Turkey, but in each case, how the 
government functions differs.   
This is also true for different governments in Turkey.  In 1977, the ability of 
the governments to effectively govern was quite notably less than the 
governments of 1987 and even those of 1991, even though the latter have higher 
scores of fragmentation.  Although scholars frequently argued that it was 
fragmentation of the vote that led to the inability of those governments in the 
1970s to govern, the actual number of parties and fragmentation was not 
particularly great—according to Laakso and Taagepera‟s index, the effective 
number of parties was just above three and less fragmented than even the 2007 
election results.  Though the two major parties following the 1977 elections had a 
major percentage of the vote share, the problem was intractable behavior of 
political leaders that would have likely led to the same net result if the two parties 
had 98 percent of the vote between them and a 49 percent share apiece. 
Fragmentation figures, then, do not tell us how political elites will behave once 
                                                          
43
 Number were taken from, Clive Church, “The Swiss Elections of October 2003: Two Steps 
Toward System Change?” West European Politics, Vol. 27, No. 3 (2004), p. 525; Clive Church, 
“The Swiss Election of 21 October 2007: Consensus Fights Back,” West European Politics, Vol. 
31, No. 3 (2008), p. 614. 
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the shares are distributed, and this seems to make a critical difference in regard to 
the relation between stability and fragmentation. 
Furthermore, the formulas used to derive measurements of fragmentation 
are not precise and in certain cases mislead.  The different data outcomes for 1950 
and 1954 are indicative of this problem.  Any formula taking into account the 
squares of a fraction are going to necessarily overweigh the effect of a party that 
garners a large percentage of the vote, which could potentially mask an increase 
in actual fragmentation.  In 1950, the two parties combined garnered 
approximately 95 percent of the total vote.  In 1954, they received a smaller 
percentage of the total vote to the favor of a growing third party along with the 
entrance of a fourth, but because the winning party increased its overall total, the 
indices suggest that fragmentation was decreasing slightly when the opposite 
could be seen as true, depending on what is considered relevant fragmentation.  
With this in mind, only the derivative of Golosov‟s index that is particularly 
sensitive to fragmentation away from two-party competition picks up the 
increased fragmentation.
44
  Although such an index might not be relevant in all 
cases, a significant period of the history of the Turkish party system demonstrated 
a penchant toward two major competing parties, though one party was often 
dominant. Thus, while it functions in many cases similarly to the other indices, it 
detects movement away from two major parties more so than fragmentation away 
from simply the largest party. Thus, this index observes increased fragmentation 
in 1954, despite the gains of the Democrat Party, and also in periods like 1965 
where overall fragmentation was increasing despite the gains of the dominant 
                                                          
44
 The formula used for this index is: NP= ∑ 2/1+((S1+S2)²/(Si+Sj))-(Si+Sj) 
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party.  It is also more sensitive to fragmentation in 2007 than Golosov‟s index for 
similar reasons. The drawback to this index is that it is insensitive to predominant 
party systems, which could be a serious concern in particular cases, like India or 
Mexico, for example. 
The measurements of fragmentation, though rough and distant tools, do 
allow us to see patterns that might help us to locate areas in which further 
investigation might help uncover forces at work that are shaping the system.  
Though the indices for this descriptor have generally increased with time, there 
are a number of occasions where these patterns were reversed.  Although they 
could be anomalies, they might also signal a change in which unique patterns of 
interaction were taking place.  Military interventions, electoral systems, and shifts 
in tactics of political competition could trigger the entrance of new parties or the 
trend toward directing votes toward several parties engaged in a particular line of 
competition. 
These quantifiable data do not tell us that increasing fragmentation will 
increase government instability or polarization.
45
  At this point, it might be argued 
that where government instability and fragmentation coexist, there are likely other 
factors producing these two symptoms.  In other words, the malady is likely not 
the number of parties per se, but rather that which is causing the parties to splinter 
and the electorate to distribute their votes more broadly across a greater number 
of parties.  Certainly, a fragmented system would not assist effective governing 
when political elites behave inflexibly, but as could be seen in Turkey in the 
                                                          
45
 Sani and Sartori also emphasize this point in their notable work on fragmentation and 
ideological polarization. Giacomo Sani and Giovanni Sartori, “Polarization, Fragmentation and 
Competition in Western Democracies,” in Hans Daalder and Peter Mair, eds., Western European 
Party Systems: Continuity and Change (London: Sage, 1983), pp. 307-8, 336. 
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1950s, such belligerent and problematic behavior can exist even in the context of 
a party system with one party having a large governing majority.  Thus, it seems 
that the existence of fragmentation itself is not explanative of a party system, but 
a phenomenon that itself needs to be explained. 
A number of reasons have been posed in comparative literature to explain 
an increase in electoral fragmentation; several notable claims involve the size of 
the electorate, socioeconomic heterogeneity, the electoral system, and ideological 
polarization.  We will discuss the issue of ideological polarization and its relation 
with fragmentation in the subsequent section of this chapter.  As for the electoral 
system and its effects on fragmentation, this topic was discussed extensively in 
chapter two; briefly, however, the logical relationship between electoral systems 
and fragmentation that adheres to observed phenomena, as posited by Sartori,
46
 is 
that disproportionate systems are more likely to constrain the system—i.e. reduce 
the level of fragmentation—and that as a system becomes more proportional it is 
non-constraining—i.e. it functions as a non-effect.  Increased proportionality does 
not cause increased fragmentation, but it does not stop it.  In the Turkish case, the 
rather drastic shift in systems from plurality to proportional representation seemed 
to have less of an effect on the fragmentation itself than did other important 
factors.  Fragmentation was increasing under the plurality system and its increase 
that cannot be explained by other factors after the switch to proportional 
representation seems to move in the same pattern as was observed in the previous 
electoral system.  Furthermore, when efforts were made to increase 
                                                          
46
 Giovanni Sartori, “The Party Effects of Electoral Systems,” in Larry Diamond and Richard 
Gunther, eds., Political Parties and Democracy (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
2001), pp. 92-3. 
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disproportionality by altering the electoral system rules, fragmentation of the vote 
quickly increased.
47
  Thus, at least for the Turkish case, electoral system changes 
appear to be a relatively weaker explanation for the observed increases and 
decreases in fragmentation. 
As for other explanations of fragmentation, in a study of Britain, Finland 
and 75 other countries, Carsten Anckar found a close relationship between the 
size of the population and the level of fragmentation.  Not only was this true in 
comparison internationally, it held true within countries: as the population 
increases so does fragmentation within a polity.
48
  Turkey, with a population 
surpassing 70 million, would thus expect a level of fragmentation simply because 
of the size of its population.  Furthermore, as its population has grown, 
fragmentation has also generally increased.  As a satisfactory explanation for the 
existing fragmentation in the Turkish party system, however, this remains limited.  
It cannot account for the decreases and spikes in fragmentation while the 
population itself has obviously increased on a secular trend.  In Anckar‟s study, it 
was of greater explanative value than other independent variables such as 
urbanization, presidentialism, ethnic-religious fragmentation, and effective 
thresholds.
49
 
Beside electoral systems and size of the population, scholars have claimed 
that social heterogeneity could have a significant impact on the fragmentation of 
party systems.  According to this argument, the socioeconomic or cultural 
cleavages are the prime shapers of the extent of fragmentation in any polity.  
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 Ibid., p. 316. 
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While some have held that this causal factor is generally explanative,
50
 others 
have specified “political cleavages” as the determinant rather than “social 
cleavages” 51  or have found that social forces (heterogeneity) and district 
magnitudes collectively determined the amount of fragmentation.
52
 Might this 
“social” element be explanative for the Turkish case in particular?  Not entirely.  
Although there is a measure of heterogeneity within the Turkish electorate, both 
socially and economically, the lion‟s share of the fragmentation in the party 
system seems to have little to do with these potential divisions in Turkish society.   
As was discussed in the previous chapter, the nature of political parties in 
Turkey, especially among those considered at least marginal successful in 
electoral competition, fit the description of what could be called “nation 
parties”—that is, they each purport to represent the general interests of the nation 
and cater inclusively to all groups in society, while downplaying existing 
socioeconomic divisions.  This being the case, new parties that fragmented the 
existing votes in Turkish elections often bore great resemblance to their other 
contemporaneous competitors.  These new parties have not appeared to “add” to 
the existing representation in any sort of meaningful way.  The only possible 
exception to explicit cultural representation of a particular group is with the 
Kurdish leftist-nationalist parties that emerged in the particularly in the southeast 
region of Turkey post-1991, and these parties have had very minimal success, 
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even among the Turkish Kurdish population.  Nonetheless, this one set of 
subsequent parties could not begin to account for the fragmentation observed in 
the Turkish party system, nor for periods of decreasing fragmentation, such as the 
current period.  Furthermore, if we relegate the issue to political cleavages, as 
stipulated by Coppedge, we might get closer to an explanation, except that the 
cleavage lines themselves appear to have changed and shifted, and thus also 
require a careful examination; hence, the reasoning behind this study‟s attention 
to the political paradigms that set the political cleavage lines at various points 
throughout the history of the Turkish party system.  It is only through 
investigating these that we will be able to understand the nature and pattern of 
fragmentation in various periods of Turkey‟s political history with electoral 
competition. 
 
3.3 Ideological Polarization and Other Polarizations in Turkish Politics 
 
There is one concept correlated with the existence of fragmentation that has 
yet to be discussed, and it is both a classic argument regarding fragmentation in 
comparative literature and a frequent resort of students of Turkish politics in 
particular.  This position is that fragmentation is correlated with the manifestation 
of ideological polarization in the party system, or in its extreme form, that 
polarization is the cause of fragmentation.  Beginning with the work of Sartori, a 
case is built that centrifugal (polarizing) forces can logically lead to an increase of 
parties competing in the system to fill the ideological gaps as the polarization 
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stretches the line from left to right.
53
  Bartolini and Mair also, building from 
Sartori, posit the “strong relationship” between the “format of a party system” and 
“patterns of ideological polarization.” 54Furthermore, as Sani and Sartori point out, 
though these system level dynamics may exist independently of one another, their 
concurrent existence spells trouble for the “working of democracy.”55   
Can the existence of ideological polarization and fragmentation be 
correlated in Turkey such that, when one observes an increase in fragmentation, 
one can expect similar increases in polarization and/or vice versa?  In the works 
that discuss the Turkish party system, this relationship has been frequently 
referenced.
56
  While the observation of both polarization and fragmentation in the 
Turkish case cannot be disputed, a potential ambiguity remains in regard to what 
the relationship between these two dynamic is and whether or not there is a 
positive correlation in this particular case between ideological polarization and 
fragmentation—in other words, when ideological polarization increases in Turkey, 
should we expect fragmentation to also be increasing?   
In order to address this ambiguity, we need to carefully delineate several 
points:  First, how might the context within which the original derivation of the 
relationship between ideological polarization and fragmentation of the vote differ 
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from the Turkish context; second, what type of polarization are we talking about 
and can we observe more than one cause or location for existing polarization in 
Turkey?   
As in the case of volatility, the consideration of fragmentation and its initial 
formulas (Golosov‟s 2010 index is an important deviation from this) took place in 
the context of established Western European political systems.  As discussed 
earlier, the historical conditions under which democracy emerges significantly 
influences the operation of the system.  In many of these Western European 
democracies, enfranchisement of the peasants and laborers coincided with parties 
particularly created with a mandate to represent these new identities.  Thus, this 
encouraged the tendency within these systems for parties that represented narrow 
ideologies and interests with the understanding that these particular interests could 
be aggregated for the overall national interest within parliament.  Such an 
understanding provided an opportunity, in the context of ideological polarization, 
for parties to move away from the center without necessarily being punished by 
the electorate.  As discussed in chapter two, the preponderant outlook toward 
political parties in Turkey is that each competing party should endeavor to 
represent the well-being of the whole, which forces parties that wish for electoral 
success centripetally toward the center.  Thus, ideological polarization in Turkey, 
based on the historical and current constraints of political culture and values 
regarding political parties, is necessarily centrally based.  Hence, where in other 
systems, ideological polarization might lead to greater fragmentation by the 
successes of parties that operate at greater distance from the center and with 
narrow ideologies, sustained ideological polarization seen as salient to the 
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electorate in the Turkish party system has directed the system toward 
defragmentation, not greater splintering.  In such cases, the parties occupying the 
center-left and center-right function more effectively as “channelment”57 or “focal 
arbiter” 58  for opposition against the dominant party, because the polarization 
revolves around one macro-issue or political outlook.  Missing this pattern would 
lead to a great misunderstanding of the Turkish case.  Thus, the context becomes 
very important and, particularly at this point, simply anticipating and applying 
trends observed by scholars in the West European democracies for the Turkish 
party system becomes extremely problematic. 
This is not to say that polarization does not encourage fragmentation in 
Turkey.  The important question becomes, what kind of polarization are we 
talking about, and in this case, a great deal of confusion can result from this 
ambiguity.  Polarized behaviors have been a regular feature of Turkish politics, 
especially among political elites, but not all forms of polarization have been 
equally constant and explicit distinction is necessary.  Consider the following 
observation by Ali Çarkoğlu:  
Interpersonal animosities at the very top of the party leadership fall 
very much in line with Turkish historical experience . . . these 
seemingly superficial, uncooperative attitudes in party leadership . . . 
exasperate the fragmentation and polarization in the system.
59
 
 
Note here that the attribution for fragmentation and polarization in the Turkish 
case is placed on the leadership style of the party leaders and their inability to 
cooperate with other political elites.  Çarkoğlu‟s observation here is a very critical 
                                                          
57
 Sartori, “The Party Effects of Electoral Systems,” p. 95. 
58
 Alan Ware, The Dynamics of Two-Party Politics: Party Structures and the Management of 
Competition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 17. 
59
 Çarkoğlu, “The Turkish Party System in Transition,” p. 551. 
 117 
 
one.  This norm, also discussed in detail in chapter two, has been a regular 
dynamic among political elites even preceding the foundation of the Republic.  
However, the polarization certainly created by this type of behavior has little to do 
with polarization from ideology.  Furthermore, the polarization itself is 
specifically located at the level of political elites both intra and interparty.  The 
net result of such polarization is factionalization within parties and uncooperative 
relations between parties.  Because this type of polarization is not concurrently 
located among the electorate, there is little constraint on the voter from switching 
to the newly emerging parties from factionalization, and in fact, the voter might 
even desire to do so as a response toward the governing and opposition parties 
inability to work together. 
This polarization might be argued to be the most constantly observed form 
of polarization, but its fragmenting effects are confounded by other forms of 
polarization, namely, ideological polarization.   While it is true that when a new 
focal point for ideological polarization enters the system, it might initially 
encourage further fragmentation as the new issue is ultimately crosscuts the 
existing divisions (as can be seen in 1969 and 1973 and also in 1995 and 1999), 
based on the nature of ideological polarization in Turkey, this line of division and 
competition is generally taken up by the two center-most parties and the system 
begins to pull back toward what is seen as the central debate (1977 and 2007 are 
particularly good example of this phenomenon). As long as the electorate finds 
the polarizing focal point salient, the trends moves toward defragmentation until a 
new crosscutting division enters to compete with the old, or, as in certain 
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historical cases of the Turkish party system, the military intervenes and puts a halt 
to the contest. 
There is another type of polarization related to the party system that has 
been observed in the Turkish case to a greater or lesser extent in different periods 
of its history.  Çarkoğlu again expresses concern that the existence of a threshold 
system (implemented in 1982), which leaves minor and extreme parties out of the 
system, “creates a considerable danger of pushing these . . . to more extreme 
positions and adding to the severity of ideological fractionalization and 
polarization.”60   Here again, we have a pairing of fragmentation and polarization, 
but with a very different understanding.  Obviously, the threshold system is 
implemented and understood to decrease fragmentation of the seats and vote 
within a party system.  Marginal and extreme parties are either left out of the 
system or forced to move to the center in order to subsume a larger voting bloc, 
and thus, it seems clear that the author is not referring to ideological polarization.  
It seems that, rather than referring to polarization located within the system—
either among the electorate or political elites or both—we are talking about 
polarization outside and directed against the system.  In such a case, we are 
referring to society-located polarization against the system fostered by 
disillusionment or de facto disenfranchisement—the feeling that one is not able to 
be represented by the existing system.  This form of polarization can be 
particularly destabilizing if the groups generating such polarized attitudes are 
large enough and remain on the outside of the pattern of contestation within the 
                                                          
60
 Ali Çarkoğlu, “The Turkish general election of 24 December 1995,” Electoral Studies, Vol. 16 
(1997), p. 91.  This claim was repeated in a later article, see Çarkoğlu, “The Turkish Party System 
in Transition,” p. 548. 
 119 
 
party system.  Based on the restrictions against regional or ethnic parties in the 
1982 Constitution, an element of this type of polarization has been observed 
among some within the Kurdish population since the 1980s and certainly some of 
the violence that occurred in the 1970s could be attributed to such anti-system 
disillusionment, although arguably it was also concurrently mixed with violence 
stemming from excessive partisan enthusiasm. 
At this point, one must also acknowledge that, though ideological 
polarization in the Turkish case has often resulted in defragmentation as the 
political division that has trickled into society is channeled into two major parties, 
when fragmentation has existed concurrently with ideological or social 
polarization, as Sani and Sartori note, it “has spelled trouble.”  Ideological 
polarization that has spread to society in the midst of belligerent and 
uncooperative behaviors and attitudes by the political elites have been a volatile 
mix in Turkish politics.  This particular nexus has been the object of observation 
of numerous students of Turkish politics, and though the particular dynamics 
between the forces of polarization and fragmentation are left unexplained or 
misunderstood, the devastating results of the instances of their combined presence 
on politics and governance are clearly evident to all observers. 
These various manifestations of polarization in the party system or society 
at large in Turkey necessitate careful and particular description and attention by 
scholars studying and conveying system-level dynamics.  A great deal of 
confusion can result from imprecise references to polarization or from attributing 
all polarization in the Turkish case to ideological polarization, being the form of 
polarization most frequently addressed in the comparative literature.  Each form 
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of polarization interacts differently with the other dynamics in the system, 
requiring a careful study of the source and location of polarization in order to 
predict subsequent possibilities of volatility and fragmentation. 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
 
As the preceding discussion demonstrates, though we might safely propose 
that certain dynamics within the party system might be continuous, it is also 
necessary to recognize variance within these regularly occurring phenomena.  The 
danger of remaining at pronouncements of continuity is that it may indeed hide 
interactions, the observations of which are of critical benefit for a proper 
understanding of significant changes and patterns in political competition as it 
occurs through history.  Furthermore, the dynamics regularly observed within the 
system are best understood in interaction with one another.  High volatility 
numbers might often correspond to increasing fragmentation, but it might also 
occur as a result of party system shrinkage and defragmentation.  Certain forms of 
polarization at certain times and locus points in the system might increase 
fragmentation and volatility in some situations, but function to decrease it in 
others.  These interactions make it imperative on the researcher to go beyond 
continuity and search for the variance and interaction and their potential causes as 
they are observed within the party system. 
The indices and tools to study these system-level phenomena can be helpful 
but are also importantly limited when it comes to explanation.  The numbers 
generated from the formulas are reliable in their systematic and neutral ability to 
generate numbers, but they are also rough and distant tools that, while 
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highlighting certain patterns, hide other forces at work that shape electoral 
outcomes.  The well-known indices are often employed at the national level, and 
one often finds that in-depth interpretation spring from these very distant 
measurements, or that the measurements operate as an interpretation in and of 
themselves.  Certainly, if something is occurring at the national aggregate level, 
there is likely something taking place at the provincial, group and individual 
levels, but it would be an important logical misstep to assume that stability at the 
macro-level necessarily means stability at the various micro-levels. 
On closer inspection, that the observed phenomena of volatility, 
fragmentation, and polarization are not primarily causal agents but are themselves 
the product of interactions and forces operating within the system becomes 
evident, and it prompts us to understand how all of these forces play a role 
shaping the parameters and lines of contestation framing the observed electoral 
competition.  Political culture—i.e. the predominant orientations taken by both 
voters and the political elites toward politics—as was discussed in the previous 
chapter, plays an important role in determining how these observed dynamics 
operate.  The pattern of behavior of political elites and the electorate‟s tendency to 
prefer general interest, inclusive “nation parties” create clear constraints and 
opportunities for the increase and reduction of volatility, fragmentation and 
polarization.  Thus, while observed tendencies in the comparative literature can be 
beneficial, they need to be applied to the specific case with care and awareness of 
the particular context.  The preponderance of definitive literature on party systems 
has been developed with the established Western European democracies as its 
starting place; thus, its “comparative” merit is of less generalizability than has 
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often been attributed to it.  Certainly, there are many parallels between the 
Turkish party system and other party systems in Western Europe, but there are 
important differences—such as the context of their respective emergences—that 
encourage us toward caution and logic when applying such literature to the 
Turkish case. 
Once we have considered the “continuity” in the system, we are left with the 
case of making an argument for change.  To do so, we must first address the most 
persuasive argument against party system change—the operation of a continuous 
and essential political cleavage—and then present the case for how dynamic 
change might be taking place in the competitive electoral arena in Turkey.  This, 
therefore, will be the focus of the next two chapters. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
ESSENTIAL ELECTORAL CLEAVAGES AND THE TURKISH PARTY 
SYSTEM  
 
 
 
Economic power, rather than domination, increasingly set the relation 
between notable and villagers. . . Deals, trade-offs, and bargains became 
much more persuasive than in earlier situations, and client politics 
flourished on a new level. . . It was undeniably a form of mobilization. . . 
that brought a greater portion of the masses into a meaningful relation 
with the center.
1
 
While it is important to assert and discover forces or agents of a party 
system that have acted upon the system in fairly consistent ways through time, it 
is also imperative to not over-assert continuity where it does not exist, or much 
will be hidden by the oversight.  The underlying assumption of this work is that 
party systems are relational and interactive in nature, and though these 
interactions may stabilize into predictable patterns for periods of time, the door is 
necessarily always open to change.  The political paradigms that encapsulate these 
patterns of interaction are vulnerable to shifts and changes initiated by 
socioeconomic structural changes, creative strategy change by political actors, 
institutional modifications, alterations in predominant orientations toward politics 
and political behavior, etc.  With this foundational understanding in mind, one 
must necessarily address an important alternative that itself also posits a primarily 
                                                          
1
 Şerif Mardin, “Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?” Daedalus, Vol. 102, No. 
1 (1973), pp. 185. 
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relational understanding of party systems, but one that is ultimately stable and 
static—an essential2 historical political cleavage that perpetually determines the 
lines on which electoral competition takes place. 
In the previous chapter, when applying the inter-bloc volatility 
measurements to the Turkish case in particular, at the national net aggregate level, 
the very low levels of such volatility certain confirm institutionalization of the 
party system and, at least, prompt the question of whether or not Turkey has also 
observed an essential cleavage that has maintained the shape of the party system 
throughout history.  This has, of course, been claimed for the Turkish case, and 
several varieties of essential cleavages exist, including to a lesser extent a “left-
right” socioeconomic cleavage, a topic taken up in detail in the following chapter, 
but the most influential proposition for an essential political cleavage is that of the 
center-periphery division, first argued for the Turkish case by Şerif Mardin, and 
its offspring the traditionalist-modernist and secularist center-Islamist periphery 
cleavage.  If indeed we take such a cleavage as the relational foundation for the 
party system in electoral contestation, then our work is largely done.  The political 
paradigm would ultimately be reduced to one historical paradigm and the 
strategies and discourse with which electoral competition is entered into would be 
consistently related to this cleavage and little more would need to be said or 
explored in regard to the relational interaction of the system.  Thus, before we are 
effectively able to pursue the possibilities of relational and paradigmatic change, 
                                                          
2
 By „essential‟, I intend to mean a predominant cleavage that bears the most weight in 
determining the structure of the party system.  It does not suggest that no other „social‟ cleavages 
or minor „political‟ cleavages might exist, but that the „essential cleavage‟ is the most explanative 
of voting behavior—why voters vote for certain parties. 
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we must carefully consider and address this very established and plausible 
alternative explanation. 
In 1973, Şerif Mardin wrote his famous piece, “Center-Periphery Relations: 
A Key to Turkish Politics?” published in the journal, Daedalus.  It was printed 
again with a few additional comments in 1975 in a collected work by prominent 
scholars of Turkish politics and edited by Engin Akarlı and Gabriel Ben-Dor.3  
Although not extensively referenced until the 1980s, it has now indisputably 
become one of the foundational works on Turkish politics, arguably the most 
influential single work, functioning as an ever-useful meta-narrative for almost 
any topic relevant to Turkish politics or society.  Despite approaching the forty 
year mark, scores of academic articles and books published in the last year 
covering broad topics under the umbrella of Turkish politics still find it necessary 
to refer either explicitly to the work or the foundational assumptions that Mardin 
proposes in the seminal article.  No other prominent article in the field of Turkish 
politics could boast more than a fraction of the shelf life of this one work. 
Though the work itself, a lengthy extended narrative of the history of the 
relations between the State and society beginning with the height of the Ottoman 
Empire, makes some subtle but important concessions and nuanced statements, 
the general outline of the work, as it is popularly understood and appropriated, 
goes as follows:  Stemming from the strong state tradition and educational 
peculiarities of the Ottoman Empire, the Turkish Republic has inherited a 
significant cultural-political cleavage between an modernizing military-
                                                          
3
 Şerif Mardin, “Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?” in Political Participation 
in Turkey: Historical Background and Present Problems, ed. Engin Akarlı and Gabriel Ben-Dor 
(Istanbul: Bosphorus University Press, 1975), pp. 7-32. 
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bureaucratic center and a heterogeneous and traditionalist periphery.  The 
secularized and Westernized lifestyle of the central elites, who had privileged 
access to secular education, placed a “wedge” between themselves and the rest of 
the masses of society who were more comfortable with the religious symbolism 
and hierarchy existing in their local communities.  With the advent of multiparty 
politics in 1945, the periphery appeared to find its voice in the vehicle of the 
Democrat Party (DP), while the center remained true to the Republican People”s 
Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP).  The military coups of 1960 and 1971 
(Mardin”s article pre-dates the 1980 intervention) were seen as a re-assertion of 
the power of the center over the growing power of the periphery.
4
  
Subsequent students of Turkish politics have frequently taken this division 
to be an explanative electoral cleavage for the Turkish party system, with the so-
called “center-left” parties representing the views and voice of the center and the 
parties of the “right”, both center and extreme, manifesting the political desires of 
the heterogeneous periphery. Although the substance and boundaries of this 
powerful-versus-powerless cultural dichotomy are frequently described in various 
ways, including a reduction to a simple secularist-Islamist or modernist-
traditionalist divide,
5
 the rough picture has generally been maintained as an 
underlying framework through which electoral behavior, among others, is 
explained.  And it is without question a fairly parsimonious interpretation.  The 
essential question, however, is whether or not this narrative is explanative as the 
                                                          
4
 Mardin, “Center-Periphery Relations,” pp. 184-6. 
5
 For a secularist-Islamist conceptualization, see Ali Çarkoğlu and Binnaz Toprak, Değişen 
Türkiye’de Din, Toplum ve Siyaset (İstanbul: TESEV yayınları, 2006), pp. 12-3; for a modernist-
traditionalist one, see İlter Turan, “Unstable stability: Turkish politics at the crossroads?” 
International Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 2 (2007), p. 322. 
 127 
 
essential cleavage of the Turkish party system?  The question of whether or not 
there is a “social center” that largely establishes the values and accepted practices 
that trickle down to the rest of society, or whether or not there are observable 
socio-cultural differences in lifestyle and outlook between existing political 
boundaries—such phenomena arguably could be observed in any polity, including 
those considered “advanced industrial” democracies—is not being addressed.  It 
is another matter when one asks the question of whether or not a center-periphery 
divide—i.e. an explicit battle between dominating elites and the powerless rural 
masses—can explain how parties are formed, who they are formed by, why voters 
cast their votes, and how change is occurring.  Are there better ways to explain 
the Turkish party system? Would the positing of another cleavage or approach to 
the party system produce greater explanative power?  
In order to address these questions, a review of the theoretical concept of 
center and periphery in the related foundational works would be beneficial along 
with a closer empirical investigation of the initial state of the party system when 
the vast rural population entered into democratic suffrage in Turkey and the 
possible evidence of subsequent electoral changes. A consideration of the logic 
and implication of maintaining such an interpretative framework should also be 
taken into account and will, therefore, be discussed below.   
 
4.1 Theoretical Underpinnings of ―Center and Periphery‖  
 
Besides the seminal work by Mardin, there are two other widely-known 
theoretical sources for the inspiration behind the conceptualization of a center-
periphery cleavage in the Turkish case.  One is the essay written in 1961 by 
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Edward Shils,
6
 and the other is the introduction to a volume of collected work by 
Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan in 1967.
7
  Although both share the 
concepts of “center” and “periphery”, their focus and interpretations diverge, at 
least in a few significant points, from one another.  As it turns out, both works are 
referenced in Mardin‟s piece although the latter somewhat more subtly.  Mardin 
begins with a direct quote from the first sentence of the essay by Shils—”Society 
has a center,” and in his first endnote he writes that his “initial formulation is 
derived from” this work.8  His reference to Lipset and Rokkan appears as an 
embedded appendage (though introduced as “especially important”) in the fifth 
endnote, referencing works on social cleavages in Western Europe.  Whether or 
not Mardin intended such an outcome, most works referring to Mardin‟s center 
and periphery formulation assume an interpretation more in line with Lipset and 
Rokkan.  Hence, it is beneficial to consider all of these works while seeking to 
understand the theoretical framework for center and periphery in the Turkish case 
as it is generally attributed to Mardin. 
One is first confronted with the critical question regarding the location of 
the center—i.e. the center of what?  In the essay by Shils, the understanding of 
“center” and “periphery” importantly transcends the political, indicating as its 
locus the totality of “society” in a structural-functional sense.  Although politics is 
                                                          
6
 The original source of Shils” essay used by Mardin is the following: Edward Shils, “Centre and 
Periphery,” in The Logic of Personal Knowledge: Essays Presented to Michael Polanyi on His 
Seventieth Birthday, 11 March 1961 (New York: Free Press, 1961), pp. 117-30.  I accessed this 
essay through its reprint in a collected work of Shils: Edward Shils, Center and Periphery: Essays 
in Macrosociology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975), pp. 3-16.  Thus, the page 
numbers in this work refer to the latter source. 
7
 Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan, “Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignment: 
An Introduction,” in Party Systems and Voter Alignment: Cross-National Perspectives, ed. 
Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan (New York: Free Press, 1967), pp. 1-64. 
8
 Mardin, “Center-Periphery Relations,” p. 187. 
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seen as one of the interdependent subsystems, it remains as only one of a number 
of relevant institutional formations in society.  Along with the political, Shils 
includes the economic system, kinship system, and status system along with 
educational and religious institutions. 9   Hence, the center can be seen as an 
aggregate of the elites derived from these various institutions and the center, itself, 
becomes an arena—Shils refers to it as a “zone”—in which these various elites 
struggle to establish their hierarchical positions
10
 in relation to the other intra- and 
inter-institutional elites.
11
  Although the elites from the various central institutions 
are mutually affirming to a greater or lesser extent, they operate so as to establish 
both themselves as authority and social order that disseminates from the center.  
Thus, the essential line of demarcation between the center and periphery in 
Shilsian conceptualization is one of social authority and the lack thereof.  
Connection to the center is connection with social power and vice versa. 
In contrast to Shils, Lipset and Rokkan‟s conceptualization has a notably 
more political, rather than social, understanding of the center and periphery, 
which places threatened local elements against a dominating national center.  
They write:  
At the l end of the territorial axis we would find strictly local 
oppositions to encroachments of the aspiring or the dominant national 
elites and their bureaucracies: the typical reactions of the peripheral 
regions, linguistic minorities, and culturally threatened populations to 
the pressures of the centralizing, standardizing, and “rationalizing” 
machinery of the nation-state.
12
 
 
                                                          
9
 Shils, “Centre and Periphery,” pp. 3-4.   
10
 Ibid., p. 10. 
11
 Ibid., pp. 3-4. 
12
 Lipset and Rokkan, “Cleavage Structures,” p. 10. 
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In this well-known work, the authors see center and periphery forces as political 
oppositions that could potentially manifest themselves, at least initially, in 
electoral contest.  This is possible in the sense that the center-periphery cultural 
divide is realized territorially—local communities mobilize to combat the 
dominant urban centers in response to efforts to centralize the nation-state and 
the economy.  Thus, it presents itself as a struggle for power between particular 
groups, located in specific territorial domains.  Such a juxtaposition of 
oppositional groups, considered the likely product of a national revolution, could 
also be seen as “the conflict between the central nation-building culture and the 
increasing resistance of the ethnically, linguistically, or religiously distinct 
subject populations in the provinces and the peripheries.”13  Therefore, though it 
is particularly understood on the political level, Lipset and Rokkan‟s “center-
periphery” cleavage is also related to the issue of power or authority—i.e. the 
power of the national center to impose its centralizing will on the local 
sociopolitical structures.   
Shils, rather than seeing the cultural divide as manifested primarily 
territorially—i.e. urban centers versus provincial localities—frames the cultural 
and power distinction between center and periphery in terms of values.  Particular 
emphasis is given to the “central value system” more so than the elaboration of 
particular cultural groupings or to the existence of central elites, whose 
importance lies in their espousal of the central values that are a self-affirmation to 
those elites themselves.  In this sense, the values, authority to rule, and the elites 
are in a dynamic relationship.  In a vein similar to Pierre Bourdieu, the Shilsian 
                                                          
13
 Ibid., p. 14. 
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“central value system” is constructed from what could be understood as existing 
societal symbolic capital, the relative weight and authoritative interpretation of 
which is reinforced by those who operate at the elite level.
14
  The values function 
in order to provide order in society and bolster the authority of that particular 
societies central elites; thus, Shils emphasizes the desire of the elites to inculcate 
these values among the masses in ever increasing margin in society, a process that 
goes hand in hand with centralization.
15
  In a Shilsian conceptualization, the 
peripheral values are those that operate in opposition to society itself and the 
periphery associated with these values can, therefore, be described as living 
“outside society.”16  
Hence, one would not expect a clear delineation between the values of the 
center and the values of the periphery among individuals in society based 
necessarily on one‟s location from the center.  Alternative values certainly 
circulate and those “prophets” both intimately tied and intensely hostile to the 
existing values exist,17 but one‟s location within the center or within the periphery 
does not indicate one‟s attitude toward the central values.  Instead, center and 
periphery in this case designate the distance one stands from the elites and 
authority and the extent to which one has the power to alter or authorize the 
central values of society.  In other words, it designates one‟s distance and location 
in relation to societal power, not necessarily one‟s attitudinal orientation toward 
the dominant values. 
                                                          
14
 Ibid., p. 4.  Compare with Pierre Bourdieu, “Social space and symbolic power,” in In Other 
Words: Essays Towards a Reflexive Sociology, trans. Matthew Adamson (Stanford: Stanford 
University,1990), pp. 122-39.  
15
 Shils, “Center and Periphery,” pp. 5, 14. 
16
 Ibid., p. 13. 
17
 Ibid., p. 9. 
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These values are also not the monopoly of one institution but are derived 
from and support all institutions at the center of society.  Thus, while students of 
Turkish politics are well-acquainted with the values of the Kemalist elites, if one 
takes Shils into account, it would be a mistake to see these as the incontrovertible 
and uncontested values of the central system in Turkish society; rather, they 
represent in a Shilsian sense one set of values contesting other values within the 
social center.  Though the principles of Atatürk could be seen as the central 
values of the Republican state and the dominant founding elites, these values were 
in contestation with other values in the center of society, such as those stemming 
from the Hanefi school of Sunni Islam. 
The well-documented complexity existing in the relation of the Kemalists 
with the pre-existing religious institution based on the Hanefi interpretation of 
Sunni Islam must be seen in this light.  Although the Kemalists undoubtedly had 
secularism in mind as a chief value, as Yıldız Atasoy points out, their secular 
nationalist project was ultimately framed within a particular Islamic identity.
18
  As 
Sunni Islam was such an embedded value of the system, the founders of the 
Republic could only alter the arrangement of the hierarchy of the center and alter 
the institution and structure of its elites, placing the religious elites lower in the 
hierarchy. But the religiously-oriented system values present in the social center 
meant that they could only seek to ensure greater control over this institution, they 
could not completely eliminate or replace the values derived from this area of 
society, and thus, had to appropriate them in establishing a unifying national 
                                                          
18
 Yıldız Atasoy, Islam’s Marriage with Neo-Liberalism (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 
p. 32. 
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identity. 19   The elites from even a powerful institution cannot independently 
determine the primary values of the entire center; they must engage them within a 
space of contestation within the center.  
In addition, the enumeration of secondary values in Shils‟ essay seems 
particularly significant when applied to the Turkish case.  Shils indicates that the 
secondary values of a society determine the grounds on which one is able to 
obtain the position of elite.
20
  In Mardin‟s work, it is clear that the positions of 
elites in Turkey, at least in the periods that he discusses, are occupied largely 
according to merit, education and patronage, and to a far lesser degree on 
birthright, a fundamental conclusion affirmed by Frederick Frey,
21
 setting a 
crucial limitation on the distance between the center and the periphery in Turkey.  
The distance between the central elites and those constituting the periphery could 
generally be said to be only one generation, many of the elites themselves in the 
military and bureaucracy (the primary institutional locus of the center according 
to Mardin and others)  rising to elite status from an initially peripheral position.
22
  
Furthermore, the existence of such secondary values in the central value system of 
Turkey would anticipate far more frequent conflict among the central elites and 
greater chances for shifting in interpretations and emphases in regard to the 
primary values of the central system.  
                                                          
19
 See Halil Karaveli, “An Unfulfilled Promise of Enlightenment: Kemalism and its Liberal 
Critics,” Turkish Studies, Vol. 11, No. 1 (2010), pp. 97-9.  
20
 Shils, Center and Periphery, p. 6. 
21
 Mardin, “Center-Periphery Relations,” p. 172; Frederick Frey, The Turkish Political Elite 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1965), p. 29. 
22
 For support for such a claim, see Clement H. Dodd, “The Social and Educational Background of 
Turkish Officials,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 1 (1965), pp. 268-76; and Joseph Szyliowicz, 
“Elite Recruitment in Turkey: The Role of the Mulkiye,” World Politics, Vol. 23 (1971), pp. 371-
98.   
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In Mardin‟s account of Turkish society, the emphasis is placed on a sharp 
demarcation of the values and culture of a politically ruling center and the 
subjected periphery, a demarcation intensified by the secularization of the center 
and the subsequent marginalization of the religious elites, which were seen as the 
organic channel that allowed for the maintenance of communication between the 
center and the periphery.
23
  From a Shilsian perspective, such a phenomenon 
would be anticipated in a society that is largely decentralized and in which 
interaction between the central elites and the periphery is kept to a minimum, a 
situation more explanative of periods in the Ottoman Empire, the primary subject 
of Mardin‟s work.24  Thus, even national centralization and state education would 
necessarily reduce the demarcation of values between the central elites and the 
periphery.25   
Related to this, another critical point underscored numerous times in the 
works of both Shils and that of Lipset and Rokkan is that democratization 
ultimately blurs the existing separation between the central elites and the 
periphery prior to the institutionalization of democracy.  According to Shils: 
 When . . . a more unified economic system, political democracy, 
urbanization and education have brought the different sections of the 
population into more frequent contact with each other and created 
even greater mutual awareness, the central value system has found a 
wider acceptance than in other periods of the history of society.26 
 
                                                          
23
 Mardin, “Center-Periphery Relations,” p. 172.   See also, Şerif Mardin, “The Just and the 
Unjust,” Daedalus Vol. 120 (1991), pp. 113-29. 
24
 Mardin devotes approximately 14 pages to “center and periphery” in the Ottoman Empire and 
the early Republican period, for which he makes a very persuasive case; his coverage of the 
multiparty period, on the other hand, extends for less than 6 pages. 
25
 „Central‟ization is undeniably an intention to order a certain polity around the values and 
structure of those in control at the authoritative center. 
26
 Shils, Center and Periphery, p. 11. 
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Shils also assumes that this contact between the center and periphery, brought on 
by democracy, modern economic structures and education will confound the 
clearer division in values that existed in “pre-modern” or “non-Western” 
societies.27  Furthermore, while “central values” would be appropriated by greater 
numbers, contestation over the values of the center would increase, which would 
itself be the result of the periphery‟s approach, and in some cases, entrance into 
the center.28  Democracy, rather than simply a vehicle through which opposing 
sides rigidly take position in the form of parties, requires the center to enter the 
periphery and vice versa, leading both to greater consensus and tension regarding 
central values.  This is not surprising as democracy is seen as ultimately 
empowering the masses, which then would almost necessarily challenge a cultural 
schism that is primarily one between the few powerful elites and the powerless 
masses. 
Lipset and Rokkan also question the possibility of an extended center-
periphery cleavage with the expansion of democratic suffrage.  They write, 
“Purely territorial [i.e. center-periphery 29 ] oppositions rarely survive the 
extensions of the suffrage,” 30  and here they mean primarily the extension of 
suffrage to landless peasants.  They also point out:  
The early growth of the national bureaucracy tended to produce 
essentially territorial oppositions, but the subsequent widening of the 
scope of governmental activities and the acceleration of cross-local 
interactions gradually made for much more complex systems of 
alignments.
31
 
                                                          
27
 Ibid., pp. 10,13. 
28
 Ibid., p. 13. 
29
 “Territorial” here refers to the dimension specified by the authors of which the primary pole of 
focus is that of center and periphery. 
30
 Lipset and Rokkan, “Cleavage Structures,” p. 12. 
31
 Ibid., p. 13. 
 136 
 
 
The territorial center and periphery cleavage, as with the authority-based cleavage 
in Shils, tends to fragment and is complicated by the various interests of different 
local communities.  In other words, once the power of political representation is 
brought to the powerless periphery, these groups are no longer united against a 
central force and interests begin to divide into other sociocultural or 
socioeconomic cleavages. Political parties would finds themselves competing in 
different ways for the interests of these distinct groups.  Thus, as with Shils, a key 
assumption of the Lipset and Rokkan work is that primary cleavages determining 
the party system change and shift.  They assert, “There is a hierarchy of cleavage 
bases in each system and these orders of political primacy not only vary among 
polities, but also tend to undergo changes over time.”32  Territorial cleavages, in 
the constellation of cleavages provided by Lipset and Rokkan, are understood as 
possible initial stages of electoral competition that would be cross-cut with others 
in time. 
This brings us to another critical point regarding the inspirational roots of 
the center-periphery concept:  classical modernization theory.  In both works 
predating Mardin‟s formulation of the concept for Turkey, the strong opposition 
between the periphery and the center is ultimately a pre-modern one.  The basis of 
the conflict, where it arises, is in response to actions of centralization by the 
nation-state; it is primarily understood as a transitional stage from pre-modern 
traditional societies to the unified society of the nation-state.  Thus, where 
national education, centralization of the economy and institutions, the spread of 
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nationalist sentiment among the masses,
33
 and especially democratic suffrage 
have taken place, the theoretical assumption is that an explicit “center-periphery” 
distinction would blur and weaken.  Thus, unlike in other cases where the 
terminology is being used in the present context in relation to minority ideologies 
or groups whose voice is considered illegitimate or unrepresented within a 
hegemonic social or political system,
34
 the utilization of the terminology in 
relation to “elites” versus the “masses”, whether one adheres to modernization 
theory or not, necessarily conjures up the association of a pre-modern cultural 
conflict, suggesting that such a society is still undergoing the pangs of nation-state 
centralization, economically and attitudinally.  It is from the anticipation that such 
a cleavage would wane with the advance of modernization that Mardin states, 
“Until recently, the confrontation between center and periphery was the most 
important social cleavage underlying Turkish politics and one that seemed to have 
survived more than a century of modernization.” 35  To be fair, Mardin also 
concedes the possibility of a change in the primary cleavage in the Turkish party 
system.  Later he writes, “There is evidence both of new cleavages and of 
differentiation within the periphery,” but goes on to add, “But these are future 
aspects of Turkish politics, and center-periphery polarity is still one of its 
extremely important structural components.”36 
Although there were numerous reasons to question a persistent center-
periphery electoral formulation for those following Mardin, particularly in more 
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recent periods of electoral history—many of these factors conceded by Mardin 
himself—the continuity of such a cleavage to the present period has been 
maintained in numerous works on Turkish politics.  Though it seems plausible on 
a superficial level to assert the possibility of a center-periphery electoral cleavage 
during the initial period of the Turkish party system, there are a number of 
reasons highlighted in the Mardin text for why even this is problematic.   
First, the very fact that, as Mardin also notes, the Democrat Party leaders 
were every bit as central elite as the CHP elites indicates that a new interaction 
was taking place between the center and periphery that complicated the lines of 
interaction.37 Furthermore, as Mardin again points out, the CHP incorporated large 
numbers of peripheral notables into its political party machine: “What is 
remarkable is that a sizeable portion of the provincial, notable class was 
successfully co-opted into the ranks of the Republican People‟s Party.”38  It is 
remarkable because it demonstrates a phenomenon not predicted from a center-
periphery electoral cleavage: elements from the periphery—i.e. local notables—
were co-opted by the central elites.39  Furthermore, the attribution by scholars of a 
Lipset and Rokkan style (center) urban-rural (periphery) conflict based on a 
transitional period from localized feudalism to national capitalism is extremely 
problematic in the Turkish case.  As Mardin himself asserts, during the Ottoman 
Empire, there was no oppositional “feudal class” of powerful landed elites who 
                                                          
37
 Ibid., p. 184. Not only were they equally elite, they were also equally committed to Kemalist 
values as their opponents.  The leader of the DP, Celal Bayar has been described as “the Turkish 
leader who most consciously tried to model himself on Atatürk. George Harris, “Celal Bayar: 
Conspiratorial Democrat,” in Political Leaders and Democracy in Turkey, ed. Metin Heper and 
Sabri Sayarı (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2002), 53. 
38
 Mardin, “Center-Periphery Relations,” p. 182. 
39
 Joseph Szyliowicz, “Elites and Modernization in Turkey,” in Political Elites and Political 
Development in the Middle East, ed. Frank Tachau (Cambridge, MA: Schenkman Publishing, 
1975), 34. 
 139 
 
could counter central urban authority as the economy was in the firm hands of the 
state. 40   Furthermore, as will be clarified in detail below, the electoral 
demographics do not confirm the anticipated result.  If anything, the notables 
associated with “pre-modern” socio-economic structures in the East were more 
successfully mobilized to support the “central” CHP rather than the “peripheral” 
DP.  
  The scholars following in the footsteps of Mardin, however, by asserting a 
primary center-periphery cultural cleavage as the persistent determinate of the 
Turkish party system seem to be ignoring this anticipation of change despite the 
fact that much empirical evidence exists to support an assertion of multiple 
realignments and system change.
41
  That societies have a center and operate upon 
a hegemonic set of central values that provide both order and authority to intra-
societal relations is a possible argument for the scope of social theorists, but to 
say that democratic politics operates as an explicit electorally-manifested cultural 
struggle between a competing central elite and a powerless peripheral population 
is another issue entirely and must be empirically verified.   
 
4.2 An Explanative Center-Periphery Cleavage in the Turkish Party System? 
 
While this study is necessarily focused on the multiparty system and its 
operation in national elections, a brief note should be made on the major focus of 
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Mardin‟s work—the Ottoman Empire and the Early Republican period.  Mardin‟s 
discussion of the existence of a center-periphery cleavage extends back into the 
Ottoman Empire for several generations and seems to capture a fairly orthodox 
portrait of the social relations of the time, which indeed indicates a fairly clear 
cultural and power distinction between the central state—i.e. the Sultan, the 
military and bureaucracy and, to a lesser extent, the religious elite—and the 
largely powerless and non-influential masses. Of this relationship Mardin writes, 
“In the general, ecological sense, the center and the periphery were two very 
loosely related worlds.”42  It is in this period, Mardin‟s interpretation comes to 
most closely resemble the understanding of Shils, who writes: 
The mass of the population in most pre-modern and non-Western 
societies have in a sense lived outside society and have not felt their 
remoteness from the centre to be a perpetual injury to themselves. . . 
and the consequent alienation has been accentuated by their 
remoteness from the central value system.  The alienation has not 
however been active or intense, because, for the most part, their 
convivial, spiritual and moral centre of gravity has lain closer to their 
own round of life.43 
 
There is good reason to believe that this distance was more or less sustained 
during the single-party period, as Mardin also maintains.  The leaders of the 
Turkish Revolution were, by and large, members of or closely associated with the 
bureaucratic and military elite that existed in the closing period of the Ottoman 
Empire.
44
  As pointed out by Frey and others, the political elite running the 
country and implementing the reforms had been exposed to secular education and 
largely came from the western region of the country or were immigrants from 
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European provinces lost prior to the end of the Empire.
45
  Until the end of the 
single-party period, the representatives of even the far eastern provinces of 
Turkey were often highly educated bureaucrats from the Marmara and Aegean 
Region.
46
 Local representation was a secondary concern, especially in the eastern 
regions considered the most peripheral, until the development of multiparty 
politics.  Thus, it seems likely that in terms of interaction, values, and culture, a 
distant gap existed between those closely associated with the Westernized, secular 
political elites and the rest.47  The values of the periphery were largely determined 
by local orientations and hierarchies, and the relation between the two realms was 
less confrontational than non-interactive. 
There are significant reasons to believe that this gap would be reduced and 
complicated by the institutionalization of democracy.  As anticipated in the 
theoretical works of Shils and that of Lipset and Rokkan, the logic of democratic 
contestation itself suggests that such a divide would necessarily be confounded by 
the institutionalization of democracy.  When İsmet İnönü opened the door for 
multiparty democratic elections in 1945, it was truly a “democratic revolution”48 
in that he suddenly empowered the rural inhabitants, estimated at around 80 
percent of the populace in 1950,49 to suddenly interact with the central state elites 
regarding the affairs of state.  Kemal Karpat writes, “High government officials 
who had enjoyed seclusion in the past—traveling in separate coaches, never seen 
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in public except on special occasions—began to talk directly to the people.”50 The 
buffer that essentially existed between the two worlds was suddenly removed, 
offering this massive population that hitherto had little influence at all to be able 
to place and remove governments as they saw fit. 
If it existed, how might a center-periphery electoral cleavage operating in 
the party system be observed empirically?  Several points of inquiry seem 
particularly fruitful.  Such a cleavage suggests that voters are intentionally making 
their choice of a center vote versus a periphery vote based on knowledge that the 
recipient of the vote clearly represents one side of this cultural divide, that they as 
a voter are on one side, and that this cleavage is salient.  Thus the nature and 
background of party elites become important.  One would expect peripheral 
parties to be filled with elites that are more likely to come from or have ties with 
the periphery—such as local notables—than the other party.51  One would also 
anticipate that the discourse of the parties would clearly resemble their respective 
powerful versus weak cultural positioning.  Furthermore, one would assume that 
the areas that were most distant from the interaction with and power of the 
center—the least nationalistic and centralized—would be the most likely to vote 
in greater numbers for the peripheral party and vice versa.  Finally, for it to be an 
essential cleavage of the system, one would anticipate that there would be some 
measure of stability in how the vote is cast; in other words, significant changes in 
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the distribution of votes across the population and volatility would not be 
observed. 
An investigation of the nature and the background of the party members of 
the Turkish Grand National Assembly in the early period of multiparty politics—
the period prior to the first military intervention on May 27, 1960—reveals a 
number of interesting trends.  One trait remaining stable both across time and 
across political parties was a high level of secular educational attainment.52  To 
use Shilsian terminology, this seems to be an incontrovertible “secondary value” 
determining the possibility of elite status in the central system values in Turkey.  
None of the parties greatly differed on this account.  On the other hand, during 
this early period, though there was an occupational difference observed between 
the CHP elite and the DP in the initial turn-over election of 1950; the CHP 
deputies were more likely to come from an “official” background (military or 
bureaucratic service) while the DP parliamentarians were more likely to come 
from “professional” and “economic” occupational backgrounds (lawyers, doctors, 
businessmen, and landowners); however, this difference became negligible in 
subsequent elections.53   
It is also important to note that the distinction between bureaucrats and 
professionals could not be understood as a distinction between elites and non-
elites, but an indication that elite occupations that provided “sacred authority” to 
use Shilsian terminology were undergoing a transformation.  During the period 
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that witnessed the dramatic fall of the Ottoman Empire and the equally dramatic 
establishment of the Turkish Republic, it was the secularly-educated bureaucrats 
who effectively administered the affairs of state.  There were no better claimants 
for a modern, Westernized and skilled pedigree than those civil and military 
bureaucrats educated for the purposes of statecraft.  The values of modernization 
and Westernization were indisputably maintained in the early Republic, but the 
expansion of education and the model of the West began to highlight other 
professions such that they took on sacred social status.  Doctors, lawyers, bankers 
and financiers represented progressive society, and thus, when the selection of 
elites was left to the masses in society, it is no surprise that both parties began to 
recruit heavily from these professional positions.  Once multiparty politics got 
underway, these centrally elite occupational groups began to take political 
prominence.  It is for the same reason, and no coincidence, that one begins to see 
the rise of the engineer and technocrat in politics beginning in the 1960s.
54
  Their 
social desirability places them necessarily in the social center, not the periphery. 
Furthermore, although some distinction initially existed at the level of 
centrally-elite occupational status, a significant complicating factor arises when 
“localism” is taken into account.  Although both parties, with the advent of the 
multiparty system, sought to increase the level of local representation—deputies 
representing their home constituents—the CHP out-performed the DP in this 
area.55  Though most of the DP parliamentarians were residents of the Marmara 
and Aegean regions, the CHP deputies were increasingly drawn from local 
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notables in Central and Eastern Anatolia.  Therefore, it would be hard to suggest, 
based on the overall composition of the competing parties, that the rural 
(peripheral) voters would have been able to make a clear choice of party on this 
basis.  Where the parties were not largely mirrors of one another in their elite 
status, it could be suggested that the CHP offered greater incentive to the rural 
provincial farmer in this regard because it had appropriated their local (i.e. 
peripheral) power structures into the representative function of the party to a 
greater extent. 
The background of the leadership of the DP was also no mystery to the 
populace; they were all significant members of the CHP and had sprung from the 
same class of political elites.56  Thus, if these parties became the channels to reify 
a national center-periphery divide, it was unlikely that the background of the 
deputies was a decisive factor.  In fact, early investigations into the rural attitudes 
toward the new multiparty contest show a focus, not on cultural, but on pragmatic 
concerns, and researchers like Richard Robinson following the elections as they 
transpired in the villages detected hesitancy and uncertainty regarding the DP in 
the rural areas he visited.  He writes, “The Democrats won in the villages by a 
surprisingly narrow margin [in comparison to their huge wins in the big cities] . . . 
It was as though many trusted the Democrats even less.”57  Lerner also recounts a 
discussion in a village coffee house in which the older men argued that “it would 
be better to have a small margin between the major parties.  When the parties are 
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competing and need our votes, then they heed our voice.”58 Indeed, the accounts 
of attitudes in the villages in the 1950s clearly suggest voting according to 
functional and local concerns, not antipathy to a central hegemonic force. 
Was there an observable trend of the cultural periphery to support a 
particular “party of the periphery” at the expense of a party representing the 
interests of the center elite?  The answer to these question also seems to be “no”.  
At the advent of multiparty politics, there is wide agreement that there was a 
significant separation between the West regions of Turkey and the central and 
eastern Anatolian regions in terms of both centralization and development.  Power, 
wealth and advanced education were largely located in the western regions, 
especially along the Marmara and Aegean coasts.  The largely rural residents of 
the eastern parts of the country had very little access to control but were subjected 
to the control of the institutions of power located in the west.  Frey writes, “The 
East . . . was rigidly controlled; it was so unsure that it was made sure.  Political 
life was closed.  The West, on the other hand, was more modern and more 
powerful; thus political life could be and needed to be relatively more open.”59  
Thus, one would expect that the provinces of the West, which had been included 
to a far greater extent into political deliberation and decision-making during the 
single-party period, and contained larger clusters of secular, “modern” and 
educated elements of the population, which shared the values of the Kemalist 
elites, would be the citadel for the party of the “center.”  Concurrently, the areas 
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farthest in distance60 from the institutional centers of power and its accompanying 
culture, which were located predominantly in the East, would most likely be the 
bastions of the “peripheral” party vote.  Certainly, the Sheikh Said revolt in the 
Southeast in 1925 demonstrated the potential power of rebellion within the 
periphery in response to a centralizing state.
61
 
The electoral geography in Figure 4.1, however, completely bewilders such 
an anticipated result. 62   The fifteen provinces (in red) garnering the highest 
average vote in the three elections from 1950-1957 for the “center” CHP are all 
on the Eastern “peripheral” half while those fifteen provinces providing them the 
least support (in blue) are predominantly Western. The Central Eastern and 
Southeastern regions of the country were the least centralized and the home to 
large portions of Kurds and Alevis whose peripheral values and socioeconomic 
structures placed them the furthest from the center and its social values and 
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The fifteen highest (red) and lowest (blue) average vote totals by province for CHP 
 (1950-1957) 
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institutions.  These are the provinces that were the mainspring of the CHP‟s 
electoral support in the initial elections until 1965. There are no provinces in the 
top fifteen that supported the CHP west of Sinop, located in the central Black Sea 
region.  Tachau has also noted this quandary and writes:  
The CHP, the party of the modernized, urban, official elite, actually 
drew its greatest voting strength from less developed rural parts of the 
country rather than from the cities, where one might have expected it 
to show its greatest strength.  Contrariwise, the DP, speaking for the 
periphery, showed greater strength in the more modernized western 
part of the country than in the less developed east.63 
 
Can these electoral results from the initial elections in the multiparty period, 
which seem to confound intuition, be explained away in a manner allowing for the 
maintenance of a national center-periphery cleavage in the party system?  Not 
really.  It may be superficially claimed that those adhering to the values of the 
center (primarily bureaucrats, military, intelligentsia and Westernized elites) were 
in fact quite a small proportion of the total population. 64   Thus, even in the 
provinces of the large, developed Western cities in which such elites were 
clustered, they were still a clear minority of those populations; therefore, the rural 
masses and urban poor of those provinces voted for the peripheral party in large 
numbers, bringing the result that one sees in the West.  Thus, it is possible—
though ethnographic research of the period strongly challenges this—in a 
province like Istanbul that voters went to the polls and voted according to a 
cultural cleavage that pitted those associated with the powerful central elites 
against the power-deprived and resentful peripheral masses.  The ethnographic 
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research of Turkish village life of the time consistently points to the fact that these 
villagers framed their approach to voting according to egotropic, and to some 
extent, sociotropic interests, not according to a sociocultural power division,
65
 and 
this was based on the machine politics style of clientelism promised by the DP 
even in 1950 that worked very effectively in nationalist and centralized areas of 
the country.
66
 
Explaining the results witnessed in the Eastern Anatolian region according 
to this cultural cleavage is even more problematic empirically. Although political 
elites might have had a hand in the outcome, forces were at play that would have 
to be understood as minimizing any sort of awareness of a national center-
periphery divide when the votes were cast or the results would have necessarily 
been different.  As will be discussed in depth in chapter six, the distribution of the 
vote corresponds closely to the distinct styles of patron-client relationships 
employed by the two major parties.
67
  Patron-client relations, by its very nature, of 
course, is based on relationships formed by members from different positions on 
the social hierarchies, assuming a cross-cutting relationship between center-elites 
and peripheral masses for some purpose—i.e. voting.   Whether there was an 
actual center and periphery cultural difference is not the question; the issue is 
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whether or not the political parties and voter behavior were structured with this 
distinction in mind, and this seems not to be the case, at least on a national scale. 
A typical justification for establishing the Democrat Party as the party of the 
periphery in relation to the “centrist” CHP is the claim that the DP mobilized the 
masses as the spokesman for the peasant farmer while the CHP maintained its 
position as the defender of the Republican reforms and values.  The DP could, 
therefore, be seen as representing the discourse of alternative values to challenge 
the central system values embodied in the principles of Ataturk and Kemalism.  
To what extent might this explain the possibility of a center-periphery cultural 
political struggle?  There are a number of reasons why such an interpretation 
could be seen as problematic.  On closer inspection of the behavior, discourse and 
programs of the two parties, one observes that their approaches to electoral 
contestation were more complex and often closely resembled one another. 68  
Furthermore, if we use party manifests and campaign speeches as our reference, 
the CHP seemed to appeal far more specifically to the village citizenry and their 
plight than the DP, who consistently emphasized a general interest approach.
69
  In 
terms of liberalizing the legal status of religious expression, for example, the CHP 
strategically took the lead in the years immediately preceding the DP victory in 
1950;70 thus, even if we take the liberalization of religion to be a value of the 
periphery in this period, as is widely claimed, both parties seemed willing to 
negotiate with the periphery when electoral fortunes were at stake, and both 
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parties had clear limitations on how far they would liberalize the laws in regard to 
religious observance and secularism.71  It was the advent of multiparty politics 
itself, and not any particular party, that seemed to lead to a measure of 
liberalization of religion based on the inevitable result of elites needing to gain 
approval from the peripheral masses, and the need for such measures was 
understood by both major parties.
72
 
The DP certainly tried to initially capitalize on the grievances sustained 
during the single-party period, but these grievances resonated from every segment 
of society, not just those typically associated with the periphery.  The DP was, as 
Menderes himself claimed, “the party of all those who wanted to end one-party 
rule.”73  There was antagonism toward the apparent monopolizers of the state, and 
therefore, the DP attracted villagers but also the intelligentsia, workers, 
businessmen, and even those in the military, until at least 1955.74  Furthermore, on 
closer investigation, the appeals by Menderes and the DP are far more in the 
realm of anti-incumbency and anti-authoritarianism than a conjuring up of a 
cultural battle.  Very similar charges were leveled by the CHP against the DP 
once they were in power during the 1954 and 1957 elections.  The leaders of the 
DP were, themselves, firmly embedded within that elite culture and could not 
have easily succeeded with anti-elite discursive rhetoric. 
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  Furthermore, the effect of political discourse assumes its broad 
dissemination across the targeted society.  How would the elements of the 
periphery, especially those most distance from the opportunity to interact with or 
inside the center, be exposed to political discourse in this earlier period?  In the 
1950s, rare access to radio and the likelihood of insufficient educational 
opportunities would make it very difficult for the periphery to be directly aware of 
existing national discourse between the parties.75  The vast majority of the people 
reading the newspaper and listening to the radio at this time would have been the 
people who fit the profile of those near, associated with or within the social center.  
As indicated in studies of the time, the periphery likely received a lot of its 
national information processed through local word of mouth.76  Thus, to discover 
what the rural masses were thinking when they went to the ballot box one has to 
recognize that this filter of interpretation was at play and could likely lead to a 
variety of symbolic representations of what a vote for the CHP or the DP meant.  
Such realities in the peripheral provinces make it difficult to imagine that these 
rural villagers were effectively aware of and mobilized by a nation-wide cultural 
struggle against the center.  It was much more likely that in these isolated 
“peripheral” areas, “village and regional loyalties superseded national loyalty.”77  
Considering that there is little empirical evidence for a nation-wide center-
periphery cleavage directing the party system at the outset, it prompts the question 
of why the continuity of this divide would be proposed even 60 years after the 
entrance into multiparty democratic elections, especially since the so-called 
                                                          
75
 Richard D. Robinson, The First Turkish Republic (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 
1963), pp. 40-1. 
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 Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society, p. 137. 
77
 Robinson, The First Turkish Republic, p. 42.  See also Chapter 6. 
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“periphery” parties have held the reins of government for most of this time.  
Could it be that the initial formation of the party system has largely been 
maintained throughout this period, or it is possible to propose that, though not 
beginning with a center-periphery cleavage, the system started to shift toward one?   
Figures 4.2 and 4.3 visually help to eliminate the notion of continuity in 
terms of electoral behavior.  The electoral maps show the behavior of the 
electorate in relation to the CHP and “center-left” parties.78 There was a great deal 
of consensus in the 1970s that Turkey had realigned and that the system and the 
parties within it seemed to be dividing at new lines of contestation.79  Thus, as one 
can see from Figure 4.2, although there are a few provinces that continued their 
strong pattern of support or opposition to the CHP, there are some striking 
differences from Figure 4.1.  Unlike in earlier elections, suddenly the populace in 
the largest city centers—Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir and Adana—and industrialized 
cities like Zonguldak showed strong support for the CHP.  Furthermore, the 
eastern provinces of the country, which in earlier elections had leaned toward 
support for the CHP, began to shift their vote in opposition to the party. 
                                                          
78
 The “center-left” is a combination of the CHP and the DSP, and to a lesser extent the SHP since 
2002.  As there is less fragmentation on this side, and the “center” is regularly argued to be “the 
homogenous center,” it seems logical to search for the possible political center-periphery cleavage 
by focusing on this set of parties rather than the others. 
79
 See Özbudun and Tachau, “Social Change and Electoral Behavior,” pp. 460-80; Sabri Sayarı, 
“The Turkish Party System in Transition,” Government and Opposition Vol. 13, No. 1 (1978), pp. 
39-57. 
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By the time that we reach the latest general elections, represented in Figure 
4.3, the map looks to be a near spatial reversal of the 1950s portrait in Figure 
4.1.
80
  This might be part of the reason that the notion of a center-periphery 
political cleavage has successfully been maintained into the twenty-first century.  
                                                          
80
 For other major works utilizing the electoral geographic mapping method in the more recent 
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Figure 4.2 
 
The fifteen highest (red) and lowest (blue) average vote totals by province for CHP  
(1969-1977) 
 
Figure 4.3 
 
The highest (red) and lowest (blue) average vote totals by province for the ‗Center-Left‘  
(1999-2007) 
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The idea of a cultural Western modernized “center” represented by parties often 
referred to as the “center-left” combating the traditionalist, Islamist populace of 
the central and eastern Anatolian regions seemed to fit the superficial portrait of 
more recent voting behavior.  If one does not have access to older electoral data 
and simply compares the present picture with the portrayal of Turkish politics 
found in Mardin‟s essay, the possibility of such a cleavage seems compelling.  It 
should not be surprising that the famous essay really began to take flight in the 
1980s when electoral patterns slowly began to fit the broad interpretation in a 
rough sense.81  There still remains a logical problem, however, in that the political 
power and elites that have governed since the 1980s have been those attributed as 
peripheral parties.  Thus, the power relations necessary to invoke a center-
periphery understanding are not existent and, thus, proposing such a social 
cleavage make less sense than other cultural or functional considerations. 
Especially since the work of Kalaycıoğlu in 1994, the evidence of 
religiosity as a determinant of party preference has led some to assert that a 
secularist-religious conservative cleavage is the continued manifestation of the 
center-periphery cleavage in more recent electoral periods.
82
  Scholars, 
particularly since the late 1990s have found a relationship between religiosity and 
votes for the “left” or “right” parties, and posited this as the evidence of a center 
and periphery.
83
  The logic of such an assertion, however, is extremely 
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problematic.  While it is undoubtedly true that many of the Early Republican 
leaders were more secular in lifestyle and outlook than many in the peripheral 
masses, there is absolutely no evidence or empirical means to connect those that 
are more or less religious today to those in the past or to voting behavior.  If the 
issue dividing groups in society is primarily regarding religious and secular 
culture and not an issue of powerful center versus powerless periphery, then it 
also make little logical sense to use such loaded terminology.  Describing the 
clustering of highly educated and secular voters on the “left” against religious 
conservatives on the “right” as “center versus periphery” also seems to 
demonstrate a lack of comparative knowledge of other democracies, especially 
those labeled “advanced industrial democracies” where the same clustering has 
been observed.  The terminology applied to such democracies at this stage of 
history, of course, would be seen as insulting as it suggests a pre-modern cleavage 
emphasizing unconsolidated national centralization; thus, Western scholars 
typically use the terminology in developmental literature regarding undeveloped 
regions of the world such as Africa.
84
 
4.3 Conclusion 
This all seems to suggest that the existing cultural divisions of a center and 
periphery maintained through the early days of the Republic, when confronted 
                                                                                                                                                              
Preferences,” Electoral Studies, Vol. 25, No. 2 (2006), pp. 369-392; and Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, 
“Attitudinal Orientations to Party Organizations in Turkey in the 2000s,” Turkish Studies, Vol. 9, 
No. 2 (2008), pp. 297-316. 
84
 For an example outside of Turkey, see Bruce Berman, “Clientelism and neocolonialism: Center-
periphery relations and political development in African states,” Studies in Comparative 
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with the institution of democracy, were complicated such that it would be 
problematic to assume an initial center-periphery cultural cleavage as the 
operative divide in the Turkish party system, let alone a persistent and stable 
manifestation of such a cleavage.  The extent of change in the electoral votes of 
parties and families of parties at the electoral level alone challenges the positing 
of any explanative historically stable political cleavage.  
The maintenance of the well-known center-periphery cleavage as a 
foundational explanation for the operating of the Turkish party system is 
problematic for the student of Turkish politics for several reasons.  Perhaps most 
importantly, the constant summoning of this meta-narrative for Turkish politics, 
intentionally or unintentionally, serves both sides of a current political discourse 
in Turkey and certain assumptions regarding “non-Western” nations more than it 
facilitates academic inquiry and explication. Within Turkey, the concept of central 
elites pitted against the peripheral masses seems to be a ready-made tool 
appropriated by both those who identify with the Turkish “center-left” and those 
opposing them.  Thus, in the current political battle, it is not the existence of a 
center-periphery divide that is in question, but rather the substance of the 
attributes in defining one‟s own position and the other side.  
Those on the “center-left”, who assert that the central system values are the 
values established by Atatürk and the “Six Arrows” of Kemalism, have often 
portrayed it as a struggle of modernity versus backwardness.  The peripheral 
masses, in this rendition, are traditionalists, reactionaries, and not guided by the 
principles of science and modernity, but by religious faith and superstition; thus, it 
becomes expedient that those in the center struggle against the rise of the 
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periphery in its current state.  This fails to take into account that the supposed 
“periphery” is far more “modern” and shares far greater consensus with the 
“center” than it is often credited with.  For example, it is not secular education 
that is contested as much as it is the means to accessing such an education and the 
rewards that follow.  As scholars such as Toprak and Heper have also pointed out, 
there does not appear to be a debate centered around a secular state versus shariah 
law (as it is sometimes presented in the discourse),85 but rather a contestation of 
the understanding of secularism.
86
  Arguably, the “central value” of secularism 
has been fairly successfully consolidated; it is the particulars that are being 
debated.  This “center-periphery” discourse also seems to operate as a self-
justification by the center-left for why the parties from this social outlook have 
not been successful: such an argument suggests that as politics is essentially 
cultural politics; thus, there is an inevitable limit on the percentage of votes that 
they can win, and there is no reason to evaluate their arguably failing political 
emphases and strategies. 
On the other side of politics, those who readily associate themselves with 
the periphery understand their own position as that of the democratic masses 
struggling against the hegemony of elite dominance that has simply served the 
interests of those elites.
87
  This interpretation of the struggle depicts the periphery 
as the democratic and liberal voice that is pitted against authoritarianism and the 
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status quo.  This view often ignores its own political position‟s tendencies toward 
authoritarianism and passes over areas in which it is clearly less democratic and 
liberal than its self-portrait would attest to.  Furthermore, association with the 
periphery puts this group in the position of “underdog” as if its struggle was 
incessantly against a stronger, dominant force, completely nullifying that it has 
been parties from this supposed “peripheral” position that have dominated 
Turkish politics and set quite a lot of the social rules since the 1950s.  True, there 
are other forces associated with the “center” that have had a strong hand in 
politics, such as the military and especially the judiciary in the last decade, but it 
would be hard to claim that what we are witnessing is that of strong versus weak, 
elites versus the powerless masses.  Whether or not one argues that there is a 
cultural or worldview struggle in Turkish politics, no matter how one approaches 
it, arguing that this divide is between central elites with all the authority and the 
powerless peripheral masses—the theoretical imagery conjured up by the 
comparative terminology—would be the least explanative. 
Ultimately, the center-periphery focus is problematic because it hides the 
fact that something much more complex was and is occurring. What needs to be 
observed is not how the Turkish electorate manifested a pre-existing cultural 
cleavage of power-wielding elites versus the masses, but how those elites, when 
initially confronted with the challenges of multiparty competition, developed 
divergent strategies to form successful links with those in the periphery whether 
or not they ultimately shared the same cultural values, and the subsequent 
contestation over “central values” since the critical election in 1950.  Democracy 
pushed the rural, less educated farmer into a previously unknown position of 
 160 
 
power and shrank the distance between the cultural center and periphery, allowing 
these groups both to affect the other side and be affected by it.88 Karpat writes: 
Party developments on the one hand, and economic and social 
changes on the other, affected the mentality and behavior and brought 
into active political life the most neglected group in Turkey: the 
peasants. . . Since no political party in Turkey can hope to win an 
election without the villagers” support, it is obvious that the peasantry 
will continue, under present circumstances, to play a decisive role in 
politics.89  
 
Thus, as both Shils and the work of Lipset and Rokkan anticipated—and to 
some extent, the future prediction in Mardin‟s piece—the advent of democracy 
seems to have complicated the relations between the existing center and periphery 
divide in society, particularly in the political realm.  We are left then, in the 
absence of such a divide, to adequately explain the dynamics of the Turkish party 
system, to observe more closely the nature of the interaction and to try to 
determine the possible changing paradigms—with its composite dimensions of 
competition and domains of identification—in operation that effectively 
established the boundaries of political contestation in the system.   
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CHAPTER 5  
 
 
POSITIONING, INTERACTION AND THE TURKISH PARTY SYSTEM 
 
 
 
Parties and party systems are not simply objects, but also subjects.  It is they who 
ultimately set the agenda, and it is they who ultimately determine the terms of 
reference through which we, as voters and citizens, understand and interpret the 
political world.
1
 
 
Once the question of one essential historical cleavage is put to rest, we are 
left with the endeavor of how to properly conceive and explain the competitive 
interaction within the electoral arena of party systems.  A widely-used shorthand 
to delineate the positions parties take in wooing the electorate is the familiar left-
right positioning, locating the parties on the spectrum of options on a linear space.  
Such a conception undeniably offers significant benefit to discussions of party 
systems depending on the objective behind the study.  This is particularly true 
when what is needed is a parsimonious description of party positions in a single 
contestation—i.e. synchronically.  The useful strengths of the left-right scale, 
particularly the emptiness and flexibility of its categories, become a handicap, 
however, when one wants to locate and understand change in party systems over 
time.  Its flexibility allows its descriptors to maintain referential meaning even in 
a context where significant substantial elements of the competitive space have 
shifted and electoral change has occurred; thus, the substantive meaning attributed 
                                                          
1
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to positions in one period could not be assumed to be consistent with another.  
Therefore, its potential benefit as a primary tool of description is greatly limited in 
studies such as this one, which purports to investigate the dynamics of the system 
over time—i.e. diachronically. 
How then should this arena of contestation be conceived?  As Hinich and 
Munger have argued, spatial models that would attempt to capture all of the 
contestable policy space are also problematic as party systems are shaped by 
electoral outcomes, requiring the electorate to have a reasonable understanding of 
how the contestable space is organized,
2
 which is an observation also noted in the 
Turkish case by Çarkoğlu.3  This interaction between the parties and the electorate 
seems to push party systems toward simpler positioning within the competitive 
space.  Hence, while the contestable space remains largely containable within 
simple models of one or two dimensions at any given time, complex changes 
across time lead to shifting and reconstitution of meaning of those simple 
dimensions, resulting in alterations in the operation of the party system, attitudes 
and behaviors of parties, and voter alignments.  To capture this phenomenon 
effectively so that change can be observed and addressed, both synchronic and 
diachronic conceptualizations of the system are required.  If we, indeed, conceive 
of the party system as a system rather than a set of parties,
4
 then interaction 
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becomes important, and relational interaction necessarily leaves the door open for 
alteration and change. 
 
5.1 Left-Right linear descriptions and Giovanni Sartori 
 
One of the most compelling arguments and frameworks for utilizing the 
left-right scale can be found in the definitive work on party systems by Giovanni 
Sartori; thus, it would be of benefit to examine his conceptualization of the left-
right scale and his original rationale for its effective usage.  Anchored in Sartori‟s 
formulation, we will be able to return to the Turkish party system and examine 
how the left-right scaling has been used in this particular context.   
Toward the end of Sartori‟s famous work Parties and Party Systems, he 
devotes a chapter on how to conceive of contested space within party systems.  
His essential argument boils down to two propositions:  First, that because of the 
dynamic relationship between parties, other parties, and the electorate, the need 
for simplicity in communicating each party‟s position, despite the existence of 
multidimensional cleavages, pushes the positioning of parties toward uni-
dimensional configuration; second, because of this tendency, there is a great deal 
of parsimony in utilizing a left-right scale to convey this configuration because 
left and right can be effectively appropriated to delineate any existing political 
cleavage because as a signifier, it is not anchored to any particular signified. 
Sartori, through an initial discussion of Downsian Theory of party 
competition, enumerates three “post-Downsian” concepts that he argues are 
relevant to party competition: issue, identification and image.  An emphasis on 
competition at the level of issues would suggest that the space of political party 
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contestation would be very complex and lines of issue division would inevitably 
cross-cut party positions, leaving the electorate quite confused and uncertain 
about voting choices and affiliation, etc.  Furthermore, as Sartori also suggests, 
issues have to be understood as extremely salient to the voter if they are to be 
determinant of positional space.
5
 Voter identification with parties in terms of 
party system shape is also not completely explanative, as Sartori point out, 
because, due to the common existence of “negative voting,” “feeble identifiers 
may well turn out to be very stable voters.”6 Of these three concepts, then, Sartori 
places the most emphasis on “image”, which emphasizes the mental pictures 
created by parties—such as “workers‟ party”—to attract the electorate.  He writes, 
“Parties communicate to mass electorates via party images and . . . much of their 
electoral strategy is concerned with building up the appropriate image for the 
public from which they expect votes.”7  In regard to how image is used in relation 
to competitive space, Sartori adds the concept of positioning, specifically the 
interaction between “position-perception” and “position-image”:  
The notion of position-perception implies that the voter places himself 
and the parties in some kind of spatial ordering, in a row: and the 
notion of position-image implies that parties maneuver precisely for 
conveying to the electorate a spatial location of themselves.
8
 
Thus, while not ignoring multiple dimensions space, Sartori argues that, in most 
systems, the nature of competition and the interaction of the parties with the 
electorate pulls the potential space from multidimensionality toward the direction 
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of one or two dimensions.  This can be argued, according to the author, even for 
systems with numerous parties.  He writes, “While the segmented polities surely 
require a multidimensional explanation for the party identifications, it does not 
automatically follow that their competition is multidimensional also.”9  Thus, in 
the arena of electoral contestation, the parties could be seen as squeezing 
themselves into linear space of one dimension, and in this regard, “the feeble case 
might well be the case of multidimensionality.”10 
Having thus argued that competitive positioning tends toward linear space, 
Sartori emphasis on utilization of left-right scaling becomes clearer.  Critical to 
the understanding of such an assertion is not that Sartori is arguing that the 
substance of party system competition more or less falls along the same lines, but 
that, whatever the salient political dimensions, the system moves toward spatial 
simplicity.  Thus, the very recommendation of employing left-right scales to 
manifest the positions of the parties in the competitive system is due to the 
inherent emptiness of the left-right terminology in comparison to other options: 
We seemingly find no contradiction in assuming one left-right 
dimension while acknowledging that it actually consists of multiple 
orderings depending on whether the criterion is economic, 
socioeconomic, constitutional, populistic, or, in the end, no criterion at 
all.
11
 
 
Multidimensions and divergent substantial cleavages can be subsumed within the 
flexible space of a left-right scale, because: “We discover that the „emptiness‟ of 
our left-right boxes facilitates, and indeed prompts, the squeezing of a multiplicity 
of orderings (equivalent to a variety of issue spaces) into one and the same spatial 
                                                          
9
 Emphasis in the original. Ibid., p. 304. 
10
 Ibid., p. 304. 
11
 Emphasis in the original. Ibid., p. 300. 
 166 
 
dimension.”12  The emptiness of „left‟ and „right‟, therefore, allows no conflict in 
various dimensions squeezing into the space because it is ultimately a „neutral‟ 
designation, encouraging positioning along its lines.  The meaning attached to 
„left‟ and „right‟ are “emotionally symbolic,” providing the parties with flexibility 
to adapt and renegotiate the substance of its positions.   
In this understanding, party system space that is demarcated with 
descriptors such as left and right allow the electorate to understand parties within 
this position-image—i.e. “center-right” or “left—thus, it can remain a relatively 
accurate and somewhat stable short-hand for party positioning in space while the 
actual substance of the delineations between parties is regularly being 
renegotiated through competition and changing contexts.  Thus, at any given time, 
a party can self-describe as “center-right” or be attributed as “center-right,” and 
the electorate, identifying or distancing themselves from such a party, can 
accurate locate themselves in the current positioning, but the substance of this 
position—its constellation of issues—can change drastically with time.  For 
example, though at various points in history voters could accurately identify 
themselves and the party in relation to „right-left‟ scaling, what the CHP (or its 
short roughly ten-year span as SHP) has in substance meant as “center-left” is 
indisputably changed from the 1970s (nationalist-social democrat), the late 1980s 
(pluralist-social democrat), and in the 2000s (secular-nationalist).  This is an 
important observation when implementing left-right interpretations on a party 
system.  The Sartorian understanding of left-right, if it is to be explanative of the 
system, needs to be placed and elaborated within its individual context, and it 
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must also lead to initial assumptions of time-specificity (although this might not 
always be the case)—i.e. it is ultimately a synchronic tool, not one that effectively 
explains historical shifts and transitions.  Within this conceptual framework, when 
one posits that a system has consistently tended toward a left-right distinction in 
the electorate, such a claim is saying very little in actual substance except that the 
left-right imagery has been used in party positioning in competitive space. 
Such a conceptualization of left-right placement would lead us to primarily 
nominal relational understandings rather than ordinal value understandings of the 
positions as they are taken up from left to right, particularly in the Turkish case.  
The substantive or quantitative meaning that exists when a portion of the 
electorate seems to re-position themselves as “right” or “far right” rather than 
“center right” is therefore questionable.  The difference in self-placement alone 
does not indicate what, if any, change occurred in the political views of the 
electorate; such a determination would require a deeper analysis that party or 
electorate placement on the left-right dimension.  Though the positions are not 
measureable, they are necessarily relational, and thus become approximations of 
where one party stands in relation to one or more parties whose identification with 
a position on the scale anchors the relational placement.   
Furthermore, left-right placement has also been used as a measure to 
comprehend the dynamic between the particular system of parties and the 
electorate. A key question becomes whether or not individual self-placement is 
more likely a reflection of the context of current party system dynamics or 
whether it is an independent placement based on non-contextual ideological 
criteria. Since the key work on individual self-placement by Inglehart and 
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Klingemann in 1976, scholars have agreed on three critical components in 
individual self-placement on a left-right scale: social, value and partisan 
components.
13
 The social component reflects positioning based on one‟s social 
status in society; the value component addresses placement based on awareness of 
ideological values as they relate to the Western democratic polities, and the 
partisan component reflects an individuals‟ self-placement on the line in tandem 
with the placement of the political party with which they are affiliated.  Among 
the works addressing these components, the vast majority give priority to the 
partisan component in particular,
14
 although a number of studies by Freire on 
European polities, by enhancing the proxy measurements for the social 
component, have found that one‟s socioeconomic status in society is arguably 
equally or more important than the partisan component.
15
  A number of studies 
argue for the importance of the value component—i.e. approaching one‟s 
placement on the scale according to wider ideological values—but these were still 
limited to a focus on traditional Western European countries in which the relation 
between the values, the party‟s positional placement, and the left-right scale are 
deeply intertwined,
16
 or, though positing that values were growing in importance 
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in European countries, they still determined that the partisan component was the 
strongest indicator of self-placement, especially among “less-advanced” countries 
when relative levels of development were taken into account.
17
  Thus, it would be 
a reasonable conclusion that, in most cases, a voter‟s self-placement on the left-
right scale is more a reflection of their own particular political and socioeconomic 
context rather than an indication of how they are measuring up to “universal” 
ideological norms.  Where values are important or distinct from party affiliation, 
the values seem to be contextually-based and filtered through approximations of 
contemporaneous political debates and, thus, still anchored by party placement 
and other relevant cues to positioning within the arena of politics, even when 
voters are undecided.  In other words, non-affiliated voters place themselves on 
the line in relation to their conceptions of space taken up by existing parties in 
their system.  A brief discussion of how left-right placement has been used to 
discuss the party system and voting behavior in Turkey will help illuminate the 
importance of clarifying what left-right positioning and descriptors do and do not 
indicate. 
 
5.2 The Left and Right in the Turkish Party System 
 
The point at which the indicators of “left” and “right” became relevant in 
the broad sense in the Turkish party system began arguably with the initiation of 
ideological politics through the founding of the Turkish Workers‟ Party (Türkiye 
                                                          
17
 Oddbjørn Knutsen, “The Partisan and the Value-Based Component of the Left-Right Self-
Placement: A Comparative Study,” International Political Science Review, Vol. 18, No. 2 (1997), 
pp. 191-225. 
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İşçi Partisi, TİP) in February 1961.18  Though a small “leftist” party that was 
never able to garner more than 3 percent of the vote, it‟s popularity among the 
intellectuals and upper class in industrial urban centers has been credited with 
instigating İsmet İnönü‟s famous placement of the CHP “left of center” 19shortly 
before the general elections in 1965.
20
  Once a major party established its 
position—“left of center”—in response to the socialist ideological party, it created 
an opportunity for the other parties to, in some way, positional themselves in 
relation to the image. While the relative positions on the left and right of the well-
known parties are not debated, it is still necessary to try to clarify where the 
critical line of division was laid as the substance guiding the positioning.  In other 
words, what were the substantial motivations and conceptions that led İnönü, the 
leader of the CHP, to position his party to the “left of center.”  
It is fairly clear that the “left of center” position was an attempt to delineate 
exactly where the CHP stood in socioeconomic outlook in relation to the socialist 
TİP and the other major party, the economically liberal Justice Party.  The 
declaration of the Seventeenth Congress of the CHP in October of 1964, which 
predated the announcement of the CHP‟s position on the left-right scale, helps to 
indicate the substance of their “left of center” imaging of the party.  As Ahmad 
records:  
                                                          
18
 Feroz Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 1950-1975 (Boulder, CO: Westview 
Press, 1977), p. 218. 
19
 In Turkish, “ortanın solu.” In direct translation, this would be better read as “left of middle” 
rather than “left of center,” but the phrasal awkwardness of the former prompts the widespread use 
of the latter.  However, as will be seen in chapter nine, there is a significant conceptual difference 
between “middle”—i.e. orta—and “center”—i.e. merkez—which comes into play in the impetus 
behind imaging in later paradigms in the Turkish case. 
20
 This is a widely-held claim by many scholars.  See Ergun Özbudun, “The Turkish Party System: 
Institutionalization, Polarization, and Fragmentation,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 17, No. 2 
(1981), p. 231. 
 171 
 
It dealt with . . . land reform, social justice, social security, economic 
development, „democratic‟ etatism, education, secularism, the fine 
arts, nationalism and youth.  Only through the proper socioeconomic 
policies, read the declaration, would the „extreme Right‟ and „extreme 
Left‟ be countered.21  
Thus, both the understanding and position of the party in relation to the 
positioning of themselves as “left of center” and the public reaction indicates that 
the understanding of the categories was largely based on the prevalent 
socioeconomic ideological left-right scaling found in Western Europe. 
This understanding of an ideological/functional left was not missed by 
scholars of the period.  Joseph Szyliowicz, discussing the 1965 general election 
outcomes in Turkey, writes about “the rising concern with ideological issues and 
the resulting division of the parties into „left‟ and „right.‟”22  Thus, ideology of the 
socioeconomic nature as was common in Western Europe, became the substantial 
framework within which positions were taken up.  As the ideological battle 
intensified, the charges of “communist” and “infidel” were leveled at the “leftists” 
while the left shot back accusations of fascism toward those affiliated with the 
“right.”23  Sabri Sayarı, writing about the polarization of politics in the period, 
states: 
The major source of cleavage, which acts as a principle catalyst in the 
ideological polarization of the party system, centers on the pro- and 
anti-leftist orientations displayed by the parties.  Although there are 
some notable programmatic differences between the parties on the 
Right, for example, they all share a common anti-Socialist/anti-
Communist world view.  It is this anti-Communist fervor which seems 
to differentiate them from the parties on the Left.
24
 
                                                          
21
 Ibid., pp. 250-1. 
22
 Joseph Szyliowicz, “The Turkish Elections: 1965,” Middle East Journal, Vol. 20, No. 4 (1966), 
p. 480. 
23
 Ibid., p. 481. 
24
 Emphasis is mine. Sabri Sayarı, “The Turkish Party System in Transition,” Government and 
Opposition, Vol. 13, No. 1 (1978), pp. 49-50. 
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This interpretation of the polarization and the dynamics of the system is very 
interesting, and it seems to confirm an assumption of Sartori: though there were 
significant lines of cleavage separating the parties on the right from one another, 
the nature of electoral contestation and its polarization caused the parties to 
“squeeze” themselves into the left-right scale and enter the ideological discourse. 
This socioeconomic ideological association with the usage of “left” and 
“right” seems to be the orthodox position among the other major scholars of party 
politics in that period.  Kemal Karpat clarifies this interpretation in claiming that 
“the reason for the increased support for the [CHP] politicians among the 
youngest men [in the urban squatter areas] can be attributed to the „left of center‟ 
or welfare state policy adopted by this party in 1965.”25  Thus, Karpat equates the 
designation of left with the common socioeconomic policy consistent with the 
contemporary understandings of left in Western Europe at that time.  Ergun 
Özbudun also seems to have made this interpretation.  In an article written along 
with Frank Tachau, he argues that voter alignments in this period seem to 
correspond to “the increasing importance of socioeconomic cleavages”26 in which 
parties were competing according to “functional” rather than “cultural” 
cleavages.
27
  Though the “left-right” scale was not utilized in that article, it is 
clear in his other writings that he had such an understanding.  When explaining 
the “left” position of the CHP, he writes, “The appearance of the [socialist TİP] 
                                                          
25
 Emphasis is mine. Kemal Karpat, “The Politics of Transition: Political Attitudes and Party 
Affiliation in the Turkish Gecekondu,” in Engin Akarlı and Gabriel Ben-Dor (eds.), Political 
Participation in Turkey: Historical Background and Present Problems (Istanbul: Bosphorus 
University Press, 1975), p. 111. 
26
 Ergun Özbudun and Frank Tachau, “Social Change and Electoral Behavior in Turkey: Toward a 
„Critical Realignment‟?” International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 6, No. 4 (1975), p. 
479. 
27
 Ibid., p. 461. 
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seems to have been a major factor in the [CHP‟s] opening to the left,” and “the 
[“fascist” nationalist MHP] was also instrumental in producing a rightward drive 
for the [AP].”28  Hence, the positions on the line are established according to 
ideological position as was common in many other systems in Western Europe at 
the time.   
Quantitatively, this association was also manifested in results of factor 
loadings for political parties competing in this same period in a study by Üstün 
Ergüder and Richard Hofferbert.  Though they derived three separate indices for 
factor analysis—center-periphery, left-right, and anti-system—only the party 
loadings according to the left-right index (which established proxies for 
conventional Western European socioeconomic ideological positioning) takes the 
shape of the actual major political contestation of the period.  Only this index pits 
the Justice Party (AP) on one end against the Republican People‟s Party on the 
other.  The indices for center-periphery and anti-system placed the two parties in 
the same competitive space; in fact, the center-periphery index determined that 
the CHP was slightly more peripheral than the AP.
29
  It is safe to say then, when 
the statements of the parties themselves and the scholars of the period are 
combined, that the substance behind the positioning of “left” and “right” in this 
period from the mid-1960s through the 1970s was primarily socioeconomic 
positioning.
30
 
                                                          
28
 Ergun Özbudun, “The Turkish Party System,” pp. 231-2. 
29
 Üstün Ergüder and Richard Hofferbert, “The 1983 General Elections in Turkey: Continuity or 
Change in Voting Patterns,” in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, eds., State, Democracy and the 
Military: Turkey in the 80s (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), p. 92. 
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 For further analysis of this period, see chapter seven. 
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In 2007, a prominent scholar of Turkish politics, Ali Çarkoğlu, published 
the results of an interesting study with the intent to substantiate or associate 
certain characteristics with voters‟ self-designations along a left-right scale in 
Turkey.
31
  His primary conclusion is “the left and right as reflected in the 
determinants of self-placements along the L-R scale have no tangible 
socioeconomic basis such as economic deprivation but have instead bases in 
ethnic [i.e. Turkish vs. Kurdish] and sectarian [“Islamist vs. secularist and Alevi] 
differences.”32  This leads the author, in fact, to claim that the substance of the 
positions taken up in the current political space as indicative of the ubiquitous 
resort of students of Turkish politics, the center-periphery cleavage.
33
  Although 
the author stretches the significance of certain variables whose coefficients 
approach a straight line, and he downplays several variables with strong and 
significant coefficients, we can see from the sample population from which he 
derived his tables, that the “left” is associated with a secular outlook, pluralism, 
Alevism, Kurdishness, lack of primary school education, and a desire that society 
should either be radically changed or protected from any change—i.e. 
maintenance of the status quo.
34
  The “right” was associated with “Turkishness,” 
religiosity, desire for charismatic leaders, and positive evaluations of the state of 
the economy.
35
   
Furthermore, the potential criticisms of this study—i.e. that it doesn‟t seem 
representative of the mainstream positions on left and right in the current 
                                                          
31
 Ali Çarkoğlu, “The Nature of Left-Right Ideological Self-Placement in the Turkish Context,” 
Turkish Studies, Vol. 8, No. 2 (2007), pp. 253-71. 
32
 Ibid., p. 267.  Emphasis is mine. 
33
 Ibid., p. 256. 
34
 Ibid., p. 265. 
35
 Ibid., p. 265. 
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context—help to clarify the changes even more strongly.  Çarkoğlu noted that, 
among the roughly 1,850 participants derived pulled with sampling methods from 
all regions of the country, the respondents tended to prefer one (farthest left), five 
(center), and ten (farthest right).
36
  Although individuals on the right and left also 
placed themselves on spaces in-between, the mode was one, five, and ten, which 
subsequently leads the profiles of those respondents to more strongly determine 
the trends.  Çarkoğlu tacks this up to participants being exposed to “ambiguous 
unobserved thresholds.”37 While I concur with the author that this certainly could 
be part of the problem, a more explanative hypothesis could be made if one 
assumes that the spectrum of issues over which participants self-identified on a 
left-right scale also reflect the significant issues establishing the placement of 
parties in the existing party system.  The post-1991 relational placement imagery 
for party positioning has generally emphasized that parties with strong pro-
Kurdish and Alevi elements are further left on the scale than the other “center-
left” parties, and the Turkish nationalist party (MHP) has perennially been 
described as far right.  If the constituents of these parties placed themselves on the 
extreme ends of the spectrums as the strong influence of the “partisan component” 
would suggest, we would expect the strongest coefficients to be skewed in 
relation to these groups.  A second glance at the results in the table appears to 
strongly confirm this hypothesis.  The five strongest coefficients in order are 
“does not speak Kurdish with their family” (right), “does not show signs of 
Alevism” (right), “prefers society should radically change” (left), “prefers 
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 Ibid., p. 262. 
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protecting society from any change” (left), “is not a primary school graduate” 
(left).
38
  The strongest coefficients except for “prefers protecting society from any 
change” suggest that the poles of right and left are occupied with the views and 
demographic realities of Turkish and Kurdish ethnic nationalists, respectively.  
This also helps explain the apparent huge contradiction that the left purportedly 
wants society to radically change and protect it from any change.  The former is 
the rhetoric of the Kurdish nationalist leftists while the latter is a well-known key 
position of the “center-left” at the present time. Therefore, while we observe that 
the poles of the Turkish party system and its electorate in the 1970s were 
occupied by those entering into radical socioeconomic ideological rhetoric, in the 
first decade of the 21st century, the poles seem to represent ethnically-based 
concerns, which is also supported by studies by the same author in which the 
electorate place the parties on a left-right line.
39
  
The implications of this change in left-right ideology in the 1970s are 
profound.  The self-positioning of the electorate in Turkey along a left-right scale, 
whose self-placement has also been shown to be remarkably predictive of party 
affiliation,
40
 as would be expected by the broader literature on self-placement and 
the partisan component, seems to be based on entirely different criteria than it was 
several decades earlier, rendering any sort of historical left-right comparison 
extremely dubious.  All of the proxy variables from which a traditional left-right 
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socioeconomic positioning could be derived turned out to be completely 
indeterminant in Çarkoğlu‟s 2007 study.  Such a dramatic dynamic change 
contained within the superficially stable left-right framework clearly indicates the 
need to approach left-right scales as predominantly synchronic and with a 
corresponding necessity to elaborate upon what left and right signify at any given 
time.  Unfortunately, these considerations have often not been heeded in 
discussing the Turkish case. 
One problem has been to attach meaning to the left-right self-positioning 
that potentially does not exist or is ultimately circular.  Yılmaz Esmer, for 
example, correctly determines that “the most important predictor of voter 
behavior in Turkey was the “left-right ideology.”41   What he means by this, 
however, is that the respondents‟ self-placement on an eleven-point scale was the 
most consistent significant indicator of party preference for all of the major 
parties.  While this is an interesting finding, we still must ask, “What does it 
mean?”  The author seems to assume that the self-placement was connected to a 
stable ideological scale exogenous from the current political environment.  
However, one must ask what criteria, benchmark or anchor these respondents 
were most likely using to determine their own placement on the scale.  Is it more 
likely that these voters participating in this survey were basing their 
understanding of left and right in relation to how those terms are widely used as 
descriptors of parties and politicians or that they were deriving their placement 
from some abstract universal criteria external to their political context?  It seems 
clear that for a strong majority, it would be the latter; hence, the meaning of the 
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Figure 5.1 – Left-Right Diachronic Comparison 
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relationship of this coefficient with political party choice is simply that the 
respondents had a fairly accurate understanding of the current relational imagery 
in regard to the six major parties.  In other words, where the parties placed 
themselves and have been placed in relation to the others was generally clear to 
the electorate.  Thus, their self-placement on the scale simply becomes a proxy for 
party family identification or self-identification anchored within the current 
political context, and Esmer‟s work demonstrates clearly that the left-right 
imagery has been successful in communicating position-images to the electorate 
in that contemporary period of Turkish politics, not that a non-contextually-based 
knowledge of ideology as it occupies a left-right linear framework was 
determinant of how voters in Turkey choose their parties.  
Another existing problem in this regard has been the tendency to compare 
self-placements on a left-right scale over time and translate this into an 
interpretation of concrete and quantitative shifting in ideological perspectives.  
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Consider the recreated graph in Figure 5.1, which originally appeared in a work in 
1998.
42
 The author is comparing self-placement results in 1977 with self-
placement results in 1990 and 1995.  What do these lines ultimately tell us?  
Critically, they tell us very little about the ideological constitution of the 
electorate at those times.  We cannot with any certainty argue that the electorate 
in 1990 is quantifiably more centrist in a certain ideology than they were in 1977 
or 1995.  What can be said then?  This graph shows us that the positioning and 
placement of parties and their subsequent relation with the electorate have 
changed quite dramatically from 1977.  One could argue, in tandem with 
knowledge of the electoral competition in 1977, that the majority of the populace 
was fairly equally divided between a party casting an image of itself as “center-
left” (the CHP) and a party with a “center-right” image, with a fairly decent 
portion of the population in the undecided position (center).
43
  The 1990 line 
suggests that one major party, the Motherland Party (ANAP), and to some extent 
a number of other parties placed themselves toward the center of the contested 
political space.  As the “centrist” party continued to lose ground to another party, 
the DYP, which largely shared the ideological space but for imaging reasons 
chose to emphasize its “center-rightness,” the electorate, to some extent, seemed 
to follow in their re-identification.  The problem in interpretation is the reference 
to the self-placement scale as “ideological.” Although, to some extent, ideology is 
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Performance and Agenda Change,” Political Studies, Vol. 46, No. 3 (1998), p. 552. 
43
 The author, having only the percentages for “center-left,” “center” and “center-right” but having 
two numbers on the scale that fit each category, divided the percentages for each equally across 
the numbers for that category. The total score for center-left, for example, was divided equally 
across numbers three and four; center was five and six, and center-right was seven and eight. Ibid., 
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involved in how parties position themselves in competitive space, which ideology 
and relative to what must be determined because it is from this interaction that the 
electorate of a polity filters its self-placement.  If members of the polity are 
placing themselves along the scale in terms of left and right, it is much more 
likely that their decision is influenced more by the fact that the national parties are 
positioning themselves in space according to such an understanding rather than 
that a broad electorate has applicable knowledge of a universal substantive left-
right ideological scale.  The primary proxy that determines their positioning has to 
be the current dynamics of the party system. 
Because of this, the argument that has been leveled toward the Turkish 
polity that it is sliding to the right (or back to the center) can be only indirectly 
true.  For example, that self-placement scales between 2002 and 2004 showed that 
the electorate on the right moved back toward the center and center-right indicates 
not that a substantial ideological change or decrease in polarization has 
occurred,
44
 but that the most popular party was employing effective image-
positioning to fill the vacancy left behind by former parties occupying that space.  
The party itself could not be seen as substantially moderating its ideology from 
2002, but its placement moved toward the center-right—or “social center” in their 
discursive imagery—away from the traditional placement of a religious party on 
the right.  Certainly some ideological change might be taking place, but their self-
placement has to be seen as strongly filtered and confounded by the individual‟s 
existing—even if quite temporary—attachment to a particular party or political 
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context and its subsequent image-positioning.  Hence, while increasing numbers 
of voters found themselves supporting parties traditionally identified as being 
located further to the right, this occurred simultaneous to those “rightist” parties 
moderating their rhetoric and issue formation to appeal to voters closer to the 
center. 
Thus, though the left-right scaling has proven to be a particularly beneficial 
tool in explicating the synchronic relational positioning of parties competing in 
the system in Turkey, the problem has been how to measure substantial political 
change within the electorate over time and how to capture this in such a way that 
it can be effectively explicated.  Further consideration of the relational dynamics 
beyond left-right spatial positioning seems to be beneficial to fill out the 
foundation that the discussion of Sartori‟s work has provided for us. 
 
5.3 Relational Change and Party Competition—Structure and Agency 
 
Despite the diagnosis by Lipset and Rokkan in 1967 of party system 
“freezing,” the possibility for party system change on a number of significant 
levels seems to loom large.  Although parties themselves can be understood as 
benefiting from stability in the system in which they have been able to take up a 
significant role, there are also potential opportunities for existing or new parties 
by initiating alterations in the nature of competition or the image-positioning of 
the party in certain competitive contexts.  Besides the actions of political actors, 
such as parties and political leaders, the structures organizing society are 
themselves not static elements in the arena of political contestation and as these 
alter, whether drastically or gradually, they open up new possibilities that can be 
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appropriated by risk-taking actors.  To the extent that institutions, such as the 
electoral system, or constitutions change, one could conceive of potential changes 
in the party system.  While the issue of electoral system change was taken up in 
chapter two, a discussion below on the dynamics of structure and agents on party 
system change would be beneficial in highlighting the dynamics in which 
relational interaction between parties takes place. 
Although historically, as can be observed by the assumptions of Lipset and 
Rokkan in their foundational piece on party systems and cleavages discussed in 
the previous chapter,
45
 scholars have generally accorded a great deal of weight to 
structural and cultural factors, they have increasingly begun to leave an important 
place for the agency of political parties and leaders.  Sartori himself, for example, 
attributed an important level of agency to political parties.  Rather than simply 
being a reflection of the public will, he posits, “Parties do not only express; they 
also channel.”46  In other words, rather than simply being an institutionalized 
mouthpiece of public opinion, parties interact with and reconstitute “public 
interest” in a way that suits their agenda.  He goes on to say that “more than 
expressing and reflecting public opinion parties shape, and indeed manipulate, 
opinion.”47  Furthermore, Sartori‟s own definition of party system implies the 
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 In this account, cleavages and the subsequent party systems are seen as deriving from 
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significance of actors: “A party system is precisely the system of interactions 
resulting from inter-party competition.”48  The critical element of the definition, 
as Sartori himself emphasized, was the “inter-action” of actors—i.e. the parties.  
That this relational element is what distinguished party systems from other 
alternatives such as one-party regimes places great weight on the actions and 
reactions of the actors constituting the system. 
Another prominent scholar of the field, Alan Ware, in a recent work on two-
party systems writes, “To put the matter crudely, political science has generally 
understood the party/party-system relationship in the following way: parties are 
similar to (human) train „drivers‟ on many subway systems, in that they do not 
actually drive their trains.”49  The rails that determine the course of the parties are 
often understood as socioeconomic phenomena and/or the political culture or the 
forces of the „electoral market‟, to which parties respond robotically if these alter 
or shift.  Such perspectives, argue Ware, among other things leave out “the 
interventions of individual political actors who are attempting to operate within 
those structures.”50  Later, he spells out more clearly the complexity of these 
interventions by actors: 
The party‟s external environment is not a „given‟ to which it must 
respond, but rather something that the party is partly creating through 
its conflicts, cooperation, and communication with a whole array of 
different kinds of actors.  Those interactions are themselves 
continually restructuring that environment: it is a dynamic process.  
Secondly, the party is itself both a single actor—with a distinct set of 
interests—and is also composed of individual actors who own 
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interests can conflict with, as well as be aligned with, those of the 
party.
51
 
Thus, within this “dynamic process” actors interact in such a way that they are 
both structured and structuring their environment both within and external to the 
level of the party.  It is also this emphasis on political actors that frames Ware 
criticism of the classical realignment approaches toward the American political 
party system.  “Rather than being exogenous social variables about which the 
elites themselves can do little,” he argues that realignments “are „managed‟ by 
political elites.”52 
In his seminal work on party system change, Peter Mair takes a very similar 
position on the agency of political elites.  Though much of his work is devoted to 
the argument that party systems are in fact changing much less than has been 
proposed since the 1980s, he bases his argument not on the stability of social 
dynamics and structures but on the agency and adaptability of political parties to 
counter change.  He writes:   
The fact that fundamental transformations in party systems are 
actually quite infrequent therefore tells us more about the capacity of 
those party systems to constrain voter choice than it does about any 
inherent integrity of the equilibria themselves. . . To put it another 
way . . . parties and party systems are not simply objects, but also 
subjects.  It is they who ultimately set the agenda, and it is they who 
ultimately determine the terms of reference through which we, as 
voters and citizens, understand and interpret the political world.
53
 
Thus, somewhat ironically, the agency of political actors become the key factor 
maintaining stability, and for Mair, it is the manipulation and maneuvering of 
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parties to maintain the system in the face of changing socioeconomic conditions 
and structures that demonstrates the significant role of agency.
54
 
This juncture between structure and the agency of political elites and 
parties can also be seen to impact the nature of party organization structure.  
Perkins, also intending to address the tension between structure and agency writes: 
 Political actors are not simply pawns, acting out strategies 
dictated by larger structures, but are actors with their own goals 
and aspirations. . . For a more complete understanding of political 
processes we must consider neither the structures nor the political 
actors in isolation from one another, but how the latter work in the 
context of the former.
55
 
 
At this nexus, he uses the existing knowledge and typologies of party 
organizations to demonstrate how actors in the newer democracies in Eastern 
Europe, responding to existing structural opportunities and constraints, form 
party organizations corresponding to available options.  Where there is wide 
access to media resources for campaigning, cadre parties tend to often be the 
choice for party formation.  Where existing civil society organizations exist that 
can be exploited for mass mobilization, parties have greater opportunity to utilize 
a mass party organizational structure.  In countries where the bureaucracy is 
porous and the government in power has strong distributive possibilities, 
clientelistic strategies become more likely.  While the author‟s examples 
demonstrate that the organizational decisions of political elites are not a given, 
and that they are usually confronted with a number of opportunities, the trends in 
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Eastern Europe have shown rationality in terms of organizational structuring of 
parties.
56
   
It might also be noted that, while Perkins focuses on party formation 
options in an organizational sense, it might be equally valid to claim that his 
observations of party behavior have a great deal to do with party emphases based 
on campaigning strategies; thus, while the author discusses “mass party” options, 
for example, what he is targeting is the decisions of parties to mobilize the 
electorate through existing support organizations.
57
  This being the case, these 
strategies could theoretically be deployed by a party in relation to existing social 
and political structures whether or not the actual hierarchical or other structuring 
of the party changes.  As will be seen in future chapters, such strategic refocusing 
based on existing opportunities and constraints occurred in the Turkish case 
whether or not the party as an elite hierarchical organization changed in its 
structural organization. 
Beyond the dynamic between political agents—i.e. political parties and 
elites—with their environment, one must also consider how outcomes are formed 
from the interaction between agents, the existing political elites.  That parties 
necessarily must be understood within their dynamic interaction with other parties 
seems foundational to a party system approach. Bardi and Mair establish this as a 
fundamental basis for party system study by emphasizing the distinction between 
a “set of parties” from a “system of parties” approach. Although the “system of 
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parties” concept certainly constitutes more than inter-party interaction, it is clearly 
a key element:  
In a set of parties, the individual parties involved are seen to be more 
or less free to move about as they wish, being limited only by the 
physical confines of the polity in which they operate.  In the systemic 
approach . . . the parties are also constrained by their interactions with 
the other parties in the system, and in some cases, such as in the very 
„strong‟ case of polarized pluralism, this may serve to limit severely 
their room for maneuver.
58
 
Agency, then, must be understood as not as „super agency‟ in which parties are 
able to make any possible decision, but as agency that is contextualized within a 
system that it is also affecting and engaged in action with other mutually 
empowered agents.  This entails that they are able to initiate and act, but that 
options and decisions are accompanied by opportunities and constraints provided 
by socioeconomic structures and institutions.  Bardi and Mair‟s emphasis on party 
interaction as superseding a mere summing of existing parties as the fundamental 
understanding of the party system draws its own assertion from Sartori‟s 
definition that “a party system is precisely a system of interactions resulting from 
inter-party competition.”  His elaboration on the definition might be even more 
helpful in this regard.  Sartori writes, “The system in question bears on the 
relatedness of parties to each other, on how each party is a function (in the 
mathematical sense) of the other parties and reacts, competitively or otherwise, to 
the other parties.”59  The description of parties as a mathematical function of the 
others might seem to suggest a determination that removes agency, but in fact, 
Sartori could be seen as saying that parties are the result of an aggregation of 
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agencies, including the party itself.  To the extent that each party is shaped by the 
existence of the other parties in the system, so too does that party shape the nature 
of the others.  Thus, action, shaping and determination must all be seen as 
operating in a dynamic relationship. 
Another arena of interaction, parties in relation to voters, must also be seen 
as involving agency on the part of parties and political leaders. Rather than the 
assumption that social forces determine the operation of the system, that the needs 
of the electorate and existing socioeconomic conditions establish the position of 
parties who respond in predictable and anticipated ways to such forces, parties 
should be seen as actors able also to shape the electorate for their own benefit and 
that of the mutual benefit of the existing party system. In this regard, Mair 
illustrates the active nature of the parties on the policy concerns of the electorate.  
As discussed above, Mair argues that it is the power of the parties to constrain 
voter choice that effectively explains why party systems have been able to 
maintain themselves or, to use Lipset and Rokkan‟s terminology, to “freeze.”  He 
writes, “The notion of constraint is crucial here, in that it is the constraints which 
are „imposed‟ on voters by the party system and by the parties as individual actors 
which constitute the real motor of persistence.”60  Two points are critical here: 
one, parties act to “constrain” voter choice, and two, their actions of “imposing” 
choice on the voters are ultimately based on the intention to maintain the status 
quo and their place within it.   
How then do parties constrain the choices of the electorate on whom they 
depend for votes and their subsequent translations into seats?  One important 
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action of parties is to establish the discourse within which politics is conceived 
and discussed.  The actors within the system, based on their “structure of 
competition,” as Mair states, “act to „freeze‟ into place a specific language of 
politics.  Party competition, and politics more generally, then becomes dominated 
by a particular overriding choice, to which other considerations are 
subordinated.” 61   Sartori, as discussed earlier, expresses this, perhaps, more 
strongly using the expressions of “channeling,” “manipulating” and “distorting.”62 
The summative “language of politics” that frames a given system is obviously not 
created by individual actors but the product of the interactions and the 
development of salient relational boundaries between the various actors.  
Understood in this way, the political discourse established by the parties 
competing within the system forms the boundaries and debate in which societal 
interests and concerns are discussed.  The language guides or “imposes” the set of 
issues and views that the public are to be concerned about.  Furthermore, with its 
establishment, the existing political discourse acts to stabilize the existing lines of 
competition operating within the system.  The stabilization of the system 
ultimately serves the mutual interests of the parties competing in that framework.  
Mair argues:  
Much as rival cigarette manufacturers have a mutual interest in the 
promotion of smoking, however competitive they may be vis-à-vis 
one another as far as the marketing of their own particular brands may 
be concerned, the established parties in a party system may be seen to 
have a mutual interest in the survival of their particular conflict and 
their particular form of competition.
63
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Thus, though the electorate and other social forces and developments certainly 
play an active role in shaping the party system, the parties within the system are 
also acting to channel these other forces toward their ultimate benefit within a 
predictable—i.e. stable—system.  
The emphasis on the salience of political parties and elites to act is in no 
way a suggestion that structural forces do not also act upon the system; however, 
just as parties and political elites are seen in dynamic interaction with the 
electorate, a similar parallel can be made in positing the interaction of the parties 
and political elites with impinging structures and institutions.  To the extent that 
there is a dynamic interaction, the various strengths of the actors can change 
depending on the context; in some cases, structural forces can be seen as tying the 
hands of political actors.  Ware writes, “Agency can matter, but there are often 
circumstances in which individual actors cannot change outcomes because of the 
role played by structure (or other factors).”64  At the same time, an argument that 
proposes that political cleavages that shape the party system are simply 
manifestations of cultural and social realities is also problematic. As Mair argues, 
the very evidence that predominate cleavages change when social structure does 
not helps to indicate the role that parties have in shaping the political discourse.
65
 
The dominance of structure over agency or vice versa cannot be understood as a 
consistent given.  Even when political actors are highly constrained by structural 
forces, there are usually multiple alternatives, offering more or less risk to the 
actor.  Such a view would not likely satisfy a strong proponent of agency or 
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structure, but an approach that seeks to give to each an active role in shaping 
outcomes, messy though it may be, might help bring us closer to accurate 
explication of the predominant dynamics acting on and within the system. 
Mair, in seeking to understand and define party systems, uses the concept 
“dimension of competition” and in some cases “structure of competition.”  He 
defines this as the framework that ultimately provides stability to the particular 
system.  It is the established pattern of strategy employed by the system of parties 
consisting of “the issues on which they competed, the ways in which they 
appealed to voters, the approaches they adopted to the process of government 
formation, and the various alliances and divisions which they fomented.”66  The 
dimension of competition is also framed by its particular “language of politics”—
i.e. discourse.  This concept along with its paired concept “domains of 
identification” closely parallels the emphasis of this current study on the concept 
of “paradigms.” Though “government formation,” one of Mair‟s components of 
the concept, is outside of the specific focus of party systems in the electoral arena, 
the other aspects, the strategies employed to attract voters, the issues emphasized 
and the framing political discourse must be seen as relevant component parts of 
the concept of party system paradigms as understood in this work.  This also 
seems to closely capture the meaning of “pattern of interaction” as it is used by 
Sartori and Ware.  Arguably, it is within this conceptual framework that a party 
system in its historical operation can be fruitfully investigated. 
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5.4 Conclusion 
By paying attention to electoral strategies, approaches toward the voting 
population, and the political discourse, we are able to observe important changes 
and investigate the cause of changes in the party system and locate the points or 
periods in which an old paradigm transitions to a new paradigm that again 
structures and stabilizes the system.  These shifts are typically not subtle; once a 
paradigm begins to transform, one is usually not left to only observe the change 
through the discourse, but it often manifests itself in some form within the 
quantitative measures employed to detect change in party system behavior, such 
as localized measures of volatility or fragmentation or other means utilized to 
detect changing or realigning electoral behaviors.  As Mair also writes, “When 
that potentially vulnerable structure of competition collapses, the party system can 
be subject to quite a dramatic transformation.”67  Because the party system is 
shaped around these paradigms, which are ultimately stabilized patterns of 
interaction—i.e. they are relational—they are necessarily vulnerable to change.  It 
only takes an important push from any number of the possible forces or actors to 
set in motion a transformation through the inter-connected relational network of 
actors.   
This does not mean, however, that paradigm change necessarily results in 
party system change in the minimalist sense—i.e. in Sartorian typology.  An 
important paradigm shift can take place without changing the main political 
parties or number of relevant parties engaged.  Such a case could be argued for a 
paradigm change that took place in Turkey in the 1960s.  Although the main 
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political parties remained the dominant forces shaping the system, their patterned 
dimensions of competition and domains of identification—i.e. paradigm—very 
clearly changed with important consequences. In other cases, it could actually be 
the change of party system that seems to be the impetus for a change in the 
patterns of interaction between the political parties and elites.  In Turkey, for 
example, it was the institutional conditions of the party system at its outset that 
seemed to determine the paradigm that gave stability to the system, if briefly, at 
the advent of multiparty politics in the late 40s and 50s and again when the 
military returned power to political elites in 1983.  In other cases, however, a 
change of the political paradigm could lead to a change in the party system itself, 
arguably the case in Turkey leading up to and following the 1995 national 
election as will be discussed in chapter nine. 
An approach toward party systems that focuses predominantly on the 
political paradigms that help stabilize and manage the existing system requires a 
more restricted usage and conceptualization of the left-right linear competition 
framework.  Because the usage of the terminology, left, right, etc. is manifestly 
trans-paradigm—in other words, it is able to empty out its substantive meaning to 
be re-employed in existing lines of political competition—in order to harmonize 
with the relational-interactional patterns of interaction, it must be seen as 
primarily a relational positioning function operating intra-paradigm.  As 
paradigms shift it is not argued here that “left”, for example, loses all of its 
previous significance to be replaced with entirely new meaning, but that important 
substantive changes or shifts can take place from paradigm to paradigm without 
the need to change the relational left-right positioning.  This is also not meant to 
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deny that there are always some within any given democratic polity that utilize a 
conceptualization of left-right that is based on the externally anchored ideological 
positioning derived from Western European systems.  The vast majority, however, 
and the most common usage of “left-right” terminology seems to be more clearly 
contextually based and anchored to the existing political environment.  Whether 
or not an individual is affiliated with any current party, they most frequently place 
themselves relationally within the political context in which they are embedded.  
In the following chapters, this particular study of the electoral party system in 
Turkey will proceed grounded upon these critical conceptualizations. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
 
THE INITIAL PARADIGM – 1950-1965  
 
 
 
The desire to exploit sacred beliefs and make the emotions that are deeply 
embedded in the national conscience the tool of cheap political games  
is clearly in evidence before us.
1
 
—Celal Bayar, President of the Democrat Party (1950) 
 
The welfare of the villager is the starting point of our election manifest . . . We are 
persisting in the plan to turn our villages into cooperatives and equip them with 
productive machinery. . . We are pushing for a radio in all of our villages.  Those 
who don’t know Anatolian villages can’t understand the worth of our desires.2 
—İsmet İnönü, Leader of the Republican People’s Party (1950) 
 
Though a plethora of political parties had existed at several points toward the end 
of the Ottoman Empire
3
 and two opposition parties
4
 had been brought into being, 
albeit briefly, at different points during the Early Republican Period in Turkey, it 
seems most appropriate to begin the discussion of paradigms in the multiparty 
system at the point at which the right of organized and independent opposition to 
the governing party could be relatively guaranteed and when the vast majority of 
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the population could lay claim to having a stake in determining the composition of 
the future government through the electoral process.  It is for these reasons that we 
begin with the general election of 1950, though a brief comment on the 
development of the multiparty system would be of benefit. 
In 1945, with the end of the Second World War and an assembly divided 
over land reform legislation, an opportunity opened up for opposition parties to 
contest the existing single-party governing Republican People‟s Party (CHP) in a 
context in which multiparty competition seemed amenable to all parties involved.  
The land-reform debates initiated at the beginning of 1945 and brought to the 
assembly in May inspired an Istanbul industrialist, Nuri Demirağ to submit an 
application to the government for the right to form a party that would be called the 
National Development Party (Milli Kalkınma Partisi) in July of 1945.5  Perhaps, 
more importantly in terms of historical impact, dissent within the ruling single-
party CHP was embodied by the famous “Proposal of the Four” (Dörtlü Takrir) 
submitted by former Prime Minister Celal Bayar, Adnan Menderes, Fuad 
Köprülü, and Refık Koraltan in June of that same year, essentially requesting that 
the party loosen wartime restrictions and allow additional parties and open debate.  
These four members of the CHP for various reasons were either expelled or 
resigned from the party by the end of 1945.  Although their had been earlier hints 
from the President of the Republic, İsmet İnönü, that the country would be 
moving in a more democratic direction,
6
 his speech at the beginning of November 
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in 1945, explicitly calling for opposition parties and free and direct voting in the 
subsequent election, further emboldened these four leaders and, in January of 
1946, the Democrat Party (DP) was formed.
7
  
Though general elections were held in 1946, in which it became clear that 
the significant line of contestation would be the organ of the single-party years, 
the CHP, and its newly formed competitor, the DP, the undisclosed nature of the 
election results and the accusations of electoral fraud demonstrated that certain 
remaining “kinks” needed to be worked out of the system stemming from the 
single party era.  By the general election of 1950, however, the vast majority of 
the electoral irregularities had been addressed by the passage of appropriate 
legislation, and the country and the world witnessed a very open electoral contest. 
As the nation entered into its initial transition to democratic multiparty 
elections, it seems particularly important to seek to understand the paradigm—i.e. 
the pattern of dimensions of competition and domains of identification in their 
historical context—within which political actors and the electorate oriented 
themselves to competitive politics.  Though it is certainly true that each change in 
the political paradigm over time contributed substantial elements to the working 
dynamics of the party system, it seems logical to anticipate that the initial 
paradigm would be more foundational, likely establishing certain critical patterns 
that would persist despite the exposure to other changes.  Therefore, with this 
assumption in mind, we should investigate the socioeconomic, institutional and 
cultural forces involved at the advent of multiparty democracy that may have 
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contributed to the trajectories of this early party system formation and determine 
the nature of the dimensions of competition—i.e. the national political discourse 
employed in electoral contests and the non-discursive strategies employed to 
mobilize the voters toward the competing parties—and the domains of 
identification comprising this initial paradigm. 
This initial period is also of great significance in another way.  As discussed 
in chapter four, the enfranchisement of the villagers in such a way that they 
suddenly had a critical influence on who would be governing the country could be 
seen as a revolution in its own right.
8
  The profundity of this sudden and 
significant change has not been missed by students of Turkish politics. This 
drastic change could be at least partly responsible for the well-known assertions of 
a center-periphery political cleavage that pits the peripheral villagers against 
central state elites.  That there was an existing cultural cleavage between the 
urban, bureaucratic and intellectual class, which had hitherto been the dominant 
force in running the country, and the vast population that lived in the rural 
heartland, seems fairly evident.  The question is how these initial parties, each led 
by members of the central elite, attempted to forge alliances with a population that 
they had previously not had to take into account in any great measure. The 
strategies to woo this election-determining segment of the population, effectively 
integrating this populous into the affairs of the state, are of particular interest.  It is 
to these issues that we now turn. 
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6.1 The Context of Initial Multiparty Competition 
As discussed at the outset in Chapter One, the operation of a party system in 
the electoral arena needs to be understood as an interactive dynamic that includes 
both actors, such as the parties and the electorate, and also other forces, social 
structures and existing institutions, that are both likely to contribute to the shaping 
of the system and in turn be impacted by the system or actors within it.  Thus, we 
will first outline the potentially contributing factors that impacted the direction the 
party system would take and the overall electoral trends observed during the 
period, and then the role of the political actors will be examined.   
The socioeconomic condition of Turkey at the end of World War II, during 
which it managed to avoid having to shoot a single bullet though it abandoned its 
neutral position and sided with the Allies as the combat came to a close, offered a 
significant challenge to any potential government leadership.  Rampant poverty 
tied to inflation and price controls, derived from the wartime necessity of 
spending a great deal of resources equipping a national defense, led to discontent 
among many elements of the population, from landowners to bureaucrats (who 
experienced major reductions in salary).
9
 Furthermore, accompanying this austere 
period was the presence of military police, the gendarmerie, maintaining order but 
also associated with the heavy arm of the state.
10
  The vast proportion of the 
populace (at least 80 percent) lived, not in urban environments, but in the rural 
villages and were in need of a great many services traditionally rendered by states, 
such as schools, roads and access to electricity.  Thus, as Turkey approached 
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elections in 1950, the country was emerging from a number of challenges that 
were certainly at the forefront of the Turkish voter.  The state‟s ability or inability 
to provide these services throughout the country during the single-party regime 
left only one party to point a finger at: the CHP.  For good or for ill, the country 
entered multiparty politics with the possibility of scrutinizing the previous record 
of only one of the parties competing, the CHP, which gave a terrific advantage to 
an untested but organized and party with a new approach, the DP.   
Another important reality of this time was the lack of structural 
centralization connecting the state to most of the villages and especially the 
provinces in the eastern half of the country.  Though much had been accomplished 
and intended in regard to rebuilding and creating a national infrastructure since 
the founding of the Republic in 1923, the fact remained that most villages in 1950 
were without electricity,
11
 without radio, and could not be easily accessed by 
roads (in many places these were simply ruts in the dirt); in effect, they were 
isolated from outside or national considerations.  Richard Robinson, who did 
ethnographic work in Turkey in the 1950s writes: 
The sheer fact of isolation had important consequences, for isolation 
meant that this community lived outside of the stream of national 
consciousness.  Communication from village to village was slow and 
uncertain. Communication from region to region was exceedingly 
difficult.  Word of mouth was, of course, the most important means of 
communication.  There was no radio in the village, no postal service.
12
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The status of structural (and attitudinal
13
) centralization at the beginning of 
multiparty competition has serious implications for the possible strategies that 
might be employed to mobilize the vote nationally.  At the same time, 
interestingly, voter turnout in the villages was quite high, comparable to and often 
surpassing the national turnout rate in the urban centers during this period, which 
begs the question of on what basis were these villagers, composing approximately 
80 percent of the population, being mobilized in such high numbers? 
The international context could also be argued as having on influence on the 
nature of the framework within which domestic politics could be contested.  The 
consequences and evident failure of fascism worldwide, and the political dangers 
posed by its ideology and forms of mass mobilization were likely on the minds of 
the political and state elites of this period.  Furthermore, the post-World War II 
bullying, encountered from the Soviet Union and the domestic assertions, whether 
true or not, that Soviet agents were working within the country to sow chaos by 
encouraging both Islamic fundamentalism and communism
14
 generated a great 
deal of anxiety toward the espousal of any sort of narrow ideology, but 
communism and Islamism in particular.  These concerns regarding ideology 
resulted in the passage of amendments to the Penal Code (Articles 141, 142, and 
163) that prohibited extreme “leftist” parties and the use of religion for political 
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purposes.  Both parties that shaped the nature of politics in the 1950s, the CHP 
and the DP, cast their votes in favor of these changes.
15
   
In addition to this, for a number of reasons including the fear of Soviet 
expansionism, the relationship between Turkey and the Western powers was 
experiencing a clear warming trend.  The rising dominance of the US, their 
commitment to protect Turkey from the Soviets, and the initiation of the Marshall 
Plan in Turkey in the late 1940s were certainly factors that played a role in this.  
Turkey‟s desire to align itself with the West certainly assisted the creation of an 
environment that was warm to the development of a multiparty system; at the 
same time, however, one must be careful not to take this argument too far.  An 
“external pressure” to democratize the country would have to be understood only 
in the most indirect sense; no evidence has been provided to show that the benefits 
of Western economic and military support were contingent upon multiparty 
development within Turkey.  Though democratic developments within the country 
were certainly welcomed by their Western allies and, thus, the international 
context was “warm” to such a change, the ultimate impetus came from factors in 
the domestic context and, ultimately, İsmet İnönü.16  The domestically-based 
division among the political elites regarding the contested issue of land reform 
mentioned earlier and a socially-based yearning for change would also have to be 
seen as operating as an important catalyst in the transition to multiparty, 
democratic politics. 
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In order to understand further the context of this first political paradigm, one 
must also look at the nature of the political institutions in place as multiparty 
competition was in its infancy.  The first constitution of the Turkish Republic of 
1924 was not created in order to guarantee the supremacy of the one-party regime, 
but was left neutral on the issue of democratic practice, in fact, it gave no 
guidance to the regulation or prohibition of opposition parties at all.  Thus, as 
noted by Özbudun, multiparty elections were ushered into Turkish history without 
the need for a single change to the constitutional document itself and “only 
relatively minor changes in other laws.”17  While this impressively points to the 
forward-thinking of Atatürk and the early Republican leaders and the fact that 
they did not utilize the constitution to ensure their own dominance, the lack of 
careful development of laws with democracy in mind seemed to have left serious 
loopholes that could be argued to be the ultimate instigator of the military 
intervention that occurred in the middle of this period (May 27, 1960).   
Thus, in 1950, while voters were able to elect ministers of parliament freely 
and directly as opposed to only being able to vote for electors, who would then 
select the representatives in parliament, the electoral system remained an extreme 
type of electoral plurality system.  Uncomfortable with dividing the existing 63 
provinces into smaller voting units, voters were expected to choose candidates for 
all the seats in parliaments designated for their particular province.  The lists of 
candidates were generated on separate party lists, so that the most common 
practice was a down-the-line selection of all the candidates from one particular 
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party in each province.
18
  Hence, even if a political party won by the slightest of 
margins in a province, they generally occupied all the seats in parliament.
19
  This 
created quite drastic levels of disporportionality in seat allocation and gave the 
governing party tremendous legislative power.
20
  Such potential voting margins 
made balance of power provisions such as presidential veto power almost 
negligible, and the existing constitution had no constitutional judicial check on 
parliamentary power.  Its decisions were not open for review.  Thus, the 
conditions established by the existing electoral system as multiparty politics began 
strongly encouraged voting for a potentially winning party (at least at the 
provincial, if not, national level). 
As mentioned previously, the existing laws also narrowed the boundaries in 
which parties could compete.  Articles 141, 142, and 163 put constraints on the 
extent to which ideology and religion could be used in order to differentiate one‟s 
party from the others.  Furthermore, the DP passed an amendment (of Article 70) 
soon after coming to power that would increase the penalties for groups intending 
to form an association or party whose aim was the supremacy of a particular 
group or class or the altering of the nation‟s existing social and economic 
principles.
21
  These measures, limiting ideology and emphasizing general over 
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 In fact, the DP passed a law after the 1957 election that even forbid split-ticketing.  The voter 
was required to select the whole list; she/he could not pick and choose.  Karpat, Turkey’s Politics, 
p. 389. 
19
 William Hale gives a good example of this.  See, William Hale, “The Role of the Electoral 
System in Turkish Politics,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 11, No. 3 (1980), 
p. 402. 
20
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a new constitution in the 1950 election. 
21
 Karpat, Turkey’s Politics, p. 371. 
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particular interest, stemming from the values of the political and state elites,
22
 
further encouraged the formation of parties along the “nation party” mold—i.e. 
parties that ostensibly seek to represent all the interests in society rather than the 
interests of a particular class or group.
23
  They also, by curtailing ideological 
appeal and formations around certain groups or classes, presented important 
challenges to the competing parties, which of course need to distinguish 
themselves and establish the positioning of the party in relation to the others.  
From the cultural standpoint, multiparty competition was initiated as a 
contest among the same pool of political elites.
24
  For example, the leaders of the 
top three parties competing in the 1950 general election were all originally 
members of the CHP during the single-party years.
25
  The leaders of the CHP and 
the DP in particular had matured under the shadows of Atatürk,26 and both parties, 
despite the existence of revisionist historical accounts to the contrary, were clearly 
committed to the founding values and principles of the Republic, with the 
exception that the DP had issues with or at least a divergent interpretation of the 
economic principle of “statism”. They would have all been considered elites, 
particularly in terms of educational status.
27
  By the 1950s, professionals like 
                                                          
22
 See chapter 2 and the concept of “nation parties.”  
23
 This is not to confuse the fact that in 1950, one of the key, albeit minor, opposition parties in the 
electoral contest was the Nation Party (Millet Partisi). Though I am referring here to the general 
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representing the interests of the whole.  It would later become the Republican Nation Party and 
then the Republican Peasants Nation Party. 
24
 For an elaboration of this argument, see chapter four. 
25
 İsmet İnönü (CHP), Celal Bayar (DP), and Hikmet Bayur (MP).  Many other members of each 
of these parties also had associations with the CHP. 
26
 In fact, the leader of the DP, Celal Bayar has been described as “the Turkish leader who most 
consciously tried to model himself on Atatürk. George Harris, “Celal Bayar: Conspiratorial 
Democrat,” in Political Leaders and Democracy in Turkey, ed. Metin Heper and Sabri Sayarı 
(Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2002), 53. 
27
 Frederick Frey, The Turkish Political Elite (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1965), pp. 29-72. 
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doctors, lawyers, and bankers were receiving social elite status that began to 
trump the previous elite designation of bureaucrats, which is why the major 
parties of this period, specifically the DP, AP, and CHP, began to enlist 
professionals into their ranks in high numbers.
28
  Thus, the nature of political 
competition transpired such that, rather than having parties formed to represent 
new or various segments of society, the existing social elites competed with one 
another for the votes of these newly important segments of the population.  This, 
of course, would have made it quite difficult for any of these parties to attack the 
identities or the class roots of the members of other parties as they would have 
been cutting off the branch on which they were also sitting.  This led to the 
tendency of diminishing identities of any sort and emphasizing the faulty 
“actions” or policies of other parties rather than their backgrounds, especially on 
the level of national leadership and discourse during the campaigns.   Such 
cultural homogeneity creates challenges for the more simplistic center-periphery 
cleavage interpretations that assume a strong cultural or class difference between 
the parties.  Though their approaches and attitudes toward mass mobilization 
might have been different, the explanation cannot be explained by clear class 
distinctions among political elites. 
 
6.2 General Electoral Trends of the Period 
 
After the initial freely-contested election of 1950 was greeted with much 
national and international enthusiasm, which saw almost 90 percent of the eligible 
population cast their votes at the ballot box, the overall voter turnout started to 
                                                          
28
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“Aspects of Party Organization in Turkey,” Middle East Journal, Vol. 30, No. 2 (1976), p. 193. 
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wane (see Table 6.1).  Furthermore, as voter turnout decreased, greater disparity 
in this behavior was observed between the eastern and western sections of the 
country.  As noted by Özbudun and others, the provinces in the eastern most parts 
of the country continued to realize high turnout, while the western sections of the 
country began to observe a very noticeable decline in this regard,
29
 this in itself, 
also suggesting divergent approaches to political participation in various regions 
of the country, an issue that will be discussed along with non-discursive campaign 
strategies below. 
Table 6.1 – Electoral Trends of the Period30 
 1950 1954 1957 1961 1965 
Top-Two Parties’ vote % 93.1% 91.4% 88.5% 71.5% 
(85.2%) 
81.6% 
Effective # of Parties 
(Mod. Golosov) – National 
 
2.11 2.14 2.22 2.8 
(2.3) 
2.5 
Effective # of Parties 
(Mod. Golosov) – 
Provincial Ave. 
 
2.08 2.20 2.28 2.52 2.59 
Volatility – National 
Aggregate 
 
-- 4.5 10.7 56.8 29.8 
Volatility – National 
“Inter-bloc”  
 
-- 4.5 6.0 4.3 3.8 
Voter Turnout 89.3% 88.6% 76.6% 81.4% 71.3% 
 
As can also be seen from Table 6.1, despite the secular fragmentation of the 
vote through the election of 1965, a clear two-party tendency could be seen, both 
nationally and at the provincial level.  Though massive changes in the electoral 
system rules occurred prior to the general election in 1961, which allowed for 
                                                          
29
 Ergun Özbudun, Social Change and Political Participation in Turkey (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1976), p. 104. 
30
 All electoral data taken from the publication of the Turkish Statistics Institute. Milletvekili Genel 
Seçimleri 1923-2007 (Ankara: Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu, 2008), p. 28. 
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much greater fragmentation due to a proportional representation system that 
would greatly reduce the disproportionality of seat allocation, the fragmentation 
continued largely on pace with previous rates if one controls for the military 
junta‟s critical effect of closing down the dominant party of the 1950s, the DP.  
Most of the additional fragmentation occurred as a result of the clear race between 
two new parties to be seen as the successor of the former DP, a contest ultimately 
won by the Justice Party (AP).  The 1961 election provides interesting evidence 
toward the two-party tendency among Turkish voters of the period.  In this 
election, as can be seen by the average effective number of parties‟ rate (2.52), 
from province to province, the race was largely between two clear parties 
although which parties were the prime competitors at the provincial level differed 
from region to region.  If the old system would have been applied (strict 
provincial plurality), the AP would have won 48 percent of the seats, the CHP 
26.7 percent, the New Turkey Party (YTP) 17.1 percent of the seats, and the 
Republican Peasants Nation Party (CKMP) would have received 8.2 percent of 
the seats.
31
   Such an increased fragmentation of the seats had the old electoral 
system been applied was due to the fact that the YTP and, to a lesser extent, the 
CKMP, which only garnered 14 percent of the vote a piece nationally, were one of 
two parties competing for dominance in a number of provinces while nearly 
absent in other provinces. 
Though generally true, especially in the East, the votes won by parties were 
volatile and fluid and the major parties tasted the displeasure of the electorate 
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when they failed to “deliver” what was expected to their voters.  As can be seen 
from the “inter-bloc volatility” numbers in Table 6.1, partisan lines seemed to 
strengthen as the 1960s progressed, even while overall volatility increased, 
particularly in the Western provinces. This too would encounter significant 
changes at the provincial level as the 1960s drew to a close due to the entrance of 
new discursive framing starting immediately prior to the 1965 election and 
leading to fragmentation and voting shifts among segments of the population until 
1977. With the exception of the election immediately following the military junta 
in 1961, voter turnout experienced a steady decline that suggested increasing 
ambivalence toward the election results. 
 
6.3 Dimensions of Competition:  6.3.1 National Campaign Discourse  
 
It is at this point that we should begin by seeking to understand how the 
electorate was mobilized and the mechanics of contestation between the parties 
that ultimately determined the observed outcomes.  In this regard, it seems 
reasonable to begin with an examination of the extent to which national campaign 
discourse influenced or reflected the political paradigm of the period.  By 
“national” discourse, the intent is to highlight the political speech-making of 
national party leaders in forums that would allow for broad, if not national, access.  
For example, how did these important political leaders frame the political contest 
and position themselves in their speeches and proclamations that were published 
in widely disseminated newspapers?  Did their relational positioning of 
themselves and their parties and their emphasis of certain issues direct voters and 
the nation toward a certain paradigm?  If campaign “stumping” did not shape the 
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paradigm, did it in some way reflect or respond to the paradigm that established 
the nature of political contests of the period? 
As time has passed, interpretations of the electoral competition of this 
period seem to have become more certain, delineating more explicitly the lines 
dividing the two major parties ideologically. When ideological distinctions are 
proposed, one assumes that these suggested positional differences would be 
communicated—in other words, ideology that exists usually shows up in party 
election manifests or in campaign discourse.  In such interpretations of this sort 
regarding the initial phase of multiparty competition, we are often confronted with 
a portrait of a liberal and conservative Democrat Party pitted against a 
“progressive”32 and status quo Republican People‟s Party.33  Other analyses of the 
period have argued that the Democrat Party was the party of the peasant, rallying 
the periphery against a hegemonic elite and urban bureaucratic class.
34
  In 
explaining the success of the DP with the peasants, claims have been made that 
the party utilized religion or an obsessive emphasis on the plight of the villager as 
the discursive motor that turned out the rural vote.
35
  In a country whose village 
contingent at that time constituted up to 80 percent of the population, it seems 
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 The term, as used in Turkish politics, has referred to those who are trying to prevent the country 
from moving “backward” toward “traditionalism” ala a positivist modernization understanding. 
33
 For one example of the “progressives” versus “traditional” political contestation, see İlkay Sunar 
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reasonable to propose that a party dominating in such conditions must have had 
favor with the peasantry.  How explanative, then, are these claims about the nature 
of political contestation in this period?  Does such a reality have a reflection in the 
national discourse of these parties? 
Upon closer inspection, the results are bewildering.  Examination of the 
campaigning of the leaders of both parties during this period leaves us very little 
room for clear demarcation.  Often where differences emerge, an assumption of 
effective or influential national discourse would have led us to conclusions that 
contradict the electoral results.  On the national stage, both parties emphasized the 
peasantry and their economic and developmental welfare, with a slight edge, if 
any, going to the CHP in the area of discourse.  Positioning of oneself and one‟s 
party in relation to the other often involved the same strategy:  personal and 
acrimonious accusations of the other parties‟ leadership or record of 
governance—i.e. their behavior, not their cultural or social-class identities—and 
unfair, authoritarian or deceptive behaviors.  Both parties accused the other of 
trying to divide the country and jeopardizing national unity.  They also both 
emphasized economic development of some sort and criticized the other party in 
this regard.  Contrary to popular impressions of the period, religion factored very 
little in the electoral speeches of the major vote receiving parties—with the partial 
exception of 1957—but they also showed that they were willing to make popular 
“liberalizing” concessions in this regard in the hope of votes or increased power.  
It could be argued that the lack of evident distinction in ideology—or, to a great 
extent, policy—was largely responsible for the intensity of the acrimonious and 
 
213 
personal attacks; there was very little else that could be discussed or used to 
distinguish the major parties from one another.
 36
 
From a perusal of the national election results, it is tempting to assume that 
the DP must have catered to the peasantry in their electoral discourse, yet upon 
closer inspection, this very plausible assumption encounters troubling 
inconsistencies.  Starting with the first free and organized campaign in 1950, the 
CHP showed a consistent focus on the plight of the rural villagers.  The focus of 
major speeches conducted by the Prime Minister Şemsettin Günaltay, President 
İsmet İnönü, and embedded as the keystone of their election manifest 
(beyanname) was the condition of the peasants.  In a speech by Prime Minister 
Günaltay in Kastamonu, the Premier declared that the parties “primary duty would 
be to take into account [the conditions of our villages].”37  Among the issues that 
the party would concern itself with would be water, seeds, schools, standard of 
living, infant mortality, and modern agricultural equipment.
38
  As for President 
İnönü, though his speeches in 1950 were often filled—along with the proposal for 
a new constitution—with concerns about election-related violence, for which the 
DP was seen as instigating, and the need for the governing party to guarantee the 
security and safety of the citizen, he also began to emphasize the importance of 
the villager as election day approached.  In Izmir, for example, İnönü declared 
that the prosperity of the villager was the party‟s primary concern and elaborated 
                                                          
36
 See also, Ahmad, Turkey’s Experiment, p. 17. 
37
 “Gunaltay‟in Kastamonu‟da soyledigi nutuk: Koylunun kalkinmasi, refahi icin yeni tedbirler 
alinacak,” Ulus, 12 April, 1950, p. 5. 
38
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on all the services that the CHP would provide to the rural village population if 
elected.
39
 
As for the Democrat Party in 1950, the campaign discourse of its national 
leadership was notably absent of explicit references or appeals to the village 
voters—a trend maintained throughout the electoral contests within its ten year 
lifespan.
40
  The DP seemed almost more concerned than the CHP about preserving 
its appeal to the good of the whole nation rather than any particular group.
41
  In 
1950, if the DP singled out any particular group in the speeches of its national 
leadership, they were more likely to emphasize the right of the urban workers, and 
particularly the workers‟ right to strike—a rare issue for which the DP and CHP 
had clearly defined and oppositional positions.  Thus, where the DP believed the 
right of the worker would be best preserved by being granted the right to strike, 
the CHP argued that the rights for which workers would strike should be ensured 
by legal decree rather than by striking, which could jeopardize stability and 
national interest.
42
  Interestingly, these positions were completely reversed in 
1957
43
 after seven years of DP rule and the ruling party‟s subsequent hesitation to 
provide the right to strike that seemed so critical in 1950, and the workers were 
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only given the right to strike with the 1961 Constitution provided by the military-
appointed National Unity Committee. 
It is also striking the extent to which the 1950 CHP election manifest was 
devoted to the villager.  Within the declarations of the intended program of the 
party, a section composing more than a quarter of words in the total program 
document (26.5 percent—459 of 1730 words) was given over entirely to the 
concerns of the rural citizenry.  This section of the manifest devoted specifically 
to the villager does not include the program to combat malaria and tuberculosis, 
the economic development program for the eastern region, or the expansion and 
development of electricity and energy sources mentioned elsewhere in the 
document, which are more generally relevant but would also be particularly 
relevant issues for the village population. The section devoted to the development 
of villages included the provision of land, seed, water and machinery along with 
education, medical assistance, and insurance.  Within the document, 
approximately one in every 52 words was either “village,” “villager,” or “peasant” 
(ciftci).
44
  It is also important to point out that the CHP election manifest was kept 
to a minimum amount of words, simply expressed, and organized for easy 
reading, perhaps for those with less extensive reading capabilities.  In other words, 
it was meant to actually be read and understood by a broad spectrum of citizens.   
This attempt to appeal to the rural voter through the election manifest seems 
to have been lost on the Democrat Party.  Outside of a shorter section entitled 
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“agriculture,” representing about 13.6 percent of the document (423 out of 3099 
words), very little is addressed to the concerns of the rural voter.  “Agriculture” 
itself suggests an industry that goes beyond the scope of the interests of the 
individual village peasant, who may or may not own his or her own land and may 
or my not benefit directly from agricultural reform, and might be argued to have 
the large landowning farmers in mind.  If we consider the frequency of reference 
to the rural voter, the words “village”, “villager” or “peasant” appear only nine 
times in the entire document, which is approximately one reference per 344 
words.  If one concedes the word “agriculture,” which must in any case be seen as 
a less direct, though relevant, reference to the villager, the reference to the village 
vote moves up to approximately one per 172 words (19 out of 3099).
45
  
Furthermore, the language and style of the document suggests that it was intended 
for a more highly educated audience, and useful program information regarding 
the party is much more difficult to pull out.  Though a manifest, its rhetorical style 
is largely based on criticizing or belittling the suggested program put forward by 
the CHP.  The few references to villagers often arise in response to the CHP‟s 
election manifest and its usage of the term.  One would have to conclude that, 
quite contrary to what one might anticipate, at least at the level of national 
election discourse, the appeal by the DP was directed less toward the villager than 
was that of the CHP though it could hardly be argued that the interests and votes 
of the rural citizenry were lost on any of the competing parties. 
Besides sharing an interest in the votes of the village citizenry, the two 
major parties, the DP and CHP, shared a similar approach to religion and politics 
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at the level of discourse, in that, both parties largely avoided appealing to religious 
sentiments in their major campaign speeches, with the notable exception of the 
1957 campaign.  When the Nation Party used the death of one of their founding 
members, the conservative but beloved former Chief-of-General Staff, Fevzi 
Çakmak, as a stage to inflame religious sentiment in their behalf, both major 
parties responded in strong condemnation against the usage of religion for 
political aims.  The leader of the DP, Celal Bayar reacted very critically against 
such political behavior and stated: “The desire to exploit sacred beliefs and make 
the emotions that are deeply embedded in the national conscience the tool of 
cheap political games is clearly in evidence before us.”46   Even prior to this 
declaration, which led to one of the notably few consensual meetings between the 
two major competing parties, Bayar had declared to an audience in conservative 
Çankırı:  
[Though we thank God that we are Muslims,] we are a political party. 
It is not right for a political party to take religious issues as its 
foundation, and have its program and propaganda guided and 
supported by only this because religion is a sacred belief, and those 
who use religious propaganda as a tool will be accountable before 
God and disrespect religion.
47
 
 
It would be hard to argue, that the DP, based on the major speeches of DP leaders 
that were published widely throughout the nation, were exploiting religious 
discourse for electoral gain. In the few instances where religious terminology was 
used, as in the quotation above, it was used in conjunction with a rejection of 
religious propaganda for political gain.  In this regard, the Democrat Party bore 
very little difference from the Republican People's Party, and it is important to 
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note, as Hale and Özbudun have pointed out, despite the myriad charges that were 
leveled at the DP leaders when they stood trial after the military coup on May 27, 
1960, actions that threatened the state principle of secularism was not one of the 
accusations.
48
 
Those who argue that there was a distinction, but that the DP's exploitation 
of religious sentimentality occurred not in speech but in practice, have to consider 
the behavior of both parties in the multiparty period while in power and in 
opposition.  The beginning of concessions toward religious interests occurred 
from 1946 to 1950 when the CHP was in power.  Already starting in 1947, the 
CHP debated the secularism amendment in their party convention, arguing that 
the current position was too “anti-clerical.”49  From this point on, the CHP passed 
resolutions to open schools for the training of imams, a Faculty of Theology in 
Ankara, optional religious instruction to students in primary schools, and they 
reopened sacred tombs of saints, which were commonly associated with mystic or 
sufi Islam.
50
  Furthermore, when the CHP found itself in opposition to the DP, 
with whose leadership it shared a similar “progressive” and secular worldview, it 
had little qualms in seeking coalitions with parties such as the Nation Party (later 
reformed as the Republican Nation Party), whose political propaganda and 
electoral base seemed to contradict the secular principles of the CHP, though it 
was ultimately blocked in these efforts by the DP.   
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On the other hand, though the Democrat Party was responsible for the 
building of additional mosques and lifting the ban on the use of Arabic for the 
ezan, the Muslim call to prayer, they were also responsible for cracking down on 
Islamist activism while in power, initiating the closure of the Nation Party in 1953 
for anti-secular and anti-democratic practices, closing down periodicals of 
Islamist groups, and cracking down on the Ticani sect, which had been defacing 
statues of Atatürk.51  In 1953, the Democrat Party also passed a law (6187) that 
further increased the penalty for using religion for political purposes.
52
 
Although a number of scholars have noted an increase in the religious 
discourse of the Democrats while campaigning in the general election of 1957, 
less frequently emphasized is the behavior of the opposition CHP, which entered 
into the same discourse by also identifying themselves with religious concerns 
and liberalization.  Political leaders from the CHP, like former Prime Minister 
Şemsettin Günaltay, reminded the people of the religious liberalization that began 
with the CHP in the late 1940s,
53
 and declared that “those who accuse us of being 
irreligious (dinsiz) are the irreligious ones.”54  Others like Kasim Gülek declared 
to a crowd in Adana that it was their party that put an end to the “ringing of 
church bells in Turkey.”55  Even İnönü, though also suggesting that using religion 
as a political tool could set the people against one another,
56
 was found ending 
speeches with “May God protect you” (Allah hepinizi muvaffak etsin) and 
uncharacteristically adding the departure blessing “We entrust you to God” 
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(Allahaısmarladık).57  Such behavior, though a deviation from the discourse of 
both parties before and after this election, does not demonstrate a particular 
penchant unique among the CHP to use religious sensibilities to accumulate votes 
or that either party had a “religious ideology”, but that both parties in the context 
of wooing the populace were willing to “play that card” if deemed necessary.  In 
1957, with the DP losing popular support as the economy stagnated and inflation 
soared, the party had little of positive note to reference in their speeches and, thus, 
became more sensitive to the religious sentiments of the people and began to 
emphasize religiosity and the building of mosques.  The CHP, not willing to be 
tagged the irreligious party, responded in kind and also put on a more devout face.  
Interestingly enough, in Karpat‟s study of the 1957 elections, he observed that the 
religious rhetoric paid little dividend to either party, but particularly the 
Democrats, who seemed to show an important electoral loss in precisely those 
provinces where they employed appeals to religious sentiment in their discourse.
58
  
Though the losses are likely not directly tied to the religious rhetoric, it seems to 
indicate that, whatever the topic of the campaign speech, people were not paying 
that much attention and were likely taking cues from the economic downturn and 
the other strategies of mobilization. 
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Thus, despite the claims of those who hold to an essential historical 
cleavage in Turkish politics, continually placing Islamists on one side and 
secularists on the other, a careful and disinterested observer of the early period of 
Turkish multiparty politics would likely come to another conclusion.  To the 
extent to which the liberalization of religion practice entered into the political 
electoral contestation of the day, its manifestation seems to fit well the conclusion 
of Sunar and Toprak, who write:  
When the republican state elite split and reappeared manning the posts 
of the multi-party system, not only the newly-emergent Democrat 
Party (DP), but the old guardian of republican virtues and Kemalist 
reforms, the Republican People's Party (RPP) as well looked upon 
Islam as an important source of what they were after: namely, votes.
59
 
 
Where the emergence of a “revival of Islam” was observed, rather than pointing 
the finger at one political party, the impetus for such a development should be 
sought elsewhere.  As Karpat writes: “The establishment of a multi-party system 
in Turkey produced as a consequence a more liberal interpretation of secularism. 
. . It may be said that religious liberalization was a natural consequence of 
democracy and a necessary adjustment to it.”60 Considering the liberalizing 
measures, it was not the leadership of either party, whose secular worldviews 
offered little impetus for the liberalization of religion, but the enfranchisement of 
the devout Anatolian villager, previously excluded from the realm of national 
politics, that brought about such a result.
61
  It was not a “revival of Islam” so 
much as simply the entrance of the existent popular Islam into political activism 
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 Sunar and Toprak, “Islam in Politics,” p. 428. 
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 See also, Feroz Ahmad, “Islamic Reassertion in Turkey,” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 10, No. 2 
(1988), p. 756. 
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emboldened by the advent of democracy.  If the DP could be accused of more 
extensive liberalization, it seems only the product of managing to remain in 
power for a longer period than the CHP.  In any case, their historical record in 
power demonstrates that there were clear boundaries that would not be breached, 
and the Republican reforms were not at all imperiled by the DP or the party that 
subsequently assumed its mantle, the Justice Party (AP). 
If the appeals to the Anatolian village population and the religious 
sentiments of the electorate were not the grounds on which the two parties 
distinguished themselves, how did they discursively position themselves in 
relation to the other or others?  Here too, in contrast to interpretations by some 
students of Turkish politics, we find a great deal of similarity in the repertoire 
utilized in the speeches of the party leaders.  For example, a continuing 
accusation of the period made by especially the major parties—the DP, CHP and 
AP—was that other parties were trying to divide the country and spoil national 
unity.  The accusations of partisan and divisive behavior toward the major 
competitor were leveled by the CHP and the DP throughout the 1950s.
62
 This 
discursive strategy continued unabated even after the military coup in 1960 
changed the competitors in the electoral field.  In 1961, Former General Ragıp 
Gümüşpala and leader of the AP, besides emphasizing togetherness63 and that that 
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 For examples, see “Celal Bayar, şiddet politikası iddialarını tekrar reddetti,” Vatan, 6 April 
1950; “İnönü‟nün ikinci nutku,” Ulus, 26 March 1950; “İnönü, partiler üstündeki milli birlikten 
bahsetti,” Vatan, 10 May 1950; “İsmet İnönü, Malatya‟da ilk seçim nutkunu dün verdi,” Vatan, 10 
April 1954; “Başbakan Menderes, İnönü‟ye Erzurum‟da cevap verdi,” Vatan, 20 April 1954; 
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 “R. Gümüşpala, ısrarla beraberlikten bahsetti,”  Hürriyet, 1 October, 1961. 
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their party was not a party that privileged any particular class,
64
 a statement not 
coincidentally made after speeches by the CHP emphasizing their focus on 
industrial workers,
65
 also proclaimed that “those who rise up to divide the country 
will be condemned by history.”66  Inonu and the other CHP leaders positioned 
themselves against the others in much the same way, emphasizing that they were 
the party for national unity and that they would not resort to fomenting of anger 
or revenge or partisan behaviors that would divide and weaken the country.
67
 
Scholarship in more recent decades has suggested that the DP and AP‟s 
appeal to the “national will” (milli irade) was actually a way of posturing the will 
of the nation (the people, or “common people”) against the will of the “state” and 
its elites,
68
 and in so doing were dividing society into separate camps.  On closer 
inspection, however, such interpretations seem to be more in line with 
revisionism based on later development and present considerations and 
interpretations than with the reality of the period.  If one had to argue that a 
particular party was appealing to particular interests in their campaign discourse, 
that party would have to be the CHP, even though it would be very hard to argue 
that even this party was the vehicle for particular interests or classes.  Both the 
DP and the AP took great pains to distance themselves from being a party of 
narrow emphasis in their official discourse, eschewing even favoritism toward 
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villagers or industrial workers.  Thus, their use of “millet” (nation) was regularly 
employed to suggest their appeal to the whole nation, not as a tool to distinguish 
the regular folk from the elites.   
While it is true that Süleyman Demirel, the successor to Gümüşpala as 
leader of the AP, expressed a “national will” that could be thwarted by 
authoritarian forces within the state apparatus, this too seems distant from a class 
distinction; instead, it could be argued to be a rhetorical device suggesting that 
Demirel‟s party embodied the will of the whole.  In other words, it appears to be a 
majoritarian democratic appeal consistent with the way the predecessor Democrat 
Party interpreted the implication of the results from the ballot box.
69
  
Furthermore, if the expression were truly understood as a social division, the fact 
that the CHP, including İnönü,70 also employed this expression confounds the 
issue.  The frequent reference to this expression seems to have more to do with an 
intersection point between a particular interpretation of democracy (majority rule 
as determined by elections) and a clear internalization of the value for “nation 
parties” representing the whole or general interests of society, rather than any 
particular group.
71
  How the parties behaved in practice, of course, was a different 
matter, but in their ideals and rhetoric, they could not escape the desire to 
represent themselves as the party for the whole nation. 
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The other forms of positioning that one finds throughout the period involve 
presenting one‟s own party as the trustworthy party that keeps its promises, while 
the other parties would promise the moon just to get votes.
72
  The major parties 
regularly positioned themselves as the democratic party struggling against an 
authoritarian force.
73
  The DP and the AP, of course, had to refer to past 
behaviors of the CHP during the single-party regime, while the CHP was able to 
put forward more contemporary accusations, but the ultimate pattern and 
functional positioning was the same.  Here too, when confronted with the similar 
patterns of accusations from both sides, it becomes much harder to claim that 
accusations of authoritarian tendencies by the DP and the AP toward the CHP 
demonstrate a manifestation of the center-periphery cultural cleavage. 
Beyond this, when other strategies seemed less effective, sometimes direct 
slander and character attacks prevailed.  This sort of politicking was employed 
particularly by politicians like Adnan Menderes and Osman Bölükbaşı.  
Menderes‟s defensive posture in campaigning led to a number of colorful 
accusations.
74
  For example, in 1957, Menderes, responding to the claims that the 
DP had led Turkey to a crisis point and a one man dictatorship, declares that 
“these claims consist only of an old dictator‟s fabricated lies and legendary 
                                                          
72
 For examples, “AP lideri Gümüşpala Ege‟de,” Hürriyet, 28 Eylül 1961; Ulus, 2 October 1961; 
“İnönü dediki: Son hedefim huzuru temin etmektir,” Akşam, 12 October 1957; “CH Partisi 
Devletçilik oyunu oynuyor,” Akşam, 17 October 1957; “İnönü: „Ölçüsüz vaitte bulunamayız‟ 
dedi,” Hürriyet, 10 April 1954;  “CHP‟nin vaadleri ve muhalefet,” Vatan, 29 April 1950. 
73
 “Bayar, zaferin D.P.de olduğunu söyledi,” Vatan, 6 March 1950; “İsmet İnönü, Malatya‟da ilk 
seçim nutkunu dün verdi,” Vatan, 10 April 1954; “İnönü‟ye gore: Demokrasimiz geriye dönemez,” 
Akşam, 13 October 1957. 
74
 For another example from 1954, see “Menderes, „Dünkü Milli Şef bugün Milli jurnalcıdır‟ 
dedi,” Vatan, 22 April 1954. 
 
226 
tales.”75  A day later in Trabzon, he addressed the issue once more, saying “İsmet 
pasha [İsmet İnönü] says that there is a crisis.  İsmet pasha‟s crisis is in his own 
head, beloved citizens.  İsmet pasha is sick, sick like someone who has contracted 
Malta fever or the Asian flu.  His sickness is the love of [governing] power 
(iktidar hastası), power fever.”76  İnönü, responding to allegations of being power 
hungry, accused the Democrats of being the prime examples of such a “primitive 
mentality” and used the example of the DP exploiting the radio for propaganda 
while denying it to the opposition parties.
77
   
In 1961, the anti-establishment or alternative party was clearly the 
Republican Peasant Nation Party (CKMP) led by the attention generating Osman 
Bölükbaşı.  His positioning of the party put the CKMP as the one that stood apart 
from the junta supporters.  As the leader of one of the two parties that survived 
closure during the coup, his hope for electoral success was to sway old DP voters 
to his party by presenting the new parties as being created by the CHP to split the 
old Democrat Party votes.
78
  His campaign speeches included evidence of the 
AP‟s leader, former General Ragıp Gümüşpala, support for İsmet İnönü, which 
challenged AP party‟s position as being distinct from the CHP and the successor 
to the DP.  In the midst of these allegations, a photograph was leaked to the press 
that showed the former General kissing the hand of the CHP‟s leader that was 
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allegedly the work of the CKMP.
79
  Thus, one party, the CKMP, attempted to 
distinguish itself by lumping the others together.
80
  The others, then, addressed 
the accusations by marginalizing the behavior of Bölükbaşı and accusing him of 
showing a lack of etiquette for a political leader, of behaving like a tough guy, 
and of being a person who spreads false rumors to cause trouble.
81
 
Besides these other tactics, much of the campaign discourse throughout the 
period at the national level, and likely at the local level, was economic and 
developmental in nature.  The need for advancement in mechanization, 
industrialization, technology and trade was a point agreed upon by all segments of 
the population.
82
  The disagreement was largely based on the specific points of 
carrying this out and the particularly policy that played a large role in the 
emergence of a multiparty system, land reform.  Thus, much of the political 
discourse had to do with general plans and occasional specific points regarding 
economic development.  The CHP seemed to offer the most specific and 
accessible plans in this regard, but in doing so, often fell victim to harsh and 
condescending attacks by the competing parties, particularly the DP and the AP, 
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as specifics always provide areas to be attacked, especially when communicated 
in language that is accessible to a wide audience.   
The general election of 1965 diverged from these patterns of discourse at 
several points, and thus must be considered a transitional election of sorts as its 
pattern of interaction foreshadowed a new paradigmatic approach to electoral 
politics—positive and negative image positioning as a discursive strategy.83  
While certain elements of image positioning had existed prior to this election, 
such as the DP in 1957 presenting the CHP as the party of the irreligious or 
atheists (dinsiz), such usage was not persistent or stable at the national level.  In 
1965, however, several positive and negative positioning images did begin to take 
on frequent usage throughout the campaign.  The CHP began to use the famous 
“left of center” (ortanın solu) expression of itself84 as a simple way to emphasize 
its focus on “social justice” and fulfilling the requirements of a “social state” 
towards its citizens.  This focus was not new and the “social justice” and “social 
state” discourse was already widely used by the CHP in the 1961 campaign; what 
was new was the shorthand “left of center” as a way to position themselves in the 
minds of the electorate.  This position, of course, gave way to negative position 
imaging by their competitors, particularly Demirel and the AP, who positioned 
them as “communists” or “associates to communists.”  The banners at AP 
campaign speeches in 1965 began to famously read in clever Turkish rhyme, 
“Left of center is the road to Moscow” (ortanın solu, Moskova yolu).   
Considering the imaging on the other side, the use of the expression “demirkırat” 
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(iron white horse), a popular distortion of the name of the former Democrat Party, 
began to be used by both sides to create an image of the AP.
85
  In this sense, it 
could be understood both positively and negatively.  The AP, of course, used the 
expression as image positioning in order to benefit from the old party‟s faithful 
constituents and establish that their party would continue in the style of the DP.  
The CHP and İnönü used the expression “second demirkırat” as a reminder that 
this party was a facsimile of a previous party—a party that ultimately came to a 
fateful end. 
At the same time, however, the 1965 election, though demonstrating new 
approaches to discursive political contestation between the parties, must be placed 
at the border between the first and second paradigmatic period, as the electoral 
behavior displayed, in contrast to future elections, very little evidence that 
attention was being paid to this important discursive change.  Thus, this particular 
election could be seen as closing the book on one paradigm and its electoral 
patterns while also initiating a new one, the results of which were relegated to the 
future.  Ahmad, in his analysis of the 1965 elections argued that the utilization of 
“left of center” late in the campaign was initiated, not with that election, but with 
future elections in mind.
86
  İnönü had used the term prior to the beginning of 
campaigning,
87
 but waited to address it again until just days before the election 
took place.  The vote loss suffered by the party across the nation was likely due to 
a combination of misunderstanding and confusion regarding the party‟s “left of 
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center” position,88 receiving the brunt of the punishment for the ineffective 
coalition governments forced upon it under threat of military intervention, and the 
clear position taken by İnönü regarding land reform, for which he declared that he 
would not abandon political life until that reform had been effectively carried 
out,
89
 a position that did not likely sit well with the large landowners who had 
been mobilizing votes for the party, particularly in the eastern provinces. 
After examining the patterns of discourse, we are still left with the question 
of why did the elections turn out the way that they did? Why did the DP and then 
the AP have such success against the CHP?  Considering the nature of the 
campaign appeals, without knowing the results of the elections throughout the 
period, one might expect the CHP to have had greater success, first with the 
village citizenry and then among the urban poor and working class.  The first 
response to this disjunct seems to be that a great portion of the outcome would 
have to have been determined by factors other than discourse.  One piece of 
evidence for this is that, despite the increasing acrimonious attacks and 
polarization among the political elite that took place in 1957, the voter turnout 
dropped considerably from 1954, an unlikely phenomenon if campaign discourse 
was being taken seriously.  Though the electorate was voting and mobilized in 
fairly high numbers, especially in the initial elections, the catalyst for voting must 
have been located outside of the major speeches of the national party leaders. 
It is true, particularly in 1950, that İnönü did not initially campaign in a way 
that would have attracted the population at large.  His initial points of interest in 
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his early speeches were those of a statesman who is concerned with the status of 
the nation as a whole, its security and stability, not the cares and concerns of the 
individual citizen.  Thus, after years of leading the nation as its top statesman, he 
struggled, at the outset, to employ the mentality of a politician in his speeches.  
Nonetheless, toward the end of the 1950 campaign and then throughout the 
following election, he was able to capture a more effective campaign style that 
addressed needs likely to be felt by the audience.  However, the CHP was further 
hampered, after losing in 1950, by the fortuitous economic conditions, particularly 
for farmers, in 1954 and then stifling oversight by the DP in 1957 ultimately 
meant that electoral campaigning was a losing battle.  In 1961, arguably the 
connections between the CHP and the ruling military junta and its decisions to 
hang three DP members including Menderes a matter of weeks before the 
election, was a significant damper on the CHP‟s potential electoral gains as the 
party was popularly seen as supporting and being supported by the military 
intervention.  Furthermore, the military, unhappy with the electoral outcome, 
ultimately pressured the parliament into accepting coalition government with the 
CHP as the senior partner, an arrangement that ultimately destined the party to 
failure.  In the end, the electoral discourse and positioning of the parties in their 
speeches in this first paradigm seemed to matter less than the other strategies 
employed to mobilize the vote on their behalf.  The actual mobilization of votes 
occurred not through successful speech-making, but through non-discursive 
strategies that were employed by both parties on the local level.  It is to these 
dimensions of competition that we now turn. 
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Table 6.3 – Particular Election “Shapers” in 1950-1965 General Elections 
 Major Campaign Issues Concurrent Exogenous Factors 
May 
1950 
 - Election security and fairness 
- Social order and security 
- Economic Development 
- New Constitution Proposal (CHP) 
- Death of Nation Party leader and former 
Field Marshall Fevzi Çakmak 
May 
1954 
- Economic Development (foreign 
market) 
- Foreign Policy 
- Major agricultural boom and fortunate 
weather conditions 
October 
1957 
- Economic recession 
- Authoritarian behaviors of the DP 
- Religious Credentials 
- Economic recession and inflation 
- Threats from Khrushchev and Soviet 
Union leveled at Turkey 
October 
1961 
- Osman Bölükbaşı 
- National Unity 
- Economic Development 
- Return to elections from junta rule 
- New constitution and electoral system 
- Execution of former Prime Minister 
Menderes and two other ministers in Mid-
September 
October 
1965 
- Communist Threat 
- Foreign vs. National Oil Control 
- Ind. Development and Workers’ Rights 
- inflation and cost of living 
-  “Left of Center” / Land Reform 
 
 
 
6.3.2 Non-Discursive Electoral Strategies 
To assert that patron-client relational behavior by political parties was an 
important element of politics from the first days of multiparty competition in 
Turkey would be a fairly unextraordinary claim indeed.  Such behavior has been 
noted widely in the mainstream literature on Turkish politics.  Perhaps more 
interesting, and more accurate, would be the observation that both major parties 
employed patron-client strategies, not just the DP and its future mantle-bearer the 
AP, which has more often been the focus, but also the CHP.  Furthermore, there is 
much to suggest that the particular form of the strategy differed between the 
parties, and that this difference, seems to more effectively explain the 
constellation of voting results across the electoral map during this first period.  
While the CHP largely emphasized existing patronage networks, depending on 
loyalties and existing local structures descending from the first years of the 
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Republic, if not earlier, the DP employed what could be seen as political 
clientelism—or machine politics—at the local level to mobilize the votes on their 
behalf.  It is for this reason that the DP, in general, performed much better in 
provinces that were more strongly linked to the centralized state; the CHP, on the 
other hand, greatly benefitted from the existing social structures in the least 
centralized
90
 areas of the country.  Both parties had supporters in the urban 
centers, but even here, as predicted by their preferred patron-client strategy, the 
DP and AP found greater success until the mid-1960s.  It is this dimension of 
competition that most effectively explains the electoral fortunes and constellation 
of the votes in the first paradigm. 
Although we could classify the strategic behavior of both the CHP and the 
DP within the general concept of patron-client relations, it is concurrently 
important to acknowledge that there are varying patterns of interaction within this 
general classification, which in its broad conception only requires as necessary 
conditions an unequal or lopsided status between patron and client, reciprocity, 
and proximity—i.e. face-to-face contact91—while other aspects, such as duration 
and level of loyalty, might vary from context to context. In regard to more specific 
demarcations, the conceptualizations utilized by Ayşe Güneş-Ayata in 
distinguishing “patronage” from “clientelism” seem particularly helpful for 
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understanding the Turkish case.  She appropriates the understanding of patronage 
from Scott,
92
 describing it as “a dyadic asymmetrical relationship where loyalty is 
extended in return for a share of the patron‟s personal resources.”93  Clientelism, 
on the other hand, the conceptualization for which Ayata draws on Powell,
94
 is 
understood as “brokerage in party politics where the relation is instrumental, 
loyalty is weak and reciprocity is calculated on a one-to-one basis,” and “the 
broker uses state resources rather than his own resources.”95   
Weingrod‟s distinction between the focus and location of patronage as it is 
discussed in anthropology versus political science is also helpful in this case to 
demarcate the terms.  Anthropologists, who were the first to study patron-client 
relations, have focused on social relations among unequal partners in which 
enduring bonds of loyalty are formed.
96
  On the other hand, political scientists 
have focused on the type of patron-client relationships that are intertwined with 
government, less enduring, and often related to the cycle of electoral campaigns.
97
  
Weingrod also argues that the observed patron-client phenomena typically occur 
in distinct contexts.  The “patronage” relations discussed by anthropologists are 
often observed in societies “in which authority is dispersed and state activity is 
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limited in scope.  In such a context “mediators”—or “proxies”—are needed to fill 
in the existing gaps in the system due to a lack of centralization, a role often 
fulfilled through a landlord-peasant relationship.
98
  In contrast, it is the expanding 
scope of the state and its activities that opens the opportunity for political 
clientelism—or as Weingrod refers to it, “party-directed patronage.”  It is the 
party‟s association with government and the spoils of the state that provides 
opportunities for mediation and reciprocity.
99
  In the former case, the patron is a 
power resource independent of the state that, in a distant manner, connects the 
locality with the state apparatus.  The latter form of patron-client relationship 
brings the locality in much closer contact with the state itself as the party, to 
which the individual forms dyadic bonds, is seen as a representative appendage of 
the state itself.  Thus, though in both cases a vertical, unequal “dyadic 
contract”100—i.e. between a patron and a client—is in operation, the relational 
distance of the state is significantly different. 
Turkey, during this initial multiparty period, could be described as 
demonstrating distinct variation in levels of centralization across the regions 
within its borders.  Centralization, the effective connecting of the local to the 
“national” through a variety of means at the disposal of the state, including 
nationwide educational structures, taxation, state-led implementation of law and 
order, bureaucratic diffusion, etc., has been seen, particularly when modernization 
theory was the predominant approach to the “non-Western” world, as a critical 
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foundation for the advancement of modernization and industrialization.  
Intertwining the local with the state apparatus and an awareness of one‟s 
connectedness at the local level seemed a critical prerequisite to societal 
specialization and industrial advancement.  Thus, while the terminology of 
“development” was widely utilized at this time to distinguish regional 
peculiarities, the extent to which development is referring primarily to economic 
and industrial specialization or to state-connectedness is less clear, and in some 
cases, this difference seems rather important.  In certain areas of the country such 
as Central Anatolia, despite their fairly basic socioeconomic conditions, villages 
and villagers had an awareness of their connectedness to the state through existing 
educational structures, bureaucratic offices, etc.; whereas, in the far eastern 
regions of the country, the state was still linked to the territory through “proxies”, 
who were usually large landowning notables operating through local sociopolitical 
power structures that predated the existence of the Republic.
101
  In these areas, 
outside the occasional visits from the gendarmerie and the tax man, governance 
and politics in society was largely understood within its local manifestation, and 
the relevance and one‟s own relevance to a “national body” was rather more 
vague, or at least, once removed (through the proxy).   
Thus, depending on the level of centralization and the existence of pre-
existing sociopolitical hierarchies, one‟s motivation for voting in national 
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elections could differ greatly.  Ergun Özbudun, in a study of political participation 
in Turkey in the 1960s and early 1970s, delineates four different motivations for 
political participation—deferential, solidary, instrumental, and civic 
participation.
102
  Deferential participation “results from the actor‟s deep respect 
for and strong identification with the influencer and [the actor‟s] concomitant 
desire to be and appear to be influenced by him.”103  Solidary participation comes 
from a desire to demonstrate affinity and unity with one‟s social group, which 
could be structured around kinship, religion, village community, ethnicity, social 
class, etc.
104
  Instrumental participation is engaging in political behavior with the 
assumption that one or one‟s group will receive explicit material gain as 
reciprocity for their action.
105
  Civic participation, on the other hand, is entering 
into political behavior as a moral duty or obligation, not in anticipation of any 
personal gain, but based on one‟s sense of responsibility toward the state and its 
well-being.
106
 
When we superimpose these motivations for political participation over the 
existing sociopolitical contexts, it might be reasonably anticipated that in areas 
where centralization was not yet completed deferential participation, and to some 
extent, solidary participation would be commonly observed.  Voters are mobilized 
in deferential support and loyalty for the “proxy” and the locally-oriented 
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sociopolitical structure in which they are embedded.  Furthermore, depending on 
how local lines of distinctions were drawn in relation to provincial borders, the 
national unit through which members of parliament would be determined, the 
members of these sociopolitical units might act with more horizontal feelings of 
solidarity in relation to another such community with which the election had 
positioned them as competitors for the limited seats.   
As one then moves into the regions of the country where centralization and 
awareness of one‟s connectedness to the nation as a whole could be observed and 
pre-existing sociopolitical structures and actors operating as proxies were few in 
number, solidary, instrumental and civic participation would increase.  Certain 
communities and groups, based on their proximity to other antagonistic groups 
(whether these are understood as religious, ethnic, or village groupings) could be 
mobilized through solidary motivations.  Perhaps even more common would be 
instrumental mobilization through promises of material benefit, whether on 
individual or group level, that would accompany the support of a particular party.  
Furthermore, though any member of a national society might develop a civically-
minded orientation toward participation regardless of their condition, it might be 
expected to exist in greater numbers among those with greater exposure to formal 
education.  This could be anticipated as being so, not because of one‟s level of 
enlightenment or intelligence, but simply because it is in the state‟s interest to 
indoctrinate moral duties and obligations toward the state, and the primary vehicle 
for the state to accomplish such a goal is public, or state-supervised, education. 
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Figure 6.1a – Classic “Center-Periphery” Electoral Cleavage 
Center 
CHP                                         DP 
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Considering this formulation, how did the principle parties mobilize their 
respective voters?  As is illustrated in Figure 6.1b, in contrast to the 
oversimplified “center-periphery” electoral distinction in Figure 6.1a, the parties 
had greater success in general with peripheries living in distinct contexts.  The 
CHP, as has widely been observed, encountered greater success in areas where 
they could mobilize “proxies”—i.e. local notables—many of whom had already 
Figure 6.1b – Cross-Cleavage Competition for Peripheral Votes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
developed connections with the state (and the party) during the formation of the 
Republic and the single-party period
107
 (see “Party A” of Figure 6.2 below).  The 
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notable became a client of the (patron) party, and in turn, utilized his existing 
patronage relationship within the local community to mobilize the votes.  The 
loyalty existed on both levels, but, as the volatility of votes in these regions 
attests, the bonds of loyalty were often stronger between the communal voters and 
the notable than between the notable and the party.
108
  In fact, it was the strong 
loyalty, patronage relations that existed between the notable and his community of 
mobilized voters that provided the leverage for switching loyalties to a patron-
party that offered greater reciprocity toward the notable (see Figure 6.2).  The 
CHP‟s long-standing success, extending back into the single-party years at least, 
in gaining the loyalty of these “proxies” served them well in the initial electoral 
contests.  Particularly in this first period of electoral competition, the “fortress” of 
votes for the CHP came largely from the provinces in the far eastern regions and 
the fertile Mediterranean provinces where such mobilization arrangements were a 
much greater possibility.
109
  The correlations of positive support for the CHP in 
Table 6.4 below clearly show such a regional trend throughout the paradigm along 
with a negative correlation in regard to level of development. 
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Figure 6.2 – Two Forms of Patron-Client Relations for Political Mobilization 
 
Note: In the “Party B” form of patron-client relations, the broker may indeed rely on 
his/her own local-level resources in his/her dealings with clients, a phenomenon 
that has often been observed in the Turkish case.  The distinction, however, is that 
the proxy in the Party A relationship has acquired patron status prior to and 
independent to his/her connection to the party, and it is for this very reason that the 
proxy was recruited by the party.  The brokers‟ significance to the “mobilize-able 
community” is his/her presumed connection with Party B and the access to 
resources that such a situation would bring.  In fact, these brokers may be expected 
by the party to often tap into their own local or individual-level resources, but their 
status within the community comes from being a broker of the party.  The status of 
Party A within this scenario, on the other hand, comes from being the chosen 
political vehicle of the community leader (proxy). 
 
The DP, on the other hand, seemed more adept at political clientelism and 
successfully used brokerage strategies to mobilize votes instrumentally (see 
Figure 6.2).  The party often enlisted local professionals to visit towns and 
villages as party representatives and determined what it was that the local voters 
wanted and then made promises in that regard in return for their votes.  The 
accounts of research done primarily in inner-Anatolian villages in the 1950s, 
particularly in the West and Central regions, are filled with the very pragmatic and 
instrumental declarations of villagers regarding electoral decision-making.  
Consider the following passage recorded by Lerner: 
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The Demokrat men came to Balgat and asked us what was needed 
here and told us they would do it when they were elected. . . We all 
voted for them . . . and the new men did what they said.  They 
brought us this road and moved out the gendarmerie. . . We are all 
Demokrat party here in Balgat now.
110
 
 
Though still engaged in a unequal or hierarchical relationship, where conditions 
permitted it, the DP mobilizers interacted with their clientele, the rural farmers 
and urban periphery directly through brokerage, and the reciprocity was based on 
received or promised explicit material benefit—roads, mosques, schools, farm 
equipment, and the removal of the gendarmerie—(or the promises thereof) for 
support at the ballot box.
111
  In this regard, as Sayarı has well noted,112 the party 
mobilized votes according to a strategy closely resembling the “machine 
politics”—i.e. organized distribution of material rewards to mobilize masses of 
voters—concept in Scott‟s seminal article on patronage and machine politics.113  
This basic difference in regional tactics and subsequent varying success of the 
parties was noted by Özbudun, who writes, “While local notables were influencial 
enough to mobilize their supporters in the less developed east, they could not exert 
much influence upon the more modern peasantry of the west, who were more 
responsive to the leadership of provincial merchants and professionals.”114  In 
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most places where centralization was fairly consolidated, these sorts of material 
and economic interactions made sense, a fact born out by the correlations of 
support for the party by region and level of development in Table 6.4.
115
  During 
the single-party regime, the party and the state were closely intertwined such that 
it was natural to assume, especially in the absence of clear ideological platforms, 
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that these competing parties were rival distributive arms of the state.
116
  This, of 
course, created bonds to the party that were much more short-term and contingent 
(see “Party B” in Figure 6.2), but the obligatory bonds were more directly 
connected to the party (and to a less extent, the broker) than in the “Party 
A/proxy” scenario. 
In addition to this, in villages where there were existing social factions, the 
party lines fell conveniently within the ongoing local social cleavage.
117
  At the 
beginning of multiparty competition, the leading faction, usually connected to the 
existing headman (muhtar), who embodied the existing government at the local 
level, often became supporters of the CHP, while the opposing faction supported 
its primary challenger, the DP.
118
  This phenomenon of local faction voting 
behavior has been noted by a great many students of politics and village behavior 
in Turkey.  Szyliowicz writes: 
The peasant could join either the old, established CHP or the newly-
created opposition, the DP.  This decision was usually made solely on 
the basis of local factors—mainly village rivalries.  If the patriarch of 
such a family had connections with the government, he usually 
remained loyal to the CHP.  His rivals, realizing that association with 
a political party might provide him with additional status and power, 
would immediately join the opposition party to strengthen their 
position within the community.
119
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Sayarı writes, “Party competition meant, first and foremost, that factions could 
obtain support from outside the village or small-town by establishing linkages 
with political parties . . . For political parties . . . the prevalence of factional 
oppositions proved to be highly instrumental in electoral mobilization.”120  
Özbudun, in his study of political behavior in Turkey, noting the “remarkably 
strong tendency” toward a two-party system in the villages evident from the data 
accumulated, also argues that its explanation must be found in the pre-existing 
local factions and rivalries among groups in villages.
121
 
Certainly, from area to area and village to village, the lines between 
conditions where patronage through a “proxy” who operated through pre-existing 
sociopolitical power structures, dyadic “factional” village social structures, or 
villages where “machine party” clientelism took place might have been blurry.  
The relative proportion of each strategic form of mobilization, due to the lack of 
existing data in this regard, also cannot be exactly determined although 
Özbudun‟s work, which captures these distinctions quantitatively from a later 
period where these strategies continued if somewhat fading, does give us a 
glimpse of their prevalence if declining at the point in which his research was 
carried out.
122
  What seems to be foundational, however, and of critical import is 
that determinants of voting behavior were predominantly local for the vast 
number of voters in Turkey during this initial period, as students of Turkish 
politics and society consistently claimed up until the 1980s when the alternative 
“center-periphery” national cleavage explanation began to gain prominence in the 
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literature.
123
  Despite an apparent abandonment of the empirical electoral data of 
this period in recent decades, the localized nature of politics and electoral strategy 
in this period cannot be emphasized too strongly; as Szyliowicz states, “local 
events were of much greater significance in shaping an individual‟s allegiance.”124   
Therefore, attention to the political and campaign discourse at the national 
level bears little explanative power in regard to electoral outcomes.  As discussed 
in the section above, for anyone endeavoring an investigation of the electoral 
discourse, its disjuncture from the ultimate outcomes of electoral contestation and 
voting behavior is beyond evident.  Furthermore, cultural identification as 
occurring in a massive national cleavage—i.e. such as is proposed by a center and 
periphery—cannot explain election outcomes when one confronts the empirical 
data at the provincial level and the massive weight of sociological, 
anthropological and political evidence that provided unwavering observations of 
an emphasis on local considerations—whether culturally or instrumentally 
determined.
125
  This alone holds the best explanative power for the constellation 
of voting behavior in this period.  Where the political battle was “us” versus 
“them”, it was understood within a local rather than national context,126 and those 
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with an eye on the national scene behaved more clearly according to instrumental 
motivations of localized individual or group embetterment rather than some sort 
of solidary motivation at the national level. 
The veracity of this claim can also be illustrated by the clear volatility of 
the vote first toward and then away from the Democrat Party and the Republican 
Peoples‟ Party in 1954 and 1957 as seen by the “Tr B Vol” columns in Table 6.5, 
which measure the movement between the CHP and its competitors.  Had the 
cleavage between these primary competitors been based on identification, such as 
the widely-held claim that the DP and AP were the representative of the urban and 
rural powerless periphery and the CHP was the party of the central elite, the 
pattern of voting behavior would have arguably been more stable and exhibited 
less “instrumentally” based patterns, and of course, the village vote would not 
have been so divided in 1950.  Had the identity motivation been a strong factor, 
the sudden and strong shift of votes away from the CHP in 1954 and then back 
toward the CHP in 1957, for example, could not easily be explained.  One also 
sees from these volatility statistics that, as time passed, movement between blocks 
began a secular decrease, possibly suggesting that the lines of identification began 
to slowly grow until 1969, a change which will be discussed in the subsequent 
chapter.  
Furthermore, consideration of these mobilization strategies points us to the 
significance of the initial election victory of the DP, the pattern of subsequent 
voting behavior, and provides clues as to why this paradigmatic approach to 
politics by both the parties and the electorate began to fragment, especially 
beginning with the election in 1957 (see Table 6.6). If the name of the game is 
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distributing patronage or material benefits then winning or losing has critical 
implications for future elections. As Sayarı writes: 
The [CHP‟s] inability to come to power at a time when patronage 
distribution had become almost a prerequisite for success among the 
peasant voters proved to be a major electoral liability for the party.  
Undoubtedly, there was an element of a vicious circle at work here: 
The [CHP‟s] failure to come to power and hence its lack of access to 
governmental funds reduced, if not entirely precluded, the possibility 
of exchanging votes with goods and services. 
 
 In this sense, the timing of the Democrat Party‟s win was critical.  A great 
measure of the explanation for their success in 1950 could be tacked up to the fact 
that they were simply on the right side of the winds of change within society—the 
CHP had been the party in power for 27 years.  Assisting their initial success, the 
fact that they came to power at a moment in which large amounts of foreign 
financial aid was pouring into the country and optimum weather conditions 
provided bumper crops, both of which put extra money in the pockets of the 
village farmers, turned a 50/50 split of the rural population in 1950
128
 to a much 
greater rural victory in 1954, a victory effectively explained by patronage and 
instrumental mobilization from the machine party strategy employed by the DP.  
This also anticipates that, in 1957, with the nation in debt and the coffers running 
dry, there would be a significant change in the votes, and in fact, the DP lost 
nearly 10 percent of the vote (from 58.4 to 48.6) while the CHP gained almost 6.5 
percent from the previous election at the national level.   
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While the gradual increase in fragmentation of the vote in each election 
was itself partly a result of the desire to shop for better patron-client relations at 
the local level, the gradual nature of the fragmentation and the two-party tendency 
could at least in part be explained by the electoral strategy, particularly the DP‟s 
machine politics—i.e. party-based clientelism. Though Özbudun also suggested 
that the two-party tendency may stem from existing dyadic social factions 
representing themselves as a two-party political cleavage, which seems to clearly 
account for one part of the explanation to this phenomena, his data and analysis 
also reveal, as do the data in Table 6.6, that the strong two-party cleavage was 
most evident in the most developed regions of the country—the Marmara, Aegean 
and Mediterranean regions.
129
   The first two regions were notoriously supportive 
of the Democrat Party and stood to gain the most from party clientelism; thus, one 
could also argue that, in such an environment of electoral mobilization, the voters 
understood the need to support a clear winner whether or not the electoral system 
allowed for minor parties.   
If machine politics is the name of the game, any party not in first place is a 
loser—a reality placing clear constraints on the number of effective parties. These 
mobilization strategies, thus, provide the best explanation for the observable 
trends of the period: maintenance of a two-party tendency despite a great deal of 
volatility from election to election, a clear tendency and pattern of fragmentation 
that both progressed as dissatisfaction grew, but also remained limited despite 
existing possibilities in the electoral system in the 1960s, and volatility and 
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fragmentation that ultimately fit the pattern of the economic realities and the 
governing parties ability to distribute the spoils of office.   
As fragmentation grew from dissatisfaction with the governing parties, it 
also simultaneously put stress on the power of the winning horse to effectively 
distribute the promised goods to those who mobilized and were mobilized on their 
behalf.  By the 1960s, the ability of the party governing the country to distribute 
patronage no longer existed to the same extent that it had for the DP in the early 
1950s.  Furthermore, the existence of coalition governments from 1961 to 1965, 
and its inability to provide the largesse seen in earlier years, due in part to an 
unexpectedly poor showing by the CHP who won the post-coup election with a 
slight plurality (36.7 percent) over the AP (34.8 percent), put pressure on these 
predominant strategies for voter mobilization, especially in regard to the 
brokerage-style clientelism of the DP, which was continued by the AP.
130
   
The CHP in 1961, among other issues, likely fell victim to its popular 
association, at least in spirit, to the military junta who made a fateful decision to 
execute the popular former DP Prime Minister Adnan Menderes just weeks before 
the electorate cast its votes.  Thus, despite a plurality of the vote, it was forced to 
enter coalitions with parties not of the same mind—not a recipe for effective 
governance. The mantle of the DP, divided among two parties not-so-subtly 
attempting to mobilize the electorate under the old party‟s banner, was not clearly 
set upon the shoulders of the AP until after the election in 1961.  Thus, in 1965, 
we see for the last time a shaping of the contest solely under “politics as usual”—
i.e. a paradigm solely oriented toward patron-client strategies at the local level and 
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where the national discourse and ideological positioning of parties could be seen 
as merely window-dressing for the former.  By 1969, it became obvious that 
something else was intervening in electoral competition and mobilization such 
that the outcome of the elections was being affected by it. 
 
6.4 Domains of Identification 
 
One also generally expects that, beyond the “dimensions of 
competition”—i.e. the discursive issues and non-discursive strategies employed to 
mobilize voters—that “domains of identification”—“the various identities which 
tie particular voters to particular parties”131—would additionally intervene in the 
shaping of the lines of political contestation.  In this first paradigmatic period of 
Turkish politics, however, it could be fairly successfully argued that no strong 
“identification” markers were in operation to guide voting behavior or party 
preference.  Certainly, pre-existing social and cultural cleavages existed, but a 
perusal of the data and voting patterns confounds any simplistic dividing lines 
between these categorizations and the ultimate direction that the votes were cast.  
Due to the powerful influence of patron-client strategies, many unexpected 
bedfellows could be found.  Local factions of devout Sunnis can be found casting 
their votes for either major party or minor parties,
132
 while intellectuals and other 
elites cast votes for the DP in the name of democracy‟s advancement in the initial 
elections and switched to the CHP in later elections for the same reason.
133
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Furthermore, any descriptions of the parties involved or the electorate 
casting their votes for these parties, especially prior to 1961, as “left” or “right” 
would have to be understood as anachronistic.  Because of the fears of extreme 
ideological positions, the references to “left” in the 1950s were attributions that 
attempted to place the targeted individual or group outside of the political party 
system.  The extreme right, or religious right would also have to be seen in the 
same vein, and laws existed that banned the explicit demonstration of such 
political behavior.
134
  Thus, self-positioning or relative placement of oneself or 
one‟s party in such a manner would have offered very little utility,135 and thus 
these identifying symbols were not used by mainstream political parties until after 
the creation of the 1961 Constitution, and it was not until later that such 
positioning found utility as effective image positioning and cleavage forming.  It 
is for this reason that Karpat had “positioning” difficult in trying to explain the 
various political parties in Turkey in 1959.  He writes, “All the major political 
parties of Turkey, consequently, are middle of the road parties, representing the 
conservative, traditionalist conceptions.”136 
As discussed in the section on national discourse above, the parties‟ 
placement of themselves in relation to the others was largely based on moral 
distinctions—that one‟s party was moral, honest, and trustworthy while the other 
party or parties were not.  Following the 1960 coup, however, one begins to notice 
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the advent of a developing identification of sorts.  Though “left” and “right” were 
not widely used by the major parties until 1965 and later, a number of post-1960 
coup parties found it useful to identify themselves with the defunct Democrat 
Party.  The use of the old party‟s symbols, such as the kırat,137 indicated that these 
parties intended to pick up where the DP had left off.  Thus, the same brokerage 
and machine politics approach that was seen so favorably by much of the village 
populace, who felt empowered by the act of presenting a list of demands directly 
to educated local professionals enlisted by the party, would allegedly be 
maintained by these parties, which allowed for continuance in electoral results 
until the end of the 1960s.  It was this continuation of the old party‟s legacy, a 
logical strategy for the new parties entering the competition, that helped form the 
beginnings of identification with a style of politics—this more so than an 
ideology—and that divided them from their major competitor, the CHP.  These 
initial formations of lines that could be perceived as “identifying” at the national 
level of politics and predictable in terms of the direction a vote is cast must be 
understood as a great deal more fluid and ambiguous at this time than they would 
become in later periods. 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
 
The political legacy from this initial period of multiparty politics in the 
Republic could be argued to have both positive and detrimental aspects.  The 
application of patron-client strategic relations in the mobilization of the citizenry 
has often been addressed in relation to the long-standing pattern of problematic 
                                                          
137
 White horse. 
 
255 
behavior in democratic politics, particularly in relation to the “populist” and 
irresponsible government spending, which seems to naturally accompany it.
138
  
Another problem associated with this pattern of party strategy is that, while 
Turkish parties ostensibly desire to represent the general interest of the whole 
nation (see Chapter Two), they become the vehicle for very particular, even 
individual, interests.  From such a perspective, as Roniger points out, “clientelism 
is shown to neutralize the system of representation, as “friends” are placed in the 
strategic synapses of power and mechanisms of control.”139 Furthermore, because 
its purpose is ultimately to establish party loyalty through an artificial alliance of 
members of unequal status, this of course being one of the necessary conditions of 
patron-client relations, it is most effective in forging partnerships with those that 
are most needy, or—to represent it in another way—the most peripheral.  Thus, 
those at the middle level of society, in between the elites and the otherwise 
powerless, the urban middle class, are often left out of receiving the benefits of 
this pattern of democracy, which prioritizes distributing the spoils of the state for 
mobilization and support.  Kalaycıoğlu has argued that this pattern of democracy 
has disenchanted the urban middle class toward democracy and led them to be 
supportive or open to authoritarianism or even praetorian regimes to secure their 
way of life.
140
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While these criticisms deserve the attention that they have been given, it is 
also possible to propose that, though patron-client relations might have slowed 
some of the anticipated fruits of democratization, the political brokerage and 
machine politics employed by the Democrat Party may have set a pattern that has 
ultimately guaranteed the consolidation of democracy as a political regime in 
Turkey.  Heper, discussing the differing perspectives of state and political elites in 
Turkey, has stated, “In Turkey, democracy did become the only game in town, but 
the rules of that game did not resemble the rules of liberal democracy.”141 The 
action of the “political elites” to engage in party brokerage with a large mass of 
citizen clients brought the state, and importantly democracy, perhaps in overly 
simplistic and materialistic ways, into direct contact with vast segments of 
society.
142
 Scott argues, that the “machine politics” form of clientelism that 
exemplifies how the DP and AP, in particular mobilized votes, constructs “a 
cacophony of concrete, parochial demands into a system of rule that was at once 
reasonably effective and legitimate.”143  While the increased contact and apparent 
open ear of the state toward individual concerns no doubt established a positive 
association toward democracy, Heper‟s observation that this did not bring about 
“liberal democracy” is a critical one.  In anticipation of such a development in 
regard to political clientelism, Roniger writes, “Patrons and clients are not 
interested in the generality of equality and rules; they are interested in resources.  
                                                          
141
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They do not seek to promote a rule for citizens as such; they are on the lookout for 
situations that are to their advantage, on the basis of favoritism.”144  
Thus, the orientation of the hitherto largely disenfranchised rural masses 
and urban poor was directed toward the ballot box, largely for functional, if overly 
particularistic, purposes.
145
  If one argued that there was a malady in Turkish 
political orientations stemming from the advent of democracy, rather than the 
more exotic and sensational claims regarding the impact of cultural identities and 
religion on electoral behavior and outcomes, it might be the strong egotropic—
individual self-interest—approaches to voting that do not correspond with a 
concern for the rights or equality of others.  However, considering the 
heterogeneous nature of the population and the great diversity in cultural outlook, 
one can easily imagine a worse scenario for the young country in its initial 
orientations toward multiparty politics.  Not surprisingly, functional—i.e. 
economic—considerations are still identified as a prime motivator for electoral 
behavior.
146
   
The various ways in which these patron-client relational strategies were 
applied also seem to be important, the distinctions still having regional 
repercussion in citizens‟ attitudes toward the state and its system.  Where the DP 
mobilized the electorate face to face with party representatives, such as in Central 
and Western Anatolia, the populous is perceptibly more connected to the state and 
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democracy, if also correlated with nationalism and conservatism.  In the far 
eastern and southeastern regions, where patronage was used to mobilize the vote 
through proxies, anti-state and anti-system behavior are still considered chief 
“state-level” concerns of the region.  One wonders what the outcome might have 
been had the CHP, and to some extent the DP and its successors, engaged in more 
direct contact with this populace.  Obviously, the “proxies”—local notables—who 
were chosen to represent the party had a strong investment in this possible 
scenario not being the case, but the ultimate distance between the actual party and 
the mass of citizens in these regions was such that the integration of the masses 
into the state, which occurred in other places, could not be realized there.   
Finally, while it has been the case that the vast body of literature 
addressing this period of Turkish politics has often been particularly harsh toward 
the political behavior and strategy of the CHP, one can also find ground to 
interpret the party‟s behavior differently.  First of all, despite claims to the 
contrary, the CHP did engage in pragmatic and democratic behavior.  While the 
party relied on old alliances from earlier political periods and worked through 
“proxies” more frequently than the direct interaction and brokerage style 
commonly employed by the DP, their utilization of these relations were politically 
pragmatic.  Furthermore, the CHP rapidly adjusted to multiparty competition, and 
the composition of its parliamentary candidates mirrored that of the DP.  In terms 
of prestige, professionals, doctors and lawyers in particular, were at the social 
center in the Shilsian sense until the 1960s, when they were overtaken by 
engineers.  The CHP in this first paradigmatic period pulled from these elite 
classes no less than the DP once multiparty elections took off.  The CHP, as is 
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evidenced in Frey‟s work, actually surpassed the DP in numbers of 
parliamentarians who were of local origins.  This was obviously a drastic change 
from the single-party period in which the Grand National Assembly was filled 
with bureaucrats.
147
   
The CHP, more so than the DP, seemed to rely on campaign discourse 
over face to face contact and interaction with the masses, but their discourse was 
not elitist nor particularly “statist” and showed clear appeal to important elements 
of the electorate.  Especially in 1950 and in 1961, election programs were created 
to be read by a broad spectrum of society and explicitly emphasized the concerns 
of the villagers and urban workers.  Their declarations ultimately seemed to land 
on deaf ears and fell victim to the ridicule and mockery of their prime competitor, 
the DP and later the AP.  Had the populace taken the CHP‟s discourse seriously, 
one could imagine a different scenario in the final election results.  Ultimately 
though, the major crutch of being the party that governed for all 27 years 
preceding 1950 and the direct contact and promises of the DP encountered by a 
large section of the electorate proved to be the decisive factor.  The CHP during 
this paradigm, through candidate selection, “proxies”, and through discourse 
found a way to garner at least 20 percent of the votes (and often much more) in 
every election and every province in the country.  Thus, despite the popular trend 
to disparage the political savvy of the CHP under İsmet İnönü, the CHP in the first 
decade of the 21
st
 century, for example, could not boast the same level of 
competitiveness and pluralism that the CHP, though unsuccessful and unfortunate 
in the final analysis, managed in the initial period of multiparty competition. 
                                                          
147
 See, Frey, The Turkish Political Elite. 
 260 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 7  
 
 
THE IDEOLOGICAL IMAGING PARADIGM – 1965-1980 
 
 
 
The Justice Party, the holder of the civilizing and homeland loving principles 
handed down to us by the Great Atatürk, acts to serve the great Turkish nation.1 
—Suleyman Demirel 
 
One of the characteristics of the period that followed the Revolution of 27 May 
1960, in Turkey, is the emergence of labor as a new social and political force 
attached to the principles of Atatürk and democracy.2 
—Bülent Ecevit 
 
While the machine politics of party clientelism, which had functioned so 
well under the Democrat Party and was bequeathed to its ultimate mantle-bearer the 
Justice Party (AP), continued or flourished in the western regions along with the 
“proxy” form of patronage particularly in the eastern portions of the country, by the 
1969 general election, the ultimate electoral outcome could not be completely 
explained by these mobilization strategies and this became more evident as Turkish 
politics moved toward the military coup of September 12, 1980.  During the 
transitional election of 1965, votes began to seep away from the Republican 
People‟s Party (CHP) in provinces across the country, but perhaps more 
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surprisingly from its traditional bases in the east.
3
  By the general election of 1969, 
the CHP began to draw its greatest strength from the region where it had previously 
been the weakest—the Marmara Region—and became the weakest where it had 
previously garnered a great measure of support—the Southeast Region.4   By the 
time we reach the election of 1977, the electoral map indisputably attests to the fact 
that the CHP was dominating in the large industrial and urban centers of the country 
and managed, under the leadership of Bülent Ecevit, to accumulate 41.4 percent of 
the vote nationwide.  The comparison of the regional performance of the CHP 
before and after 1965 in Table 7.1
5
 bears this out very clearly.  While only minor 
regional alterations in the AP‟s support occurred, a stark difference in support for 
the CHP, especially in relation to development had taken place. 
Scholars of the period consistently interpreted the trends over the 1969, 
1973, and 1977 election as the clear manifestation of an electoral realignment.  The 
CHP was clearly performing in areas of the country and among segments of the 
population with a measure of success that it had not previously witnessed.  The 
apparent electoral setback for the party in the Senate and by-elections of 1979, with 
major gains going to the AP, and the military coup in 1980 caused the 
interpretations of a realignment to remain in the realm of speculation and debate, 
and ultimately history.  While the military‟s forceful intervention into the political 
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sphere leaves the question of “realignment” one for supposition, the facts less 
controversially indicate that a change had occurred in the political paradigm—i.e. 
the dimensions of competition and domains of identification—in the country.  
Orientations toward politics and strategies used to mobilize the electorate displayed 
a shift that deserves careful attention. 
The shifting of the political paradigm also allows one to see the complex 
interaction between actors and their contingent environment.  As will become 
apparent in the following sections, an insistence in proposing that structure, 
 263 
institutions, or agents alone can account for the observed phenomena of the period 
fail to capture the very contingent “dance” that occurred between these various 
forces.  As the paradigm shifted from one constellation of strategies and domains, 
the significant contributions from each of these forces cannot be discounted.  Actors 
responded to changes and they did so in an arena of competition laid out within 
spaces provided by created institutional structures, but their actions cannot be seen 
as inevitable and determined by the existing space; instead, they acted according to 
an array of possibilities suggested by the existing opportunities and constraints in 
the system.  It is the complex interaction of such forces that allow us to understand 
why the CHP, and not the Turkish Workers Party, during this period ultimately 
became the spokesman for the urban workers, taking the votes of this segment of 
the population, which had previously been given to the AP.   
Thus, in order to understand this transition from one paradigm to another, 
we will first examine the historical contingency in which this paradigm emerged, 
and then consider the dimensions of competition and domains of identification that 
comprised the system of interactions within this period. 
 
7.1 The Context of the Period 
 
Much of the classical work on this period in Turkey‟s history focuses on the 
issue of “social change,” particularly in regard to urbanization.6  Changes in the 
                                                 
6
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level of development in Turkey caused an increase in the population from not quite 
21 million in 1950 to nearly 39 million in 1974.  From 1950 to 1965, while the rural 
population increased on average by 1.8 percent per year, the urban population 
increased by an average of 5 percent per year over the same period.  Thus, the 
percent of the population living in cities increased from less than 25 percent in 1950 
to around 39 percent in 1970.
7
  The development of roads which was one of the 
hallmarks of development in the early 1950s under the Democrat Party, not only 
made it easier to transport goods and materials to and from the provinces and 
villages, it created an easier access to the opportunities of upward mobility and 
industrial jobs in the city for many poor farmers, who benefited the least from the 
agricultural policies of the DP government. 
This social transformation brought a number of interesting questions to the 
forefront of research into Turkish politics and society.  Chief among them were: 
how do these new migrants to the urban (modern) centers compare to their 
(traditional) cohorts in the villages they left behind?  In what ways do they orient 
themselves similarly or differently now that they are in the city (or at the margins of 
it)?  And who would become the political voice of this growing mass of citizens?  
From a political perspective, this growing class of society constituted a significant 
opportunity in terms of electoral gains to a party willing to seize the nascent 
                                                                                                                                        
Organizations and Elites in Turkey (1950-1969) (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971).  
While the first three examples address change among the masses, the final example—i.e. Roos and 
Roos—addresses the change among elites but largely finds that the impetus for elite change occurred 
through social change—i.e. modernization and industrialization (see Chapter 3, “Industrialization 
and Social Transformation”).   
7
 Karpat, The Gecekondu, p. 58. 
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opportunity. Throughout the initial paradigm, the DP and, subsequently, the AP 
successfully managed to woo these voters through the same form of political 
clientelism that they had employed in many of the villages despite the fact that the 
general economic policies and outlook of these parties were not especially 
beneficial to this particular social group, and as Karpat shows, this was true 
regardless of which party they traditionally voted for when living in the village.
8
 
Though often living on the margins of the city and struggling to defend 
these squatter communities from being demolished, this population‟s confrontation 
with city and state created a heightened sense of political awareness and political 
action that distinguished these newly-arrived urban dwellers from their village 
counterparts.  Having built unofficial dwellings on state lands, the members of these 
communities were placed in a context in which they had to be aware of political 
mechanisms and unite in order to realize their demands.  Thus, they acquired a 
much more heightened awareness of both political action and of political 
community that bordered on class consciousness or functional concerns that 
transcended former social groupings and loyalties.  Karpat writes: 
In the case of Turkish squatters, the demand making transformed the 
traditional and mythical devlet baba (father state), an aloof, 
authoritarian semideity, into a living government—into human 
organization that could be manipulated to do or undo certain acts, 
especially with regard to the gecekondus.
9
 
 
This transformation in the understanding of “devlet baba”, ultimately integrated 
these newly arrived urban dwellers into the urban and “national political culture, 
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and this occurred “to a degree far more pronounced than the older city residents or 
villagers simply because [they do] it consciously and self-interestedly.”10   Thus, 
these squatters, most of whom were industrial workers recently arriving from the 
provincial villages, entered into the politics of “demand satisfaction” and, hence, 
were “not inspired by radical ideologies”—except when their material demands are 
not met by normal political channels.
11
 
These major socioeconomic changes also had an important impact in the 
rural areas.  As the country developed and rural areas had greater contact with life 
beyond the village, traditional sociopolitical hierarchies continued to weaken.  This 
was particularly evident in the regions that had relied on these sociopolitical local 
notables—referred to as “proxies” in chapter 6—during the previous paradigm.  As 
noted by Özbudun in his seminal work of the period, while contingent necessities 
demanded that political parties—the CHP being most successful in this regard—
utilize the existing sociopolitical hierarchies to mobilize votes in these attitudinally 
and structurally non-centralized regions, the political participatory act of voting 
endowed upon the people of the region necessarily began to effect the existing 
relationship between notable and peasant.  It was the latter that, in national 
comparisons of attitudes toward political participation, expressed that they had a 
high level of personal political efficacy.
12
  This was, of course, importantly 
understood at the local level, so that while the existing “proxy” form of 
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mobilization in these areas did not effectively attach these local constituents to the 
nation as a whole, it certainly impacted their view of democratic processes and their 
own role within their local context.  Because of the notables need to connect 
themselves the new channels of power—i.e. political power—they suddenly had to 
listen to those people constituting the local community in a much closer way, and 
those beneath them felt increasingly empowered to directly address their concerns 
with this local political figure. Therefore, as the pre-existing bonds of power 
weakened, the notable‟s power began to decline or it began to be primarily 
sustained by the notable‟s politicking skills.  These tensions are at least partially 
manifested in the phenomenon of large blocs of votes going to independent 
candidates (usually notables) in increasing numbers over time in precisely these 
regions and in clear contrast to the other regions of the country.
13
  The inability of 
major parties to address the particular concerns of the region pushed many notables 
that had retained mobilizing power to run independently for both national and local 
elections. 
The tumultuous socioeconomic changes proved to provide ample ground for 
a “national” cultivation of socialist thought and, of course, conservative counter-
movements.  While socialist associations and groups had existed even in the last 
decades of the Ottoman Empire, these groups had simply “borrowed Western 
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political ideas without much concern for their economic and social relevance.”14  
Beginning in the 1950s, however, the social transformation in the country that had 
replaced the position of elite status previously occupied by bureaucrats with 
intellectuals with professionals, fostered among the former sentiments that tended 
toward socialism and a “national” reordering of society; at the same time, the 
amount of urban wage earners, the segment of the population traditionally seen as 
potentially receptive to such a political outlook was growing rapidly.
15
  While the 
development of socialist thinking among bureaucrats and the intelligentsia could 
hardly be called a “grass-roots” movement, it was unique to previous socialist 
“movements” in that the ideology was conceived within a national container, 
constructed such that it could be reconciled with the foundational principles of 
Kemalism.
16
 
This group would ultimately leave its mark on the period, not through 
electoral mobilization, but through the military coup on May 27, 1960, which was 
led by young officers and supported by bureaucrats and the intelligentsia in 
particular.  During the interim period of the junta, prior to the elections of 1961, it 
was members of the latter who were entrusted with writing up the draft of the 
Constitution that would set the course of politics in the Second Republic.  While 
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scholars have also correctly pointed out the politically liberal features
17
 or the 
bureaucratic emphasis
18
 of this new Constitution, which was adopted by referendum 
on July 9, 1961, this new constitution unquestionably added a “social” component 
that strongly distinguished it from previous and successive constitutions.  One can 
easily perceive this aspect in the defense of the provisions of the constitution by 
İsmet Giritli, one of the key members of the group of seven who were asked to draft 
a new constitution on the first day of the “revolution.”  Giritli writes: 
Western democracy provides the opportunity to utilize existing 
freedom to secure even wider freedoms; but wider freedoms in the 
chaotic social and economic structure of our present-day world 
require protection for individuals and groups that are weak from an 
economic and social standpoint.  It becomes necessary to provide 
means of enhancing their material and spiritual existence, to give 
them not only the classic rights and freedoms but economic and 
social rights as well.  This is why the new Turkish Constitution not 
only provides ample social and economic rights to supplement the 
political freedoms, but also demonstrates sensitivity towards 
safeguarding these rights from violation.
19
 
 
Thus, embedded within the national constitution, which described Turkey as a 
“social state,” were provisions for a State Planning Organization and land reform, in 
which portions of large land holdings would be taken and reapportioned to poor  
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farmers with little or no land.  In addition to this, the official leader of the junta and 
President of the Republic, General Cemal Gürsel is said to have openly suggested 
that “socialism might be beneficial to Turkey.”20 
These all points to the fact that an important institutional change had taken 
place within the country.  Based on the actions of particular actors, arguably 
responding to their conditions within the socioeconomic changes occurring in the 
country (in turn stimulated by other actors), a new institutional framework was laid 
that, in sharp contrast to the previous institutions, not only allowed the formation of 
ideological formations, at least implicitly encouraged an indigenous form of 
socialist thought to take root among segments of the population.  The set of laws 
accompanying the previous constitution of 1924 strictly prohibited narrow 
ideologies from forming, largely from the fear that such associations would 
necessarily be particularistic in interest and that this, in turn, would jeopardize the 
corporate “classless” nature of Turkish society and the interests of the whole.  Such 
an opening in the political landscape seemed to represent a potential challenge to 
what appeared to be an established (political cultural) value, at least at the elite 
level, if not among the populace, of “nation parties.”  
One of the first challenges to such an established value was the formation of 
the Turkish Workers Party (TİP) in February of 1961 by a number of trade 
unionists.
21
  For the first time, a leftist party that emphasized the plight of the urban 
                                                 
20
 Karpat, “The Turkish Left,” p. 181. 
21
 Erkan Doğan, “Parliamentary Experience of the Turkish Labor Party: 1965-1969,” Turkish 
Studies, Vol. 11, No. 3 (2010), pp. 315-6. 
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working class and the poor rural peasant was allowed to compete legitimately 
within the existing institutional structure.  Its existence, fostered by the new 
conditions that allowed for “democratic socialism” (but not communism or any sort 
of “revolutionary” movement), brought the political position of “left” into the party 
system.
22
  As a successor to a political environment in which “left” and “extreme 
right” were understood both legally and from a perspective of social values as being 
politically “out-of-bounds,” this was an important change indeed, providing new 
opportunities to the other parties within the system to use this party‟s position to the 
benefit of their own positioning or imaging.   
The establishment of the State Planning Organization (SPO), instituted by 
its provision in the 1961 Constitution, created an additional constraint on the 
political strategies employed in the earlier period by the DP.  The SPO effectively 
distanced the governing power from the work of economic development and 
distribution of state funds ostensibly for that purpose.  The ability of previous 
governments to sit in the captain‟s chair in regard to these economic development 
projects had been a prime vehicle for exactly the type of clientelistic, machine 
politics that accorded the large victories for the Democrats in the 1950s.  With 
developmental spending taken out of the hands of the governing party and placed in 
the lap of bureaucrats, the valve for pork barrel spending that paralleled a 
community‟s support for the party providing the goods and services was suddenly 
shut off.  Hyland notes that one of the strategies utilized by the Justice Party and 
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Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel to address this economic impotence was to place 
the blame on “those blankety-blank SPO technocrats back in Ankara.”23  While this 
might have been a short-term solution, it clearly put pressure on the AP in particular 
to change a strategy that had been so effective for their predecessors in the previous 
paradigmatic period.   
While the failure of local constituencies to receive pork-barrel benefits from 
1961 to 1965 could be blamed on the weak coalition governments, for most of the 
period led by the CHP, after the electorate provided the AP a majority of the 
popular vote and a strong governing position in 1965, the party was left without 
excuses other than the one suggested above.  It is not surprising then that the AP 
began to lose votes in subsequent elections until 1977; they simply could not fill the 
role of the first “demirkırat”24 under whose mantle they had competed, thanks in 
part to the constraints placed on them by the newly created SPO.  Though the SPO 
under the AP largely came to represent the interests of private business rather than 
the public sector, the very nature of “planning” restricted the government‟s ability 
to make the kind of pork-barrel expenditures so common under the Menderes 
governments.
25
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7.2 Dimensions of Competition: 7.2.1 National Campaign Discourse 
 
While a number of the features prominent within the first paradigmatic 
period of electoral contestation could be said to continue into this second period, 
such as personal attacks on oppositional party leaders and emphasis on economic 
policy, it brought a new discursive strategy into the system that ultimately seemed 
to mirror voting behavior across the country.  While the political leaders during the 
previous period spoke and spoke and spoke some more, there was little evidence 
that the great expenditure of words was having much of an impact on what the 
voters did at the ballot box and how those voters perceived the parties and the 
political contest.  Arguably, the effective change was a matter of simplification: 
establishing one‟s position not by clear rhetoric, but by framing one‟s party in such 
a way as to be remembered and understood in relation to other parties such that it 
could be easily transmitted and disseminated throughout the electoral population 
without the chance of much distortion—i.e. image-positioning.26 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the CHP‟s positioning of itself through 
the expression “left of center,” and later “democratic left” seemed to have an 
important instigating impact on the shape that the competition within the party 
system would take from 1965 to 1980.
27
  Certainly, the existence of the leftist TİP 
preceded the move of the CHP to establish a “left of center” image of themselves, 
but it was critically important that the CHP, one of the two major parties, employed 
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such a strategy.  Positioning oneself against a minor party, such as the Turkish 
Workers Party would have little utiliy for most parties, as it would fail to address 
their position in relation to more important competitors, but once the position of one 
of the major parties is established, it created an opportunity for reactive positioning 
that could potentially benefit all the other parties.  The CHP‟s concern about the 
growth of the “left” and the existence of the TİP as a motivating source of their own 
positioning has been pointed out by scholars,
28
 the motivations for which will be 
discussed in the section below, but the ultimate positioning was based, not on 
inevitable factors, but on specific decisions made by both parties.   
An interesting piece of evidence to suggest that image-positioning was a key 
element in the pattern of electoral behavior in this period is simply the fact that, at 
the level of the discourse regarding general policy, one could find a great deal of 
continuity in the CHP‟s policy proclamations, stretching back at least to the late 
1950s,
29
 with the campaign promises in 1965 mirroring exactly the promises in 
1961.  In 1961, however, there is little to show that the electorate was responding to 
the CHP based on its campaign discourse.  This is in stark contrast to 1965, in 
which portions of the electorate, large landowners in the east, who had previously 
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supported the party but who would be most (negatively) effected by the CHP‟s 
position, punished the party at the ballot box. Conversely, starting in 1969, the 
urban industrial population and blue collar workers that would benefit from the 
CHP‟s policy, began to flock to the party in increasing numbers through the general 
election of 1977.  However, this change in electoral behavior began not with 
proclamations of the party‟s policy, unquestionably beginning in 1961 and arguably 
as far back as 1957,
30
 but with the announcement of the CHP‟s position as “left of 
center,” which in the 1970s, became the “democratic left.”31 
In 1961, the CHP campaigned on a platform of “social justice” stemming 
from the “welfare state” principle.  The 1961 “Foundational Aims Manifest” posted 
by the party in their newspaper organ, Ulus, delineates these themes in a one-page, 
twenty-five point declaration.  Included in the document are promises for land for 
poor farmers, water for dry ground, proper wages for the Turkish worker, health, 
education, and social security.  The document promises that the increase in wealth 
for both the city-dweller and the rural citizen will occur within a “just” framework 
(adil bir düzen) and that the provisions of the new constitution will be implemented 
immediately.
32
  The usage of the expression “social justice” as a description of the 
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party‟s economic policies entered many of the election speeches, particularly by the 
General Secretary İsmail Rüstü Aksal.33  İsmet İnönü in a campaign speech over the 
radio stated that the situation of the [urban] worker was the most important topic for 
the CHP.
34
  In his fourth radio speech, he reiterated this point and emphasized the 
need for justice in the agricultural sector with land from those with more than 
enough going to those who do not have enough land to live off of.
35
  Emphasis on 
these points by the leaders of the CHP can be found throughout the campaign.
36
 
These were the identical issues of the 1965 campaign for the CHP.  Land 
reform, water reform, tax reform to benefit the working man, social justice, 
implementing the provisions in the 1961 Constitution
37—all of these issues can be 
traced back to declarations made in 1961.  Thus, the “change” to left of center was 
not really a change at all in terms of party ideology, policy or outlook.  What 
changed in the 1965 election was the decision by the party to clarify a political 
position that could operate as a simplifying image explaining where the party stood 
in relation to the others. 
One might counter this claim by arguing that the CHP gains occurred 
largely due to the change in party leadership from İsmet İnönü to Bülent Ecevit.  
While Ecevit‟s leadership might certainly play a role in the big gains in the two 
                                                 
33
 “Sosyal Adalete Yürekten İnanıyoruz,” Ulus, 28 September 1961; “Büyük hamleler yapmalıyız,” 
Ulus, 2 October 1961. 
34
 “Sözde, işte, hedefte doğruluk,” Ulus, 1 October 1961. 
35
 “Biz dirlik ve düzeni kuracağız,” Ulus, 11 October 1961. 
36
 Karpat also noted this emphasis by the CHP in the 1961 campaign and writes, “With İnönü‟s 
support, the Republican Party committed itself to the solution of social and economic problems and 
especially to social justice.” Karpat, “The Turkish Left,” p. 180. 
37
 See, “Reformları yapmadan siyaseti bırakmam,” Cumhuriyet, 4 October 1965. 
 278 
elections in the 1970s, the change in leadership does not explain the general trends 
for several reasons.  First, while one cannot discount the personal popularity of 
Ecevit among the electorate, this could only explain increases in the vote for the 
party, it cannot explain the clear shifting of voting centers, including gains and 
losses, that transformed where and from whom the party was taking votes.  
Furthermore, the clear pattern of the CHP making gains in the large industrial cities 
among the urban workers began in 1969 with İnönü still at the helm, and Ecevit‟s 
hand in this outlook by the party was known at least by 1965 with the initiation of 
“left of center” and with no noticeable gains in the cities.  Thus, it safe to say that 
the imaging of the party, simplified so that it was easily disseminated, bore an 
important responsibility for where the CHP began to acquire votes, even if we 
attribute the extent of the gains in part to the change of leadership. 
Though the positioning of the CHP on the moderate left had a significant 
impact on the lines of contest in the party system, the campaign discourse of the 
period did not translate into a situation in which all parties clearly positioned 
themselves along a left-right placement scheme; instead, while the other parties 
reacted to the declared positioning of the CHP and, in fact, tried to muddle its 
imaging by positioning it much further left (or right in the case of TİP38), the parties 
themselves, for the most part, tried to avoid explicit self-positioning, favoring 
instead a general positioning away from the left, or anti-left.  Thus, while it was a 
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safe bet to position most of the other parties on the right, considering their anti-left 
positioning, exactly where they were located, especially in relation to the other anti-
left parties, was open to conjecture. 
The AP, as the dominant “anti-left” party, and its leader, Süleyman Demirel 
were particularly adept at muddling the position of the CHP.  Even with the CHP 
image-positioning occurring late in the 1965 campaign, the election meetings held 
by the AP quickly were filled with the infamous rhyming slogan, “ortanın solu, 
Moskova yolu,” [the left of center is the road to Moscow].39  Demirel and the AP 
began to focus on the communist threat immediately, suggesting that if the CHP 
was not communist at the moment, it was traveling down that path.
40
  The 
reimaging of their major opponent as communist leftist played a major part in the 
AP‟s strategy of appealing to rural and conservative voters in lieu of employing 
machine politics.  The conservative populace in the towns and villages across the 
country, in a similar way to their counterparts in many Western countries of the 
period, were easily aroused by the fear of the threat of communism.  As the “leftist” 
CHP continued to expand it support base, this anti-communism, anti-leftist strategy 
began to pay off.  Furthermore, the anti-communism was particularly effective for 
the AP in comparison to the other minor “anti-left” parties like the Democratic 
Party and the Republican Reliance Party; in fact, anti-communist rhetoric could be 
seen as being damaging for the latter, because the rhetoric assumed the need for a 
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strong, major party to take the lead and establish a stable government that could 
counteract a communist threat.
41
 
The CHP responded to this reimaging of their party by the “anti-left” parties 
by pushing the latter away from any possible image of moderation by positioning 
them, particularly the AP and the National Action Party (MHP) as exploiters or as 
collaborators with foreign exploiters.
42
  Although the AP had been labeled fascists 
by groups on the left, especially after the National Front coalitions, this terminology 
was used rarely in official campaign discourse.
43
 Erbakan, and to a lesser extent 
Ecevit, were fond of referring to Demirel as a Mason;
44
 thereby calling into 
question his “Muslim-ness” and suggesting that he might be in league with dark 
international forces.
45
  
The AP, of course, was primarily interested in identifying itself as the 
successor to the Democrat Party; in contrast, its self-placement on the right was 
much more ambiguous and fluid.  In July, prior to the October 1965 general 
election, the AP changed its symbol from that of a sun rising over an open book, to 
the figure of a white horse,
46
 symbolizing its relationship with the old Demirkırat47 
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party.  Especially in the period prior to the polarization of the 1970s, the AP was 
content to attack the leftist position of the CHP, identify themselves as the 
successor to the DP, and remain ideologically ambiguous.  Demirel, in the 1965 
campaign declared, “We are against all „isms‟ including liberalism and capitalism.  
We are not for any diehard ideology or system.  We establish our economic view 
according to the conditions of the day.”48 
While the party system was readjusting to this change of tactics through the 
introduction of ideologically-based image-positioning, it began to display clear 
evidence of fragmentation, particularly in 1969 and 1973 (see Table 7.3).  As 
certain factions composing the traditional support of the major parties noted the 
movement away from the status quo, the “Old Guard” broke away to form new 
parties that took chunks of support away from the parties, engaging in a new form 
of electoral combat.  In 1967, the “Old Guard” of conservatives and land owners 
broke away from the CHP and formed the Republican Reliance Party led by Turhan 
Feyzioğlu, snatching 6.6 and 5.3 percent of the total vote in the 1969 and 1973 
elections, respectively.
49
  Demirel‟s rift with member of the party concerned about 
his big capitalism policies, many of them in the “declining sectors” like local 
notables and land owners affected by the expanding industrial sector, caused the 
formation of the Democratic Party in 1970.
50
  This party managed to acquire 11.9 
percent of the national vote in the 1973 election.   
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Further fragmentation occurred when a personality conflict between 
Demirel and Necmettin Erbakan caused the latter to break away from the AP and 
run successfully as an independent in 1969 and later form the first explicitly 
Islamist-oriented party to compete in the general elections in the multiparty period. 
His first party, the National Order Party, was closed down in the 1971 intervention 
and was not able to compete in a national election, but it reopened as the National 
Salvation Party, garnering 11.8 of the national vote in the 1973 election.
51
  
“Islamist” or “religious conservative” factions had always been an element within 
the major parties, particularly the DP and the AP and the smaller Republican Nation 
Parties, but the environment of change, the damage done to the reputation of the AP 
in conjunction to the 1971 intervention, and the related uncertainty provided a 
window of space for these other parties.  Meanwhile, the existence of the 
“communist/socialist” threat seemed to encourage the formation of a type of 
extreme religious nationalism as a reaction to its entrance to the system.
52
  This 
party, led by one of the instigators of the 1960 coup, Alparslan Türkeş, ultimately 
became known as the Nationalist Action Party (MHP), whose electoral fortunes 
began inauspiciously but managed to receive 6.4 percent of the vote in the 1977 
general election.
53
 
                                                 
51
 For more on Erbakan, see Elisabeth Özdalga, “Necmettin Erbakan: Democracy for the Sake of 
Power,” in Metin Heper and Sabri Sayarı, eds., Political Leaders and Democracy in Turkey 
(Lanham, MY: Lexington Books, 2002), p. 129.  See also Table 7.2. 
52
 Jacob Landau, “The Nationalist Action Party in Turkey,” Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 
17, No. 4 (1982), p. 588. 
53
 For a more detailed electoral snapshot and their change from the CKMP to the MHP, see Table 
7.2. 
 283 
Table 7.3 – Electoral Trends of the Period 54 
 1965 1969 1973 1977 
Top-Two Parties’ vote % 81.6% 74.0% 63.1% 78.3% 
Effective # of Parties 
(Mod. Golosov) – National 
 
2.50 2.84 3.39 2.61 
Effective # of Parties 
(Mod. Golosov) – 
Provincial Ave. 
 
2.59 2.89 3.45 2.72 
Volatility – National 
Aggregate 
 
29.8 14.8 30.1 18.3 
Volatility – National 
“Inter-bloc”  
 
6.8 3.9 5.8 8.1 
Voter Turnout 71.3% 64.3% 66.8% 72.4% 
 
 
 
Table 7.4 – Regional Effective Number of Parties, 1965-1977 
 
Though the shift initially allowed for fragmentation and decrease in voter 
turnout, as the line of contest became clear, the new pattern of politics actually 
reversed these trends (see Table 7.3 and 7.4).  Within the campaign discourse, both 
parties exploited the use of positioning to try to move their major competitor further 
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away from the center in the minds of the voters.  Thus, though neither the AP or the 
CHP could have been accused of actually resembling anything close to fascism or 
communism, respectively,
55
 the intense rhetoric along “ideological” lines 
effectively polarized the populace into one of the two major party‟s camps, the 
bipolar trend clearly evident in all of the elections post-1973, and it did so in a 
manner that fit the nature of the ideological contest.  Particularly for those parties 
not engaged in this polarizing line of contestation—i.e. “left” versus “anti-left”—
they suffered devastating electoral defeats as the polarization intensified in the 
1970s.
56
  Only the MHP, which actively engaged in this ideologically-based 
polarizing imagery both in parliament and outside of it, experienced electoral gains 
as a minor party in the tense atmosphere of the 1977 general election.
57
 
In an interesting study conducted by Ergüder and Hofferbert, which used 
factor analysis to determine the partisan structure of the Turkish party system in the 
four general elections from 1965 to 1977, the voting returns of the parties were 
measures across three factors: center/periphery, left/right, and anti-system.  The first 
factor was weighted toward development and centralization, the second according 
to industrialization, and the third was weighted according to where the MHP, the 
most clearly anti-system party, accumulated its votes.  The results showed that for 
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both the “center/periphery” factor and the “anti-system” factor the AP and the CHP 
were clustered together and set against the other minor parties.  In fact, the AP 
proved to be the more “central” of the two major parties with the CHP positioned 
closer toward the peripheral end of the center, especially the CHP of 1965.  The 
factor that pits the AP and the CHP against one another in regard to partisanship is 
that of “left/right.”  Furthermore, this opposition is demonstrated most strongly in 
the polarizing elections of the 1970s with the parties‟ electoral outcomes from these 
two elections sitting as opposing bookends on the extreme ends of the factor 
loadings.
58
  These outcomes, based on electoral data, demonstrate the significance 
of the discourse on the polarization; not only did the electorate move to bolster the 
votes of the two major parties, but they did so in ways that could be predicted by 
their ideological positioning.  While it would be overstating the facts to argue that 
image-positioning discourse totally determined voter behavior, for which we also 
need to consider the non-discursive tactics of the parties during the period, the 
connection between the nature and intensity of the observed social polarization and 
this ideologically-based self-imaging and reimaging of one‟s opponents would be 
very hard to ignore. 
Considering the discussions of ideological polarization in other contexts, 
one might wonder why the clear manifestation of intense ideological polarization, 
such that extremists from both sides were shooting it out on the streets in the final 
years before the 1980 coup, did not result in greater fragmentation but instead 
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decreased the fragmentation as the conflict intensified, particularly after 1973 (see 
Table 7.3).
59
  As discussed in chapter two and three, the nature in which the 
electorate and political elites are oriented toward politics and the party system 
seems critical in this regard.  Arguably, in an environment in which “nation 
parties,” which represent the general interests of the whole nation, are valued, 
polarization that exists in the system ultimately tends to be bipolar.  For ideological 
polarization to fragment, it often necessitates narrowing ideologies to the point of 
representing particular interests, especially if we consider the traditional ideological 
left.  Where parties are understood as representing a collection of interests, serious 
constraints are placed on centrifugal movement in an ideological sense; hence, 
political divisions are not segmental under such orientations experiencing 
polarization but instead massive and binary in scope, cutting across the social 
center.  Thus, in Turkey, whenever the electorate, and not simply the political elite, 
has become politically polarized, the party system has ultimately shrunk in size as 
political polarization in society at large intensified. 
Despite some of its earlier promising indications, the leftist TİP ultimately 
suffered from this orientation in society to electoral contest and in its 
misunderstanding of how to woo its desired electoral contingent—the working 
class.  Although the party was established with this particular social group in mind 
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and beginning in 1962 was directed by a number of Marxists,
60
 there is ample 
evidence to show that the party intended to address more inclusive concerns and 
operate, at a minimum, within a nationalist framework.  The slogan on the party 
emblem during the 1960s was “land to the villager (peasant), work for everyone,” 
communicating even in its most essential declaration that it had in mind not only 
the largest segment of the population—the village citizenry—but in fact intended to 
produce work or jobs for everyone.  Furthermore, if one peruses the party‟s election 
declaration pamphlet for 1965, for example, one is necessarily confronted with the 
extensive usage of the word “nation” and “national.”  The declaration (bildiri) 
begins by reminding the reader of the National War of Independence and then 
portraying Turkey as once again the target of imperialistic designs and 
occupation.
61
  The first two concerns in the election document by subtitle are 
“Foreign Policy” underneath which is a special section on the “Cyprus Issue” and 
then “National Defense.”62  All of this precedes the economic policy and ideology 
for which the socialist party was ostensibly created.  This could not be considered 
accidental.  These issues could be seen as providing the emotional associations to 
suggest nationally unifying rhetoric and that they were a party concerned about the 
nation‟s benefit. 
                                                 
60
 Kemal Karpat, “Socialism and the Labor Party of Turkey,” Middle East Journal, Vol. 21, No. 2 
(1967), p. 159; Doğan also describes the TİP as “an amalgamation of Kemalism, Western social 
democracy and Marxian socialism.” Doğan, “Parliamentary Experience of the Turkish Labor Party,” 
p. 315. 
61
 Türkiye İşçi Partisi Seçim Bildirisi, p. 3. 
62
 İbid., pp. 6-7. 
 288 
Although these gestures by the party probably enabled it to avoid being shut 
down by court order until 1971 (its low election returns probably also helped), the 
national focus and inclusiveness did not help TİP at the ballot box.  Part of its 
failure has to do with the party‟s leadership composition, which will be discussed in 
the section below, but one could also argue that at least a share of the party‟s 
problems sprang from an overemphasis on discourse as a strategy and from 
discursive inconsistency.  While there was clear evidence that discursive image-
positioning was having an impact on voting behavior, the other major parties, 
including the CHP were also utilizing practical, non-discursive means to mobilize 
their support.  Furthermore, effective discursive methods for a party involved 
simplifying the message—i.e. “image-positioning”—so that the information could 
be disseminated.  As noted by Karpat in his study, “oral communication and 
personal relations played a major part in spreading information and in facilitating 
the gecekondu dwellers‟ choice of a political party.”63 
TİP, on the other hand, seemed to put a great deal of weight on wooing 
voters by its discursive struggle in parliament.  Mehmet Ali Aybar, the leader of the 
party after 1962 and the product of an aristocratic family and French-based 
education with a law degree from Istanbul,
64
 claimed, “In the capitalist system, 
parliament is the most effective platform for socialist parties.  Parliament reflects 
parties.  What these parties are and whose side they are on clearly comes to light.”65  
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Doğan points out the optimism of TİP after they managed to acquire only 3 percent 
of the national vote, mostly from the three largest cities and from the middle and 
upper classes (not the workers for whom they were ostensibly campaigning), and 
argued that this was because they thought that they only needed a parliamentary 
foothold through which to demonstrate the party‟s virtue to the worker through its 
discursive struggle in the Assembly.
66
  The assumption that the working class, in 
particular—most of whom would be struggling to make ends meet and primarily 
concerned with immediate remedies to material problems, like water and 
electricity—would be closely following TİP‟s performance in parliament seems to 
demonstrate a critical lack of awareness of the conditions with which most of this 
class was confronting.  The working class primarily needed assistance with good 
and services, not ideology or “enlightenment”, and the electoral returns in 1965 and 
the even weaker returns (2.7 percent) in 1969 seem to bear this out. 
Finally, the contradictions noted in this party‟s discourse likely also created 
ambivalence and uncertainty in the minds of potential voters.  Karpat argues that 
the party wavered between an “orthodox Marxist” outlook and simple 
“opportunism.”67  The “amalgamation of Kemalism, Western social democracy and 
Marxian socialism” under the same roof,68 and the significant factional differences 
derived from this mixture certainly provided confusion as to where the party 
actually stood.  Although it continually emphasized its democratic credentials, the 
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tension between these factions would have brought serious questions to many as to 
whether this party could represent the Turkish nation as a whole.  As for the other 
distinctions between itself and the other major parties, these will be addressed in the 
following section. 
Table 7.5 – Particular Election “Shapers” in 1965-1977 General Elections 
 Major Campaign Issues Concurrent Exogenous Factors 
October 
1965 
- Communist Threat 
- Foreign vs. National Oil Control 
- Ind. Development and Workers’ Rights 
- inflation and cost of living 
-  “Left of Center” 
- Land Reform 
 
October 
1969 
- “Social Justice” 
- Foreign Markets 
- Constitutional Amendments & 
Implementation 
- Land Reform 
- Communist Threat 
 
October 
1973 
- Development / foreign and domestic 
markets 
- Social Welfare / cost of living 
- Placing blame for above-party 
governments from 1971-1973 
- Implementing provisions in 
Constitution 
- “Exploitation” versus “Communism” 
- Followed a period of military 
oversight and “above-party” 
governments 
- The “October War” between Israel 
and Arab States in the days leading up 
to the election 
June 
1977 
- Avoiding coalition governments 
- “Exploitation” versus “Communism” 
- Anarchy / peace of mind (huzur)  
- Industrial development 
- Cyprus 
- Disaster and murder of 34 marchers at 
a trade union demonstration in Taksim 
Square on May 1, 1977. 
 
 
7.2.2 Non-discursive Campaign Strategies 
 
TİP is a particularly interesting case for this period, but not because it was 
that powerful in an electoral sense.  The power that may be attributed to it would 
have to be based on the supposed connection between this party and the changes in 
tactic by the CHP, such as the “left of center” positioning.  What makes TİP such a 
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beneficial focus of study for this paradigm is that its failure to be a party that 
represented the working class helps illuminate the mindset of this segment of the 
population and why the non-discursive tactics of the CHP were both important and 
successful with these voters.  While TİP remained an intellectually elitist party with 
tutelary tendencies toward the working class that enabled the party to garner votes 
only among its own class—the intelligentsia—the CHP applied the pragmatic and 
needs-focused approach to politics in the big cities, understanding the mentality of 
this segment of voters and then utilizing existing civil associations—i.e the 
unions—officially or unofficially to mobilize large segments of urban voters. 
Though TİP was initially founded by a small group of union workers in 
February of 1961, it took on its more familiar shape when the party asked the 
lawyer, Mehmet Ali Aybar, to assume the role of party leader.
69
  From that point on 
the leadership of the party increasingly went to those with “political 
consciousness”70—i.e. members of the intelligentsia who understood the 
ideology—rather than leaders among the working class.  Perhaps deriving from the 
Marxian socialist ideology which framed the outlook of many in the party‟s 
leadership, the intelligentsia was seen as largely necessary to guide the party until 
the workers, according to their 1964 Party Program, “acquired class 
consciousness,”71  assuming, of course, that this had not yet occurred.  Thus, though 
many workers were included on the TİP election ticket in 1965, all of the top spots 
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were filled by the intellectual elites, and as a consequence, of the 15 seats allocated 
to the party after the election, only 2 of these were filled by workers.
72
 
Perhaps it is not surprising then that the majority of the votes that went to 
the Turkey Workers Party in the early 1960s came from affluent neighborhoods in 
the largest cities.
73
  Had the party managed to garner a significant amount of votes 
from the peasants and urban workers in 1965 as the party enthusiasts had hoped, 
they would have stolen those votes away from the AP.  As it was, generating 
enthusiasm as they did among university students, journalists and the intelligentsia, 
TİP was snatching away a potentially fruitful segment of the CHP urban voting 
base.
74
  These groups, though not always faithful CHP supporters, had been a 
fruitful base of support for the party starting in 1954 and especially by 1957 when 
the DP was very actively curtailing freedom of expression and association rights 
held dear by these groups.  Ironically, though not ultimately a major electoral threat 
to the CHP, the popularity of the TİP among these groups, influential if numerically 
slight, might have been the trigger that led the CHP to try harder to shore up the 
votes on the left and as İnönü declared, “protect the country from communism.”75  
Success for the TİP among the workers, had it occurred, though an initial attack on 
AP votes, would have significantly hurt the CHP‟s long-term strategy and ultimate 
electoral success as both parties were positioning themselves to attract this critical 
segment of the voting population.  As the election demonstrated, however, it was 
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only the students and intelligentsia, not the workers, peasants and urban poor for 
whom the party was ostensibly created, that flocked to support the party in 1965 
and accumulated a mere 3 percent of the vote.
76
 
After the election of 1961, the future leader of the CHP, Bülent Ecevit was 
appointed the Minister of Labor.  His experience in this position and his 
understanding of the mentality of the Turkish urban worker played a large role in 
the strategy the CHP was to take in the industrial cities.  Ecevit, in an essay written 
on the status of labor in Turkey  around 1969 clearly expresses his belief in the 
political mobilizing power latent among this group.  He writes: 
The power and the direct political influence of the workers are far 
greater than those of the peasants.  The significance of this 
development lies in the fact that at least one group of people outside 
the elite has, for the first time in Turkish history, attained a real 
position of influence and is now able to balance to some extent the 
traditional elites‟ power.77 
 
What Ecevit particularly noticed about the labor force and their unions is that, 
despite lacking traditional elite status, they were able to mobolize and act together 
politically, attaining their aims without the support or patronage of elites or the 
intelligentsia.
78
 
While many might have been able to recognize the mobilization power of 
workers‟ associations like Türk-İş (Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions, Türkiye 
İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu), the largest trade union, Ecevit in his essay spells 
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out the political mindset of this work force.
79
  The objectives and outlook of the 
majority of this segment of the population was only moderately progressive—i.e. 
they were in favor of “evolutionary unionism”—nationalist in orientation and 
strongly supported the existing regime within the reforms of Atatürk and 
democracy.
80
  Not overburdened with ideology or assumptions that this group 
needed to “acquire consciousness,” Ecevit displayed, even down to his blue shirt 
and simple cap, a stance toward labor that was one of admiration and respect, and 
for this reason seemed to gather a great deal of popular support from these voters.
81
  
 
So strong was the connection between Ecevit and the unions that, when 
interparty turmoil between İnönü and Ecevit regarding the party‟s stance toward the 
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Table 7.6 – Changing Fortunes of the CHP in Large Industrial Centers 
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military‟s March 12 Memorandum (1971), there was speculation that the latter 
would leave and form his own party with dissident leaders from Türk-İş.82  Though 
the major confederation (Türk-İş) did not initially openly declare any political 
affiliation, it along with another major trade union (DİSK) began to more clearly 
support the CHP as the 1970s progressed, demonstrating that the party had 
developed significant allies and vote banks in these important civil associations in 
the country‟s large industrial centers (see Table 7.6).83 That trade unions for 
nationalists (MİSK) and religious conservatives (Hak-İş) were also formed and 
mobilized for parties with the respective ideologies further indicates that the power 
of activating these groups electorally was not lost on the other competitors. Such a 
development could be anticipated based on the work of Perkins who suggests that 
parties, in an environment in which support organizations exist, tend to exploit this 
opportunity to mobilize the electorate.
84
 
Furthermore, beyond this class of employed work, there was a large 
percentage of the population living in the shantytowns (gecekondus) of these large 
industrial centers.  Hale writes that estimates from the late 1970s put approximately 
65 percent of the population of Ankara, and 45 percent of those in Adana and 
Istanbul in such dwellings.
85
  In contrast to TİP which primarily tried to appeal to 
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this population through sympathetic ideology, both the AP and the CHP were 
effectively pragmatic in their interactions with these urban communities.  Though 
hampered by the existence of the State Planning Organization, the needs of these 
gecekondu communities were relatively easy to address, and it was naturally those 
critical needs, such as promises of legalization of communities so that they would 
not be destroyed, and not ideology that was prominent on the minds of these voters.  
Throughout the majority of the 1960s, the AP was in the best position to grant these 
promises as they controlled most of the municipalities, but as the balance of power 
shifted, the CHP also benefited from this pragmatic clientelism.
86
  Karpat writes, 
“the political parties exposed the gecekondu to constant propaganda and pressure 
under the assumption that the squatters‟ votes might easily be won with various 
promises of reward.”87  As the study also demonstrates, despite the voting 
background of these newly arrived city dwellers, they showed a clear tendency to 
vote for the party in the position to grant favors—i.e. the incumbent party.  Because 
the voting behavior in these areas was largely pragmatic and needs based, whether 
or not the minor parties wanted to offer such promises, their appeals fell, for the 
most part, on deaf ears.   
While a party‟s ideology and outlook were not the primary impetus in the 
voting behavior in these communities, the CHP‟s gradual success in these 
communities suggest that it was a secondary concern.   Karpat noted in his study 
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that ideology was a growing concern among the youth in these communities and 
that this was accounting for a shift toward the CHP.
88
  It seems that for the youth, 
especially, there was ideological inconsistency in seeking help from the party of big 
business, particularly when another major party, whose general outlook more 
clearly favored the community, was willing to make similar offers.  Thus, in the 
bidding war for the votes of the gecekondus, these voters began to select the 
pragmatic (i.e. clientelistic) party that was realistically large enough to deliver on 
their promises and who shared a more complementary political outlook. Özbudun 
and Tachau show the clear gains of the CHP at the expense of the AP among this 
populous.  In the gecekondu communities studied by these authors, the CHP went 
from 19.1 percent in 1965 and 21.8 percent in 1969 to 47.5 percent in 1973 while 
the AP‟s electoral fortunes went from 62.4 to 53.8 to 26.7, respectively.89 
If professionals, such as doctors, lawyers and bankers were used as 
candidates to evince an aura of competence and quality among one‟s deputies in the 
first paradigmatic period, one notes that the ranks of parliamentary members during 
this period began to be filled with engineers in particular or “technocrats” in 
general.  The rapid industrialization and economic development created an elite 
status for those who were able to enter the field of engineering.  Thus, members 
from this category were brought into the political camps of all the major parties, and 
notable politicians of the period such as Demirel and Erbakan (and later Turgut 
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Özal) could claim engineering educational backgrounds.90  Both the AP and CHP 
could boast the existence of engineers among their parliamentary members and this 
represented the shifting pinnacle of the understanding of competent “educated elite” 
within Turkish society, having moved from bureaucrats in the single-party period to 
professionals, such as bankers, doctors, and lawyers, to engineers and technocrats.
91
  
Each of these, during their heyday were associated with both educational and 
intellectual advancement and governing competence. 
Finally, with the malady of fragmentation accompanied by uncooperative 
political elites, another well-documented strategy of political parties during this 
period was the utilization of ministerial posts and state enterprises to reward faithful 
supporters of the party, a strategy notoriously engaged in by the smallest of parties 
and even independent parliamentarians.  This behavior seems to be the result of the 
juxtaposition of two factors, the SPO‟s limiting of previous governments‟ engaging 
in the pork-barrel distributive machine politics version of economic development, 
and the extremely tight margins of difference between the major parties that gave 
even the smallest parties and independent members in parliament blackmailing 
coalition potential.
92
  Kalaycıoğlu writes: 
Political parties continued to act as excellent popular patronage 
mechanisms, distributing largesse and emoluments from the state 
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budget to their key supporters, as best and efficiently as they could.  
The easiest way to distribute largesse was to employ their supporters 
in their Ministries they occupied or the state enterprises their 
Ministries had control over.
93
 
 
The MHP, who held only three seats in parliament in 1973 and 16 seats in 1977, 
used this tactic particularly successfully.
94
  Thus, while the various ministries 
occupied by different coalitions partners encountered tremendous difficulty in 
communicating effectively with one another, they served as reward mechanisms for 
key party (or personal) supporters.  If anything, this behavior most notably engaged 
in by the minor parties, while superficially according respectability to the minor 
parties like the MHP and the National Salvation Party by giving them the status of 
governing coalition partners,
95
 had a negative effect on the perception of the major 
coalition partner, who was to be governing the country but whose ministries where 
anything but the efficient means of effective governance that they should have been.  
Because all the parties were engaged in this behavior, however, its only effect on 
the electorate might have been a push toward anti-system behavior and 
disillusionment; in any case, the inability of the governments in the 1970s to govern 
did little to stop the revolutionary and reactionary violence occurring 
simultaneously on Turkish streets. 
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7.3 Domains of Identification 
 
The “left/right” positioning that became central to campaign discourse in 
this period initiated a new “domain of identification” that would continue to help 
bind voters to the party system and party blocs within the system in future 
paradigms.  Though, as argued in chapter 5, the essential substance and primary 
dividing line between left and right has shifted, its usage consistently seems to limit 
the amount of transfer of votes from one side to the other regardless of how the 
distinction is understood in any particular period of time.  Continuities in substance 
between “left” and “right” can certainly be seen—such as the tendency for religious 
conservative citizens to be on the right and for secular positivists to be on the left; 
however, even here it is important to acknowledge that the priority given to these 
considerations and the power they have had to determine the contingent political 
environment and its discursive debates have fluctuated drastically.  Minimizing 
Turkish politics to an essential and perennial secular versus religious cleavage 
would be as foolhardy as making such a suggestion in most other democracies in 
Western Europe or North America where similar trends on the right and left can be 
posited.  One must be careful not to translate electoral tendencies and domains of 
identification into the explanation of the impetus behind voting behavior, 
suggesting that a cultural cleavage is explanative of the political divide and 
motivation behind decisions at the ballot box.  What has essentially divided the 
populace between left and right has shifted in important ways, causing certain 
domains of identification such as “worker” to migrate, and the careful observation 
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of such changing motivations provides the only effective explanation of the 
observed phenomena in the Turkish party system. 
At the same time, however, as noted by others, though “left” and “right” 
was used as the mantra for much of the violence of the period, underneath this 
supposed ideological emphasis also hid preexisting social cleavages (domains) that 
more or less overlaid the national division.
96
  Thus, street battles in the name of 
“left” and “right” ideologies were often, at least in part, battles between Kurds and 
Turks, or Alevis and Sunnis.  Alevis, especially, were associated with the left, and 
attacks on this group by Sunni Turks caused a blurring of the distinction between 
ideological identities and religious-cultural identities.  In the violent clashes in 
places like Kahramanmaraş where 109 people, mostly Alevis, were killed, the 
ultimate impetus behind the violence (whether left-right or Alevi-Sunni) seems hard 
to flesh out and might have even been unclear to those engaging in the violience.
97
  
Where these cultural factions existed among communities, party affiliations were 
often correlated to these preexisting domains of identification, as is true in the 
previous period. 
 
7.4 Conclusion 
 
The shift from the initial paradigm to one that emphasized ideological 
image-positioning seems to effectively demonstrate the complex and composite 
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nature of the “hand” involved in instigating the change.  Important socioeconomic 
and institutional changes obviously played a role in the entrance of ideology, but 
the how and who seems to have been strongly influenced by the decisions, for good 
or ill, of particular actors, amongst whom decisions guided other decisions and 
reactions, etc.  The Turkish Workers Party could have made any number of 
decisions that would have affected how the other parties responded, and the CHP, 
could have taken any number of courses in response to it, or another faction, such as 
that led by Turhan Feyzioğlu, who broke off to form the Republican Reliance Party, 
or Kemal Satır, could have taken the helm and steered the party back toward the 
center.   
The need for the CHP to have explicitly identified with the left is certainly 
questionable.  TİP never showed an ability to understand well the population they 
were trying to court, the workers.  The majority of the workers seemed to be 
directed to the center of the political spectrum, their heads not filled with 
revolutionary change guided by big ideology, but with “evolutionary progress” and 
a party that would acknowledge their basic concerns.  This was also true for the 
masses of voters living on the margins of the cities in gecekondu communities; they 
had practical needs and would have been willing to consider any centrist party 
which paid attention to their particular needs and had realistic aspirations of 
acquiring governing power.  The loss of the intelligentsia to TİP, from an electoral 
perspective, was a minor one. 
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In 1971, once again, the entrance of the military into politics, resulted in 
critical consequences, in unexpected ways.  The actions of the military in 1961 and 
the execution of former Prime Minister Menderes weeks before the election proved 
problematic for the CHP who was widely understood as benefiting from the 
intervention.  When the military intervened again in 1971, İnönü chose to comply 
with the military‟s demands in order to prevent a complete military takeover and 
speed the process back to democratic politics.
98
  Bülent Ecevit, on the other hand, 
chose to take an oppositional stance toward the military‟s demands and resigned 
from his position as the General Secretary of the party in protest.  As it turned out, 
Ecevit was ultimately brought to the helm of the party in 1972 prior to the country‟s 
return to electoral contest in 1973.  With Ecevit as leader, the party could not easily 
be seen as bedfellows with the military for which he had protested so vehemently 
against and this coincided with electoral gain. 
Süleyman Demirel, meanwhile, as the Prime Minister and leader of the 
government, being faced with the military‟s ultimatum on March 12, 1971, was 
placed in an extremely difficult position.  The previous intervention by the military 
had resulted in the execution of the Prime Minister.  Demirel, rather than fight the 
imposition by the military, chose to walk away.  As Kalaycıoğlu argues, “the 
attitude of the AP to the ultimatum of March 12, 1971 seemed to have undermined 
the party.”99  Even in more recent days and from a politician on the right, Abdullah 
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Gül, selected as President of the Republic in 2007, discussing with the journalist 
Hasan Cemal the night of the e-memorandum
100
 posted on the military‟s official 
website, used Demirel‟s actions as representative of weakness that he would not 
show in the face of opposition, saying, “Unlike Demirel, we did not put our hat on 
our head and walk away.”101 Thus, the military intervened again, but the tables had 
turned.  In 1973, the CHP, despite internal weakness due to remaining factional 
struggles, managed to gain nearly 6 percent from their previous vote total (from 
27.4 to 33.3 percent) while the AP dropped from 46.6 percent to 29.8, giving the 
CHP just enough of an electoral edge to further intensify the lines of contest and 
polarize the populace.  Once again, the political consequences of the military‟s 
intervention, just as in 1960, created unexpected results in the subsequent election.   
On September 12, 1980, the military would again intervene; however, unlike 
in previous interventions in which the military‟s impact on electoral dynamics 
occurred within the existing paradigm, the context of emerging out of this junta‟s 
rule to democratic politics would impact the system in much more dramatic ways, 
in this case even playing the lion‟s share in constructing the paradigm in which 
politics would be contested. 
 
                                                 
100
 April 2007.  It was posted allegedly to address the selection of Abdullah Gül as the AKP‟s 
candidate for president and the concern that a man whose wife wears a headscarf would be sitting in 
the seat first bestowed on Atatürk. 
101
 Hasan Cemal, Türkiye’nin Asker Sorunu (İstanbul: Doğan Kıtap, 2010), p. 36; Ecevit also made 
such a comment, “When my party is attacked, I do not pick up my hat and run as Demirel did, 
leaving my party colleagues behind.” Quoted in Ahmad, Turkish Experiment, p. 353. 
 305 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 8 
 
 
THE NATIONAL CENTER PARADIGM – 1983-1991 
 
 
 
Those who govern the country in the name of the people 
 are allowed no discrimination, have no right to divide the nation 
 and create enmity among the citizens. 
In this context, the democratic regime, as can be understood from the connotation, 
is not a separatist, but a unifying factor.   
It is for this reason that the Turkish nation, 
based upon the principles of Atatürk, will survive by its unswerving adherence to 
the motto “a single state, a single nation” in the future,  
just as it has remained in the past. 
No power will be able to divide it.
1
 
—Kenan Evren (1981). 
 
People from all four old political tendencies have united within our party.
2
 
—Turgut Özal (1983). 
 
 
On September 12, 1980, for the third time in twenty years, the tanks rolled 
through Ankara once again.  The parliament, filled with so-called “bandits”, 
“communists”, “anarchists”, and “fascists”—at least as these deputies in the 
assembly were known and described by one other in their political rhetoric—was 
disbanded, its leaders taken into confinement, and, after a period of uncertainty, in 
1981 the political parties were all closed and the deputies banned from politics from 
                                                 
1
 Quote taken from, Frank Tachau and Metin Heper, “The State, Politics, and the Military in 
Turkey,” Comparative Politics, Vol. 16, No. 1 (1983), p. 27. 
2
 “Özal: İşçinin dostu, kaşıkla verip kepçeyle alan değildir,” Cumhuriyet, 19 October 1983. 
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5 to 10 years.  The junta, running the affairs of the country through the National 
Security Council and a nonpartisan technocratic cabinet run by Prime Minister (and 
former General) Bülend Ulusu, went about the business of rebuilding a party 
system.  What concerned the Chief of Staff, and later president, was not just the 
existing parties and leaders, but what was seen as the whole degeneration in the 
approach toward politics and the disorder and fratricide that seemed to spring from 
it.  Thus, in contrast to previous interventions, the military did not intend to only 
create new parties and a party system, but to construct a new paradigm that would 
put an end to the divisive political behavior that was tearing the country apart, at 
least from the military‟s vantage point.   
The military, drafting under their tutelage what would be the third 
constitution in the short history of the Republic, far beyond crafting the formal rules 
and regulations by which politics would be played, endeavored to reshape and 
reinitiate a political state of affairs that was centered on the general will and 
stripped of all the previous ideological excess.  It is not surprising, then, that the 
political party that rose to prominence during this period was a party that, whether 
one agrees or not with their self-identification, appealed to the voters as the party 
for everyone, a party that encapsulated the four dominant political tendencies—the 
economically-liberal conservatives, the “democratic left”,3 the Islamists, and the 
nationalists.  The electorate, weary of the fratricide of the previous period and the 
                                                 
3
 I am intentionally choosing not to use “center-right” and “center-left” here as these expressions 
were not widely used in campaign parlance until later; and its emergence as an expression was 
contingent on and an important manifestation of the political orientations and norms developing 
within this paradigm as it extended to the following one. 
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military‟s strong response to those engaged or associated with ideological activity 
of the previous period, rushed to be identified with moderation (or centrism).  
Furthermore, with some minor exceptions, when one classifies the parties of the 
period into families occupying what has come to be known as the center-right and 
center-left, one finds a terrific amount of similarity in voting patterns toward these 
families throughout the period, with the proportions distributed to each family 
remaining within a relatively narrow range from province to province, so that 
regional variety, though evident in minor patterns, seemed to be temporarily 
absorbed in a more national electoral pattern.  Table 8.1 points out the distinct 
pattern between elections in this paradigm (1983 and 1987) and the elections 
immediately following it.  While there is almost no regional difference in vote 
distribution in 1983 and 1987, starting from 1995, clear variation is evident from 
region to region, especially in the distribution of the votes for “center left” and “far 
right” parties. 
This paradigmatic period, however, remained brief and gave way to another 
paradigm with very different patterns.  The new orientation to politics, constructed 
abruptly and somewhat artificially by the military, ultimately fragmented itself 
away.  The 1991 election, producing an electoral outcome uniquely dissimilar to the 
elections preceding and following it, sparked particular consequences which would 
only become evident in the subsequent general elections of 1995 (and local 
elections of 1994), bringing the short life of this moderation-focused paradigm to its 
ultimate end. 
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Table 8.2 – Electoral Trends of the Period4 
 1983 1987 1991 1995 
Top-Two Parties’ vote % 75.6% 61.1% 51.0% 41% 
Effective # of Parties (Mod. 
Golosov) – National 
 
2.65 3.46 4.15 5.48 
Effective # of Parties (Mod. 
Golosov) – Provincial Ave. 
 
2.60 3.40 3.56 4.39 
Volatility – National 
Aggregate 
 
100.0 38.5 17.4 22.7 
Volatility – National “Inter-
bloc”  
 
12.1 2.9 1.5 1.7 
Voter Turnout 92.3% 93.3% 83.9% 85.2% 
                                                 
4
 Electoral data taken from. Milletvekili Genel Seçimleri 1923-2007 (Ankara: Türkiye İstatistik 
Kurumu, 2008), pp. 96-7. Effective number of parties calculated using a modified version of 
Golosov‟s formula: NP= ∑ 2/1+((S1+S2)²/(Si+Sj))-(Si+Sj). 
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8.1 The Context of the Period 
Prior to the coup on September 12, 1980, the polarization between “left” and 
“right” in the previous paradigm had trickled down from the political elites and into 
much of the fabric of society.  As is widely documented, not only did civil 
organizations, university campuses, unions and other social elements become 
bipolar, the division extended itself into bureaucracy and even the police force—
effectively exacerbating the growing disorder and tension.
5
  The tightness of the 
margin between the largest two parties and the intransigence of the party leaders, 
refusing to cooperate or look beyond their own party‟s interests, brought effective 
governance to a halt.  Without a functioning state apparatus, which beyond the 
incapacity of the parties in parliament to legislate, was hampered by the 
“occupation” of the ministries by coalition partners, using these bureaucratic 
structures for entitlement mechanisms for the party faithful, polarization and 
partisanship descended from political orientation to social cleavages and disorder 
and violence in the streets.  While there are discrepancies in the exact number of 
“political” murders occurring in the last years prior to the military‟s intervention, it 
is widely reported that such deaths amounted to nearly eight per day on average in 
the final year
6
 and over twenty deaths per day in the final months.
7
  Certainly, the 
                                                 
5
 See also, Tachau and Heper, “The State, Politics, and the Military,” p. 24. 
6
 For such an account, see William Hale, Turkish Politics and the Military (New York, NY: 
Routledge, 1994), p. 224.  Tanel Demirel points out a number of various reported figures in his 
careful narrative of the military‟s analysis of society in the lead up to the coup.  Tanel Demirel, “The 
Turkish Military‟s Decision to Intervene: 12 September 1980,” Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 29, 
No. 2 (2003), p. 276 (see note 15). 
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social conditions provided ample encouragement to move away from such intense 
ideological engagement and get back to day to day governance and the restoration 
of order.  There is much to indicate that society as a whole was seeking a way out of 
the political impasse, including the by-elections of 1979, which was a clear vote of 
no confidence to the Ecevit-led government, and also the initial relief and 
enthusiasm for the military when they finally decided to intervene on September 12. 
Besides social aversion to the chaotic and security-deprived state of the 
country prior to the intervention, the military itself actively engaged in de-
politicizing (de-ideologizing) the society and establishing a new foundation and 
party system for the operation of democracy.  Though martial law was in effect 
prior to the coup, under junta control, swift and decisive action against ideological 
extremism, association with or suspicion of association with such elements could 
occur without constitutional constraints.  Demirel writes: 
[The junta] dealt with suspects without being restrained by any legal 
procedures as they would have been under a democratic regime, 
even with martial law, and the public at large trusted and therefore 
helped them as they were able to restore the confidence that they 
would finally be able to grapple with the problem of terrorism.
8
 
 
The military‟s actions against those with leanings on the ideological left and right 
was severe, and of course, in the international press much was made about the high 
                                                                                                                                        
7
 Tachau and Heper, “State, Politics, and the Military,” p. 25; see also, Sabri Sayarı, “Political 
Violence and Terrorism in Turkey, 1976-80: A Retrospective Analysis,” Terrorism and Political 
Violence, Vol. 22, No. 2 (2010), p. 202. 
8
 Demirel, “Turkish Military‟s Decision to Intervene,” p. 266. 
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incidence of human rights violations and torture during this period.
9
  Needless to 
say, the military used its free hand to forcefully direct the society at large away 
from ideological politics. 
In addition to rounding up the perpetrators of ideological politics, the 
military took an active role in trying to “reset” the social mindset and orientation 
toward politics.  Heper has noted this objective of the September 12 junta and 
writes that, from the military‟s perspective, “it was necessary to create a wholly 
new and different party system so as to heal the deep cleavages which had resulted 
from the mistaken notion of democracy.”10  Evidence of this stems from the junta 
leader, Kenan Evren‟s, disavowal of the expression “restoration of democracy,” for 
which he replaced it with “re-establishment of democracy”11—in other words, it 
would not be a return to democracy as previously practiced, but a reshaping of the 
foundations upon which democracy could more effectively function.  From the 
military‟s perspective, this would be accomplished by returning to an emphasis on 
the old value of the “national general interest,” which would establish the proper 
environment of unity and common good in which political competition could more 
securely operate.
12
  Evren has been quoted as saying: 
                                                 
9
 Hale reports that within a year of the intervention, 167 mass trials were underway, investigating the 
actions of known extreme rightist and leftist groups, along with a few organizations with little 
evidence of violent behavior, such as the labor union, DISK, and the Turkish Peace Association.  For 
more on the military‟s crackdown on ideology, see Hale, Turkish Politics and the Military, pp. 252-
4. 
10
 Metin Heper, The State Tradition in Turkey (North Humberside, UK: Eothen Press, 1985), p. 133. 
11
 Ibid., p. 132. 
12
 Kemal Karpat, “Military Interventions: Army-Civilian Relations in Turkey Before and After 
1980,” in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, eds., State Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 
1980s (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), p. 152. 
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Those who govern the country in the name of the people are allowed 
no discrimination, have no right to divide the nation and create 
enmity among the citizens.  In this context, the democratic regime, 
as can be understood from the connotation, is not a separatist, but a 
unifying factor.
13
 
 
Thus, political competition between parties, in such a context, rather than dividing 
the country along partisan lines, would unify the country in a rational search for the 
good of the nation.   
In order to accomplish such a task, society needed to be directed toward a 
national center, for which unifying—i.e. centering—symbols were employed that 
could be accepted by all segments of society.  The objects that the military chose 
for such a purpose were Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and a moderate infusion of 
unifying Islamic morality sometimes referred to under the expression “Turkish-
Islamic Synthesis.”  The former, to a far greater extent than the Kemalist ideology 
that had appeared in previous decades—though the ideology, of course, bore his 
name—or any of the particular principles embedded therein, was an extremely 
powerful and flexible symbol to attract the vast majority of the population despite 
the divergence of social or political outlook.  Atatürk, in this vein, represented a 
pragmatic and non-ideological approach to politics that ultimately has the 
development of the nation as its focus.
14
  The latter—a foundation of generic 
Islamic social morality—seems to be a recognition of the fact that, though Atatürk 
                                                 
13
 Tachau and Heper, “State, Politics, and the Military,” p. 27. 
14
 For more on the role of the junta‟s “Atatürkist” thought (as opposed to what was commonly 
referred to Kemalism) in centering the society on the nation, see Heper, The State Tradition, p. 143; 
also, Ahmet Evin, “Changing Patterns of Cleavages Before and After 1980,” in Metin Heper and 
Ahmet Evin, eds., State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s (Berlin: Walter de 
Gruyter, 1988), pp. 212-3. 
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had provided the Republic with a pragmatic framework of principles in which to 
progress, those principles offered little guidance to the daily affairs of the individual 
or harmony within society.  Thus, within a primary container of Turkish 
nationalism,
15
 a rationalized civic morality and fraternity was derived based on 
Islamic principles, stemming from the existing faith of nearly the entire 
population.
16
 
The military, of course, besides utilizing the discursive methods above to re-
center the polity‟s mindset, created a number of institutional changes to address the 
concerns of the previous era of politics and establish a new political environment in 
which democracy would then operate.  Within the new constitution, Article 14 
prohibited the right of “violating the indivisible integrity of the State with its 
territory and nation . . . or establishing the hegemony of one social class over others, 
or creating discrimination on the basis of language, race, religion, or sect, or of 
establishing by any other means a system of government based on these concepts 
and ideas.”17 Thus, the military was attempting to rule out leftist and rightist 
ideological parties in particular,
18
 and the secular nature of the state along with the 
                                                 
15
 By which I do not imply an ethnic nationalism, but one that is primarily territorially and 
secondarily culturally focused. 
16
 For more on this, see Sam Kaplan, The Pedagogical State (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2006), pp. 73-124; and Yıldız Atasoy, Islam’s Marriage with Neoliberalism: State Transformation 
in Turkey (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), pp. 91-4. 
17
 As of the completion of this work (May 2011), the 1982 Constitution, though undergoing a 
number of significant amendments, still operates as the foundational legal framework of the country; 
this particular article, however, was subsequently amended in 2001, removing the statement 
regarding social class and with additional provisions that protect the individual from the State. 
18
 See also, George Harris, “The Role of the Military in Turkey in the 1980s,” in Metin Heper and 
Ahmet Evin, eds., State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s (Berlin: Walter de 
Gruyter, 1988), p. 193. 
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appropriate form of nationalism among other items, were enumerated in Article 2 of 
the Constitution, an article that was also deemed to be “inalterable” in Article 4. 
The military also passed legislation that forbid members of associations 
(such as trade unions) to be involved in politics; their role was understood to 
occupy a separate civic non-political sphere.  Thus, the kind of non-discursive 
mobilization used effectively by leaders such as Ecevit in the previous period was 
effectively shut off to politics in this new political system constructed by the 
military.  Furthermore, the military established a Supervisory Board connected to 
the Office of the President in order to monitor the bureaucracy and curb its 
politicization.
19
  This, of course, had come as an attempt to address the patron-client 
tactics of political parties in the previous period, who stuffed their occupied 
ministries with as many faithful supporters as possible.  Hence, the military reset a 
number of rules that would intentionally challenge the electoral strategies that had 
been employed in the previous decade. 
In addition to these provisions, the military, aware of the blackmail potential 
of small parties that proved to be disastrous in the previous era of political 
competition and that these small parties, such as the National Salvation Party, the 
Nationalist Action Party (MHP), the Unity Party and the Turkish Workers Party, 
tended to represent sectarian elements or extreme ideologies, established a 10 
percent national threshold that must be obtained for a party to enter the National 
Assembly.  Furthermore, the new rules for political parties and elections did not 
                                                 
19
 Harris, “The Role of the Military,” p. 198; and Heper, The State Tradition, p. 139. 
 315 
allow these parties that gained less than 10 percent of the national vote air time for 
campaign propaganda on the national television stations.
20
 Therefore, while 
maintaining the broad outlines of a proportional representation of the previous 
period, these changes would conceivably both leave out the “undesirable” parties 
and enable strong governments and moderate and effectively-functioning coalitions.   
The military, beyond attempting to establish a new ideologically-light and 
centrally-focused mentality and a new legal foundation for the fostering of a less 
divisive and more orderly form of democratic politics, decided to initiate the party 
system by artificially constructing two moderate parties, one with a slight leaning to 
the left, the Populist Party (HP), and the other slightly to the right, Nationalist 
Democracy Party (MDP), that would compete for the right to govern in a very civil 
and orderly manner.  The former, was established by a seasoned bureaucrat who 
founded the party only after receiving permission from Evren and Ulusu.
21
  The 
MDP, on the other hand, when the junta could not convince Ulusu to lead the party, 
was led by a former General, Turgut Sunalp.
22
  The Political Parties Law that was 
passed in April 1983 did not forbid the founding of other parties, but the stringent 
process of founding a party and the strong veto powers of the junta, effectively 
curtailed the natural development of parties and effective rise of new leaders in the 
                                                 
20
 Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, “Cyclical Development, Redesign and Nascent Institutionalization of a 
Legislative System,” in Ali Çarkoğlu and William Hale, eds., Politics of Modern Turkey, Volume 2 
(London: Routledge, 2008), p. 66. 
21
 Hale, Turkish Politics and the Military, p. 263. 
22
 Ibid., p. 263. 
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1983 elections.
23
  While the military was involved in constructing parties just to the 
left and right of center, two other parties formed by more seasoned political 
elements vied for those same positions.  Faced with the threat that these more 
professionally organized parties posed the two parties propped up by the military, 
the junta used the loophole of vetoing enough members within the list of founders 
so that they would not have the legally mandated number of members to officially 
establish a party until the deadline for party registration had passed.
24
  Thus, two 
parties with more “political” credentials—one of these led by Erdal İnönü, the son 
of İsmet İnönü, were left on the sidelines of the electoral contest. 
The only party that escaped the veto strategy of the junta, which itself 
suggests that the military willfully allowed this party to compete, was the 
Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi, ANAP), led by Turgut Özal who had acquired 
fame as the man directing the economic recovery under the military regime.  
Though Özal was a key technocrat running the affairs of the country while the 
military was trying to “reestablish democracy,” the formation and organization of 
the party was more clearly external to military guidance and support.  This would 
prove to be a critical to the fortunes of the party as it entered the elections.  Thus, 
the military, whether or not in ways that were intended, had a large impact on the 
course of electoral politics and its paradigm as it emerged from under their hovering 
wings in November of 1983. 
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 Ibid., p. 262. 
24
 William Hale, “Transition to Civilian Governments in Turkey: The Military Perspective,” in Metin 
Heper and Ahmet Evin, eds., State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s (Berlin: 
Walter de Gruyter, 1988), p. 172. 
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The military junta‟s foci and strategies following the coup also demonstrate 
certain sociopolitical changes that would become increasingly critical forces as 
politics progressed through this short paradigm and into the next.  In the early 
period of multiparty politics, the regions highly populated with Kurdish speaking 
citizens were largely guided through pre-existing sociopolitical “proxies”—local 
notables that were often large landowners (ağa), tribal leaders and/or religious 
community leaders known as sheikhs (şeyh)—who for various reasons including, of 
course, personal benefit had come to accept the authority of the state and the 
relational status quo between the central governing bodies and the region.  
However, the expansion of education throughout the country in the 1950s and 
1960s led to the growth of what could be called a Kurdish intelligentsia.
25
  This 
group was profoundly influenced by the concurrent development of leftist 
ideology
26
 and, particularly in the 1960s but also to a lesser extent in the 1970s, 
engaged in revolutionary ambitions with their Turkish brothers to liberate Turkey 
from an unjust regime and establish distributive justice that would provide dignity 
to all the country‟s inhabitants.  These leftist Kurdish intellectuals did not only 
challenge the legitimacy of the state, they also strongly opposed the traditional 
authority of the Kurdish ağas and şeyhs for supporting the state‟s “exploitation” of 
the land for their own personal benefit. 
                                                 
25
 Hakan Yavuz, “Five Stages of the Construction of Kurdish Nationalism in Turkey,” Nationalism 
and Ethnic Politics, Vol. 7, No. 3 (2001), p. 9. 
26
 Metin Heper, The State and Kurds in Turkey (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), pp. 155-6; 
see also Joost Jongerden and Ahmet Hamdi Akkaya, “Born from the Left: The Making of the PKK,” 
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Ethnic-based protest and what could be indisputably understood as Kurdish 
nationalism, hence, seems to have largely developed within and in conjuncture with 
leftist ideology and among the elite.
27
 As time passed, some of these Kurdish 
intellectuals ideologically nurtured in the existing leftist organizations began to 
form their own particularly Kurdish-focused Marxist organizations, one of the most 
famous of these being the Revolutionary Eastern Cultural Hearths (Devrimci Doğu 
Kültür Ocakları, DDKO), which was established in 1969.28  Abdullah Öcalan began 
as a member of this group and later became the founder of the Marxist-inspired 
Kurdistan Workers Party (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan, PKK) in 1978.
29
   The 
fractionalization of the left, and the Kurdish left in particular, often set the various 
groups in violent opposition to one another along with the traditional “feudal” 
elements of Kurdish society, who were seen as being in cahoots with the Turkish 
“occupiers.”  Thus, prior to the coup, along with the violent clashes between the 
extreme right and extreme left, the predominantly Kurdish areas of the southeast 
were in a state of relative chaos and insecurity.   
                                                 
27
 Mesut Yeğen writes that “Kurdish unrest of the sixties and seventies assumed the form of giving 
popular support to left-wing parties or political groups,” which suggest that pre-existing 
“Kurdish”—i.e. in the name of Kurdish ethnicity proper—protest was channeled toward the leftish 
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however, was not the case, and the popular movement of Kurdish nationalism, proper, took time to 
trickle down to the masses, a movement that seems to have been drastically sped up by the aftermath 
of the 1980 military intervention.  See, Mesut Yeğen, “Turkish Nationalism and the Kurdish 
Question,” Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 30, No. 1 (2007), pp. 132-3. 
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 See also, Heper, The State and Kurds, p. 156. 
29
 Yavuz, “Five Stages,” p. 12. 
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The military, therefore, after taking the governing reins of the state in 1980, 
saw the “sectarian” and “regional” manifestations of the superimposed “left-right” 
ideological conflict as particularly problematic.  Immediately following the coup, 
the military banned the usage of Kurdish language, forced Kurdish families to give 
Turkish names to their children, and changed the names of Kurdish towns and 
villages.
30
  Large numbers of Kurds, particularly those associated with political 
organizations, were taken into custody.
31
  Needless to say, the military also 
effectively “destroyed the organizational power of Kurdish networks within 
Turkey.”32  By pushing society toward the “center” around unifying symbols like 
Atatürk and Muslim identity,33 the latter being seen as a particularly important 
shared identity between Turks and Kurds,
34
 the junta clearly signaled that all forms 
of cultural, ethnic, or regional politics would be left on the outside of 
institutionalized politics.
35
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Unfortunately, this forceful removal of ethnic or sectarian views from the 
formal political sphere, while artificially facilitating the moderate and national 
tendencies in institutionalized political competition observed during this 
paradigmatic period, did not have such a pacifying effect on this issue at the social 
level, outside the sanctioned walls of debate in the Grand National Assembly.  
Starting in 1984, the PKK under Abdullah Öcalan began to launch violent attacks 
against the military or any other perceived organs of the state, whether these were 
Turks or Kurds.  Ergil writes that these violent repercussions were not inevitable 
but “stemmed . . . from the harsh treatment that they suffered at the hands of the 
Turkish security forces.”36  This harsh treatment toward Kurdish leftists and 
activists and the removal of the possibility of addressing the Kurdish question 
within the reestablished institutions limited the options available to redress 
grievances within this community.  According to Yavuz:  
The 1980 coup and its oppressiveness helped to create a siege 
mentality among the Kurds . . . They had two options: move to 
Europe as political refugees and search for a new life, or join the 
PKK to fight against the Turkish state.  The PKK became more 
popular as the oppression of the military coup increased.
37
 
 
If we understand Yavuz‟s interpretation as the sentiment and available choices for 
all Kurds, it seems to be strongly overstating the case.  This description of options 
seems particularly true for the Kurdish political activists of the pre-coup period, but 
this was clearly not the essential dilemma for all Kurds.  Though the impact of 
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military junta rule created sympathy for violent resistance under the banner of “self-
defense,” there were many other Kurds who more or less acquiesced to the status 
quo or who were wary of the “godless” leftist Kurdish nationalists.  In any case, the 
military‟s actions to sterilize the political sphere in such a way so as to remove 
Kurdish, or any other particularistic grievance from the debate, created the 
temporary centrist and national tendencies in political contestation, but became a 
fomenting pressure in that the formal denial of space to such issues ultimately led to 
their explosive and violent manifestation within society beginning in 1984.  The 
violent anti-system protest during this period occurring external to the existing legal 
channels of political behavior could be seen as one of the prime forces that curtailed 
the lifespan of this paradigm. 
Finally, growing widespread access to television and its further development 
would come to have a major impact on the means of contestation in the electoral 
arena.  The impact of television on society was beginning in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s.  Kalaycıoğlu provides us with a vivid account of this social 
transformation: 
The entire gamut of social interactions between families changed for 
a while in the early 1970s.  Those who owned the new status 
symbols suddenly discovered that they, or rather their TV sets, 
constituted a great attraction.  Relatives, friends, and neighbors, who 
they had not had very close interactions, suddenly rushed to take 
their seats in front of the TV sets, in their now „beloved‟ relatives‟, 
friends‟, or neighbors‟ homes. . . If urbanization was the main force 
driving social mobilization in the 1950s, the transistor radio in the 
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1960s, and the black and white TV sets in the 1970s were the added 
influences, which fueled the process of social mobilization.
38
 
 
The fascination with this new media technology led to its rapid dissemination 
throughout society; such that, household ownership of televisions doubled from 
1980 to 1987,
39
 and by 1991, 60 percent of Turkish households owned a color 
television.
40
  As the transforming nature of these developments in media technology 
on party systems have been widely observed elsewhere,
41
 it seems logical to predict 
that its growing widespread use would have implications for the dimensions of 
competition within this paradigm. 
 
8.2 Dimensions of Competition: 8.2.1 National Campaign Discourse 
 
As could be predicted from the previous discussion, the arena of contest 
initiated after the three year period of junta rule began rather tamely and, 
particularly for the MDP and its leader Sunalp, with inexperienced campaign 
speechmaking.  By the next general election of 1987, the bitter attacks and snipes 
from party leader to party leader returned along with a number of patterns 
reminiscent of earlier periods, but there were a few notable distinctions in this 
discourse of this period spanning the three general elections from 1983 to 1991:  
First, there was a particularly clear evasion of designation of parties in terms of 
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“left” or “right” terminology and, when such terminology was directed toward 
parties, they tended to distance themselves from explicit position imaging in that 
regard, although not from other forms of imaging that were less definitively 
comparative, such as “nationalist” or “social democrat”; and second, stripped of any 
sort of strong emphasis on ideology, the discourse was largely given to particular 
concerns regarding the economy and legislation regarding the liberalization of 
democratic practice.  This second pattern could not be argued to be particularly new 
in its broad outline, but it came with a greater emphasis on the concept that political 
parties‟ primary function was service (hizmet) to its nation‟s citizenry.  Although it 
has been a noted discursive practice of ANAP in the scholarly literature, one finds 
the conception employed by most of the major parties of the period.  
The practice of persistently evading a “left/right” positioning distinction 
seems to be a regular feature of this period.  For example, in an interview with 
Turgut Sunalp, former General and leader of the MDP, Sunalp chose cryptic 
language to avoid any sort of clear categorization, declaring, “I am a lover of 
humanity (insancıl bir adamım), but I do not call myself a humanist. I am driven by 
a profound belief in social justice, but I do not call myself a socialist.”42   
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 “Sunalp: Biz faniyiz, parti ölümsüz,” Cumhuriyet, 7 September 1983. 
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In a televised debate that turned out to be critical in the outcome of the 1983 
elections, the interviewer asked the ANAP leader, Turgut Özal, where his party‟s 
political basis was located—i.e. was ANAP on the left or right.  Özal replied, “Such 
a declaration is a Western conception.  The political bases of the parties will 
become obvious after the elections on November 6.  From this perspective, I want 
to be able to say that we are gathering votes from the four previous political 
tendencies.”43  Later, Sunalp would announce, “I am not a rightist, nor a leftist; I am 
predominantly an Atatürkist.”44 Necdet Calp, the leader of the HP also tended to 
emphasize, if any emphasis in this regard was made, that his party was a “social 
democrat” party, rather than provide any explicit positioning on the “left,” though 
their positioning seems to have been largely understood.
45
   
The two parties commonly interpreted as being parties in some degree of the 
“right”—i.e. the MDP and ANAP—were particularly concerned with not being 
labeled as such, but they engaged in two distinct strategies in order to avoid such 
nomenclature.  Sunalp, as can be seen from the example above, regularly relied on a 
discursive emphasis on Atatürk in order to place himself in the center without using 
the expression “centrist” or “center party.”  At one point, he told reporters that, if he 
had been legally able to, he would have named his party the “Atatürkist Nationalist 
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Party.”46  Throughout the campaign, he regularly referred to nation‟s founder as the 
source of his various political inspirations.  Özal, on the other hand, which can also 
be seen in the reference above, conceptually placed ANAP in the center by arguing 
that it appealed to all of the political perspectives of the previous period of 
politics—Islamist, nationalist, social democrat and economically-liberal 
conservatives.
47
  At one point, he attributed his party‟s all-inclusive approach to 
politics to the realization that “there is no question of an emptiness on the right”48—
i.e. the MDP was filling the political position of the “right.”  Throughout the 1983 
general election campaign, Özal frequently used that expression for his party‟s 
political base in order to place himself in the center without using the expression 
“centrist.”49  
The attempt to keep one‟s party clear of an explicit “left/right” positioning 
continued in subsequent elections.  For example, in the 1987 general election, upon 
returning to politics, Bülent Ecevit immediately began to question the “positioning” 
of the Social Democrat Populist Party (SHP),
50
 accusing them of not being social 
democrats, and of being “captured by the left.”  A member of the SHP, Aytekin 
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Kotil, replied by saying, “The SHP‟s position is obvious.  No one has the strength 
to move the party to the right or to the left of this position.”51  Interestingly enough, 
though defending the party‟s position as “obvious”, Kotil did not want to venture to 
say where that position was, only that they could not be moved to the right or the 
left of it, leaving one to assume a fairly central position for the party.  The attacks 
between Ecevit and İnönü would continue into the 1991 general elections, while 
Ecevit attacked SHP as being the shelter for separatists and leftist elements, İnönu 
accused Ecevit of being protected by the leader of the ultra-nationalist party, the 
Nationalist Endeavor Party (Milliyetçi Çalışma Partisi, MÇP), Alparslan Türkeş 
and rightist journalists, thus accusing him of being a rightist politician.
52
  Ecevit 
was even accused, not only of being a rightist, but also a fascist by supporters of the 
SHP, hence, the ironic wheels of fate having turned full circle from the mudslinging 
imaging of the 1970s; thus, Ecevit spent much of the 1991 campaign insisting that 
he was not a fascist or a rightist,
53
 without, of course, ever indicating where exactly 
he was positioning himself.  Throughout the period, whenever one sees the usage of 
“left” or “right”, it is not being used by the party leaders themselves, but is being 
externally placed on them while they dodge any such distinction, leaving the 
audience with the impression that they are located somewhere near the center. 
One must also acknowledge, however, that there were some milder 
indications of image positioning at work, especially in the elections of 1987 and 
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1991.  Süleyman Demirel, upon his return to politics after the forced hiatus, 
engaged in politics in much the same way he had left it seven years earlier, 
attempting to rally the voters around the old “kırat” imagery employed so 
frequently by the AP in the 1960s and 1970s, and itself an intentional reference to 
the Democrat Party of the 1950s.
54
  Thus, even in the 1980s, Demirel was creating 
party imagery that intended to channel the electorate through the practices of the 
defunct governing party of the 1950s, a tactic that once again demonstrates a 
positional instutionalization of the Turkish party system despite the number of 
changes in the party that fulfilled that particular role position.  Although the extent 
to which the explicit summoning of the kırat were behind the modest election 
outcome for Demirel in the 1987 general elections is unclear, and he moved away 
from its explicit reference by 1991, the kırat imagery remained firmly affixed to the 
party emblem.  At the same time, the SHP, especially as time went on, clearly 
demonstrated that it was channeling votes through the legacy of the CHP.  For 
example, the emblem of the SHP was undoubtedly intended to conjure up the image 
of the old CHP emblem.  While the latter has six arrows that shoot like a ray of light 
from an orb to the right on a red background, signifying the six foundational 
principles of the Turkish Republic attributed to Atatürk, the former has six rays of 
light shooting upward from an orb on a red background. 
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In the 1983 general elections, with the more seasoned politician Turgut Özal 
pitted against the political novices of Sunalp and Calp, one observes what appears 
to be an important difference in sloganry.  In short, ANAP made its appeal and 
party propaganda through catchy slogans, helping its distinctions to stick in the 
minds of the electorate.  Özal realized that you have to repeat ideas in order for 
them to stick, and thus his continued references to the party of the four old political 
tendencies and party slogans, such as “flower for the bee, honeycomb for the honey, 
and Özal for Turkey,”55 and “the friend of the worker does not give with a spoon 
and take with a ladle.”56  Such discursive tactics were completely lost on the leaders 
of the other two parties, and this distinction has to be at least in part responsible for 
the outcome of the paradigm‟s first general election.  It was not until the return of 
skilled and seasoned politicians in the following general election of 1987 that Özal 
could be said to have competition in the area of creative sloganry in political 
propaganda. 
The political environment in this paradigm following the coup of 1980 put 
pressure on the politicians to avoid ideological rhetoric and focus on the issues of 
economic policy and democratic development.  While a focus on economic policy 
and development was not a new feature of campaign discourse, the broad usage of 
the concept of the party as in the service (hizmet) of the nation was a notable feature 
of the period.  While Hakan Yavuz has argued that this usage of hizmet has 
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traditionally been an Islamic conception employed by Islamic political movements 
in Turkey,
57
 a phenomenon which might have indeed been true for periods 
preceding multiparty politics, its wide appropriation by political parties in the 1980s 
belies such a narrow conceptualization.  Furthermore, the first regular appropriation 
of such a concept of political parties by a mainstream politician could be argued to 
have been by Demirel in the 1977 general election.
58
  His use of hizmet, of course, 
was strongly overshadowed by the other discursive patterns and imaging of the 
period. In any case, at least during this paradigmatic period from 1983 to 1991, one 
could argue that its supposed Islamic inspiration was largely put aside for a more 
secular and broad usage, conveying a type of appeal that seemed appropriate for an 
increasingly individualistic and consumer-oriented electorate. 
The idea of their political parties being at the service of the society was a 
regular aspect of the discourse of all political parties starting in 1983, not just 
ANAP.  Necdet Calp, the leader of the “social democratic” HP argued, for example, 
that the very existence of political parties was to govern the country and provide 
service (hizmet vermek).
59
  Turgut Sunalp the leader of the MDP, established by the 
secularist military junta, was found declaring, “I will serve you with the people you 
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elect.”60  Erdal İnönü, the leader of the SHP in the 1987 and 1991 elections also 
regularly appropriated the language of hizmet.  He declared, for example, that if the 
SHP was in government, “hizmet would go to every corner of the country,”61 and 
that “in our understanding”—i.e. the understanding of the SHP—“the state exists to 
serve” (devlet hizmet için vardır).62  The emphasis on hizmet also continued with 
Mesut Yılmaz in the ANAP party leadership seat.  Among other references to 
hizmet, at a campaign rally he suggested that “in our homeland, lets remove politics 
from mere fighting and engage in politics in order to serve you.”63 
The stripping of strong ideological underpinnings and an emphasis on 
hizmet by the major centrist parties seems to have had a number of consequences.  
The idea of parties existing as competing services for the people logically decreases 
the voters‟ sense of responsibility toward the party and increases the chosen party‟s 
responsibility to the people who selected it.   The voting citizen, thus, enters into the 
electoral contest as a potential consumer weighing out the quality and features of 
various options, and with the expectation that services will be rendered.  Thus, the 
attractive and depolarizing hizmet discourse acts as a double-edged sword.  While 
focusing on the value of service, one then expects that notable services will be 
accomplished by the party.  Thus, the perceptions by voters that the previously 
chosen party had not been able to deliver—this being particularly important for 
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governing parties—justifies the subsequent search for another “service provider.”  
Hence, while such rhetoric undoubtedly decreases the levels of politically-based 
social polarization, it also relieves the citizens of strong feelings of duty to any 
particular party and volatile voting patterns become a likely consequence.  The 
observations of fragmentation, volatility and de-institutionalization of parties as the 
period progressed provide strong affirmation of these assumptions.  Especially in 
this period, the “service” discourse stayed largely at the level of rhetoric and 
framing the nature of the “ideal” relationship between government and the 
electorate.  As will be seen in the next chapter, the Welfare Party effectively altered 
this status quo by ostensibly putting the “service” discourse into practice. 
At the same time, the relatively “boring” political sphere and the realization 
that society was not at the throats of one another led to the fairly positive 
contemporary interpretations of the trajectory of Turkish democracy by many 
students of Turkish politics, especially prior to 1994.
64
  Outside of the eastern 
provinces of the country, many of which were embroiled in violent actions between 
the PKK and the military and its security organs, the relative peace-and-quiet in the 
political realm stood in stark contrast to the previous period and seemed to indicate 
that the hopes of the military regime, outside of the growing fragmentation, were 
being realized. 
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Table 8.4 – Particular Election “Shapers” in 1983-1991 General Elections 
 Major Campaign Issues Concurrent Exogenous Factors 
Nov. 
1983 
- Privitization (selling operation rights 
for the Bosphorus Bridge) 
- Inflation 
- Social Welfare / Urban Housing 
- National Economy 
- Election followed three years of strict rule by 
military junta 
- New Constitution 
- Two parties with large grassroot support sat 
on the sidelines (occasionally interferring)  
- Widely spreading access to state television 
Nov. 
1987 
- Strict provincial electoral threshold 
implemented by the ANAP government 
- ANAP’s record in government 
- Inflation / National Economy 
- PKK terror / Marshall law in 
Southeast 
- Sudden return of the pre-1980 political elite 
Oct. 
1991 
- Need for change from ANAP 
governance 
- Television propaganda and private 
stations 
- Inter-party alliances 
- PKK terror 
- Better deliverance of social services 
- Sudden emergence of privately-run 
television channels like Star-1 and Mega-10 
 
           Finally, with system fragmentation occurring following the 1983 campaign 
and picking up speed as the old political leaders returned to the contest in the 1987 
general elections, as the Provisional Article 4 of the Constitution, which forbade the 
political activities of former party leaders, was repealed by referendum, the 
discursive attacks took on a new pattern.
65
  With multiple parties competing on the 
moderate left and moderate right, political engagement became an electoral battle 
on two fronts, between what Kalaycıoğlu refers to as opponents (those opposite 
one‟s political outlook) and competitors (those competing within the “same 
                                                 
65
 The referendum to repeal the article passed by a razor-thin majority (50.1 percent). For more on 
the controversial decisions and events in regard to bringing back the old guard, see Ergun Özbudun, 
“Democratization of the Constitutional and Legal Framework,” in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, 
eds., Politics in the Third Turkish Republic (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 43-4; and 
Ahmet Evin, “Demilitarization and Civilianization of the Regime,” in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, 
eds., Politics in the Third Turkish Republic (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), p. 32. 
 334 
electoral turf”).66  Thus, campaign speeches took on the role of attacking one‟s 
competitor—greater priority seemed to be leveled at this aim—and then one‟s 
largest opponent.  Ecevit and, to a lesser extent, Erdal İnönü, would attack one 
another and then ANAP.  Demirel and Özal (later Yılmaz) would go at each other 
before dealing with the parties located to the “left”.  Such a two-pronged strategy 
had a clear rationale; one was most likely to attract or persuade new voters from the 
parties that took similar positions and catered to overlapping domains of 
identification.  Though not an impossibility, the difficulty of wooing voters from 
opponent parties made attacks on those parties a secondary concern. 
 
8.2.2 Non-discursive Campaign Strategies 
With the utility of nearly all previous forms of non-discursive mobilization 
on the wane, though these were not entirely discarded, the need to gather large 
segments of the electorate demanded new and creative strategies.  The penchant for 
charismatic leadership and the growing distance between the voter and a particular 
party gave a window of opportunity to those able to master the fast-developing 
means of propaganda through media technology, particularly television and its later 
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Figure 8.1 – Two-Pronged Campaign Attack (1987-1991) 
“Left” “Right” 
SHP (İnönü) ANAP (Özal Yılmaz) 
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expansion with the advent of private channels outside the direct control of the state.  
In addition to this important new tool of contestation, in what would become an 
important catalyst in shifting the paradigm away from the “center”, minor 
ideological parties formed a unified electoral platform with one another or with a 
larger party in order to leap the 10 percent threshold set by the military and enter 
the parliament, re-fragmenting into their original parties once their seat in the 
Assembly was secure.  These minor religious or nationalistic ideology parties, 
virtually ignored prior to 1991, suddenly became a force to be reckoned with and 
began to change the entire divide (or divides) on which political parties and the 
system drew up the lines of battle.   
On October 22, 1983, Turkey tuned in to the state-run television channel 
TRT to view the first ever open-forum campaign debate in the nation‟s history.  It 
was estimated that 33 million Turkish viewers across the country—the largest 
number of viewers for a television program in the country‟s history up to that 
point
67—gathered together to watch Turgut Sunalp, Necdet Calp and Turgut Özal 
discursively “duke-it-out” in a live debate.  Sunalp‟s long experience as a high-
ranking officer and Calp‟s lifetime in bureaucratic civil service paid little dividend 
against the naturally-gifted speaker, Özal.  Polling and analysis following the results 
of the debate clearly show that Özal had dominated.68  Milliyet, conducting surveys 
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regarding the results of the televised debate, found that based on certain qualities of 
leadership demonstrated in the debate, Özal was found to lead the others with 58 
percent of those surveyed choosing him while 25 percent chose Calp and 17 percent 
selected Sunalp.
69
  When asked to choose which party they would vote for in the 
upcoming election, though more than half were still undecided, ANAP had more 
than twice as many votes as the next closest party—i.e. Calp‟s HP.70  The clear 
electoral margin acquired by Özal from the success of the debate was more or less 
maintained steadily the following two weeks and in the election.   
Much has been made of the speech President Evren made right before the 
election that suggested that Evren and the junta was clearly in support of the MDP 
and concerned about ANAP.
71
  Some have even gone so far to suggest that the 
speech led to a “protest vote” against the military‟s interference into “the nitty-
gritty of politics,”72 suggesting that the motivation behind voting for ANAP was 
largely due to a desire to protest the military‟s muddling into democratic affairs.  
The general emphasis further suggests that, whether intended or not, that the cryptic 
proclamations of Evren had a substantial effect on the outcome of the election.
73
  If 
one takes this course of action, one is confronted with a number of confounding 
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problems.  First of all, the polling results available before the election all point to 
the fact that, in what is the most astonishing aspect of Evren‟s last-minute election 
tutelary guidance, the speech had basically a non-effect.  In fact, if it had any effect, 
it might have reduced ANAP‟s share of the vote by a slight margin and given it to 
MDP, but based on inevitable polling error and such a slight difference, such 
notions could not be confirmed.
74
  Second, with very little difference between the 
polling estimates and the final results, considering that Evren had not shown any 
clear preference prior to the speech on November 4, it becomes hard to claim that 
the impetus behind support of ANAP was a “protest vote.”  In addition to this, 
Turgut Özal, had been appointed in 1980 as the deputy prime minister of economic 
affairs and worked in such a capacity until 1982; the military was clearly on board 
with his economic program, the very platform on which ANAP was campaigning.  
Furthermore, while two other centrist parties sat on the sidelines of the campaign 
unquestionably due to the will of the junta, ANAP was allowed to compete also 
obviously through the will of the junta; they could have easily have also vetoed 
ANAP out of the elections.  Finally, Özal himself, when asked by the reporters 
which party was closest to the desires of the junta, argued that ANAP was closest to 
the junta regime in terms of outlook and a desire for a unified Turkey.
75
  Taken 
together, these considerations make it very hard to claim that Evren influenced the 
elections or that the electorate chose to support ANAP simply in protest of the 
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military.  What seems less controversial in lieu of the evidence, is that, while the 
military‟s tutelary guidance regarding the election had little effect, the ultimate 
shape of the election outcome can be attributed to Özal‟s more effective discursive 
campaigning in general and his success against the others in the newly exploited 
medium of television in particular. 
In the general election of 1987, Özal, now confronted with politicians more 
of his political mettle, utilizing his government‟s power of the state-run television 
channels, chose to block debates or any extended campaigning by the other political 
parties on television.  The government‟s refusal to let the other parties compete in a 
forum and have campaign-related interview programs with reporters led Süleyman 
Demirel, who had recently returned to politics through a referendum along with the 
other old guard, to refer to the election as the “silent election.”76  The other political 
leaders were limited to taping a short political infomercial that was aired beginning 
just one week prior to the elections.  Once again, success in this medium, even 
considering the short duration allotted, appeared to have a significant impact on 
some of the party‟s fortunes.  Based on polling of the public and other experts on 
the political advertisements, Erdal İnönü was considered to have been the most 
successful at the infomercial endeavor.
77
  The polling company KONDA, which 
had been conducting regular polling research for the daily newspaper Milliyet 
showed that İnönü‟s SHP had jumped in strength from 18 percent prior to the airing 
of the campaign informercial to 29.8 percent the day after it first appeared on 
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television.
78
  While the other parties maintained their previous percentages or 
dipped very slightly, the SHP made a huge gain and appeared to pick up a large 
number of the undecided voters.  Though they would lose a few points by election 
day (they ended up with 24.8 percent of the national vote), the potential power of 
successful campaigning through the new and widespread medium of television 
seemed to have been demonstrated once again. 
In 1991, with the advent of private television channels, the ability for the 
government to control who was broadcasting what and when was suddenly stripped 
away, and for the right price, political parties and politicians could make their case 
on these new Turkish channels beamed into the country by satellite.  In an excellent 
study of the 1991 general elections, Ayşe Öncü describes the new environment: 
More than sixty-five percent of Turkish households switched on their 
television sets to gaze at color-sound images of politicians and 
political parties created by marketing consultants.  In the living 
rooms of some seven million families, close-ups of electoral 
candidates competed with familiar faces of talk-show hosts and 
anchorpersons.  Popular tunes of political commercials intermingled 
with video-clips of rock music and advertising jingles.  Voice-over 
flashes of ideo-terms such as “welfare,” “freedom,” “rights,” 
“representation,” and the master-term “democracy,” superimposed 
over pictures of cheering crowds in political rallies, joined the stream 
of flashforwards announcing various forthcoming attractions.
79
 
 
This account demonstrates the electoral “gold-rush” by political parties and 
politicians to capitalize on the goldmine of visual media, which through private 
television opened up new spaces of competition in rapid fashion.  The tools to 
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attract voters to one‟s party were no longer simply discursive or materially-based, 
as was the case with the effective machine-politics of the DP in the 1950s; instead, 
the goal became to draw the electorate and make one‟s appeal visually. 
This exploitation of visual elements could be seen even in advertisements by 
political parties in newspapers.  While the trend to pay for newspaper 
advertisements became a regular practice by 1977, they originally started as 
basically open letters with a memorable slogans and the party symbol.  The public 
enthusiasm for new visual mediums, best represented by television, seemed to 
coincide with newspaper advertisements that were increasingly visual in their 
appeals.  Attractive pictures of the party leader rousing a massive crowd at a huge 
rally, the actual event of which consequently became less relevant as parties could 
more rapidly spread their messages to greater numbers in less time through more 
technological means, became the backdrop of an appeal for support. 
As Öncü also notes one of the more creative and image-transforming visual 
appeals in 1991 came from the Islamist-oriented Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, RP).  
Traditionally seen as the party of small town merchants of Central Anatolia, they 
suddenly were able to increase their votes in every segment of the country, 
including the large urban areas where they had previously been almost non-existent.  
While Öncü interprets the 1991 election results for the party as only a moderate 
success,
80
 which seems an understatement considering that they more than doubled 
their previous election totals in the vast majority of provinces and managed to 
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hurdle the threshold and enter parliament for the first time in post-1980 politics, she 
points out the critical point that the party capitalized on the new visual environment 
by creating a new image of the party, presenting itself as “simply ordinary.”81  
Rather than present the viewing public, whether on television or through 
newspapers, with images of the aging leader Necmettin Erbakan, who by the way, 
was rated poorly by the public in his television infomercial in 1987, they provided 
images of regular citizens explaining why they would support the RP.  They 
included people from all portions of society, and their problems were usually based 
in existing economic injustices.
82
  The images created the impression of a 
thoroughly modern and mainstream party concerned about the cares of the current 
economic environment and was a far cry from the traditional caricatures of voters 
for an Islamist party. 
While one might also pose other reasons why the RP might have gained in 
strength at the loss of votes from ANAP, including increasing defection of leaders 
from the Islamist faction of the party as the liberal faction gained strength 
culminating in the appointment of Mesut Yılmaz as party leader,83 the creative and 
unexpected advertising campaign by the RP certainly played a role in their 
acquisition of votes in new and unexpected segments of the population.  Thus, once 
again effective and creative utilization of the new opportunities provided in the 
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arena of contestation demonstrated that one could alter ones electoral fortunes by 
“packaging” one‟s campaign message in the newly available visual mediums.84  Its 
regular exploitation by political parties would be completely consolidated by the 
following paradigmatic period.   
The ability to communicate with wide audiences simultaneously also created 
clear consequences for party organizational structures.  Although the military junta 
had no doubt intended to reduce centralized party power and increase intraparty 
democratic procedures, the new technologies put natural pressure on parties to 
consolidate power around national charismatic leadership.
85
  As long as the party 
could communicate its message broadly from a central location to local 
communities spread throughout the country, the electoral mobilization utility of 
local party leaders was once again diminished.  To pay for marketing and broadly 
disseminated advertisements through existing media, capital and emphasis 
necessarily had to be channeled toward the center rather than the other way around 
in order to get the message out.
86
  These new realities along with large subsidies 
provided by the state strongly directed electorally successful political parties in 
Turkey toward an “electoral-professional” form of party structuring.87 
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Another particularly important strategy effectively employed in 1991 was 
entering into electoral alliances with other parties in order to pass the 10 percent 
national threshold established by the military junta.  From the perspective of the 
military regime that ruled in the interim between 1980 and 1983, the explicit 
purpose of the relatively high national threshold was to prevent a fragmented 
system with weak coalition governments and the entrance of small regional and 
ideological parties into parliament.  Both of these aims would presumably help to 
foster the sort of centrist and consensual politics the military, and of course, many 
in society, were hoping for.  In 1991, several parties that had been only a marginal 
force in the 1980s merged their candidates onto lists with other parties to ensure 
that they would pass the necessary national threshold.  While in the 1980s, the 
views of Islamists, Turkish nationalists and Kurdish nationalists had been 
moderated through factional representation in large centrist parties, suddenly each 
of these groups were representing themselves in their own right underneath their 
individual party banners.  What appeared to be an inauspicious beginning, ended up 
having huge ramifications for the Turkish party system. 
In 1987, the RP, the MÇP, and the Reformist Democracy Party (Islahatçı 
Demokrasi Partisi, IDP) had managed to garner only 10.9 percent of the national 
vote between them, the lion share of this going to the RP (7.2 percent) while the 
MÇP and IDP received less than 3 percent and 1 percent respectively.  All of the 
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parties, of course, fell below the 10 percent threshold.  These parties made an 
electoral calculation that by pooling their candidates into one list, under the banner 
of the RP, that their combined strength would push them over the 10 percent hurdle.  
This, of course, happened as the RP coalition was able to garner 16.9 percent of the 
vote, and then, once in parliament, the electoral alliance ended with the division of 
the parties once again under their old party banners.  Certainly, the alliance 
probably served to encourage voters to vote for this coalition of conservative right 
parties as their combined strength, particularly of the RP and MÇP would likely put 
them over the institutionalized barrier.  This foot in the door of the Assembly, 
which brought them into the realm of legitimized parties, suddenly gave particular 
voice to religiously conservative and ultra-nationalist concerns and proved to be a 
critical spark for the RP whose electoral shares continued to climb to their peak in 
1995.  Its ability to creatively utilize the media during campaigns and combine 
electoral lists with competitors played important roles in its electoral successes in 
the first half the 1990s.
88
 
In terms of electoral alliances, another very critical merger took place on the 
“left” between the SHP and the largely Kurdish and southeast-oriented HEP 
(People‟s Labor Party—Halkın Emek Partisi).  As can be seen from the previous 
periods, the CHP, in whose shadow the SHP walked, had always been comprised of 
a national coalition that connected the West with the East.  The Kurds in the 
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southeast had always been an important element of this formula though for different 
reasons at different times.  With the growth of various “leftist” ideologies among 
the Kurds, connections were maintained with the CHP and then the SHP on these 
lines.  Parliament deputies like Ahmet Türk had been the representative face of the 
CHP in the southeast in the 1970s and the party had, even when experiencing a 
break with many of the area‟s large landowners, always managed to gather together 
at least a moderate amount of votes from these provinces.  As a “social democratic” 
party, the SHP also presented the image of being pluralist and an advocate of the 
expansion of democratic freedoms, which encouraged the maintainance of a faction 
of Kurdish political elites within the party.  Furthermore, the total elimination of 
“Kurdish” political organizations following the coup and the continued suppression 
of such non-violent political expression made the SHP the closest legal association 
to represent the concerns of Kurds that were under “State of Emergency” (OHAL) 
rule in the southeast.  
With the rise of PKK terrorism and the actions of a conservative faction 
within the SHP led by Deniz Baykal to steal the party leadership away from Erdal 
İnönü and move the party in a more conservative direction, the “Kurdish and Alevi” 
faction in the party increasingly came under attack from within the party itself 
following the 1987 general elections.  According to some, the SHP was under the 
occupation of Kurds and Alevis.
89
  After a number of confrontations and pressure 
within the party from General Secretary Baykal and others in his faction like Ali 
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Topuz, a large number of these Kurdish deputies had been pushed out of the party 
and left to their own devices.  On June 7, 1990, 11 of the 19 deputies expelled from 
the SHP formed HEP (some of the remaining deputies would join later).
90
  Thus, 
the core of this new party had come from the SHP and, for the most part, formed the 
vote potential for the SHP in the southeastern provinces.  It was very likely that, for 
this reason, as the 1991 election approached, the SHP made the initial gestures 
toward HEP to form an alliance, despite the fact that the gestures were toward 
politicians that had been pushed out of their own party.  Though it took a while for 
both sides to agree on the terms, the two parties agreed to an electoral alliance 
under the SHP in early Septemeber of 1991. 
This merger turned out to be the last hoorah to date for the long-standing 
East-West alliance begun under CHP and continuing with the SHP, operating in its 
place after the former party‟s closure.  With the military and security forces in 
armed combat with the PKK and its leader Abdullah Öcalan, it was easy for the 
western-based Turkish supporters of the party, who typically had a culturally 
homogenious understanding of “Turkishness”, to see the alliance with Kurdish 
nationalists, who were seeking an acknowledgment of a “Kurdish” problem and 
decentralization, as a move to shelter separatists.  The general election results 
showed a clear pattern: the SHP took clear electoral hits in the western provinces 
while they held their ground or made gains in the east (see Table 8.5).  For these 
supporters of the party in the western provinces, their worst fears seemed realized 
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after these SHP/HEP members famously insisted on speaking Kurdish during their 
oath-swearing inauguration ceremony in parliament on December 6, 1991, an action 
that initiated international fame (or infamy) for Leyla Zana who came to the podium 
wearing a bandana of the colors commonly associated with “Kurdistan”, and their 
ultimate separation from the party and reformation as ÖZEP and then HEP through 
the course of 1992.
91
  Though the lists of HEP candidates that would campaign 
under the SHP umbrella were largely determined by Erdal İnönü and other 
members of the SHP, popular accusations arose that these HEP candidates to run 
under the SHP ticket were personally approved by the PKK leader Öcalan.92   
 
Table 8.5 – The Changing Regional Fortunes of the SHP93 
 
Thus, what appeared to be, at least on the superficial level, a reconciliation 
between the major elements on the “left” of the Turkish political spectrum, 
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ultimately led to a severe cleavage that would ultimately divide the country into 
“East” and “West” as far as political “left” positioning is concerned.  While the 
leftists of the East maintained an understanding of left that emphasized 
socioeconomic justice, “pluralism”, and a decentralized state, albeit with a clear 
“Kurdish” identity underlying the appeals, those on the West were left with a 
guiding ideology that increasingly became centered on a maintenance of the status 
quo and a focus on a fairly rigid interpretation of Kemalism, the resulting 
underlying nationalism of which allowed these parties to make headway toward 
reconciliation with the nationalist right, with whom many of their young members 
had been in mortal combat with in the 1970s.  This drastic cleavage on the left 
would come to have a significant impact in shaping the party system and the 
discursive framework of the subsequent paradigm.
94
 
 
8.3 Domains of Identification 
 
Though the Turkish electorate in this short paradigmatic period, which 
managed to be maintained only through the general election of 1991, tended to view 
themselves as centrist
95
 and society, if not the political elite themselves, tended to 
approach political competition much more harmoniously, the old line of “left” and 
“right” held a great deal of its shape.  As discussed above, though the political 
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parties seemed to intentionally deemphasize their “positioning,” especially in its 
“left/right” understanding, the voters still behaved, in large measure, according to 
the understanding of “left/right” in the previous paradigm.96  Urban blue-collar 
workers and the lower classes tended to vote for parties on the left, while the 
middle-class and rural communities showed a preference for parties on the “right.”  
In other words, although the existing “institutionalization” from the previous 
periods had been deemphasized and the parties appeared to take fairly middle-of-the 
road positions, except with notable but moderate distinctions in economic policy 
approaches, voters still acted according to the pre-coup institutionalized patterns.  
ANAP, especially at the beginning, had overlain the divide somewhat even between 
“left” and “right.”  But their major electoral achievement was to gather the old 
“National Front” coalition of the previous decade in one party and under the 
guidance of “liberal” leadership.  This phenomenon was partly inspired by the 
centrist outlook of the country coming out of junta rule and, to some extent, was 
itself an inspiring element that encouraged centrism.  Ironically, the lack of 
polarization in society due to the centrist outlook, beside the return of the old guard 
in 1987, probably also hastened the fragmentation back into nationalist, Islamist, 
and economically-liberal conservative groupings, as there was no threatening 
menace for which a common front was necessary. 
The results and ramifications of the 1991 general elections would come to 
rattle the foundational line between left and right.  With the East-West cleavage 
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occurring on the left, the constellation of attributes and meanings associated with 
the left, especially in the West, shifted away from the economy and toward socio-
cultural concerns that created a platform primarily focused on maintaining the status 
quo.  In the West, those who had supported the parties on the left largely from class 
and economic concerns found a more sympathetic ear in the populist and 
distributive parties of the religious right.  Thus, while the designations of “left” and 
“right” enabled these blocs to contain a decent portion of the electorate who had 
been associated with the corresponding labeling of previous paradigms, the 
changing of substantive meanings in these relational positionings allowed for a 
measure of electoral shifting between these blocs.  This shift will be discussed in 
more detail in the following chapter. 
 
8.4 Conclusion  
 
Although one could level a great many criticisms toward decisions made by 
the military junta in the process of “reestablishing democracy” in the country, it is 
easy to imagine how they could justify their overall aims and motivations inspiring 
their decision-making, even if some of their apparent hopes were a bit unrealistic.  
It was not only the military that was seeking an end to the years of fratricide that 
was snuffing out the futures of many of its young citizens in particular; certainly 
society as a whole was happy to see the reprieve in violence under the military 
regime.  The objective to foster a harmonious society that was bound together by 
essential shared values seemed a worthy endeavor, at least on paper.  The 
assumption, however, that the disgruntled ethnically Kurdish or Kurdish-speaking 
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citizens of the country would be pacified by restrictive laws and physical force and 
be willing to acquiesce to a political system that allowed them to enter only if 
muzzled seems particularly problematic.  Removing legal and legitimate channels 
for protest from elements in society that have grievances, whether or not these are 
seen as warranted, strongly encourages social violence and anti-system behavior as 
the remaining outlets for protest.  Perhaps the excessive measures to direct society 
toward the center actually fragmented it in the end as all potential pressure valves 
had been closed off. 
The military‟s decision to punish the old guard of political elites was 
probably also an action for which plausible self-justification by the junta could have 
been made.  Removing politicians like Ecevit and Demirel who, despite their slight 
differences in actual political outlook, fomented extreme opposition and caricatures 
of one another and created an unnecessary political impasse that simply exacerbated 
the growing societal chaos, might seem understandable.  However, the military‟s 
subsequent decision to artificially prop up inexperienced but loyal leaders who had 
little political charisma only served to encourage the justification of the return of the 
more experienced political leaders.  Had moderate parties like SODEP and DYP, 
which clearly had more grassroots organization and impetus, been allowed to 
compete with ANAP rather than the MDP and the HP, the need for the others to 
return might have seemed less pressing and fragmentation might have not reached 
the levels it did. 
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Finally, whatever Evren and the leaders of the junta thought about Özal, his 
personality and social outlook essentially embodied the centrist paradigm that the 
leaders of the military regime were ultimately hoping for.  His eclectic personality 
and pragmatic behavior allowed him to seem an approachable figure for a large 
swath of society, from Islamists to secularists, liberals to nationalists.  ANAP‟s 
ability to straddle, more or less, the political center ultimately hinged on Özal‟s 
ability to represent and moderate the various factions collected within the party.  
Subsequent leaders of the party did not have the charisma (Akbulut in particular) or 
the ability to inspire confidence and loyalty in other factions (Yılmaz could not be 
seen as an effective leader of Islamists or ultra-nationalists) that could keep the 
party‟s internal coalition together.  His exiting the party to fill the vacant seat of the 
Presidency raised a critical question of legitimacy for the party both internal and 
external the party walls.  Özal‟s rather short career as a national politician, thus, 
coincides well with the rather short paradigmatic period with which he is 
associated.  Though he could be attributed with a great many mistakes and 
shortcomings, it is hard to not conclude that one could see in his leadership an 
essential incarnation of the brief paradigmatic national centralist orientation. 
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CHAPTER 9 
 
 
THE CULTURE-IDENTITY PARADIGM – 1995-2007 
 
 
 
Don’t burn your own mattress by your anger at Deniz Baykal.  He has also 
saddened and disappointed me.  He eliminated democracy within the party and has 
taken the party in the wrong direction.  But what can we do; these are our friends.  
For this reason alone, it is both right and necessary  
to give our support to the CHP.
1
 
--SHP politician Dr. Gürbüz Çapan on why the CHP should be supported (2007) 
 
With our conservative democrat identity, the Ak Party desires to rebuild the 
fragmented center-right in Turkey along with eliminating the old understandings of 
politics, and place our political foundations in the center. . . The Ak Party, in a very 
short period, has reached its objective and sits at the very center of Turkish 
politics.
2
 
--Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (2002) 
 
 
In 1965, one party‟s campaign strategy became an important factor in the 
shifting of the paradigm that structured the party system.  This party (the 
Republican People‟s Party, CHP), which operated in the center of politics, brought 
from the outside of the traditional arena of contest, not an entirely new discourse or 
policy outlook, but the novelty of the “left of center” imaging.3  Thus, without 
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drastically changing its political program or approach to politics, which had begun 
to coincide with its “left of center” imaging at least into the late 1950s, it infused 
the system with an ideological flavor by bringing the taboo expression “left” into 
mainstream politics.  Approximately thirty years later, nearly the converse situation 
occurred, an “outsider” party with a taboo but long-standing image—i.e. Islamist / 
religious conservative—and “anti-establishment”4 rhetoric brought itself into the 
center of the system, not by changing its image, but by newly taking on and 
prioritizing (and ultimately mastering) mainstream (ordinary) policies and tactics 
again resulting in a critical shift in the national political paradigm.  Ultimately, they 
took the “service” discourse of the previous period and very deliberately put it into 
practice, particularly in needy urban communities, and through incarnating the 
discourse, catapulted themselves into a mainstream political contender; however, it 
was arguably not the Welfare Party‟s practices or policies that led to an altering of 
the paradigmatic approach to politics, but rather their image as an Islamist party 
endowed with governing power, as they were the leader of a coalition with the True 
Path Party for about a year from June of 1996 to June of 1997 when they were 
pushed out of government through pressure from the military and a number of civil 
society organizations, largely comprised of various business and economic 
organizations and those groups commonly associated with what is referred to as 
“the secular establishment.” 
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Thus, the “rise of Islamic Fundamentalism” began to color the 
interpretations of politics and society in Turkey in general, and most issues in 
Turkish society, including electoral behavior, have become popularly 
compartmentalized into oppositional secular and religious camps.
5
  While the 
accuracy of such oppositional formulations is also the subject of considerable 
debate, what seems more evident in this paradigmatic period of electoral 
competition is that, socio-cultural identities, issues and cultural cleavages have 
come to play a role in campaign discourse at a level never before encountered in 
electoral contest in Turkey—one could, in fact, argue that it was almost entirely 
absent in the strategies of all major parties in all previous paradigms, the parties of 
which explicitly avoided dividing society into any notable cultural divisions.  The 
Welfare Party scare, however, triggered a heightened-sensitivity to any 
manifestation of religious devotion in the public sphere that encouraged a 
significant segment of society to rally in defense of the existing interpretation of 
secularism and the preservation of the status quo and their way of life.  Electoral 
discourse, thus, switched from policy, campaign promises and “service”, to the 
persuading of segments in society of the existence of a national and socio-cultural 
threat that must be defended against. 
Meanwhile, the ethnic terrorism and retaliatory violence that began in 1984 
in the eastern and southeastern provinces with large populations of ethnically 
                                                 
5
 For a clear example of this binary conceptualization in caricatured form, see the pseudo-academic 
work: Zeyno Baran, “Turkey Divided,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 19, No. 1 (2008), pp. 55-69. 
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Kurdish citizens continued at a heightened pace in the 1990s.  With the death-toll 
rising and the fears of Kurdish separatism, the fortunes of the explicitly nationalist 
National Action Party (MHP) also began to rise.
6
  Thus, the poles of discourse in 
the electoral arena, which, of course, also found its place in the governmental and 
legislative arenas, began to take shape as a primary pole between religious 
conservatives and secularists
7
 with a secondary pole of Turkish nationalists versus 
Kurdish nationalists and pluralists.  For parties such as the CHP, the MHP and the 
succession of Kurdish leftist nationalist parties, their representation of particular 
identities (secularism, Turkishness, Kurdishness, respectively) in response to a 
perceived threat has become more of a primary dimension of competition—i.e. an 
explicit strategy employed to mobilize votes.  For the Justice and Development 
Party (AKP), in particular, and to a lesser extent, the Welfare Party (RP), their 
religious identities, as it relates to electoral competition, were at least instrumentally 
                                                 
6
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Toward Religion,” World Politics, Vol. 59, No. 4 (2007), p. 571. 
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placed in a secondary position—i.e. as a domain of identification.8  Though 
certainly some voters supported these parties because of their religious credentials, 
the mobilization and appeal to the voters very intentionally prioritized, not the 
sacred, but the profane material and policy-based concerns of the electorate.  Hence, 
ironically, in this paradigmatic period, the parties most associated with the 
“modernization” discourse that emphasizes functional approaches to voting 
behavior relied heavily on a platform that depicted a cultural conflict, portraying a 
secularist identity “threatened” by the “backward” Islamists, while those with 
devout Muslim credentials excessively focus on development and economic 
concerns in their attempts to mobilize voters.  Furthermore, the nationalists 
traditionally placed at the extreme poles of the political spectrum have benefited 
from the current political environment by playing a moderating and conciliatory 
role in between the polar positions of the larger parties.
9
  All of this will be 
elaborated in the following sections of this chapter. 
 
9.1 The Context of the Paradigm: The Rise of the Welfare Party 
 
In 1984, the ANAP government passed legislation that was hailed as a major 
step to decentralizing government and putting democratic participation at the 
                                                 
8
 As will be discussed, the Welfare Party DID tend to emphasize its association with religious 
concerns in its discourse, but the electoral strategy of the party suggests that electoral discourse itself 
was seen as a secondary vehicle for mobilization behind the strategies for which it exerted far greater 
effort—i.e. the focus on the local and material context of voters. 
9
 In fact, in the party‟s 2009 political program, it describes itself as occupying the “social center” 
position in Turkish politics. See, Parti Programı: Geleceğe Doğru (Ankara: Milliyetçi Hareket 
Partisi, 2009), p. 15; this „centrist‟ understanding of the party in the current paradigm has also been 
observed by Heper and İnce.  See Metin Heper and Başak İnce, “Devlet Bahçeli and „Far Right‟ 
Politics in Turkey, 1999-2002,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 42, No. 6 (2006), p. 874. 
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doorstep of the population at the local level.  Starting with Istanbul, Ankara and 
Izmir, in contrast to the old system in which large cities were subsumed under 
provincial governance with little financial discretion, large metropolitan areas were 
redrawn into a two-tiered system of governance with an elected greater 
metropolitan municipal mayor and a number of district governments under the 
mayors domain but also with their own level of autonomy and responsibilities.
10
  
Along with an increased level of elected local governance, the new laws also 
provided for a large expansion in the financial resources and autonomy at the local 
level.
11
  This change that brought about popular representation by parties with large 
budgets at their disposal led, of course, to greater democratic accountability and 
participation at the local level, but it also provided opportunities for parties 
competing for governing power at the national level. 
First, by presenting a local party leader to run for mayor of a large 
metropolitan area, if that leader demonstrated success in distributing local funds for 
the improvement of the city in recognizable ways, a party could create a huge 
potential vote bank for itself from these densely populated metropolitan centers.  As 
Öncü points out, “the mayor of Istanbul has more votes behind him than any 
national politician.”12 This, of course, was a sword that could cut both ways.  
                                                 
10
 For more on this, see Metin Heper, “Introduction,” in Metin Heper, ed., Democracy and Local 
Government: Istanbul in the 1980s (North Humberside: Eothen Press, 1987), pp. 4-8. 
11
 See Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, “Decentralization of Government,” in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, eds., 
Politics in the Third Turkish Republic (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 91-4. 
12
 Ayşe Öncü, “The Potentials and Limitations of Local Government Reform in Solving Urban 
Problems: The Case of Istanbul,” in Metin Heper, ed., Dilemmas of Decentralization: Municipal 
Government in Turkey (Bonn: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 1986), p. 63. 
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Furthermore, with successive channels of machine politics shut down or greatly 
limited at the national level, the new financial windfalls at the local level could 
provide an avenue to engage in clientelistic brokerage on the parties‟ behalf in the 
local context with much the same consequence when national elections roll 
around.
13
  While it would be difficult, and perhaps unfair, to argue that ANAP‟s 
impetus for decentralizing local governance was self-serving and political, it would 
also be difficult to claim that they were unaware of the possibilities provided to 
political parties stemming from the new municipal government legislation.  
Kalaycıoğlu points out, for instance, that the ANAP national government also saw 
fit to try to recentralize local governance after it suffered major losses in the 1989 
local elections.
14
  Thus, though we cannot argue that ANAP‟s motivation for 
changes in local government was simply electoral strategy, their behavior in this 
regard suggests that they were at least cognizant of local governance‟s strategic 
power. 
 While this local restructuring offered the possibility of a critical new 
channel for “decentralized” machine politics for national parties, potentially 
mobilizing the electorate for national parties through the performance and 
distribution of services by the local party leaders to their constituents, by the late 
1980s the increasing fragmentation of governments at both the national and local 
level, the growing debt of localities in relation to the state despite the increased 
                                                 
13
 Ibid., p. 73.  
14
 Kalaycıoğlu, “Decentralization in Government,” p. 95.  Öncü also discusses potential electorally 
strategic motivations behind the two-tiered system in order to mitigate potential losses at one of the 
two levels. Öncü, “Potentials and Limitations of Local Government,” pp. 72-3. 
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local budgets and revenues, and the reversion of the local leaders to corruption and 
particularistic clientelism
15
 caused party performance at the local level to become 
largely a hindrance rather than a benefit to the national party organ (particularly to 
the SHP),
16
 with the critical exception of the Welfare Party.
17
 
Starting with only two provincial governments (Van and Urfa) following the 
first post-coup local elections in 1984, the RP managed to maintain and add to the 
provinces it controlled until their surprising success in the local elections of 1994, 
in which it managed to take the reins of 28 of the 76 provinces, including the two 
largest provincial administrations, Istanbul and Ankara.
18
  Once the power passed 
into the hands of the local RP leaders, their strategy seems to have been to do the 
utmost to show that they were providing services to the community and developing 
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 Heper and Keyman point out that, by the late 1980s, public expenditure was increasing 
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Activism in Turkey,” Middle East Journal, Vol. 53, No. 1 (1999), p. 78. 
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the municipality.  For the average voter, the most direct impact of the government 
and the visible test for the suitability of a particular party to govern the nation was 
seen at the local level.  With a paradigmatic emphasis on service (hizmet), the 
success of any political party depending not on ideology or discourse, but on their 
ability to visibly demonstrate their effectiveness to the voters, and parties had no 
better way of manifesting such behavior than at the level of the local municipality.  
The RP, at this period of history, seemed to have understood this opportunity for 
national vote mobilization through local effectiveness better than any other party, 
and by 1995 had managed to be the victors and convinced a plurality of voters that 
they were the hizmet party. 
Their success in this framework of politics fell upon three political strategies 
at the local level: the appearance of effective and service-oriented municipal 
governments, the mobilization of civil society organizations with similar outlook on 
their behalf, and the willingness to enable local party leaders to establish the issues 
of mobilization for their constituents in various regions of the country.  First, as 
discussed above, the administering of services at the local level embodied by the 
slogan used by the party “service to the people” (halka hizmet).  The party did 
whatever it could to show that it was at work for the people, speeding up 
bureaucratic services, having such things as once-a-week “open office” sessions 
with the face-to face contact with the public, and where possible using municipal 
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revenues to clean up, repair and develop the municipality.
19
  This does not mean 
that the RP‟s municipal strategy was a sustainable long-term solution.  As Akıncı 
has pointed out, though the RP municipal governments were receiving “high 
marks,” there were indications that the populist spending was putting local 
governments into a great deal of debt.
20
  Furthermore, while they seemed more apt 
at preventing corruption that rankles the sensibilities of the rank and file in the 
communities, there was also ample evidence that various types of patronage—place 
party supporters into municipal-run service jobs—and corruption—giving local 
contracts to party supporters or those donating to the party directly or to party-
supportive charities and associations.
21
  Thus, while the RP‟s municipal track record 
caused it to stick out positively in the eyes of many voter, one must wonder how 
long their success in distinguishing themselves would have continued, and their 
success at appealing to voters through their municipal records was a strategy 
heightened by the general neglect of effective municipal governance demonstrated 
by many of the local leaders of the major parties.
22
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Furthermore, the party also mobilized civil society in its behalf in order to 
serve the community and demonstrate the party‟s “just (economic) order” (adil 
düzen).  The level of mobilization and organization at the local level among both 
official and unofficial associations that shared the party‟s philosophy caused 
Özbudun to argue that the RP was the Turkish party to come the closest to 
resembling a “mass party.”23  As White and others have observed, Islamist 
charitable organizations, though often claiming autonomy, operated to ensure that 
the needs of those in the community were being met.
24
  This was a particularly 
effective strategy in poor and working-class neighborhoods in the big cities, where 
the social-democratic parties had traditionally been receiving strong support.
25
  The 
RP along with Islamic foundations began operating as organs of social welfare,
26
 
dispensing material assistance explicitly or implicitly in the name of the party.
27
 
Finally, the Welfare Party managed to pull together a diverse national 
coalition of voters—including both Kurdish and Turkish nationalists—by allowing 
local considerations and party leaders shape the appeal in those communities.  This 
was the double-edged sword of the ease of utilizing new media opportunities to 
dispense party campaign propaganda: while effective in reaching large numbers of 
voters quickly, the party message remains at the distant “national” level and 
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requires one to make the same appeal to every sector of society.  When parties are 
formed on largely a “catch-all” model, in which one hopes to gather together 
disparate elements of society under the party banner, one national message might be 
limiting if others are willing or have the capability to speak differently to distinct 
constituencies to mobilize their voters.  Yavuz argues that a key element of the 
success of the RP in the 1995 election was that it could “adopt a local language to 
win elections” in different regions of the country; thus, though centered around a 
“just order” they focused on regional issues in the Black Sea, Central Anatolia, the 
Southeast and in the Western industrial cities.
28
  This allowed them to gather 
farmers, urban workers, Turkish nationalists, Kurds, and Islamists under one party‟s 
umbrella. 
Whether or not the RP‟s strategies at the local level would have been 
sustainable in the long term to distinguish themselves from the other “imitator” 
parties, at that particular juncture in time, these strategies were both effective and 
largely “ordinary” rather than religious.  The party‟s success over previous 
strongholds of the leftist parties cannot be understood as a radical religious 
transformation of the constituents on the left, but rather that this segment of the 
electorate seemed to consider that the Welfare Party more closely embodied the 
type of populist, social welfare party that they were hoping for.  While the place of 
an academic is arguably not to propose the nature of the hidden intentions behind 
the party or the Islamic civil society that worked on its behalf, regardless of these 
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intentions—whatever they were—the fact of the matter is that these organizations 
were popular in their communities, not because of religious propaganda, but 
because of the charitable services and concern they demonstrated in their behaviors 
to their communities.  Rather than arguing that the RP exploited religion for 
political purposes, the opposite might be argued: one could reasonable claim that 
the party, intentionally or unintentionally addressed economic issues such that it 
translated into religious gain.  Certainly some of the interest shown toward religion 
and Islamism during this period in Turkey‟s political history could be attributed to 
the fact that people were pleased with the RP‟s handling of municipal governments 
and their concern for people‟s economic situations.  In other words, because the RP 
was seen as governing so effectively and it also carried the image of “religious 
government,” it created a temporary increase in greater acceptance or desire for 
religious government because the party was the definitive proxy for this notion. 
The big gains for the RP in the 1990s, until the party was shut down by a 
ruling of the Constitutional Court for undermining the secular regime in January of 
1998, were most dramatically registered in the poor and working class populations 
of the major urban centers.  While they also seemed to make gains at the expense of 
the dramatic collapse of the “center right” parties of the period in all areas of the 
country, for which less explanation of the vote switching is needed—i.e. voters on 
the right were “abandoning the ship” of two parties steeped in extensive corruption 
allegations and poor governance records—it seems more significant for a party, 
whose image positioning was undoubtedly on the right, to register such gains from 
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a bloc of voters who had been casting their votes on the left.  Understanding this 
phenomenon and removing it from the realm of “Islamization” and “identity 
politics” and focusing on how and when this bloc of voters has been willing to 
make a change.  As was true when Ecevit managed to capture these voters for the 
CHP from the Justice Party (AP) in the late 1960s and 1970s, the electorate in these 
poor and working class urban communities have consistently responded well to 
those who have an expressed plan to address their needs and are willing to interact 
with them face to face.  Whether the party is clearly secular or has a religious 
conservative flavor seems to make less of a difference. 
A return to the conclusions of Karpat‟s seminal work on squatter areas in 
Istanbul in the late 1960s, when the winds of fortune were changing among these 
communities for the Justice Party and the CHP.  Karpat observes, “Politics in the 
squatter settlement is not inspired by radical ideologies. However, such ideologies 
can find acceptance in the settlement if the normal channels for demand satisfaction 
and political participation are closed to squatters.”29  Note that what is critical for 
the members of these communities are the satisfaction of their basic needs and 
demands and political participation—i.e. the right of political contact and 
interaction.  Ideology is peripheral or accidental in relation to the focus on explicit 
material concerns.  Studying this period of politics in the late 1960s and 1970s, 
Geyikdağı expresses a similar conclusion, relegating religion to a secondary 
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concern: “If a relatively secularist party looks more promising in the economic 
sphere, the majority of voters are likely to vote for it rather than the less secularist 
party which manipulated religion but whose economic policy does not look 
promising to the voter.”30 
In analyzing the electoral success of the Welfare Party, Heper takes 
Geyikdağı‟s argument and demonstrates its logical converse—i.e. that if a religious 
party looks more promising in the economic sphere, they are likely to vote for it 
than for other secularist parties who have no clear economic plan to address their 
needs.  After pointing out Geyikdağı‟s analysis, he writes, “In the 1995 national 
elections, the secular parties, including the ones on the left, did not offer the 
electorate well-thought-out and persuasive policy packages.
31
  In a similar vein, 
White writes: 
Although the other parties continued to represent themselves as 
populist, in the reshuffling of economic priorities in the 1980s they 
had lost either the ability to deliver egalitarian programs or interest 
in the paternalistic himaye support and protection of the masses.
32
 
 
The populism of the party was demonstrated by the fact that local party leaders and 
the party faithful were making “face-to-face” contact with the voters in these urban 
communities and making an effort to address their explicit material needs.
33
 
Finally, it is also interesting to note that, as the RP‟s success increased at the 
local government level and grassroots organizations were able to mobilize on their 
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behalf, unlike the other major political parties, they began to rely on media 
propaganda less and on actually providing noticeable services as the primary means 
of mobilizing voters.  As the goal of the party in the 1990s seemed to be to 
legitimize itself and present the party as an “ordinary” party, though this strategy 
was employed in media propaganda in 1991,
34
 it seems that by 1995, the party 
counted on local mobilization and its municipal record to more clearly convey this 
message.  Necmettin Erbakan, the leader of the party, showed a near ambivalence 
toward media propaganda throughout the campaign, and in fact when he chose to 
speak, often expressed extreme sentiments that, of course, played into the worst 
fears of the secularists.  He also chose to avoid participation in any of the open 
forum debates among the major political party leaders,
35
 and to use the terminology 
provided in a recent study by Barr, he took the role of an anti-establishment 
outsider.
36
 Considering the RP‟s careful and non-religious appeals in 1991, it is 
interesting that he made statements such as describing his party candidates as 
praying, fasting and Qur‟an reading personnel that would remove the last personnel 
(kadro) of the Republic, referring to the West as infidels (gavur), and promising to 
tear up the Customs Union agreement with Europe.
37
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Whether intentional or not, the occasional outbursts of wild opinion by 
Erbakan became the focus of attention of the other parties and operated in effect as 
a smoke screen distracting the parties from how the RP was actually mobilizing 
voters—simple bread and butter issues and grassroots mobilization.  Thus, while the 
major parties emphasized an electoral attack on Erbakan at a discursive level and in 
regard to its religious identity, they remained distant from the voters and failed to 
address the concerns that the general populace was actually interested in.
38
  Deniz 
Baykal, the leader of the newly reformed CHP, indicated that he preferred to talk to 
people through television rather than to hold public meetings.
39
  In one of the 
advertisements of the CHP in 1995, Baykal‟s idea of populism appeared to be 
suggesting that the people could send their concerns to him through fax.
40
  Thus, 
while the RP was focusing on their own appeal to voters through hizmet,
41
 the 
approach of the previous paradigm, the rest of the major parties began to shift their 
approach to campaigning in national elections.  Thus, while the Welfare Party had a 
very short stint as the leader of a coalition government at the top, from June 1996 
through June of 1997, the repercussions of the image of a religious party in power 
managed to shape the political paradigm through the general elections of 2007.
42
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Table 9.1 – Electoral Trends of the Period43 
 1995 1999 2002 2007 
Top-Two Parties’ vote % 41% 40.2% 53.7% 67.5% 
Effective # of Parties (Mod. 
Golosov) – National 
 
5.48 5.78 4.34 2.60 
Effective # of Parties (Mod. 
Golosov) – Provincial Ave. 
 
4.39 4.84 4.13 2.90 
Volatility – National 
Aggregate 
 
22.7 22.3 57.0 21.0 
Volatility – National “Inter-
bloc”  
 
1.7 7.9 4.1 7.5 
Voter Turnout 85.2% 87.1% 79.1% 84.2% 
 
 
9.2 Dimensions of Competition: 9.2.1 National Campaign Discourse  
9.2.1.1 Religion-Secularism Axis 
 
The entrance of the Welfare Party into mainstream politics brought with it a 
secular and religious discursive environment never before seen in Turkish electoral 
contest.
44
  Though parties had used religious discourse in the past, it was short-
lived—as in the 1957 elections—or operated as a defense mechanism that generated 
little response from mainstream parties, such as Demirel‟s occasional use of 
religious terminology in the 1960s, especially, in response to attacks regarding his 
religiosity. When the apparent exploitation of religious sentiment was employed, 
the reaction of other parties was to refer to it as such—i.e. religious exploitation. 
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New to the political debate were persistent cries to rally around the banner of the 
state-endorsed interpretation of secularism; appeals that effectively called on the 
secularist faithful to gather around the banner of a party primarily for that reason.  
The continuation of terrorist actions and actions against the state by the PKK and 
the persistent continuance of political parties with a strong but unofficial Kurdish 
nationalist underbelly also brought regular references to nationalist themes by most 
parties, with the surprising exception of the 1999 elections when, ironically, the two 
largest vote getters were a nationalist party on the left and right.  
In addition to discursive competitive debate colored with religious and 
nationalist themes, the entrance of certain parties, which had previously been 
understood as extremist or radical, into the center of the political arena as power 
players brought with it a greater emphasis on positioning one‟s party in the center 
(merkez).  While journalists and students of Turkish politics had begun to use such 
terminology earlier, the period beginning with the 1995 elections (and the “specter” 
of the Welfare Party) initiated the usage of such terms by political party leaders 
themselves to describe themselves in campaign speeches. Interestingly enough, it 
was the peripheral parties, such as those derived from the “National Outlook” (Milli 
Görüş) movement and the National Action Party (MHP) led by Devlet Bahçeli that 
were most insistent in describing themselves as “centrist.”  Of course, along with 
the sacred discourse also came the traditional discussion of the profane—i.e. the 
typical promises for economic and structural development.  And, while the hizmet 
discourse was maintained to some extent by parties considered to be on the right, 
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the discourse on both sides was often colored with arguments of who was more 
corrupt and who was more honest. 
Though the party with a clearly Islamist identity
45
 (the RP) was removed 
from the picture after the 1995 elections, this discourse was maintained among the 
major competing parties through the 2007 general elections.  Such a discursive 
environment allowed two possible responses (see Table 9.3), either a decision to 
mobilize the electorate through the cultural worldviews of religious conservatism or 
Turkish secularism, which necessitated a somewhat exclusionary discourse, or an 
attempt to avoid a position on either side in hopes of appearing inclusive and 
attracting voters from both major kulturkampfs.     
In 1995, as mentioned above, the Welfare Party‟s success that initiated a 
new paradigm, shifting the poles along which politics was contested, primarily 
resided in their explicit performance of hizmet at the local and municipal level.  
When Erbakan, the party leader, did enter into campaign discourse, while also 
addressing the economic promises and the parties record of service, he tended to 
send out religiously-laced messages that fulfilled the conspiracy-filled concerns 
                                                 
45
 Although “Islamist”, “Islamist-oriented”, or “Islamic” are regularly employed for the Welfare 
Party and the Milli Görüş movement as a whole, and such terminology is accurate if one means by 
this “the belief that religious values have a place in politics,” the question of the degree and extent of 
the combination of religious values, morals, norms and politics is an issue of contention.  There is an 
important difference between the belief that Shariah law should be the basis of the regime and the 
desire for the consideration of a number of moral issues that are inspired by Islamic beliefs.  The 
latter fits closely with much of the activity of “religious conservatives” in most developed 
democracies in the “West”—in terms of legislative debates over issues like birth control, abortion 
and gay rights—and, outside of a few isolated declarations regarding Shariah by Welfare Party 
members, this interpretation best fits the mainstream discourse and behavior of the parties.  Thus, my 
usage of “Islamist” in the text should be understood as interchangable with “religious conservative,” 
which is perhaps a better, less loaded, and more accurate term, but rarely used in the literature when 
it comes to politics in countries with majority Muslim populations. 
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burdening the minds of many of those in the secularist camp, and instigated a 
discourse by the mainstream parties considered to be in the center (the Motherland 
Party and the True Path Party on the center-right, and the Democratic Left Party and 
the Republican People‟s Party on the center-left) that left issues of policy behind to 
focus on the issue of religion and devout voters.  For example, Erbakan tended to  
 
Table 9.3 – Religious Discourse in Elections for the Major Parties  
 Intentional appeals 
to the devout 
Attempt to avoid a position Intentional appeal to 
secularists 
1995 Welfare Party (R)* 
Motherland Party (R) 
True Path Party (R) Republican People’s 
Party(L) 
Democratic Left Party (L) 
1999 Fazilet Party (R)  
True Path Party (R) 
Democratic Left Party (L) 
Nationalist Action Party (R) 
Republican People‟s 
Party(L) 
Motherland Party (R) 
2002 Republican People’s 
Party (L) 
Justice & Development Party (R) 
Nationalist Action Party (R) 
True Path Party (R) 
Democratic Left Party (L) 
Motherland Party (R) 
2007  Justice & Development Party (R)  
Nationalist Action Party (R) 
Republican People’s 
Party(L) 
* (R) and (L) represent parties that are generally understood as occupying a right or left 
position in Turkish politics, respectively.  Parties in italics successfully passed the 10 percent 
threshold in elections. Parties in bold took the plurality in the elections. 
 
make statements such as: “Three weeks from now, the mentality that has ruled the 
country since the Tanzimat Edict in 1839 will change, and a new world will be 
constructed,”46 “18 days from now, we will conquer Turkey,”47 and “Turkey has 
been governed for 70 years by the Western mentality, from which it is high time for 
us to be rescued.  Our political staff prays five times a day, fasts, reads the 
Qur‟an—they are morally spotless.  Our devout party members will become the 
government.  The existing members in government are the Republic‟s last 
                                                 
46
 “RP‟nin Ankara çıkarması,” Zaman, 4 December 1995. 
47
 “Erbakan: RP‟yi iktidara kadınlar taşıyacak,” Zaman, 7 December 1995. 
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personnel, and the time till we are rescued from them is short.”48  Although it is 
possible for one to interpret these remarks innocently, especially if one takes the 
comments in conjunction with the party‟s moderate positions in its election 
manifest,
49
 their bold and vague claims certainly triggered the sensitivities and 
imagination of Turkish secularists and those competing against him.  For the latter, 
they were certainly committed, in one way or another, of proving wrong Erbakan‟s 
statement that “there are two types of people in Turkey: those who are Welfare 
supporters and those who are candidates to be Welfare supporters.”50  
As the leaders of all the four parties considered to be in the center had 
unmistakable ties to the secular kulturkampf, whether or not the same could be said 
for all of the candidates under their parties‟ banners, the discursive positions each 
“competitor‟ party took often seemed to be complementary to their positional 
counterpart.  In 1995, however, for the most part, the competitor parties mirrored 
one another. For example, on the center-right, while Tansu Çiller, the leader of the 
True Path Party (DYP), promised not to form a coalition government with the RP, 
she also said that her party is busily working to put more mosques in Europe.”51 
The leader of the Motherland Party (ANAP), Mesut Yılmaz appealed to religious 
voters even more, hoping to swipe some voters away from Erbakan‟s ranks.  While 
he accused Erbakan of being a religious merchant and that he was exploiting 
religion for political purposes, in the same speech he proclaimed that “the 
                                                 
48
 “Erbakan‟a sönük karşılama,” Milliyet, 10 December 1995. 
49
 “Refah‟tan tarihi dönüş,” Hürriyet, 3 December 1995. 
50
 “RP‟nin Ankara çıkarması,” Zaman, 4 December 1995. 
51
 “Camiyi Avrupa‟ya götürüyoruz,” Milliyet, 16 December 1995. 
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Motherland Party actually provides the best service to religion” and that the enemy 
of religion is a separatist and unbeliever (kafir).
52
  Elsewhere, while he argued that 
“the glorious religion of Islam is too big to squeeze into one party, he also 
proclaimed that ANAP was a party for nationalists and conservatives.
53
  In the 
advertisements for the party, that largely attacked Tansu Çiller, as Prime Minister, 
many of these featured a woman with full head-covering complaining about being 
deceived by the government,
54
 thus creating a visual connection between devout 
people and a vote for ANAP. 
While the leaders of the center-right tried to steal religious votes away from 
Erbakan and the RP, the center-left parties tried to scare the secularists into their 
party folds.  The leader of the DSP, Bülent Ecevit, claimed that the RP would make 
Turkey even more backwards than Iran, and that the mentality of that party was 
anachronistic, feudalistic and intolerant of women.
55
  In almost every speech, Ecevit 
emphasized that the RP had failed to nominate any women as candidates for 
parliament and declared that women voters would punish the party for this.
56
  Deniz 
Baykal, the leader of the CHP, took a strong secularist stance and accused the right 
of being taken over by radicalism and religious cults.
57
  Both parties on the left took 
on rhetoric that suggested that the party offered, not alternative policy, but salvation 
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 “Din düşmanı bölücü, kafir,” Cumhuriyet, 21 December 1995. 
53
 “Bacıdan kaçıp hocaya tutulma,” Cumhuriyet, 19 December 1995. 
54
 For an example, see the advertisement for ANAP in Hürriyet, 10 December 1995. 
55
 “RP‟ye en büyük dersi kadınlar verecek,” Cumhuriyet, 11 December 1995. 
56
 For a number of examples, Ibid.; “Ecevet‟ten RP‟ye geri kafalılar,” Cumhuriyet, 13 December 
1995; “Refah çağdışı, CHP‟nin yeni sol uydurma,” Cumhuriyet, 19 December 1995; “Ecevit: RP 
ikiyüzlü bir parti,” Cumhuriyet, 23 December 1995. 
57
 “CHP‟den köklü reform vaadi,” Cumhuriyet, 2 December 1995. 
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from the religious threat.  Baykal used the language of the country being 
surrounded as if under siege (kuşatma), from which the party would offer salvation 
(kurtarmak)
58
 or be the antidote (panzehir).
59
  In the political advertisements for the 
party, Turkish society was divided into two parts; on one side was the CHP, and on 
the other, the RP.  The latter represented a desire to drag everyone back into the 
“darkness of the Middle Ages” and made “open calls for Shariah.”60 Both parties 
also used the threat of the Welfare Party as a means to suggest that it would be 
dangerous to vote for other parties.
61
  Baykal advised voters that, due to the RP 
threat, they were in no position to throw their votes away on other parties (such as 
the DSP).
62
 
In subsequent national elections—i.e. in 1999, 2002, and 2007—a slightly 
different strategy was employed.  “Competitor” parties, occupying similar image-
positions or competing among the same segments of the electorate tended to 
differentiate themselves on this issue somewhat.  Thus, in 1999, on the center-right, 
Tansu Çiller of the DYP went out of her way to present herself as the leader of the 
devout.
63
  She stopped speaking at the reading of the ezan from the mosque, accuses 
other parties of the right of closing down Qur‟an course and preventing headscarved 
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 Ibid. 
59
 “RP‟nin panzehiri biziz,” Cumhuriyet, 11 December 1995. 
60
 “Ben, Deniz Baykal. Ben de bir seçmenim,” CHP political advertisement, Cumhuriyet, 20 
December 1995. Similar dichotomies can also be found in the other CHP advertisements.  See, “Ben, 
Deniz Baykal. Benim de bir ailem var,” Cumhuriyet, 21 December 1995; “CHP, Türkiye‟dir. Yeni 
CHP: Yeni Türkiye,” Cumhuriyet, 22 December 1995. 
61
 “Ecevit: Sahte sosyal demokratları sandığa gömeceğiz,” Cumhuriyet, 20 December 1995; Yeni 
CHP: Yeni Türkiye,” Cumhuriyet, 22 December 1995. 
62
 “Güvercin, at-kurt izinde ilerliyor,” Cumhuriyet, 18 December, 1995. 
63
 She actually made that explicit claim.  See, “Çiller, Hoca gibi,” Radikal, 10 April 1999. 
 378 
women from entering universities.
 64
  In contrast, Mesut Yılmaz, the leader of 
ANAP, spent much of his campaign discourse claiming that the other parties were 
either exploiting religion or Atatürk65 although he also made a point to pause his 
speeches during the ezan after Çiller had done so the day before.66  In the 2002 
elections, both parties moderated their religious references.  Çiller largely avoided 
the topic, but Yılmaz, at several occasions, indicated that a vote for the Justice and 
Development Party (AKP) would be an invitation to another secularism-religion 
crisis as had occurred on February 28, 1997, which started the process that ousted 
the RP from power and then shut the party down.  As these two parties traditionally 
occupying the “center-right” began to implode throughout the period, a process 
clearly evident by 1999, if not by 1995, and finalized by their inability to pass the 
threshold in 2002, their influence on campaign discourse at the national level 
became largely irrelevant by 2007, such that their opinions rarely made it into even 
mainstream newspapers, despite the fact that they had merged to reform the new 
Democrat Party.  Their position and the mantle of the center-right was bestowed by 
the electorate onto the AKP. 
On the center-left, one finds Ecevit of the DSP speaking very moderately, if 
at all, about the religion-secularism issue in the 1999 elections, proclaiming that 
                                                 
64
 “Çiller‟in Kırat‟ı hala doymadı,” Radikal, 8 April 1999; see also, “Çiller: Fazilet din istismar 
yapıyor,” Radikal, 7 April 1999. 
65
 In terms of religion, he was particularly criticizing the Virtue Party (FP), the successor to the 
Welfare Party, and the DYP.  As for exploiting Atatürk, he was targeting Baykal and the CHP.  See, 
“Yılmaz‟dan Baykal‟a ret,” Radikal, 6 April 1999; “Yılmaz‟dan hile uyarısı,” Radikal, 12 April 
1999. 
66
 “Yılmaz‟ın hedefi Erbakan,” Radikal, 8 April 1999 
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they give complete respect to the beliefs of the devout while attempting to prevent 
the exploitation of religion in the political arena,
67
 ultimately garnering for itself the 
plurality of the vote.  The CHP, meanwhile, continued its presentation of itself as 
the defender of secularism and as the party of Atatürk.68  During the protests by 
secularist civil society groups and individuals regarding the Welfare Party, the 
image of Atatürk became a popular symbol that represented opposition and 
protection from the perceived religious threat, the momentum of the symbolic 
power of the popularized images of Atatürk culminated with great fanfare at the 
75
th
 anniversary of the Republic in 1998.
69
  However, the appropriation of the 
nation‟s founder by staunch Turkish secularists as a talisman-like charm to ward off 
a religious threat has continued throughout the period.
70
  Baykal and the CHP also 
tried to capitalize on DSP‟s apparent softness on the secularism issue by accusing 
the party of being a branch on the same tree as the phoenix of the RP, the Virtue 
Party (FP).
71
  Ecevit, not surprisingly, accused the CHP of exploiting the symbol of 
Atatürk.72  In the end, the DSP received a plurality of the vote and the CHP found 
itself unable to pass the 10 percent threshold and remained out of politics. 
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 “Çiller‟e ağır suçlama,” Radikal, 13 April 1999.  For another example of Ecevit‟s moderate 
discourse, see “Ecevit: Çiller hırcın,” Radikal, 11 April 1999. 
68
 “Laik Cumhuriyeti ödünsüz koruyacağız,” CHP advertisement, Cumhuriyet, 15 April 1999; see 
also the advertisement by the CHP regarding Atatürk in Cumhuriyet, 17 April 1999. 
69
 For more on this see, Esra Özyürek, Nostalgia for the Modern: State Secularism and Everyday 
Politics in Turkey (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006). 
70
 See also, Yael Navaro-Yashin, Faces of the State: Secularism and Public Life in Turkey 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002). 
71
 “Baykal: Yılmaz yargılansın,” Radikal, 12 April 1999. 
72
 “Ecevit kendini kutladı,” Radikal, 10 April 1999. 
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In 2002, with the emergence of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) 
and the impending retirement of Bülent Ecevit due to ailing health, the CHP tried to 
conveniently slide into the space left by the fading DSP, and thus suddenly 
presented itself as a moderately (friend of the devout) secularist party.  Baykal 
toured the country with the party‟s new members, Kemal Derviş and Yaşar Nuri 
Öztürk, the former a well-known economist and former member of the World Bank 
and the latter a well-known religious scholar with a famous translation of the 
Qur‟an into Turkish.  Thus, with Baykal pictured in every photo-op with these two 
men, he symbolically seemed to be directing the “center-left” party with liberal 
economy on one side and rational religion on the other.  In stark contrast to his 
earlier discourse, he began to mix religious language into his speeches, pronouncing 
expressions such as “if we are not able to make you happy, may God withhold this 
office from us”73 and, for the winners of the election, “those upon whom God 
rained down favor.”74  References to “sin,” “morals” and the “Kaaba” peppered the 
political leader‟s speeches, and he began to pause his speeches when the ezan was 
being read from the mosque.
75
  Though the CHP was still trying to attract the 
secularist voters, who often communicated that they voted for the party in light of 
the threat of religious society not out of desire,
76
 Baykal seemed to be trying to, at 
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 “Baykal: Oyumuzu satmayın,” Cumhuriyet, 16 October 2002. 
74
 “Baykal: Bizim alnımız „ak‟,” Radikal, 30 October 2002. 
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 “Hesap sorun, şimdi öfke zamanı,” Cumhuriyet, 4 October 2002; “Erzakı al, oy verme,” Radikal, 
16 October 2002; “Baykal: Oyumuzu satmayın,” Cumhuriyet, 16 October 2002; “Hedefimiz önce 
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 “Baykal: Laikliğe sahip çıkın,” Cumhuriyet, 20 October 2002; “Sol kerhen CHP diyor,” 
Cumhuriyet, 24 October 2002; “Birleşme adresi CHP,” Cumhuriyet, 16 October 2002. 
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least superficially, soften the anti-religious rhetoric in order to open the party more 
toward the center and the right.
77
  Ecevit and the DSP, shrouded in problems 
inevitably caused by the failing health of its raison d'etre—i.e. Ecevit—returned to 
a religious threat discourse in order to attract voters to the party.
78
 Following up the 
less than 20 percent garnered in the 2002 elections, the CHP of 2007 maintained the 
idea of religious threat through supportive media and civil society organs, but 
largely dropped the religion-secularism discourse at the official national level of the 
campaign for the issues of corruption and nationalism. 
What distinguishes this paradigm from all other previous paradigms is that 
religion became an issue of identification that, based on the discourse surrounding 
the elections, was a primary source of polarizing voters along religio-cultural, rather 
than functional, lines.
79
  The even greater irony is that this phenomenon seemed 
even more true for the parties of the traditional center, particularly parties of the 
center-left.
80
  The center-right exploited religious discourse to steal votes from the 
RP and the FP, but the appeals were made in cultural terms, not in relation to 
religious policy, per se; on the center-left, the party appealed to those of the Turkish 
secularist worldview—i.e. staunch positivists—by framing the political contest as a 
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 This behavior by Baykal and the CHP in the 2002 elections was also noted by Ciddi, calling this 
period CHP‟s experiment with an “Anatolian Left” agenda.  Sinan Ciddi, “The Republican People‟s 
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 “AKP gerçek kimliğini saklıyor,” Cumhuriyet, 6 October 2002. 
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N. Grigoriadis, “Europe and the impasse of centre-left politics in Turkey: lessons from the Greek 
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battle between two forces, darkness and enlightenment. The attitude of the 
supportive media organs and the other political parties on the center-left helps 
clarify this identity based mobilization.  In the 2007 elections, for instance, Zeki 
Sezer, the new leader of the DSP, opted to keep his party out of the elections, but 
toured the country for the CHP, presenting the struggle as one between darkness 
and enlightenment.
81
  A former Social-Democrat Populist Party member gives the 
following explanation for his support of the CHP:  
Don‟t burn your own mattress by your anger at Deniz Baykal.  He 
has also saddened and disappointed me.  He eliminated democracy 
within the party and has taken the party in the wrong direction.  But 
what can we do; these are our friends.  For this reason alone, it is 
both right and necessary to give our support to the CHP.
82
 
 
One notes that the reason for support is based on relational ties, and despite the 
harshest criticism toward a party leader that one could level out and ideological 
difference, this relational connection with the party is presented as the necessary 
reason for aligning with the CHP and that there is no other choice.  The Kemalist 
daily Cumhuriyet, on numerous days prior to the election, placed a black box at the 
top of the front page with a slit in the middle, from which one can see the eyes of a 
woman looking through, creating the impression of the black çarşaf, typically worn 
by women in Turkey who are members of one of a number of religious cults or 
sects.  The image is accompanied by the words: “Do you see the danger within this 
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 “Karanlığı devam mı?” Cumhuriyet, 3 July 2007. 
82
 “İttifakı destekliyoruz,” Cumhuriyet, 5 July 2007.  Emphasis is mine. 
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election‟s voting box?  We need to unify our votes for the sake of a secular and 
democratic Turkey.  Take ownership of our Republic.”83 
Ironically, if one considers the religious-secular discursive strategy together 
with the election results, one finds that, with the exception of the 1995 election, the 
parties that took the plurality of the vote were parties that generally attempted to 
avoid taking a position in this discourse.  The center-left DSP won in 1999 with 
such a strategy and the campaign discourse of the AKP, the top leaders of whom 
were groomed within but broke away from the Milli Görüş movement that 
undergirded the RP, the FP, and the Felicity Party (SP), and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 
has largely avoided clear religious appeals.  Even when constantly pressured by the 
electorate to discuss religious issues, like the headscarf and imam hatip schools, 
Erdoğan tended to frustrate both secularists and religious conservatives by passing 
the buck or not taking a clear position on those topics.  In 2002, Erdoğan repeatedly 
insisted that such questions should not be addressed toward him, but rather to the 
other parties.  In the 2007 election, while he tended to enter into a discursive 
framework of “us versus them”—i.e. “them” being the CHP84—religious policy and 
expressions were almost non-existent in Erdoğan‟s campaign speeches, which were 
primarily focused on the party‟s economic accomplishments.85  The 1995 exception 
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is also not a strong exception to this trend—i.e. that the RP won the plurality of the 
vote despite religious discourse in speeches—if we consider that the RP was basing 
its mobilization of voters on other factors and placed campaign speech-making in a 
very clearly secondary role.  In other words, the observation by Karpat regarding 
the 1957 elections seems to still hold true:  explicit recourse to religious (or 
secularist) rhetoric in Turkish political campaigns offers little benefit, or perhaps in 
some cases harm, to those parties that employ it.
86
 
 
9.2.1.2 Left-Right and Center Imaging 
 
Corresponding to the entrance of parties traditional understood as being 
located on the radical right, the self-identification and imaging of parties along a 
position returned to campaign discourse.  While parties on the “left” debated about 
the appropriateness of the adjectives that they placed next to their image—such as 
“democratic left” or “new left”—parties on the right hovered around the usage of 
“center” (merkez).  The employment of merkez by parties on the right to create a 
position image, though the expression had been used by journalists and scholars to 
describe parties for some time, does not seem to be an accidental appropriation.  If 
one considers that the imaging of the second paradigm was focused on the “left of 
center” (ortanın solu) expression, which is actually more precisely interpreted “left 
of the middle,” the usage of “center” (merkez) rather than “middle” (orta) seems to 
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 Kemal Karpat, “The Turkish Elections of 1957,” Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 14, No. 2 
(1961), p. 444.  One must be careful to distinguish the utilization of religion in campaign discourse 
from religiosity as a domain of identification.  While explicit dependence on religion as a discursive 
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offer benefit.  This will be discussed in detail in the section regarding domains of identification. 
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be making a substantive distinction. As in English, where “middle” signifies an 
average between two poles or points—i.e. designating a position in space—“center” 
conveys a substantive place around which other positions hover and which has a 
location of its own accord.  In other words, the “middle” is determined by the other 
points; the “center”, however, sets itself as the point upon which other positions are 
measured.  The reason why both the parties designated as radical or extreme right 
and the moderate right resorted to such terminology has to be understood in light of 
this distinction.   
In the previous paradigm, parties like ANAP and DYP chose not to 
delineate themselves in regard to any sort of “left” or “right” positioning.  Even the 
expression “center” seemed to be intentionally avoided.  If we consider that Turgut 
Özal regularly claimed to represent the interests of the four previous political 
tendencies, it would have been much easier for him to declare that his party was a 
centrist party, but he never used such terminology, despite its logical 
appropriateness.  By 1995, with the rise of the Welfare Party, it seems to have 
become necessary for these two parties to position themselves in relation to the RP 
and MHP on one side and the DSP and CHP on the other.  The external usage by 
journalists and political scientists of the center-right, though previously avoided in 
earlier electoral contests, suddenly became a convenient image of their position.
87
  
“Center”, thus, represented inclusion in the political center—i.e. being a party 
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 For some examples of this usage by the parties, see “Sağın adresi ANAP olacak,” Cumhuriyet, 9 
December 1995; “G. Doğu‟ya silahsız çözüm,” Milliyet, 6 December 1995; “Yılmaz DSP‟ye oy 
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within the accepted boundaries of the state system—and “right” indicated that they 
were still representing the views of conservatives. 
The parties traditionally placed on the radical or extreme right countered this 
positioning, not by claiming that they were also “center-right”, but by arguing, in 
fact that they were the center party, particularly starting with the 1999 elections.  
Recai Kutan, the leader of the FP announced that the position of the FP‟s political 
foundations was directly in the center and that all the other parties were fringe 
parties.”88  Devlet Bahçeli the newly appointed leader of the MHP after the death of 
the party founder, Alparslan Türkeş, declared that with all the discussion of center-
right and center-left parties, “Where is the center?  The center is exactly the 
MHP.”89  In this case, the meaning intended by these political leaders was that their 
party represented the societal center—i.e. the central values of the nation (millet).  
For example, Kutan considered the FP the exact manifestation of the nation and the 
national will, and that voting for the FP would be like bringing the national will into 
parliament.
90
  While the FP did not survive to the following national election in 
2002,
91
 the MHP continues to be an important player in the party system, and it has 
maintained its insistence that it occupies the social center.  In the party‟s 2009 
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program, it writes that while taking its foundation as the poetic composition of the 
nation‟s total national and spiritual values, the party is the political representation of 
the social center.
92
  The initiation of the AKP into national elections in 2002 also 
found this party placing itself in the center.  Erdoğan stated: 
 With our conservative democrat identity, the AKP desires to rebuild 
the fragmented center-right in Turkey along with eliminating the old 
understandings of politics, and place our political foundations in the 
center. . . The AKP in a very short period has reached its objective 
and sits at the very center of Turkish politics.  The AKP is in the 
center.
93
 
 
Although the party only chose to utilize this expression in 2002, it began electoral 
competition with the same discursive imaging as the two parties on the right that 
had employed it with relative success in the previous election.
94
 
By emphasizing their centeredness, these parties were able to communicate 
several messages through the image simultaneously.  First of all, it was a discursive 
challenge to their placement by external observers on the far right, claiming instead 
that they had moved into a more moderate or mainstream position.  This was a 
particularly effective strategy in the 1990s when the parties traditionally understood 
as occupying the center-right were in the process of imploding on themselves like 
dying stars.  By arguing for a center position, they seemed to transmit cues to the 
public that they could effectively carry the burden of the institutionalized space that 
was being vacated by the DYP and ANAP.  Kutan explicitly said as much following 
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the election in 1999, “The nation sent a clear message that the [voter] concentration 
on the right would no longer be the domain of ANAP and the DYP; instead they 
have moved the MHP and FP to the center in their place.”95  This strategic 
approach, therefore, also complicates popular interpretations of Turkish voters that 
suggest that there has been a terrific ideological shift to the right;
96
 it might also be 
reasonably proposed that there has been, at least at the discursive level, an 
ideological shift of the far right toward the center.  This confusion of placement on 
the right can arguably account for the apparent sliding of self-identification of the 
electoral on the left-right scale toward the right.  While individuals increasingly 
identified with parties which were still externally designated as “far right,” the 
constellation of values and policies of those parties had been moving toward 
moderation and the political center. 
Secondly, even more explicitly than the underlying intentions of using 
expressions such as “center-right” and “center-left”, the appropriation of the term 
center by the MHP and the FP intended a break with the benchmark of the previous 
image-positioning.  Rather than adhere in some fashion to the older European 
conceptions of “left”, “right” and “center”, these parties argued through their 
interpretation, that the center was located within Turkish society itself, and as they 
represented the average or predominant values of society, they were, therefore, the 
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parties that actually occupied the center. This reestablishment of the benchmark for 
positioning coincides with the significant distinctions between the substance of 
older categorizations of left and right in Turkish politics and the politics and 
substantive meanings of categorizations in this paradigm as manifested in 
Çarkoğlu‟s study on the left and right as a dependent variable.97  In this paradigm, 
left-right distinctions offered no significant indicators of one‟s economic outlook, 
but placement has become correlated with social and cultural values and identities. 
On the left, there was no officially recognized threat
98
 to the two parties 
(DSP and CHP) that dominated the vote in that area of voter concentration; hence, 
the appropriation of “center” by the parties in this bloc was generally not observed.  
While journalists, the media, and traditional parties on the “center-right” referred to 
the CHP and DSP as “center-left” parties, the parties identified themselves as “the 
new left” and “democratic left” respectively.  Thus, while these two parties were 
competing against one another in 1995, the argument over imagery had to do with 
which adjective and its substantive meaning better represented the electorate in 
Turkey who identified themselves as being on the left.  Campaigning for the DSP in 
1995, Ecevit would proclaim, “There is only one left in Turkey: the democratic 
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left”99 and that this type of leftist, was not new, but true, national and modern.100  
The CHP‟s advertisements, in contrast, declared, “The CHP is Turkey. The New 
CHP, the New Left, a New Turkey”101 and placed the DSP in the same category as 
the ultra-nationalist parties (MHP and BBP).
102
  In 1999, the two parties largely left 
one another alone, but Baykal chose at one point to attack Ecevit by claiming that 
he was no longer an Atatürkist and harbored religious reactionaries in his party,103 
and Ecevit, not surprisingly, accused Baykal of exploiting Atatürk for political 
gain.
104
  Throughout this paradigm, as has been observed since the second 
paradigm, parties on both sides tended to attack their competitor parties by 
repositioning them on the other side, or by accusing them of being puppets of the 
other side.
105
 
As the number of parties in the party system shrunk, particularly during the 
2002 campaign when it became clear that the contest would be between two major 
players (CHP and AKP), the need utilize left-right or center imagery declined and 
arguably became more dangerous to do so.
106
  As the number of parties declined, 
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the social bases of the existing parties expanded, causing any clear positioning of 
the party to potentially scare away certain voting blocs that congregated beneath the 
party banners.  While it was critical, for example, for CHP to maintain their 
traditional leftist voters, the party‟s policies began to slide increasingly to the 
right—i.e. taking an increasingly pro-market stance and employing nationalist 
rhetoric—in an attempt to widen the party‟s voting base.  Any clear delineation of 
the parties position could threaten to upset the party‟s fruit basket.  The same was at 
least as true for the AKP.  Huddled underneath the party‟s banner were 
conservatives, Islamists, some nationalists and secular liberals.  Rather than place 
themselves definitively on a line, as time passed they chose instead, if anything, to 
their identity as “conservative democrats,” which by the party‟s official definition 
conjures up a forward-thinking, fairly progressive democratic outlook, offering a 
little something for everybody.
107
  Though the MHP, through 2009, still considered 
itself the party of the social center, it also largely moved away from such 
classifications in the national elections in the first decade of the twenty-first 
century. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                        
Turkish roots, and would put them in a position to compete against the DSP.  When it became clear 
that the DSP would not be a serious electoral threat, the need to use the image-positioning of 
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9.2.1.3 Nationalist Discourse in Campaigns 
 
The issue and language of nationalism as a discursive strategy in this 
paradigm has been both important, often in ironic ways, and fluctuated widely from 
election to election.  While 1995 and 2007 involved a great deal of nationalist and 
emotional rhetoric—accusing other leaders of supporting separatists, for example—
the 1999 and 2002 elections passed with little recourse to nationalist discourse.  
This might seem particularly surprising as the two parties with the strongest 
nationalist credentials on the right and left—the MHP and the DSP, respectively—
finished the elections as the two largest vote getters.  Parties also showed varying 
levels of nationalist fervor in their speeches from election to election.  In general, 
however, parties that chose an intra-national inclusive discourse generally ended up 
with greater electoral success than those with more strident discourse, including the 
varying fortunes of MHP from election to election.   
 
Table 9.4 – Nationalist Discourse by Major Parties from 1995-2007 
 Inclusivist / No 
Nationalist Discourse 
Moderate Nationalist 
Discourse 
Strident Nationalist 
Discourse 
 
1995 
CHP RP* 
ANAP 
DSP 
MHP 
DYP 
 
 
1999 
DSP 
MHP 
FP 
ANAP 
DYP 
CHP 
  
2002 AKP 
CHP 
 MHP 
2007  AKP CHP 
MHP 
* The party that received the plurality of the vote is in bold.  Parties that passed the 
10 percent threshold are in italics. 
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In 1995, with the struggle against the violent actions of the Kurdish 
Worker‟s Party (PKK) in full swing, the issue of terrorism was a regular aspect of 
the campaign debate.  Most parties, however, even when touching on nationalist 
sensibilities, approached nationalist discourse in moderation.  For example, the 
leader of the MHP, Alparslan Türkeş, while suggesting that his party could bring an 
end to the pain of mothers whose children were falling victim to the violence and 
that he prioritized the unity of the nation, he also emphasized that he was against, in 
fact afraid, of ethnic discrimination.
108
 ANAP‟s Mesut Yılmaz and the DSP‟s 
Bülent Ecevit described their parties as representing nationalism (milliyetçilik for 
the former and ulusalcılık109 for the latter) appealed to nationalists, but both showed 
concern for the conditions in the Southeast, where a high number of ethnic Kurds 
live.
110
  Necmettin Erbakan‟s nationalism, was framed in relation to Turkey and the 
West and religious in nature, referring to Westerners as infidels (gavur); in terms of 
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Muslims in Turkey, however, he was undoubtedly inclusivist.
111
  The CHP and 
Baykal, meanwhile, enamored with the religious threat posed by the Welfare Party, 
tended to avoid the topic, and its leader even made a speech suggesting the need for 
decentralization,
112
 a popular topic among Kurdish nationalists.  The DYP and 
Tansu Çiller, however, chose to use nationalist sensitivities to her advantage, and 
accused her major competitor on the center-right, Yılmaz, of harboring separatists 
within his party and being willing to sit at the table with Abdullah Öcalan, the 
leader of the PKK.
113
 
The issue of nationalism in the 1999 election is particularly interesting.  The 
two largest victors from the ballot box were the party on the right (MHP) and left 
(DSP) with the most explicit nationalist credentials.  Furthermore, in February, 
approximately two months prior to the election, the leader of the PKK, Abdullah 
Öcalan, was captured and brought back to Turkey and was in custody awaiting trial.  
Prior to his arrest, the new leader of the MHP, Devlet Bahçeli, had promised that, if 
given a chance, he would ensure that the death sentence for Öcalan would be 
carried out if the courts handed down a death penalty.
114
  This has led some students 
of Turkish politics to assume that nationalism was a potent issue in the 1999 
elections, and that people‟s votes for the MHP, in particular, was largely do to their 
nationalists credentials and promises to have Öcalan executed.  When one studies 
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the actual campaign discourse of all parties, however, this argument becomes 
extremely problematic as the most shocking feature of the campaign speeches of 
parties during the election was the near total absense of nationalist rhetoric, a huge 
departure from the 1991 and 1995 elections, and the parties leading the way in 
avoiding nationalist discourse were, in fact, the MHP and the DSP. 
Ecevit of the DSP clearly avoided inflammatory rhetoric of both religious 
and nationalist varieties in his speeches.  When such topics were touched upon, he 
was the opposite of inflammatory.  For example, in Sivas he declared, “It was here 
that we laid the foundations of the Republic.  When we did so, we did not ask 
anyone, „Are you a Turk?  Are you a Kurd?  Are you a Sunni? Or are you an 
Alevi?‟”115  He went on to indicate that his point was that the Turkish Republic did 
not discriminate or care about various identities and that for this reason the actions 
of those who desire to divide the country would be thwarted. 
Besides insisting that the MHP was neither fascist or racist and that it had 
discarded its practices from the past,
116
 Bahçeli seemed to go out of his way to 
avoid mentioning the word “nationalist” even.  Instead, in his speeches, he 
emphasized his personal integrity and the party‟s anti-corruption stance,117 and 
made statements like, “in the National Assembly, tolerance and reconciliation 
should hold sway.  The MHP will bring about such an Assembly”118 and “When we 
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receive governmental power, all social problems will be solved, not in the streets, 
but in the Assembly.”119 In fact, the two discursive elements most prominent in 
campaign speeches were the location of the party in the center and the concept of 
hizmet—i.e. service.120  Despite the election being the first for Bahçeli as the leader 
of the MHP, the party‟s previous inability to pass the threshold and the non-
sensational nature of his campaign speeches resulted in a near absence of coverage 
of his campaign in the major daily newspapers.  The daily Hürriyet was one of the 
few papers to regularly cover the MHP‟s campaign, and in fact, also gave it little 
space.  While the surge in support for the MHP flew under the radar among the big 
newspapers, who were dually shocked on election night,
121
 the massive crowds 
showing up at MHP rallies covered by Hürriyet caused this newspaper to take the 
party seriously as the day of election drew near. 
If nationalist discourse was not the key, why were the DSP and the MHP so 
successful?  Each arrived at a successful election result for a different reason.  
Because Ecevit happened to be sitting in the Prime Minister‟s seat and was 
instrumental along with President Süleyman Demirel in the diplomacy that 
ultimately led to the capture and return of Abdullah Öcalan to Turkey.  This was 
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fresh on the minds of the electorate and the campaign began with Ecevit and DSP 
leading in the polls.  His success had more to do with a general vote of confidence 
on his conduct as Prime Minister rather than any particular strategy or discourse 
employed in the campaign.  Bahçeli, on the other hand, benefitted from the 
conjuncture of a number of points.  The deinstitutionalization of the existing parties 
on the center-right due to corruption and poor governance created a party vacuum 
for a substantial number of voters.  The party‟s determination to take a moderate 
stance and identify themselves as “centrist” undoubtedly assisted their electoral 
gains.  Furthermore, the passing of Türkeş and the emergence of Bahçeli lent 
credence to the party‟s apparent shift toward moderation and the center.  Had 
nationalism and the question of the death penalty for Öcalan been the key for the 
MHP‟s success in 1999,122 their standings in the polls would have been much 
higher at the beginning of the campaign, not at the end, months from proclamations 
about the execution of the PKK leader.  Furthermore, in 1999 the war against PKK 
was perceptibly winding down; it seems hard to propose that the MHP‟s gains were 
due to a rise of nationalist sentiment stemming from terrorism. The election during 
which terrorism and the death toll were at their highest was 1995, and in that 
election, the MHP could not manage to pass the 10 percent threshold. 
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The MHP chose to return to an appeal to nationalist sentiment in 2002 and 
2007 as it became clear that the AKP was collecting much of the center-right votes.  
Nationalism became an effective way to distinguish the two parties competing in 
indefinite positions on the right (or center according to their self-positioning).  In 
2002, Bahçeli used the threat of the impending US war against Iraq and the 
uncertainty surrounding EU membership and its subsequent obligations to touch on 
nationalist sentiment,
123
 and this time, the party found itself going from having the 
most deputies in parliament to not passing the threshold.  In 2007, with the 
reemergence of PKK actions against the Turkish Armed Forces and the AKP taking 
a pluralist and sympathetic stance toward the Kurds, the MHP once again used 
nationalist sensitivities to distinguish themselves from the governing AKP.  Bahçeli 
argued that a vote for the AKP would be a vote to divide the country into 36 parts 
and that a “New Sevres Plan”124 was in the works.125  The competition for 
conservative nationalists ultimately led the AKP to remind voters that the MHP was 
in the government coalition when Öcalan received the death sentence, but they 
neglected to hang him, which led to a speech in which Bahçeli produced a rope and 
told Erdoğan that he could hang him with it.126 
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While it was less surprising that the nationalist MHP would employ a 
nationalist discourse in 2007 to compete against the AKP, the real surprise was the 
strong appeal to nationalism employed by the CHP, which had not done so since 
Ecevit was the leader of the party in the 1970s.  Baykal, discursively concerned 
with the status of secularism and the religious threat in 1995 and 1999 and then 
concerned about corruption and lifting the untouchable status of parliament deputies 
in 2002, made nationalist rhetoric through the issue of terrorism a key component of 
the 2007 campaign.
127
  The party emphasized an apparent secret meeting between 
the US and AKP officials in Dubai in 2003 in which the latter agree to accept a 
billion dollars in return for staying out of Northern Iraq.
128
  The idea that the AKP 
was in the pockets of both the US and PKK and that they showed impotence in the 
face of terrorist actions was a regular image of the AKP created by the CHP during 
the campaign.
129
  Interestingly enough, though there were no other real contenders 
besides the AKP, the CHP and the MHP in the election, with the exception of the 
Kurdish leftist-nationalist DTP members running as independents, the combined 
votes of the two parties appealing to nationalist sentiment through the terrorism 
issue fell far short of the votes received by the AKP. 
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9.2.1.4 Economy, Corruption and “Hizmet”  
 
While economic promises and policy were once again a regular feature of 
campaign discourse, the level to which the discussion of corruption and dishonesty 
dominated the speeches and debates between party leaders was certainly unique to 
this particular paradigm.  The open forum debates in 1995 largely centered on 
Mesut Yılmaz and Tansu Çiller arguing about whom was more corrupt.  Though the 
private television station, Kanal D, broke a record for the number of viewers, the 
reports following the debate indicated immense disappointment by those viewing 
the debacle.
130
  The RP, which received the plurality of the vote in 1995, ran on a 
platform of honest, moral government. Ecevit and Bahçeli both ran on credentials 
as “honest politicians” and managed to lead their parties to first and second place 
finishes in 1999.  Both the AKP, as a new party, and the CHP, which had failed to 
pass the threshold in 1999, benefited from a clean record and an anti-corruption 
discourse, while the rest of the parties in parliament were swept out entirely in 
2002.  Baykal, who focused the majority of his speeches on clean government and a 
repeal of the law that provides untouchable status to corrupt politicians while they 
are in parliament in 2002, continued to address corruption issues in the campaign in 
2007, this time directing them against the AKP.  The CHP pointed out that the AKP 
municipal governments were distributing coal to poor families in the middle of the 
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summer right before the elections,
131
 and that Prime Minister Erdoğan had been 
giving construction bids to his father-in-law in Northern Iraq.
132
  A rising star in the 
party, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, who in 2010 was appointed the party leader, enumerated 
the boats, mansions and manufacturing plants that were owned and operated by 
children of AKP leaders and heads of ministries.
133
 
Although one find dirt on all the parties,
134
 the level of corruption by the end 
of the paradigm seemed to pale in comparison to the situation in 1995 and 1999, the 
prime offenders having been the DYP and ANAP.  Nonetheless, the success of 
party leaders with anti-corruption agendas and clean hands seemed to encourage 
maintaining the focus on this issue.  The election results of this paradigm certainly 
favored the parties who were led by “honest” politicians.  
The utilization of the hizmet discourse—i.e. presenting the impetus of one‟s 
party to be at the service of the people—continued into this paradigm; however, 
whereas in the previous paradigm one could find leaders on the left, such as Necdet 
Calp and Erdal İnönü using such expressions, from the general election of 1995 to 
the general election of 2007, the expression was only used by parties on the right.
135
  
While some parties, like ANAP, the RP-FP, and AKP consistently used such 
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 “Seçenekli Dayatma,” Cumhuriyet, 11 July 2007; “Yoksul sömürülüyor,” Cumhuriyet, 6 July 
2007; “Aflar Erdoğan‟a yaradı,” Cumhuriyet, 7 July 2007.  According to the daily Cumhuriyet, 
whose editors gave strong support to the CHP, the AKP distributed 340,000 tons of coal prior to the 
election. “Al kömürü ver oyu,” Cumhuriyet, 16 July 2007. 
132
 “Kilavuzları Barzani,” Cumhuriyet, 5 July 2007. 
133
 “Söz konusu vatansa CHP,” Cumhuriyet, 15 July 2007. 
134
 Ironically, Baykal himself was forced to give up his seat as party leader in 2010 when a cassette 
tape was leaked that apparently showed him having sexual interaction with his former secretary, who 
had later been appointed, under his tutelage, as a parliament deputy and whose husband has 
subsequently received the bids for the party‟s security needs. 
135
 The leader of the “center-right” DYP, Tansu Çiller, was an exception to this discursive trend. 
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expressions in the elections they contested, the MHP used it frequently in only one 
national election, 1999.
136
  Yavuz has argued that hizmet is a discursive 
phenomenon derived from Islamic movements,
137
 that it is non-ideological 
discourse,
138
 and that the AKP is the only hizmet party, a fact which distinguishes it 
from all other parties.
139
  Based on campaign speeches, however, it is reasonable to 
propose that the hizmet party discourse began as a modern and non-ideological 
appeal. Furthermore, its wide usage in the Turkish party system on both the left and 
the right, starting in the 1980s creates a problem for the assertion that the expression 
is primarily the domain of Islamic movements and that the AKP or even its Milli 
Görüş predecessors, from which it splintered off—i.e. the RP and FP—could be 
considered as having a monopoly on representing themselves as such.  However, 
the application of the “service” discourse became associated with its manifestation 
through the Islamist Welfare Party and its supporting religious associations.  Along 
with this, the more recent emphasis on service to God and society that can be seen 
in the mission statements of communities and associations connected to the 
controversial religious leader, Fethullah Gülen, probably relegated the utilization of 
the hizmet discourse to the parties on the right during this paradigm.  
 
 
 
                                                 
136
 For examples, “MHP‟den Yolsuzluk Mücadele Kurulu vaadi,” Hürriyet, 6 April 1999; 
“Visyonumuz, lider ülke olabilmek,” Hürriyet, 7 April 1999. 
137
 M. Hakan Yavuz, Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), p. 41. 
138
 Ibid., pp. 82, 85. 
139
 Ibid., p. 113. 
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Table 9.5 – Particular Election “Shapers” in 1995-2007 General Elections 
 Major Campaign Issues Concurrent Exogenous Factors 
Dec. 
1995 
 - Corruption 
- European Customs Union 
- PKK and terrorist actions in the 
Southeast 
- Welfare Party 
- Major economic crisis in 1994 
April 
1999 
- Corruption 
- Headscarf Issue 
- Addressing the national debt 
- Unfolding Tragedy in Kosovo 
- Capture of Abdullah Öcalan in February 
 
Nov. 
2002 
- Corruption / lifting the „untouchable‟ 
status of parliament deputies 
- European Union Membership 
- Impending US invasion of Iraq 
- IMF debt repayment 
- Major economic crisis in 2001 
- Impending US invasion of Iraq 
- Attempts to close down DEHAP and the 
AKP by the Chief Prosecutor Sabih 
Kanadoğlu during the election campaign 
July 
2007 
- PKK terrorist actions reportedly 
launched from Northern Iraq 
- Corruption / lifting the „untouchable 
status of parliament deputies 
- EU accession process 
- Who would select the future President 
following the election 
- The posting on the Turkish Armed Forces 
website during the Presidential selection 
process that appeared to be a cryptic threat 
against the selection of the AKP‟s Abdullah 
Gül as President 
 - The Court‟s ruling that a quorum of 367 
deputies was necessary to count as an 
official vote during the selection of a 
President 
 
9.2.2 Non-discursive Campaign Strategies 
As their importance as a dimension of competition was initiated in the 
previous paradigm, this paradigm witnessed the consolidation of the electoral 
strategies related to the two giant M‟s:  media and municipalities.  While seeking 
creative and professional avenues to present the propaganda of one‟s party became 
a major facet of all serious contenders for political power in Turkey, ratcheting up 
the costs of campaigning in general, its actual effects on the elections became 
increasingly indefinite.  Arguably, this was true for two reasons: the novelty of 
media usage had worn off by the 1995 election, especially following the 
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disappointing open forum debates,
140
 and Turkish voters in general have not been 
strongly inclined to respond solely to political propaganda and campaign discourse; 
furthermore, the fact that all major parties were employing professional advertising 
firms to conduct their campaigns simply raised the bar, and cost, for everyone but 
leveled the playing field for those parties that had enough money to spend on the 
now standard media blitzes and advertising.  One might argue that unless a party 
has major financial banking, through support mobilization, or, in the case of Cem 
Uzan and the Youth Party in 2002 and 2007, a rich patron, or is already a party with 
significant social backing, the high financial expense of national campaigns has 
become a limiting force on the number of parties—at least as effective as the 10 
percent threshold.  The combined juggernaut of the cost of media campaigns and 
the existing threshold has effectively made a new or minor party‟s entrance into the 
field of major contributors a very unlikely proposition, barring a severe 
delegitimizing crisis among the current contenders.  State electoral regulations also 
provide free airtime to parties that are represented in the parliament, but these 
benefits are also weighted according to number of seats in parliament,
141
 again 
providing advantage to existing power contenders and limiting the opportunities for 
small and new parties to make electoral headway. 
The foundational standard of a strong media-based campaign has a times 
been a seductive siren to certain party leaders.  Deniz Baykal‟s early success on 
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 Liderler halkı unuttu, Milliyet, 13 December 1995; Vatandaşı inandıramadılar, Milliyet, 13 
December 1995. 
141
 For an example of such distribution in an election, see “TV‟de en çok söz MHP‟nin,” Radikal, 12 
October 2002. 
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television in 1995 led him to prioritize this avenue of electoral competition over 
other forms of mobilization.
142
  He actually told reporters that he preferred to talk to 
the nation on television rather than having to go around and speak to them 
directly.
143
 The CHP‟s advertisements in 1995, which featured a smiling Baykal, 
encouraged people that they could fax their concerns to the party—a suggestion 
reminiscent of parents encouraging their children to mail a wish list to Santa 
Claus.
144
  Besides the minimal chance that people might believe that their fax would 
actually be read, in 1995, the amount of effort it would have taken for the vast 
majority of the population, especially those not in large cities, to access a fax 
machine—outside of bureaucrats and businessmen—made it a very restricted 
populist appeal indeed.  In 1999, Baykal spent most of the election trying to 
convince the other politicians to debate with him on television,
145
 which no one did, 
and the party found itself below the threshold at election‟s end.  Though the party 
could be described as having a number of potential weaknesses, certainly the 
overemphasis on disseminating propaganda through the media over other forms of 
voter mobilization probably limited the success of the CHP, especially in the 1990s 
when there were alternatives. 
No party in this paradigm that received the plurality of the vote could claim 
to have done so by their media and propaganda campaign alone.  In 1995, the 
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 See, “Kamuoyu „Yılmaz ve Baykal‟ dedi,” Milliyet, 12 December 1995. 
143
 “Meydan yerine medya,” Cumhuriyet, 21 December 1995. 
144
 “Seni dinliyorum Türkiye,” CHP advertisement, Cumhuriyet, 21 December 1995. 
145
 “Baykal: kaçmayın,” Radikal, 3 April 1999; “Baykal: Kaçak güreşiyorlar,” Cumhuriyet, 5 April 
1999. 
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Welfare Party was already leading prior to the election campaign, and their lead 
was clearly attributed to their municipal performance.  Bülent Ecevit and the DSP 
were already leading with the campaign got underway in 1999, and his votes and 
lead have to be attributed to a vote of confidence in his leadership as Prime Minister 
in the period leading up to the election, a period which included the capture of the 
leader of the PKK, Abdullah Öcalan.146  The very young AKP started the electoral 
campaign in 2002 with a lead and much of this was attributed to the leadership of 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, whose popularity was frequently tied to his effective 
governance of the greater Istanbul municipality.  The AKP‟s increase in votes in 
2007, the first for a government party in Turkey since 1954, could be attributed to 
two causes:  First, as has been widely claimed, it seemed to be a reaction against the 
perceived partisan ruling of the Constitutional Court that effectively blocked the 
AKP from appointing a President and forced early elections and the “e-
memorandum” posted on the Turkish Armed Forces website that seemed to be a 
threatening reaction toward the AKP‟s selection of Abdullah Gül as the Presidential 
candidate.  Secondly, it could be argued that the AKP also benefited from their 
performance in government as both the national and local level, but particularly the 
latter; the AKP made huge new gains in provinces in the Southeast region, and 
while they made gains in nearly every province in this section of the country, the 
biggest gains occurred in provinces in which the party had been voted in as 
municipal governors in the local elections of 2004 (see Table 9.6). 
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 See also, Ciddi, Kemalism in Turkish Politics, p. 100. 
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Therefore, every party that has acquired governmental power since 1995 has 
owed a great measure of their success to previous successful governance, at the 
local or national level, but usually demonstrated at the local government level.
147
  
This suggests a significant level of functional behavior underlying the logic of 
voters in national elections.  While it is true that ideology or party affiliation may be 
the overarching cause of a correlation between a party‟s local government and 
national parliamentary success, there are a number of examples during this period 
that clearly show that local communities showed ideological flexibility in relation to 
political parties that somehow demonstrated that they would prioritize the needs of 
the community and govern effectively.  The converse, of course, was also true; 
parties to which the local community was sympathetic could be punished severely if 
                                                 
147
 Özbudun writes, “Turkish parties generally lack deep and lasting roots in society, and their 
performance in government becames the main criterion of voters‟ choice.” Ergun Özbudun, “From 
Political Islam to Conservative Democracy: The Case of the Justice and Development Party in 
Turkey,” South European Society and Politics, Vol. 11, No. 3-4 (2006), p. 555. 
Table 9.6 – AKP National Election Fortunes in Relation to 2004 Local Election 
AKP won 2004 local election AKP lost 2004 local election 
  2002 2007 Swing   2002 2007 Swing 
Ağrı 17.7 63 45.3 Diyarbakır 16 40.9 24.9 
Muş 16.9 38.6 21.7 Batman 20.6 46.4 25.8 
Bitlis 17.7 58.8 41.1 Şırnak 14 26.9 12.9 
Bingöl 31.7 71.1 39.4 Hakkari 6.8 33.5 26.7 
Van 25.9 53.2 27.3 Mardin 15.4 44.1 28.7 
AVERAGE 21.98 56.94 34.96 AVERAGE 14.56 38.36 23.8 
* Note: Siirt was not included in the provinces above due to the need in 2002 for a rerun, 
which only featured the AKP and the CHP, and in which Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was 
running for a seat in order to enter parliament and be elligible to be selected as Prime 
Minister. 
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they failed to perform their administrative duties effectively.
148
  Though it is a quite 
factor influencing the electoral gain of parties in national elections, it is hard to 
imagine any party registering significant gains in a national election without having 
had an effective demonstration of the party‟s ability to govern at the local level.149 
Finally, the CHP and the DSP, while it was still a contending party under 
Ecevit‟s tutelage, benefited during this paradigm from the mobilization of a number 
of Kemalist or secularist civil society organizations on their behalf.  During the rise 
(and fall) of the Welfare Party, in particular, just as social action associations 
worked with the RP to address the perceived needs of the community, existing and 
newly formed associations and foundations established on the premises of Atatürk‟s 
modernization project for Turkey went to work on behalf of the “center-left” 
parties.  Groups like the Atatürkist Thought Association, the Support of Modern 
Life Association, the Modern Education Foundation and the Modern Woman and 
Youth Foundation sprung into action in order to address the perceived needs of the 
community, which was, in general, a lack of appropriate education.  The 
pedagogical nature of these associations, however, tended to most effectively 
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 The ideal example of this is the performance of the SHP/CHP in local and national elections from 
1989 to 1995.  The rising popularity of İnönü, starting from 1987, and the sympathy toward their 
social democratic platform helped the SHP capture a national plurality of the vote in local elections.  
The poor performance and the evidence and allegations of corruption by these municipal and 
provincial governments, especially in Istanbul, cause the party to be swept out of local office in 1994 
and led to steady losses in general elections in 1991 and 1995.  For more on SHP local governance 
disaster, see chapter eight and also, Ciddi, Kemalism in Turkish Politics, p. 88; see also, Öniş and 
Grigoriadis, “Europe and the impasse of centre-left politics,” p. 266. 
149
 For more information on the impact and strategic importance of local elections for political 
parties, see Nihal İncioğlu, “Local Elections and Electoral Behavior,” in Sabri Sayarı and Yılmaz 
Esmer, eds., Politics, Parties and Elections in Turkey (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002), pp. 73-
90. 
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mobilize those who shared their general culture and worldview, and had relatively 
limited success targeting those who were yet to be fully “modern” and “educated,” 
while the groups mobilized in support of the RP tended to find new bases of 
support, stemming from the fact that they had placed the material needs of the 
communities as a top priority, while the spiritual pedagogy was placed second, at 
least in its presentation.   
Furthermore, associations of this sort, particularly those mobilized on behalf 
of the CHP and the DSP, operate the most effectively in the urban environment.  In 
the case of the Welfare Party, which had historically been able to generate some 
support from small towns in Anatolia, what they needed to build onto their base was 
a way to mobilize voters in urban areas.  As the exact opposite had been the case for 
the CHP and DSP since the late 1960s, these mobilized groups had limited vote-
building potential.  In fact, as the primary mobilization technique from such civil 
society groups was that the secular Republic and the principles of Atatürk were 
under attack by religious reactionaries, who have been waiting for the right moment 
to curb all social liberties and freedoms,
150
 such accusations did little to ingratiate 
them to conservative and devout voters and seemed to confirm that the political 
lines were being drawn between secularist urban culture and those in the 
countryside and urban squatter communities.  If we consider that the CHP has 
                                                 
150
 For one example of civil society mobilization on behalf of the CHP in this vein, see “Birleşme 
adresi CHP,” Cumhuriyet, 16 October 2002.  Even as of spring 2011, the threat mobilization strategy 
is still evident in publications by these associations.  The Modern Education Foundation just release 
a new title, for example, called Ufkun Ötesinde ne Var? [What is on the other side of your horizon?] 
by Gülseven Güven Yaşer with a woman‟s eyes peering through a thin sliver on a black background. 
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primarily mobilized voters through political discourse channeled through the media 
and urban-based associations, their geographical vote distribution isn‟t particularly 
surprising—i.e. largely clustered in urban and industrialized centers in the West and 
coastal areas. 
 
9.3 Domains of Identification and the Emergence of Regional Party Systems 
 
The distinction between the dimensions of competition—strategies 
employed by parties to mobilize votes—and domains of identification—social 
identities that play an indirect role in voter choice—points out an interesting 
paradox of this paradigm, spanning from 1995 until the last general election 
covered in this study, 2007.  Though it is accurate in some way to say, as many 
students of Turkish politics have, that the major political divide during this period 
has been between secularist and religious conservatives, for one side of the divide, 
the identity has been a dimension of competition—i.e. voters have been explicitly 
mobilized through the cultural identity—while the identity of the other side has 
operated very clearly as a domain of identification—i.e. a secondary factor 
influencing voting decisions.  Since the rise of the Welfare Party in local elections 
of 1994 and the subsequent general election in 1995 when they received a plurality 
of the vote, the “center-left” has shifted tack and made the “social democrat” or 
“leftist” identity a domain of identification and prioritized mobilizing votes through 
an appeal to those with secularists worldviews through the threat of impending 
religious takeover and backwardness. 
 411 
In contrast to secularist mobilization around the CHP, the parties that were 
the target of their fears were primarily mobilizing supporters through means and 
issues not directly associated with religion.  The consistent foci of the voters on the 
right and the parties for which they cast their vote, are material concerns and the 
economy.  In fact, if one follows the fortunes of parties that have taken turns for the 
better and worse, one finds that, as the party puts material and economic concerns 
first, they gain votes.  This was true of the Welfare Party, the MHP in 1999, and the 
consistent priority of the AKP in election programs and campaigns.  When the 
successors of the RP, the FP, and the SP, in particular, moved away from 
prioritizing the economy,
151
 their electoral fortunes turned.  Not only is such a trend 
made clear through the observation of party election programs and campaign 
speeches, and the emphasis of sympathetic media organs on the economy and 
material concerns,
152
 there are indications in existing research that back this up.  In 
an interesting quantitative study by Ersin Kalaycıoğlu with very a solid 
representative sample, when numerous variables were regressed in relation to 
identification with various parties, the data shows that the strongest factor 
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 This can be measured in some fashion by perusing these parties‟ election manifests.  The RP in 
1995, for example, put the issues of the “just [economic] order” first along with its economic 
program and then dealt with social and moral issues toward the end of the manifest.  The FP put 
human rights before the economy in 1999 in their election manifest.  The SP in 2002 and 2007 chose 
to place economic concerns at the end of the manifest and legal and social concerns toward the 
beginning.  In 1999, the MHP emphasized clean government that would effectively deliver services 
to the people, but the party subsequently has deemphasized that message to focus on terrorism and 
separatists in 2002 and 2007. 
152
 As opposed to the daily Cumhuriyet, which stood clearly in support for the CHP in 2002 and 
2007, whose columnists and voluntary advertisements for the party demonstrated an emphasis on 
secularists‟ cultural concerns, the AKP‟s clear supporter, Yeni Şafak, centered its election coverage 
and concerns on policy and the economy, with no mobilization against the “other” as seen in the 
former newspaper. 
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determining identification with the AKP is attitudes toward the economy.  A very 
distant second factor, but also significant is the index for religiosity.  If we examine 
these same variables for the CHP, the order of power for these two indices is 
reversed.  Thus, while parental identification for the CHP trumps both of these other 
significant indices, which is another cultural domain influencing votes for the CHP, 
the index for religiosity, which is negatively regressed, is the second strongest 
indicator of identification for the CHP followed by the index regarding the 
economy.
153
  Furthermore, in a recent study on the AKP in Konya by Yavuz, he 
observed that those who voted for the party tended to refuse to identify with it, “The 
identity of the AKP does not stick on people.”154  He argued that this consideration 
seemed to be tied to pragmatism and a lack of ideology within the party, such that 
their supporters had come to support them with the expectation that they would 
deliver goods and services (hizmet), not because of an identity or ideology.
155
   
The policy and issue-based focus of the AKP, along with its distributive 
tendencies prior to elections, tend to confirm that the party is not primarily 
mobilizing through identities.  While is also certainly true that Islamist voters do 
vote for the AKP—a KAS agency poll in 2007 found that roughly 16 percent of 
AKP supporters polled described their political tendencies as Islamist
156—it is also 
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 Yavuz, Secularism and Muslim Democracy, p. 84 
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 Ibid., pp. 84-5. 
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 Yeni Şafak, 16 July 2007.  Akıncı, in his study of the Welfare Party, quoted research that showed 
that, even for this party with a stronger religious identity, the number of “hard core” Islamists 
constituted only 7 percent of the party‟s support.  Akıncı, “The Municipal Radicalism,” p. 91. 
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important to note that the party is not mobilizing on the basis of Islamism, and it 
would be hard to imagine that existing Islamist voters would be encouraged to vote 
for the CHP.  The supporters of the MHP, which also does not mobilize according 
to religion, has also been found to be significantly linked with religiosity, but to a 
slightly weaker degree than the AKP.
157
  In other words, the religious conservatives 
in Turkey have to either boycott the elections, which is still technically illegal, or 
vote for some party.  Considering the anti-religious mobilization that forms a large 
segment of the CHP‟s support, it seems difficult to comprehend the apparent shock 
embedded in studies that find that religiosity is tied to the parties on the “right” and 
secularist worldviews are correlated with voters on the “left”.   
Within the large categories that take the name of “left” and “right” in 
Turkish politics, the juncture of this paradigm seems to demonstrate the 
manifestation of a number of political domains that operate as sub-categories, 
helping to form stability between the two large camps.  On the left, there are four 
major domains of identification: Kemalists, secular nationalists, social democrats, 
and Kurdish nationalists.  The separation between the substantial bloc of Kurdish 
leftists and the other three domains has been rather severe through the general 
election of 2007.  On the right, one also finds four major domains: conservatives, 
nationalists, Islamists, and conservative Kurds.  In this group, there is an important 
divide between nationalists—i.e. Turkish nationalists—and conservative Kurds.  
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 Çarkoğlu, “The New Generation Pro-Islamists,” p. 173; this relationship was also significantly 
correlated in data collected in an unpublished study by this author.  See, F. Michael Wuthrich, M. 
Murat Ardağ and Deniz Uğur, “Politics, Cultural Heterogeneity and Support for European Union 
Membership in Turkey,” unpublished manuscript.  
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This has created an important measure of tension for catch-all parties on the right, a 
tension visible since the heyday of ANAP in the 1980s.  It is nearly impossible to 
have staunch nationalists in the same party as conservative Kurds;
158
 hence, when a 
party tries to maximize its appeal to identities on the right, one of the domains 
almost necessarily is left out.  The AKP, in 2007, managed to attract conservatives, 
Islamists and Kurdish conservatives (along with small segments of social democrats 
and liberals) into an electoral coalition,
159
 which allowed the MHP some success in 
accumulating a threshold surpassing number of nationalist supporters. 
Furthermore, the paradigmatic period from the 1995 to the 2007 general 
elections has increasingly evidenced the importance of regional identities, such that 
one might reasonably argue that the Turkish electoral party system of this period 
could be described as three regional party systems, each with their own separate 
axis of competition.  While it must be emphasized that the boundaries between the 
regions, particularly the Western/Coastal Region and the Central Region, are 
somewhat fluid, within the heart of these regions, one can recognize a definitive 
party system shape that distinguishes it from the other regions.  This fragmentation 
of the national party system into distinct regional systems has also ironically 
required the party who hopes to truly be a “nation party” to fragment its appeal to 
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 Both the DYP and ANAP tried to keep all of these together, with certain periods of success, but 
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 Özbudun has also observed that the AKP collected these political identities underneath its party‟s 
banner in the 2002 election.  See Ergun Özbudun, “Changes and Continuities in the Turkish Party 
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voters on a regional basis.  Since 1995, election results have clearly confirmed this 
trend (see Table 9.7).
160
 
Table 9.7 – Regional Patterns of Party System Electoral Competition 
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 It could also be argued that, in previous paradigms, there were trends that suggested a proto-
manifestation of these regional distinctions—i.e. the tendency of the Western region to adhere 
tightly to competition between the major centrist parties with few votes going to extremists or 
narrow ideology parties on the right; the tendency for voters in the Central region to show increased 
support for the various offshoots of the Republican Nation Party, which was a conservative party 
that catered to both religious conservatives and conservatives; and the tendency in the Southeast 
Region to produce a higher number of independent candidates in elections that ran outside of the 
existing party frameworks.  Nonetheless, these distinctions from region to region were less explicit 
with center parties like the CHP and the AP taking the lion‟s share of the votes everywhere.  This 
paradigm‟s pattern seems to suggest a consolidation of the slight murmurings of regional distinctions 
in previous paradigms. 
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The consolidation of regional cleavages among party systems could be 
attributed to a number of developments.  First, the critical break between the SHP 
and Kurdish leftist-nationalists following the 1991 elections resulted in a near 
shutout of “center-left” parties in the Southeast region that has led to a two party 
contest between the conservative/religious conservative party family versus the 
existing Kurdish leftist-nationalist party (see Table 9.7).
161
  Beginning in 1995, a 
geographical map of the fortunes of the center-left demonstrate a stark regional 
reality: strong performance on the western and southern coast with diminishing 
success as the party moves inland and a near absence of any “center-left” party in 
the Southeast, with combined vote shares for all center-left parties falling into the 
10 percent or less range.  Another explanation for the clear regional party system 
tendency could be found in the fragmentation of the party system in the 1980s and 
1990s that led “competitor” parties with the same general ideological framework to 
compete against one another by occupying separate demographic domains.  The 
excellent study by Başlevent et al. used voter profile data to show that the 
ideological similar parties were appealing to voters of different demographics.  For 
example, while voters for ANAP and DYP identified themselves politically in 
similar ways, they differed markedly from one another demographically.  ANAP 
voters tended to be highly educated urban voters while DYP supporters tended to be 
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 The core provinces of the region used to gather electoral data are Ağrı, Batman, Bitlis, 
Diyarbakır, Hakkari, Mardin, Muş, Siirt, Şırnak, and Van. 
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rural and less educated.  A nice parallel can be seen in the voters of the CHP and the 
DSP.  CHP supporters, like ANAP supporter, tended to be urban and educated 
while the DSP voters, as was true for DYP, tended to be less so.  For this reason, 
though not strongly emphasized by the authors, it was the pairs of CHP and ANAP 
and the DYP and the DSP that bore the most similarity in terms of voter profiles.
162
  
This also logically explains the relational groupings during the fragmented 
parliaments and electoral contests, often pitting the DYP-CHP/SHP alliance against 
the ANAP-DSP alliance.  The parties had these working affinities with oppositional 
parties because the latter were the parties the least likely to jeopardize the votes 
from their targeted demographics.  This fragmented appeal in order to firm up 
voting bases undoubtedly encouraged localized appeals over pure generalized 
interest, and it would encourage parties to invest greater attention toward 
demographics—particularly in terms of provinces and regions—where they were 
strong, especially as one‟s support base and finances were dwindling.   
Thus, the provinces bordering the Aegean, Marmara, and Mediterranean 
Region, have tended during this paradigm to exhibit a three (or two and a half) 
party system.  The contest could be shaped as a predominantly center-right versus 
                                                 
162
 Cem Başlevent, Hasan Kirmanoğlu and Burhan Şenatalar, “Voter Profiles and Fragmentation in 
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center-left conflict with the nationalist MHP functioning as a strong third party (see 
Table 9.7).
163
  In the broad center of the country, spanning from just inland of the 
coastal provinces on the west to the interior northeast corner, the party system is 
primarily a competition between the center-right, which would be considered the 
predominant party, and the conservative nationalists and the center-left functioning 
as weak alternatives—their combined strength is often still half the strength of the 
conservative/religious conservative showing (see Table 9.7).
164
  If we compared 
these geographical regions to provinces with large industrial and production 
activity, due to their more culturally complex populations, the latter tend to 
demonstrate the national aggregate with a slight advantage to the center-left (see 
Table 9.7).
165
  These outlines have been observed by excellent studies of using 
clustering methods in electoral geography,
166
 demonstrating these distinct regional 
trends even while the electoral picture was far more fragmented.  With the 
reduction of the national party system to a much smaller number of power players, 
this trend has become even more explicit. 
The result of this pattern of regional electoral party systems is the irony that, 
parties that primarily operate on a national message tend to limit themselves to 
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becoming a regional party; whereas, those parties with an electoral claim to “nation 
party” status have to fragment their appeal to the concerns of the various regions 
and compete along the lines of contestation drawn up at the local level.  Yavuz, for 
example, noted that much of the success of the Welfare Party in 1995 could be 
attributed to their success in making appeals and identifying themselves in distinct 
ways in different regions.
167
  ANAP‟s Mesut Yılmaz, in contrast, cautioned the 
DSP‟s Bülent Ecevit from getting too excited about his growing popularity prior to 
the 1999 campaign, reminding him that his party was almost non-existent in 40 
provinces of the country, particularly in the Central, East and Southeast 
provinces.
168
  In the 2002 elections, when the CHP was attempting new strategies to 
compete against the rising AKP, the party made a special campaign brochure that 
was to be distributed to the East and Southeast provinces, making promises 
particular to that region that would not have sat well with their voters in the 
Western provinces.
169
  Although it stayed at the discursive and media level, it 
indicated the awareness of the party that they needed distinct regional appeals.  The 
AKP in 2007, largely bringing together a center-right, religious conservative and 
Kurdish conservative coalition found themselves as the first or second place party 
in almost all the provinces of every region.   
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As a result of the distinct lines of competition in various regions of the 
country,
170
 the CHP, the first official political party of the Turkish Republic, has 
found itself being only regionally representative.
171
  The same is true for the MHP, 
which functions in a reciprocal relationship with the CHP in the West and Central 
provinces—i.e. as one moves to the West, the fortunes of the CHP generally grow 
as those of the MHP mostly decline and vice versa.  Not surprisingly, the fortunes 
of the successions of Kurdish leftist-nationalist parties completely lie in the votes 
they receive in the Southeast, and to a lesser extent, the East. 
 
9.4 Conclusion 
 
The electoral period spanning from the election in 1995 and the election in 
2007 has experienced a number of significant and visible changes throughout the 
period, including the collapse of three major centrist parties, the emergence of a 
new center-right catch-all party, and the shrinking of the party system to four 
serious contenders listed by electoral strength—the center-right AKP, the center-left 
CHP, the conservative nationalist MHP, and the existing Kurdish leftist-nationalist 
manifestation.
172
  These changes also make it reasonable to propose that a new 
party system has emerged since 2002, whose contours have remained fairly stable 
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in the one general election and two local elections that have taken place since that 
point.  While the party system has indeed changed and visible transformations are 
evident, if we examine the period from the standpoint of a structuring paradigm, the 
causes behind the party system change and the underlying identities and strategies 
for competition have remained remarkably stable.  The forces unleashed on the 
party system beginning in 1991 and fully evident in 1995 are the same forces that 
ultimately led to the disappearance of parties and the primary lines of competition, 
including the substantive associations of “left” and “right”.  Observing the system 
relationally in terms of dimensions of competition and domains of identification, 
not only help clarify the continuity within this particular paradigm, these 
paradigmatic components also help pinpoint the logic behind the transformations. 
Obviously, this is not intended to suggest that the results were 
predetermined; however, understanding the logic and success of various strategies 
points out the range of constraints and opportunities existing in the system.  For 
example, had the MHP, the FP, and the AKP not intentionally tried to moderate 
their discourse and present themselves as “center” parties clearly impinging on the 
storehouse of “center-right” voters, and if they had continued to project a more 
radical image, it seems likely that the DYP and ANAP might have survived the 
legitimacy crisis, even if somewhat wounded.  Had the personality conflict between 
Çiller and Yılmaz not been so great, had they resigned and entrusted the parties to 
other leadership, it is likely that the two parties would have joined together prior to 
their mutual collapse, and combining forces while still retaining legitimate electoral 
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strength would have made a big difference.  By the time they decided to unite to 
form the renewed Democrat Party, to use the well-known English expression, they 
were simply “beating a dead horse.”173  
The fragmented nature of the geographical electoral landscape, the fractures 
of which were evident from 1995, also presented new landmines to parties 
competing in the party system.  With the tag team of regional political cleavages 
and a ten percent national threshold, the arena of contest suddenly made surviving 
the political topography and establishing oneself as a legitimate power-player a 
difficult proposition.  Unlike in the 1960s and 1970s, when factions were 
emboldened to split from the mother parties and form a new electoral contender, the 
period from 1995-2007 has shown that one will not be rewarded for engaging in 
such a venture.  The split of the FP in 2001 lead to a drastic victory in 2002 to the 
moderate faction (the AKP) that held slightly greater parliamentary power over the 
other faction (the SP) that acquired only about 2.5 percent of the national vote.  
Party members with name recognition have broken away from both the AKP and 
the CHP, forming parties, which even in their first days of existence, are 
unquestionably doomed to the graveyard of insignificance.  If a party wants to 
survive in the current context, they need access to both of the two M‟s: 
municipalities and money for extensive media campaigns. 
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Finally, while it is impossible to understand the structure of the current 
paradigm without comprehending the underlying cultural clashes and the conflict 
between Turkish secularists and religious conservatives, it would also be a mistake 
to miss the functional and economic behavior of voters, even in this most culturally-
based of all the historical political paradigms.  Even as Çarkoğlu has observed the 
impact of macroeconomic considerations on voters‟ attitudes toward incumbent 
governments from 1950 to 1995, the same pattern could be utilized to explain 
subsequent elections.
174
  Thus, to overemphasize the cultural component would be 
to suggest that one could predict voting behavior primarily on cultural concerns; the 
electoral volatility of the voters in response to retrospective and prospective 
economic concerns strongly challenges the primacy of culture alone as an 
explanative factor.
175
  While the topics of Islam and Islamism seem to hold a great 
deal of attraction to students of social sciences in the current historical juncture, its 
“exotic” appeal as an explanative devise in electoral politics might, in fact, 
misrepresent actual dynamics that can be explained by more mundane factors. 
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CHAPTER 10 
 
 
CONCLUSION  
 
 
 
10.1 The Relevance of this Work for Individual Case Studies of Party Systems 
When a student of political science approaches a particular national case for 
study, such an individual is immediately confronted with a barrage of potential 
forces and actors influencing the system.  When extracting from the myriad of 
possible factors, the critical question becomes, how does one discriminate?  What 
system of study will enable the researcher to arrive at the constellation of elements 
that offer explanative power for the case at hand?  This study argues that this 
question bears profound significance.  If one fails to explicitly address the question 
at the outset, the conclusions arrived at and the emphases made might very well be 
misleading or off the mark. 
The current historical juncture in social sciences is infused with its own 
priorities and realities, and if one enters the endeavor to make a historical 
interpretation of the system, its changes and continuities, without questioning the 
priorities of the present, one is likely to drag the issues of relevance from the 
current context into the past to formulate an interpretation.  While it is certainly 
relevant to trace issues of present import into the past, what is dug up, if taken for 
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an explanation of the past historical environment, would be a very misleading 
portrait of earlier periods.  It is not by accident that students of Turkish politics, 
enamored with the role of Islam in politics, have chosen to use as the historical 
basis for their claims the works on Turkey produced during the heyday of classical 
Modernization Theory in which the role of religion and traditional culture were a 
frequent topic as the countries progress toward “modernity” determined by the 
Western model.   
It is also not a coincidence that a large body of work produced in the late 
1960s and 1970s with data and interpretation of great significance has been ignored, 
largely because these works forcefully demonstrate the secondary importance of 
religion in the political context of the time.  For a number of reasons, the cultural 
impetus behind the scholarship produced in many nations has been a magnification 
of the issue of Islam in politics, and its relevance in terms of the security or 
insecurity of the so-called “advanced industrial” nations.  Thus, the possible 
emphasis on the Islam factor becomes an extremely attractive focus of 
interpretation when studying countries with large Muslim populations, and the 
tendency to try to explain all phenomena through Islam or traditional culture is 
often evidenced.   
In addition to this, if one tries to establish a systematic framework in order 
to study a particular case, the previous approaches to using the conceptual and 
methodological frameworks in comparative politics have also led explanations, 
particularly of newer democracies, in problematic directions.  The inevitable result 
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of honing the descriptors, concepts, and methodological tools on the “advanced 
industrial” democracies during a particular historical period has set, at least at the 
subconscious level, system standards that have biased explanations—or even 
inhibited explanations—of the newer or “non-Western” cases under review.  The 
descriptors themselves have often ended up as embedded judgments on new cases, 
such that careful examinations to understand why these systems differ have been 
significantly hampered.   
Though party systems in the long-established liberal democracies have 
begun to display many of the traits of the newer systems, the standards of 
measurement and expectation are still fixed on the trends of a particular historical 
period.  As Mainwaring has asserted, party systems need to be rethought;
1
 
unfortunately, the reasoning and interpretations in the studies regarding newer 
democracies often remain unconsciously stuck in the old patterns.  Ironically, while 
authors recognizing changes in the patterns of party systems in the long-established 
democracies are quick to accurately acknowledge the impact of global and 
technological trends,
2
 the same observed phenomena in newer or non-Western 
democracies are more often then not regrettably tacked up to cultural factors or 
inability to understand or consolidate democratic norms.  Such interpretations 
should not necessarily be tacked up to chauvinism or ill intentions; instead, it seems 
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Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
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more likely the context of analysis within the existing framework of interpretation 
that directs the researcher to anticipate such biased analytic outcomes. 
While this author acknowledges that subconscious biases of one sort or 
another may persist within this study, the impetus of the work has been to search for 
a new framework with which to approach the individual party system, such that 
comparisons enable further investigation rather than judgment, but also provide a 
systematic framework for study that empowers logical and prioritized explanations 
of the system.  With this in mind, a careful analysis of the dimensions of 
competition and the domains of identification within their historical contingencies 
has offered such an approach to this study of the Turkish case.  Careful observation 
of the behavior of parties in interaction with other parties and the electorate enables 
the researcher to pinpoint areas requiring emphasis and analysis.  When patterns 
shift in relation to mobilization or discursive strategies, it also prompts an 
investigation of the other actors and the contingent environment in order to decipher 
the dynamic interactions and decisions of actors within the constraints and 
opportunities operating in a particular context.   
One must not be too quick to make a strong extrapolation from an individual 
case, however. The methodology and systematic approach of this case study of 
Turkey, while seemingly an effective approach to explain important patterns and 
transitions in the Turkish party system, might not bear the same fruit for other 
studies.  Just as the particular issues within the Brazilian case might not be 
applicable to other new democracies despite the fact that macro trends in volatility 
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and other measures resemble one another, one must not assume that Turkey’s 
micro-level political trends hold for the other countries.  The military coups and 
interventions and other rapid social changes in Turkey created an environment in 
which the political elites had to continually experiment and adjust; hence, the 
relatively frequent paradigmatic transitions that have occurred in Turkey’s more 
than 60 years of multiparty competition might not be observed in many other cases. 
What this study does provide, however, is a possible systematic approach to 
the individual case study that is largely descriptively neutral and less loaded with 
embedded judgment.  Rather than establish a few “universal” trends that should or 
should not be observed, this approach emphasizes observation of existing 
behaviors, discursive or otherwise, and establishing their patterns and consequences 
in electoral competition.  Observing the patterns that exist, whatever they may be, 
helps the student of the individual case understand how elites and the electorate are 
approaching electoral politics and why and when these patterns might change. 
 
10.2 Interactive Principles of the Turkish Party System, 1950-2007 
 
After careful analysis of the various paradigms that have structured the 
Turkish party system in the electoral arena, several general principles that transcend 
any particular period can be derived.  The first and, perhaps, most predominant 
principle is that the economic context matters to Turkish voters, and this has 
translated into predictable attitudes toward incumbent governments, explaining 
much of the impetus behind the support toward both existing and emerging parties.  
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If we consider the trends in national elections, even from simply a “retrospective” 
voter standpoint, the trend follows.  After the initial vote for the new party, the 
Democrat Party in 1950, economic success brought about victory again in 1954, but 
an electoral setback and gains for the CHP when the economy was faltering in 
1957.  Ineffective coalition government brought an electoral rebuke to the CHP in 
1965 and relatively strong performance translated in only a minor dip in 1969 for 
the Justice Party.  The gains by both major parties in 1977 seemed to clearly 
indicate a disapproval of ineffective and fragmented coalition governments, a 
tendency that was also demonstrated in the by-elections and senate elections in 
1979.  The punishment at the ballot-box by the government party or governing 
coalitions since 1983 has maintained the similar trends, mostly to the detriment of 
incumbent governments, with the exception of the DSP in 1999—benefiting from 
the capture of the PKK leader Öcalan during Ecevit’s short term as Prime Minister 
prior to the election—and the electoral gains received by the AKP in 2007, gains 
arguably at least partially due to the strong and stable performance of the economy 
from 2002 to 2007. 
The parties that have most effectively captured the hearts of the electorate 
have been those who approached the nation with both sociotropic and egotropic
3
 
incentives for support.  Though egotropic considerations have at times led to 
corrupt or irresponsible populism, Turkish voters are swayed by parties that appear 
to pay attention to them and their explicit material concerns and base their 
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 Voting for the economic good of the society at large and voting for the economic good of the 
individual, respectively. 
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campaign platforms on the emphasis of “getting things done.”4  This explains a 
great measure of the success of the Democrat Party, in first making face to face 
promises to the people contingent on their victory in 1950 and then distributing 
material goods broadly to supportive communities. The success of Bülent Ecevit 
and the CHP in the 1970s also coincides with increased attention, contact with and 
promises to the non-elite masses.  The rapid rise of the Welfare Party can also be 
tied to their distributive performance in local governments and the mobilization of 
supportive community organizations to deliver assistance to their communities.  
Though parties need a realistic sociotropic appeal—one wonders, for example, how 
far the Welfare Party would have gotten on the “just order” plans had they stayed in 
government for longer—the reliance on such abstract economic goals has not paid 
dividends for parties at the ballot box.  Even parties with very explicit social 
identities—whether religious or nationalist—plaster the billboards and their election 
speeches with populist policy promises much more so than identity-based concerns. 
The CHP in a number of elections in which they offered a clear but abstract 
economic agenda—2002 and the program developed under the tutelage of Kemal 
Derviş would be a recent example—often did not see clear fruit from such a 
strategy.  Parties that address issues of fundamental economic importance and have 
a recognizable plan—even if not distributing economic largesse—for issues such as 
jobs and health insurance are more likely to find an attentive ear, especially if they 
are placing those issues in a priority position and discussing the agenda actively 
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among the masses. This flexibility of voters has been clearly evident in the 
pragmatic voting of the urban middle and lower classes.  
While culture and religion have played greater or lesser roles in the system 
at various points, its general influence has nearly always been a secondary 
influence, relegated most frequently to the role of “domain of identification.”  
While it might be more sensational to claim otherwise, electoral behavior has 
consistently shown that the majority of the population has demonstrated a practical 
attitude toward voting.  One cannot have it both ways:  to claim that electoral 
volatility has been a regular feature of the system with swings in fortune between 
the center-right and center-left and with nationalist and religious conservative 
parties and then claim that one’s cultural identification has been the overwhelming 
motivation behind one’s vote presents problems of logic.  As Ciddi repeatedly 
noted, “no political party in Turkey can lay claim to a core of eternally loyal voters, 
which it can depend on.”5 Voter willingness to switch from religious conservative 
to nationalist to center-left parties is explained less convincingly by massive 
cultural identity switching than by voter pragmatism based on the behavior of the 
parties toward the issues over which these voters are concerned. Though 
generalized identities have offered some measure of stability as domains of 
identification, their impact on the system in Turkey is quite comparable to similar 
phenomena in the party systems in Western Europe and North America.   
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Another principle of the Turkish party system is that campaign discourse 
impacts party to party interaction far more than it affects outcomes among the 
electorate.  Beginning in the 1950s, though the CHP discursively had a more 
populist appeal in their campaign speeches and election manifests, they did not 
receive the votes from the targeted groups, like the village farmers, that would have 
been expected had campaign discourse been a decisive factor.  Even in the late 
1960s and 1970s, when the discursive pattern began to match the electoral map with 
large vote swings to the CHP in industrialized areas, other non-discursive factors, 
such as the connections made between the party and unions and populism in the 
squatter areas, can also explain the electoral shift; in all likelihood, it was the 
harmony of the populist discourse with the non-discursive strategies that translated 
into the voter gains by the party.  In the more recent periods of high corruption and 
inability to keep one’s word, the honest government and service discourse only 
worked for new and untested parties.  Furthermore, the phenomenon of pre-election 
polling that became widespread beginning with elections in the 1980s regularly 
predicted the rough shapes of the election outcomes far in advance before official 
campaigning speech-making began.
6
  Most speech-making was ignored at the 
national level; retrospective economic considerations and the success or failure of 
local governance played much larger roles.  In the current electoral context, a party 
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an opposition party contending in the elections were shown to change in the course of 
campaigning—examples of this would be the apparent late gains by the SHP in 1987 and the gains 
of the MHP in 1999. 
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relying on an effective campaign message without other existing assets that could 
provide confidence in the party will not pass the 10 percent threshold.
7
 
Where discourse did and does make a difference was at the level of party 
competition.  The discourse of the Turkish Labor Party in the early 1960s, which 
had very little electoral support, led to the self-imaging strategy of “left of 
center”—and later, “democratic left”—by the CHP, which in turn led to the essence 
of political contestation revolving around the axis of “left” or “communist” versus 
“exploiter” and “fascist”.  Though ideology behind the actual party programs 
differed only in moderate degree, the strident discourse fostered an intensity that 
found itself ultimately being played out violently on the street.  The parties in 1995 
deemphasized their own programs and instead developed various strategies to 
address the religious discourse and identity of the Welfare Party.  The party’s 
existence created definite changes in the appeals of the other parties to the voters, 
seemingly always with the RP on the back of their minds.  The clear effect on the 
discourse, in whatever direction they chose to compete, did not result in positive 
gains for these other parties.  Since the second paradigm, parties have used the self-
identifications of a contending party to distort and marginalize that party’s position.  
In the post-Baykal CHP under the leadership of Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, the clear 
change in discourse by the new leader toward more social democratic themes had 
noticeably taken the AKP out of its comfortable rhythm.  As the CHP has shown 
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 A particularly good example of this is the fate of the New Turkey Party in 2002.  Though the 
charismatic leader, Ismail Cem, was a favorite of the media and received respectable coverage, the 
party only managed to garner 1.2 percent of the vote. 
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more interest in leftist themes, the AKP, once the only party with social democratic 
rhetoric, has found itself retreating from these domains and beginning to address 
more conservative concerns.  How the CHP will fair among the electorate in June of 
2011 is still less obvious, but their change of discourse has certainly had an impact 
on the AKP and forced it to alter its discursive tack in a number of ways. 
The party system in Turkey has also shown that, though certain parties 
themselves might not be institutionalized, an institutionalization of the channels of 
representation has persisted; thus, the system has exhibited institutional fluidity.  
The CHP and the MHP, for example, certainly function as institutionalized parties.  
Though their role in the party system and emphases have shifted from period to 
period or election to election, they have retained a core identity that has enabled a 
measure of stability.  Even when these parties were not legally allowed to exist, 
explicit proxy parties operated (the SHP and the MÇP, respectively) in their stead, 
filling their channeling function until they were legally able to retain the old party 
name.  The position in the system currently referred to as the “center-right”—which 
has always championed a market economy, conservative values, and populist 
practices—has shown fluidity in terms of the party occupying its coveted domain, 
but it has never been completely abandoned or emptied out.  The parties that have 
entered and exited its prized seat in Turkish politics have always connected 
themselves to the legacy of this positions first champion, the Democrat Party.  The 
Justice Party, the True Path Party and even the current ruling AKP insist on their 
birthright to this royal lineage.  Even when this position in the party system was at 
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its weakest points with the traditional parties occupying that space imploding in the 
1990s, close observation of electoral campaigning shows that the parties outside of 
this position attempted to move themselves into its place, the voters themselves 
could be argued to have largely stayed within it framework of appeal—i.e. the 
voters outlook did not become significantly more radical but, instead, the radical 
parties wooed these voters by displaying more moderate discourse. 
Another important principle of the system is that, due to the organizational 
structure of parties—i.e. catch-all or cartel parties—which depends on the voter-
wooing potential of charismatic leaders, change in party leadership in a party that is 
a serious contender but not running the government has proven to provide an 
electoral boast in the subsequent general election.   For example, the rise of 
Süleyman Demirel in 1964 proved to be, among other factors, an important boost to 
the Justice Party in the 1965 election.  Similarly, the transition of the seat of 
leadership in the CHP from İsmet İnönü to Bülent Ecevit coincided with significant 
gains in 1973 and 1977.  The passing of the MHP’s founder, Alparslan Türkeş, and 
the appointment of Devlet Bahçeli as party leader was followed by the party’s 
largest electoral victory to date.  In each case, at the appointment of the new leader, 
the party had existing electoral strength but was not the governing party.  
Furthermore, the newly appointed leaders were not “caretakers” for the previous 
leader, but each appointment suggested fresh wind for party; this aspect seems 
particularly critical to the new leader’s success.  The electorate tends to not reward 
more of the same or a second-class representation of the old leader.  This could also 
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explain why, during the party split at the break-up of the Virtue Party, that many of 
the old supporters of the Welfare and Virtue Parties took their allegiance to the 
AKP though this party was separating itself from the long-standing National 
Outlook (Milli Görüş) movement that had been the inspiration of these Erbakan-led 
parties.  The leader of the Felicity Party, Recai Kutan, who maintained its 
connection to the Erbakan movement, has always been seen as the caretaker leader 
for Erbakan.  Thus, despite the fact that the AKP was moving away from the 
foundational approaches of the religious conservative party, a large number of long-
time supporters moved with it along with a great number of traditional center-right 
and nationalist voters, and the party was able to garner more than 34 percent of the 
vote in 2002. 
Parties that have made changes in leadership while in power have fared 
quite poorly in subsequent elections, usually because the change in leadership 
suggests weakness in the party.  In 1989, ANAP’s Özal resigned from Premiership 
and the party leadership (officially) to become President and left the seat to 
Yıldırım Akbulut, who was then wisely replaced by a more charismatic leader, 
Mesut Yılmaz.  Nonetheless, the party dropped more than 12 percent in the 
subsequent national election.  When Süleyman Demirel left the Prime Ministry also 
to become President in 1993, the head of the party and the seat of Prime Minister 
was given to Tansu Çiller.  The party lost 8 percent in the polls.  Other parties who 
have made changes after massive electoral collapses, like DSP, ANAP and DYP, 
 437 
when they are no longer legitimate contenders, have generally suffered from the 
“too little, too late” syndrome. 
Finally, coalition governments, for a number of reasons, have been a 
disaster from an electoral standpoint primarily for the senior partners that enter into 
them.  Voters have rarely been kind to coalition government partnerships, even 
when these have functioned with relative stability.  The most stable or enduring 
coalitions, DYP-SHP/CHP and DSP-MHP-ANAP, were formed from parties whose 
political outlook should have made harmony extremely difficult.  Instead, the 
coalitions between parties of similar ideology have either never materialized or 
were volatile and short-lived.  The challenges to passing legislation by coalition 
governments brings a lack of confidence toward the economy and usually economic 
hardship.  In the 1970s, the bargaining potential of minor parties was so high that 
appointments of these parties to ministries hamstrung effective governance.  
Furthermore, the consensul, concessionary nature of coalition politics flies in 
opposition to the ideal of the uncompromising politician,
8
 especially when it 
appears that the representatives of one’s political outlook are compromising and 
kowtowing toward a party whose identity is oppositional to one’s own.   
This tendency along with the widespread value for “nation parties” pushes 
the electorate, particularly in periods of polarization, toward a smaller party system.  
The desire toward a simplified debate between a government party and a strong 
                                                 
8
 See, Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, “The 1983 Parliament in Turkey: Changes and Continuities,” in Metin 
Heper and Ahmet Evin, eds., State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s (Berlin: 
Walter de Gruyter, 1988), pp. 55-6. 
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opposition could be said to manifest itself in political caricature.  For example, if 
one peruses the recent (2010) publishing of the major political cartoons and cover 
pages for the popular weekly comics magazine Penguen, every satirical comic of 
political leaders involves either Erdoğan and the AKP or Kılıçdaroğlu and the CHP 
or both of them together.  One is hard pressed to find even one or two comics 
regarding Devlet Bahçeli and the MHP despite the fact that their share of the vote is 
only 6 percent less of the national total than the CHP.
9
 
10.3 Conclusion 
Though it is beyond the ability and methodologies of social science to 
accurately predict the outcome of a future election, an analytical framework 
prioritizing essential dimensions of competition and domains of identification 
arguably directs our focus to the critical elements that demand our attention and 
explain the logic of both party and voter behavior and allow us to anticipate the 
consequential boundaries of a forthcoming election.  Other approaches to describing 
party systems that indicated levels of volatility and fragmentation, 
institutionalization and/or party system classifications offered little to no 
anticipatory value.  A systematic analysis of the patterns of electoral interaction—
i.e. the dimensions of competition and domains of identification—allows us to 
follow the “tracks” of the system such that a logical trajectory can be anticipated.  
While other  (or better) systematic approaches to studying an individual party 
                                                 
9
 Penguen Karikatür Yıllığı 2010 (Istanbul: Getto Basın Yayın, 2010).  In fact, in the entire volume, 
there are two caricatures of Bahçeli.  In one, he is standing in the background; in the other, he is 
suggesting to Erdoğan that the MHP has fallen beneath the 10 percent threshold.  See pages 89 and 
90. 
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system may be found in the future, hopefully, this study will encourage the field of 
comparative politics in general to recognize the need for new approaches toward 
parties and party systems that are both framed and interactively dynamic and that 
shed light on the logic of any given electoral party system. 
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